Richard Brian Reffett v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                  FILED
    court except for the purpose of establishing                           Dec 09 2019, 9:24 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                          CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Ellen M. O’Connor                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Marion County Public Defender Agency                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Sierra A. Murray
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Richard Brian Reffett,                                  December 9, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-957
    v.                                              Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Barbara Crawford,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G01-1808-F3-26613
    Bradford, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-957| December 9, 2019                 Page 1 of 6
    Case Summary
    [1]   In August of 2018, Richard Brian Reffett broke into an apartment in which
    M.C. and her two children resided. Once inside, Reffett entered M.C.’s dark
    bedroom, stripped naked, and digitally penetrated M.C.’s vagina while she was
    still half asleep. After Reffett had climbed atop of M.C., she realized he was not
    her estranged husband and stood up to turn on the light. Once the light was on,
    Reffett stole M.C.’s undergarments and fled the apartment. Shortly thereafter,
    Reffett was apprehended by police outside of M.C.’s apartment. The State
    charged Reffett with Level 3 felony rape and Level 4 felony burglary. In
    February of 2018, a bench trial was held, after which Reffett was found guilty as
    charged. Reffett was sentenced to nine years of incarceration. Reffett contends
    that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. We
    affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On August 11, 2018, M.C. was living in an apartment with her two children
    P.C. and Z.C. M.C.’s husband, however, was not living with the family because
    he and M.C. were separated. That evening around midnight, M.C. and P.C.
    retired to their shared bedroom, and Z.C. went to his own bedroom. At
    approximately 5:30 a.m., “half asleep” and in a “real[ly] dark” room, tr. p. 22,
    34, M.C. saw a man, later identified as Reffett, standing next to her. Reffett
    began to “fondle” M.C., digitally penetrating her vagina. 
    Id. at 26.
    Reffett took
    off M.C.’s underwear and climbed on top of her. Reffett laid atop of M.C. with
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-957| December 9, 2019   Page 2 of 6
    his legs pressed on top of hers and his hands on the sides of her body. M.C.
    assumed that it was her estranged husband, because “who else would be in
    [her] room?” Tr. p. 27. Reffett whispered to M.C. that she needed to be quiet
    because her son was in the other room. Knowing that something was not right,
    M.C. touched the top of Reffett’s head and upon feeling his hair, realized it was
    not her husband because he was bald. Upon this realization, M.C. stood up,
    turned on the light, and discovered Reffett standing completely naked. Reffett
    grabbed M.C.’s undergarments and fled. After Reffett fled, M.C. stood there
    “panicking,” and P.C., who had witnessed the incident, told M.C. to “call
    911.” Tr. p. 17. M.C. called the police, and upon their arrival, officers
    discovered Reffett standing outside of M.C.’s apartment building naked and in
    possession of her undergarments. The police also discovered a screen in one of
    M.C.’s apartment windows lying on the ground, handprints on the window
    ledge, and broken blinds. Reffett was taken into police custody.
    [3]   On August 14, 2018, the State charged Reffett with Level 3 felony rape and
    Level 4 felony burglary. On February 22, 2019, a bench trial was held, after
    which Reffett was found guilty as charged. On March 29, 2019, the trial court
    sentenced Reffett to nine years of incarceration for the rape conviction and six
    years of incarceration for the burglary conviction, to be served concurrently.
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   Reffett contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his
    convictions. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-957| December 9, 2019   Page 3 of 6
    conviction, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences
    supporting the factfinder’s decision. Young v. State, 
    973 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1226 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. It is the role of the factfinder, not ours, to assess
    witness credibility and weigh the evidence. 
    Id. We will
    affirm a conviction
    unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id. I. Rape
    [5]   To convict Reffett of Level 3 felony rape, the State had to establish that Reffett
    knowingly or intentionally had sexual intercourse with M.C. or knowingly or
    intentionally caused M.C. to perform or submit to other sexual conduct when
    M.C. was compelled by force or imminent threat of force. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-
    1. Reffett only contends that the State presented insufficient evidence of
    compulsion of force or imminent threat of force.
    Force is an essential element of the crime of rape. It is held that
    the element of force need not be actual, but may be constructive
    or implied. If the woman is mentally unconscious from drink or
    sleep, or from other cause is in a state of stupefaction, or is
    incapable from mental disease … so that the act of unlawful
    carnal knowledge on the part of the man was committed without
    her conscious and voluntary permission, the idea of force is
    necessarily involved in the wrongful act itself[.]
    Rahke v. State, 
    81 N.E. 584
    , 585 (Ind. 1907). Stupefaction is “a feeling of being
    so surprised or shocked that you cannot speak, think clearly, etc.” Stupefaction
    Definition, OXFORDLEARNERSDICTONARIES.COM,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-957| December 9, 2019   Page 4 of 6
    http://oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/stupefaction (last
    visited Nov. 19, 2019).
    [6]   Here, the facts establish that M.C. was in a state of stupefaction such that
    Reffett committed unlawful sexual conduct without M.C.’s conscious and
    voluntary permission. As such, we conclude that the force required for rape was
    necessarily involved in the wrongful act itself. Reffett broke into M.C.’s home,
    stripped naked in her bedroom, and then digitally penetrated M.C.’s vagina. In
    addition to the bedroom being completely dark and M.C. still being half asleep,
    Reffett’s conduct occurred without any time for M.C. to think clearly or speak
    out against Reffett’s conduct. We have little trouble concluding that by
    targeting a victim in a dark room, in the early hours of the morning, who has
    not yet fully awakened from sleeping, Reffett’s digital penetration of M.C.’s
    vagina encompassed the force necessary for rape. Put another way, M.C.’s
    unlawful sexual conduct did not require him to use further compulsion of force
    or an imminent threat of force because he chose to prey on a victim in a state of
    stupefaction. This is a question best left to the factfinder, and we conclude that
    there was sufficient evidence that it could reasonably find that M.C. was in a
    state of stupefaction.
    II. Burglary
    [7]   To convict Reffett of Level 4 felony burglary, the State was required to prove
    that Reffett broke and entered into M.C.’s apartment (a dwelling), with the
    intent to commit a felony or theft in it. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1, Ind. Code § 35-
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-957| December 9, 2019   Page 5 of 6
    43-2-1(1). Reffett contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
    prove that he intended to commit a felony. “Intent is a mental state, and the
    trier of fact often must infer its existence from surrounding circumstances when
    determining whether the requisite intent exists.” Goodner v. State, 
    685 N.E.2d 1058
    , 1062 (Ind. 1997).
    [8]   We conclude that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Reffett broke and
    entered into M.C.’s apartment with the intent to commit rape. The record
    indicates that Reffett broke into M.C.’s apartment at approximately 5:30 a.m.
    Once inside, Reffett entered M.C.’s dark bedroom, stripped naked, and digitally
    penetrated M.C.’s vagina while she was in a state of stupefaction. Reffett has
    failed to establish that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his
    burglary conviction.
    [9]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-957| December 9, 2019   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-957

Filed Date: 12/9/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/9/2019