Daniel Smith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this                          Jul 09 2015, 5:40 am
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Ryan P. Dillon                                            Gregory F. Zoeller
    Dillon Legal Group, P.C.                                  Attorney General of Indiana
    Franklin, Indiana
    Justin F. Roebel
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Daniel Smith,                                             July 9, 2015
    Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    07A01-1411-CR-485
    v.                                                Appeal from the Brown Circuit
    Court
    Cause Nos. 07C01-1207-CM-251,
    State of Indiana,                                         07C01-1308-CM-292
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                        The Honorable Judith A. Stewart,
    Judge
    Bailey, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1411-CR-485 | July 9, 2015          Page 1 of 9
    Case Summary
    [1]   Daniel Smith (“Smith”) appeals his convictions for two counts of Violating
    Orders to Vacate a Condemned Dwelling, Class B misdemeanors. 1 We affirm.
    Issues
    [2]   Smith presents two issues for review:
    I.       Whether he was denied the right to present a meaningful
    defense; and
    II.      Whether fundamental error in the admission of evidence denied
    Smith a fair trial.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   In 2004, Smith purchased property in Nashville, Indiana, formerly occupied by
    the local American Legion chapter (“the Property”). On January 4, 2012, the
    Brown County Health Officer issued an Order to Vacate the Property, which
    apparently lacked a septic system appropriate for residential use. Copies of the
    order were left at the Property on that date. The following day, a copy was
    personally delivered to Smith. The order was not appealed.
    [4]   In February and April of 2012, Brown County Health Department employee
    April Reeves (“Reeves”) visited the Property to record electric meter readings
    1
    
    Ind. Code §§ 16-41-20-4
    , 16-41-20-13.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1411-CR-485 | July 9, 2015   Page 2 of 9
    and make observations relative to use of the Property. On April 13, 2012,
    Brown County Sheriff’s Deputy Michael Moore visited the Property, where he
    observed a posted condemnation notice. Deputy Moore also encountered
    Smith, who reported living on a boat parked at the Property.
    [5]   On July 17, 2012, the State filed a four-count Information in Cause No. 07C01-
    1207-CM-251, charging that Smith had failed to vacate a condemned dwelling
    on or about February 1, 2012, March 1, 2012, April 1, 2012, and April 13,
    2012.
    [6]   On July 18, 2013, Brown County Sheriff’s deputies executed a search warrant
    at the Property. The search yielded recent mail, fresh groceries, and
    rudimentary water drainage components. On August 19, 2013, the State filed
    an Information in Cause No. 07C01-1308-CM-292, alleging that Smith had
    failed to vacate a condemned dwelling on or about July 18, 2013.
    [7]   On February 14, 2013, the Prosecutor filed a Motion in Limine, seeking to
    prevent Smith from introducing evidence to challenge the validity of the Order
    to Vacate. The State also moved to join the separate causes. At a hearing
    conducted on March 21, 2014, Smith argued that the local health department
    lacked jurisdiction to issue an order concerning a commercial building. The
    Prosecutor pointed out that the Order to Vacate had not been challenged in an
    administrative appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
    consolidated the charges for trial and requested the submission of briefs on the
    admissibility of evidence as to the validity of the Order to Vacate.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1411-CR-485 | July 9, 2015   Page 3 of 9
    [8]    On April 15, 2014, the trial court issued an order regarding the Motion in
    Limine. In relevant part, the order provided: “[Smith] cannot use this criminal
    proceeding as a per se challenge to the validity of the health officer’s Order to
    Vacate.” (App. 61.) The order further provided:
    the Court also finds that an order in limine prohibiting any reference to
    the validity of the Order to Vacate may be too broad and may prohibit
    relevant evidence of mens rea at the time of the alleged offenses, such
    as an explanation of why the defendant continued to live at the
    location, if he did.
    (App. 62.) Accordingly, Smith was to be afforded the opportunity to request an
    additional hearing at trial, outside the presence of the jury, should he seek to
    offer evidence of invalidity of the Order to Vacate relative to his criminal intent.
    On August 13, 2014, the parties convened for a pre-trial hearing and the trial
    court clarified that there remained “a big gray area on the culpability” and the
    trial court would “have to hear the testimony.” (Tr. 19-20).
    [9]    On August 13, 2014, Smith was brought to trial before a jury. He was acquitted
    of three charges and convicted of two -- with respect to the dates of April 13,
    2012 and July 18, 2013. Smith was sentenced to an aggregate term of forty
    days imprisonment, all suspended. This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    Right to Present Defense
    [10]   Indiana Code Section 16-41-20-13(a) provides that a person who “recklessly
    violates or fails to comply” with the statutory chapter on Unfit Dwellings
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1411-CR-485 | July 9, 2015   Page 4 of 9
    commits a Class B misdemeanor. Smith contends that the trial court denied
    him a meaningful opportunity to present a defense by excluding evidence of the
    invalidity of the Order to Vacate. He concedes that he did not comply with
    Indiana Code Section 16-41-20-9(a), which provides:
    A person aggrieved by an order of a local board of health or county
    health officer issued under this chapter may, not more than ten (10)
    days after the making of the order, file with the circuit or superior
    court a petition seeking a review of the order.
    [11]   However, according to Smith, “without evidence of State approved rules and
    regulations regarding the enforcement of septic systems, the Order stands
    invalid and unable to be enforced.” (Appellant’s Br. at 8.) He also observes
    that the Property was identified in county records as commercial property, and
    suggests that local county health officers may act only with respect to personal
    residences. In essence, Smith asserts that he should have been permitted to
    collaterally attack the Order to Vacate, although he failed to perfect a timely
    appeal to challenge its validity.
    [12]   A trial court exercises broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of
    evidence, and an appellate court should disturb its ruling only where it is shown
    that the court abused its discretion. Camm v. State, 
    908 N.E.2d 215
    , 225 (Ind.
    2009). Generally, the admission or exclusion of evidence will not result in a
    reversal on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion that results in the denial
    of a fair trial. Dorsey v. State, 
    802 N.E.2d 991
    , 993 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
    [13]   “The right to present a defense is a fundamental element of due process of law”
    and a defendant has a right to present relevant evidence offered to challenge the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1411-CR-485 | July 9, 2015   Page 5 of 9
    charges against him. Manigault v. State, 
    881 N.E.2d 679
    , 690 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2008). A defendant’s right to present a defense includes the right to present his
    or her version of the facts. Parker v. State, 
    965 N.E.2d 50
    , 53 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2012). Although this right is of the utmost importance, it is not absolute. 
    Id.
    [14]   Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 16-41-20-13(a), the State was required to
    establish that Smith had violated an order issued under the Unsafe Dwellings
    chapter and that he had acted recklessly. The elements of the charged offense
    to be established beyond a reasonable doubt did not include validity of the
    underlying order.
    [15]   Smith was placed in a position of defending against the State’s allegations that
    he had recklessly violated an order that he vacate a condemned dwelling.
    Smith testified at his trial, conceding that he had seen the Notice to Vacate and
    that he had not filed a petition for review. However, he claimed that his
    property had been condemned “for no reason” and he had “not figured out
    why.” (Tr. 173, 188.) In an offer to prove, Smith testified that the Property was
    zoned commercial, he had an operating septic system, and he had been treated
    unfairly. His offer of proof, if credited, did not directly call into question the
    validity of the Order to Vacate. Regardless, defects in the Order to Vacate do
    provide a defense to the offense with which Smith was charged.
    [16]   To the extent that Smith desired to collaterally attack the Order to Vacate, it is
    undisputed that he failed to challenge its validity by a timely appeal. The State
    was not required to independently establish its validity. Smith’s offer of proof
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1411-CR-485 | July 9, 2015   Page 6 of 9
    did not demonstrate its invalidity. To the extent that Smith desired to present
    evidence of his state of mind, personal beliefs, or mens rea, he was not denied
    the right to do so. Smith has not demonstrated that he was deprived of a
    meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.
    Admission of Evidence
    [17]   Without objection from Smith, 2 the State offered into evidence State’s Exhibit
    7, the Information filed in cause number 07-C01-1207-CM-251. Smith now
    asserts that the four-count allegations have negative implications regarding
    Smith’s character and violate Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b), which provides in
    relevant part:
    Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
    character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.
    It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
    motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
    mistake or accident[.]
    [18]   The defendant’s failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection at the time
    evidence is introduced at trial results in waiver of the error on appeal. Brown v.
    State, 
    929 N.E.2d 204
    , 207 (Ind. 2010). “The purpose of this rule is to allow the
    trial judge to consider the issue in light of any fresh developments and also to
    correct any errors.” 
    Id.
     A claim that has been thus waived can be reviewed on
    appeal if the reviewing court determines that a fundamental error occurred. 
    Id.
    The fundamental error exception is ‘“extremely narrow, and applies only when
    2
    Smith’s counsel stated that he had “no objection.” (Tr. 70.)
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1411-CR-485 | July 9, 2015   Page 7 of 9
    the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential
    for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant
    fundamental due process.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Mathews v. State, 
    849 N.E.2d 578
    , 587
    (Ind. 2006)). The exception is available only in ‘“egregious circumstances.”’
    
    Id.
     (quoting Brown v. State, 
    799 N.E.2d 1064
    , 1068 (Ind. 2003)).
    [19]   The rationale for the prohibition against bad act and character evidence is that
    the jury is precluded from making the forbidden inference that the defendant
    had a criminal propensity and therefore engaged in the charged conduct.
    Monegan v. State, 
    721 N.E.2d 243
    , 248 (Ind. 1999). However, “the rule does not
    bar evidence of uncharged acts that are ‘intrinsic’ to the charged offense.”
    Wages v. State, 
    863 N.E.2d 408
    , 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Acts are “intrinsic” if
    they occur at the same time and under the same circumstances as the crimes
    charged. 
    Id.
    [20]   State’s Exhibit 7 did not reference extrinsic conduct. Indeed, it reflected
    charged conduct. 3 The exhibit consisted of the Information alleging that Smith
    failed to vacate his condemned dwelling on four occasions in February, March,
    and April of 2012. The same Information was read to the jury as part of their
    preliminary instructions; its subsequent admission was cumulative. The trial
    3
    Smith acknowledges this in his Reply Brief, stating: “Had the cases not been joined for purposes of trial,
    Trial Exhibit 7 would have been evidence of uncharged conduct and would not have been able to be
    permitted.” (Reply Br. at 4.)
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1411-CR-485 | July 9, 2015                 Page 8 of 9
    court did not admit evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts.” Evid. R.
    404(b). Smith has failed to demonstrate fundamental error.
    Conclusion
    [21]   Smith was not denied the opportunity to present a meaningful defense. Nor did
    fundamental error deprive him of a fair trial.
    [22]   Affirmed.
    Riley, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1411-CR-485 | July 9, 2015   Page 9 of 9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07A01-1411-CR-485

Filed Date: 7/9/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/9/2015