Ryan K. Hensley v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 09 2019, 10:47 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Tyler D. Helmond F. Aaron Negangard
Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin & Chief Deputy Attorney General
Webb
Indianapolis, Indiana Josiah Swinney
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ryan K. Hensley, December 9, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1564
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82D03-1809-F3-6157
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1564 | December 9, 2019 Page 1 of 4
[1] Ryan K. Hensley appeals his conviction for level 3 felony attempted robbery
while armed with a deadly weapon, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.
[2] In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or
judge the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence that
supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom. Bailey v.
State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). It is “not necessary that the evidence
‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’” Drane v. State, 867
N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind.
1995)). “We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such
that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bailey, 907 N.E.2d at 1005.
[3] To convict Hensley of level 3 felony attempted robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he, while acting with the culpability required for commission of the crime,
engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward knowingly or
intentionally taking property from another person by force or by threat of force
while armed with a deadly weapon. Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1(a); 35-42-5-1(a).
Hensley’s sole argument on appeal is that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence that his knowing or intentional objective was to take the property in
question, here a scooter.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1564 | December 9, 2019 Page 2 of 4
[4] Our review of the record shows that in September 2018, Jordan Barrett was
driving his scooter to work when he pulled into a parking lot to return a phone
call. While Barrett was on the phone, he saw a person, later identified as
Hensley, approaching him on a blue bicycle. Hensley was wearing a skull-
printed mask which concealed his face and a black-and-white referee shirt.
When Hensley reached Barrett, Hensley yelled across the street to a pedestrian,
Andrew Murphy, if Murphy knew how to ride a scooter. Murphy yelled back
that he did. Hensley unsheathed a sword and ordered Barrett to give him his
scooter. Tr. Vol. 2 at 16. When Barrett did not respond to Hensley’s demand,
Hensley said, “Do you want to lose your fucking life[?],” and poked Barrett in
his chest with the sword, drawing “a little bit” of blood. Id. at 16, 23. Barrett
felt “[v]ery threatened” and that Hensley wanted to “take his life.” Id. at 19.
Barrett took the scooter key out of the ignition and put the key into his pocket.
Hensley rode away with Murphy walking with him. Barrett then called 911
and reported that a man had just attempted to rob him of his scooter. Police
responded and apprehended Murphy, who identified Hensley as the man on the
bicycle.
[5] Hensley asserts that no rational trier of fact could have found that he had any
interest in actually taking the scooter because he was on a bicycle and could not
ride a bicycle and a scooter at the same time, he clearly did not intend to take
the scooter for Murphy’s benefit because he and Murphy were mere
acquaintances and there was no evidence of a prior discussion to take any
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1564 | December 9, 2019 Page 3 of 4
property, and Murphy testified that he believed that Hensley was “playing”
with Barrett and Murphy told Barrett to pay Hensley no attention. Id. at 40.
[6] We observe that knowledge or intent may be inferred from a defendant’s
conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically
and reasonably points. Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010), trans. denied. Here, a masked Hensley unsheathed a sword and
demanded that Barrett give up his scooter. When Barrett did not, Hensley
threatened his life and poked him in the chest with the sword. From Hensley’s
demand and threat and his actions in wielding a sword and then poking Barrett
in the chest, a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Hensley’s knowing or intentional objective was to take Barrett’s
scooter. We must decline Hensley’s invitation to reweigh the evidence and
judge witness credibility and accordingly affirm his conviction.
[7] Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1564 | December 9, 2019 Page 4 of 4