In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of B.M. (Minor Child) and A.M. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                  FILED
    court except for the purpose of establishing                          Dec 13 2019, 8:45 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                    CLERK
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT B.M.                              ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Cara Schaefer Wieneke                                    Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Wieneke Law Office, LLC                                  Attorney General of Indiana
    Brooklyn, Indiana
    Abigail R. Recker
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Termination                         December 13, 2019
    of the Parent–Child Relationship                         Court of Appeals Case No.
    of B.M. (Minor Child)                                    19A-JT-1677
    and                                                      Appeal from the Vermillion Circuit
    Court
    A.M. (Mother),
    The Honorable Jill Wesch, Judge
    Appellant-Respondent,
    Trial Court Cause No.
    v.                                               83C01-1810-JT-4
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019               Page 1 of 11
    Bradford, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   A.M. (“Mother”) is the biological parent of B.M. (“Child”), (born October 8,
    2006). In May of 2016, Child was adjudicated to be a child in need of services
    (“CHINS”) due to Mother’s drug and alcohol abuse. In October of 2018, the
    Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned for the termination of
    Mother’s parental rights. On June 21, 2019, the juvenile court ordered that
    Mother’s parental rights to Child be terminated. Mother contends that the
    juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights was clearly erroneous. We
    affirm.1
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On March 28, 2016, DCS learned of allegations of domestic violence, drinking,
    and methamphetamine use by Mother and her boyfriend T.C. On March 30,
    2016, Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Robin Gossett Fisher went to Mother’s
    home to discuss the allegations. Mother denied any drug use but admitted to
    1
    The juvenile court also terminated Father’s parental rights, but he does not participate in this appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019                       Page 2 of 11
    drinking a twelve pack of beer on the weekends when Child was not home.
    FCM Fisher administered a drug screen, and Mother tested positive for
    methamphetamine and amphetamine. FCM Fisher later administered a second
    drug screen on Mother, and she tested positive for methamphetamine,
    amphetamine, Klonopin2, and Morphine. On May 12, 2016, DCS petitioned
    for Child to be adjudicated a CHINS. On May 24, 2016, Child was adjudicated
    to be a CHINS. On July 20, 2016, the juvenile court held a dispositional
    hearing on the CHINS petition and ordered Mother to, inter alia, maintain
    contact and keep all appointments with DCS, enroll in all programs
    recommended by the FCM, maintain suitable and safe housing, secure a legal
    and stable source of income, abstain from consuming any illegal controlled
    substances or alcohol, obey the law, complete a substance abuse assessment and
    follow all recommendations, complete intensive family-preservation program,
    engage in home-based counseling, and submit to random drug and alcohol
    screens.
    [3]   Mother was compliant with services until December 27, 2016, when she was
    arrested for domestic battery after beating T.C. with a broom while the two
    were drinking, which resulted in Child’s removal from the home. Mother was
    released from jail at the end of January and began living at CODA, which is a
    facility for domestic violence victims. In February of 2017, while Mother was
    still living at CODA, Child was placed with Mother on a trial home visit. In
    2
    Mother had a valid prescription for Klonopin.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019   Page 3 of 11
    March of 2017, Mother was taken into custody after failing to appear for a court
    hearing. Prior to turning herself in, however, Mother overdosed on Klonopin
    and had to be taken to the hospital. Mother remained incarcerated for several
    weeks and the trial home visit was terminated. On June 19, 2017, Mother pled
    guilty to Level 6 felony domestic battery. Upon her release, Mother was
    compliant with services and unsupervised visitation was implemented.
    [4]   In August of 2017, Mother became noncompliant with services, canceling
    appointments with home-based therapy and home-based casework such that
    both were closed out, and her compliance with drug screening was “[o]ff and
    on.” Tr. Vol. II p. 74. On November 1, 2017, Child was again removed from
    Mother’s care after Mother left Child at T.C.’s home for a couple of days while
    she went out drinking. Although T.C. was living in the home at the time, T.C.
    worked from 4:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m., which left Child unsupervised for
    extended periods of time. After Child’s removal, Mother failed to comply with
    services for the remainder of 2017.
    [5]   On January 6, 2018, Mother voluntarily admitted herself into Club Soda, which
    is a rehabilitation center for drug and alcohol addiction. Mother, however, was
    discharged from Club Soda after an altercation with another resident. The other
    resident began yelling at Child because the resident did not want to play a game
    with Child, which resulted in Mother calling the resident a “f*****g f****t” and
    a “[n]****r.” Tr. Vol. II p. 84. In February of 2018, DCS referred Mother to the
    Hamilton Center for a drug and alcohol assessment, which was administered by
    Dominique Jackson. Jackson recommended Mother participate in Matrix
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019   Page 4 of 11
    Group and motivational interviewing, neither of which Mother successfully
    completed. In August of 2018, visitation was ceased at the recommendation of
    Child’s therapist. The Child’s therapist advocated for visitation to stop because
    “Mother is a negative, traumatic influence on Child.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II
    p. 99. During supervised visitation, Mother was telling Child to “act out in the
    foster home, to try to hurt them, to make it difficult so that way she would get
    them home faster.” Tr. Vol. II p. 78. Thereafter, Mother completely stopped
    engaging in services.
    [6]   On October 15, 2018, DCS petitioned for the termination of Mother’s parental
    rights. The juvenile court held evidentiary hearings on February 7 and 8, 2019.
    At a hearing, FCM Fisher testified that it was in Child’s best interests that
    Mother’s parental rights be terminated and Child be adopted. FCM Fisher also
    testified that Mother had taken 201 drugs screens over the duration of this
    matter and failed to appear for forty. Mother had tested positive twenty-one
    times for various substances including alcohol, methamphetamine,
    amphetamine, THC, and morphine, with the most recent being on November
    13, 2018. Moreover, FCM Fisher noted that in October of 2018, Mother had
    left FCM Fisher a voicemail regarding birthday presents for Child, and when
    FCM Fisher had returned Mother’s call, Mother had stated that “she hopes
    [FCM Fisher] and [FCM Fisher’s husband] die a slow, miserable death and
    called [FCM Fisher] a fat, f*****g c**t.” Tr. Vol. II p. 80. Guardian Ad Litem
    (“GAL”) Angela Bullock also informed the juvenile court that she believed it
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019   Page 5 of 11
    was in Child’s best interests that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. On
    June 21, 2019, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights.
    Discussion and Decision
    [7]   The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
    traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v.
    Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind. 2005). The
    parent–child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our
    culture.” Neal v. DeKalb Cty. Div. of Family & Children, 
    796 N.E.2d 280
    , 286 (Ind.
    2003) (internal citations omitted). Parental rights, however, are not absolute
    and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the proper
    disposition of a petition to terminate the parent–child relationship. 
    Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147
    . Therefore, when parents are unwilling or unable to fulfill their
    parental responsibilities their rights may be terminated. 
    Id. [8] In
    reviewing the termination of parental rights on appeal, we neither reweigh
    the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Doe v. Daviess Cty. Div. of
    Children & Family Servs., 
    669 N.E.2d 192
    , 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
    We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which are
    most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment. 
    Id. Where, as
    here, a juvenile
    court has entered findings of facts and conclusions of law, our standard of
    review is two-tiered. 
    Id. First, we
    determine whether the evidence supports the
    factual findings and second, whether the factual findings support the judgment.
    
    Id. The juvenile
    court’s findings and judgment will only be set aside if found to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019   Page 6 of 11
    be clearly erroneous. 
    Id. A finding
    is clearly erroneous if no facts or inferences
    drawn therefrom support it. In re R.J., 
    829 N.E.2d 1032
    , 1035 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2005). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the
    juvenile court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.”
    
    Id. [9] Indiana
    Code section 31-35-2-4(b) dictates what DCS is required to establish to
    support a termination of parental rights. Of relevance to this case, DCS was
    required to establish by clear and convincing evidence
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.
    [and]
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child[.]
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).3 In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to
    sustain the termination of her parental rights, Mother contends that the juvenile
    3
    It is not disputed that the Child had been removed from Mother for at least six months under a dispositional
    decree and that there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child, both required findings
    pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019                 Page 7 of 11
    court erred by concluding that (1) the conditions that resulted in the removal of
    Child from Mother’s care would not be remedied, (2) the continuation of the
    parent–child relationship between Child and Mother posed a threat to Child’s
    well-being, or (3) termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best
    interests.4
    I. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)
    [10]   Mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable
    probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal would not be
    remedied or that the continued parent–child relationship posed a threat to
    Child. Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the
    disjunctive, DCS was only required to establish one of the circumstances. We
    choose to first address Mother’s contention that the trial court erred by
    concluding that the conditions which resulted in Child’s removal would not be
    remedied.
    In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the
    child[ren]’s removal…will not be remedied, we engage in a two-
    step analysis[.] First, we identify the conditions that led to
    removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable
    probability that those conditions will not be remedied. In the
    4
    Mother challenges the juvenile court’s finding that “An additional report, filed March 29, 2016, alleged that
    the Child was a victim of neglect due to domestic violence in the family’s home.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.
    86. While DCS was unable to find an additional report filed on said date, FCM Fisher did testify that the
    initial report that she received on March 28, 2019, alleged “domestic violence, drinking, and
    methamphetamine use.” Tr. Vol. II p. 60. Nonetheless, because there is sufficient evidence outside of this
    erroneous finding to support the juvenile court’s conclusion, it is harmless and in no way prejudiced Mother.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019                  Page 8 of 11
    second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the
    time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration
    evidence of changed conditions—balancing a parent’s recent
    improvements against habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine
    whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or
    deprivation. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court,
    which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more
    heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.
    Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions
    does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior
    is the best predictor of their future behavior.
    In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 642–43 (Ind. 2014) (internal citations, quotations, and
    footnote omitted, first and third set of brackets in original, second set added).
    [11]   The conditions that led to Child’s removal were alcohol and drug abuse. We
    conclude that DCS has produced ample evidence to establish a reasonable
    probability that these conditions will not be remedied. Throughout this entire
    matter, Mother has failed to maintain sobriety. Mother failed to appear for forty
    drugs screens and tested positive on twenty-one. She tested positive for alcohol,
    methamphetamine, amphetamine, THC, and morphine, with the most recent
    being a November 13, 2018, drug screen which returned positive results for
    methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC. Moreover, Mother’s substance
    abuse led to her conviction for Level 6 felony domestic battery, after she beat
    her then-boyfriend T.C. with a broom while the two had been drinking.
    Mother’s substance abuse also caused Child to be left unsupervised at T.C.’s
    home for a couple of days while she went out drinking with friends. Mother has
    consistently chosen alcohol and drugs over the welfare of Child. The juvenile
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019   Page 9 of 11
    court did not clearly err in concluding that the conditions that led to Child’s
    removal would not be remedied.
    II. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C)
    [12]   Mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
    court’s conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in the Child’s best
    interests. We are mindful that, in determining what is in the best interests of a
    child, the juvenile court must look beyond factors identified by DCS and
    consider the totality of the evidence. In re J.S., 
    906 N.E.2d 226
    , 236 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2009). The juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed
    before terminating the parent–child relationship because it must subordinate the
    interests of the parents to those of the children. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of
    Family & Children, 
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We have
    previously held that recommendations from the FCM and court-appointed
    special advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that
    conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient evidence to
    show that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re 
    J.S., 906 N.E.2d at 236
    .
    [13]   FCM Fisher testified that it was in Child’s best interests that Mother’s rights be
    terminated and that Child be adopted. GAL Bullock also believed that
    termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests. While
    coupling that testimony with our previous conclusion that there was sufficient
    evidence to show that the conditions of removal would not be remedied is
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019   Page 10 of 11
    sufficient to support the juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights,
    it is not as though this testimony is unsupported by other evidence in the record.
    [14]   In addition to Mother’s substance abuse issues, Mother’s influence on Child
    seems to be detrimental to his well-being. While in the presence of Child at
    Club Soda, Mother used racial and homophobic slurs as she yelled at another
    resident. Mother also told Child to act out in his foster home and hurt his foster
    parent. Moreover, Mother failed to successfully complete services
    recommended by DCS and had her visitation with Child terminated after
    Child’s therapist said it was detrimental to his well-being. Considering the
    totality of the evidence, Mother has failed to establish that the juvenile court’s
    determination that termination was in the Child’s best interest was clearly
    erroneous.
    [15]   The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1677| December 13, 2019   Page 11 of 11