Isaac L. Hayes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                        FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                               Dec 18 2019, 10:39 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                 CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                  Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                             and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Ross G. Thomas                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                   Attorney General of Indiana
    Josiah Swinney
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Isaac L. Hayes,                                         December 18, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-1402
    v.                                              Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable D.J. Mote, Judge
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Trial Court Cause No.
    39C01-1904-F4-407
    Altice, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1402 | December 18, 2019                Page 1 of 7
    Case Summary
    [1]   Isaac L. Hayes appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for a bond
    reduction, claiming that the initial bond set at $50,000 on five counts of felony
    sexual misconduct with a minor was excessive and that the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying his motion to reduce the bond.
    We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [2]   The police narrative and probable cause affidavit indicate that twenty-one-year-
    old Hayes became acquainted with K.P., who was between the age of fourteen
    and sixteen years old, sometime during the fall of 2016. 1 K.P.’s parents knew
    that the two wanted to “date” and told them both to “stay apart” and not to
    communicate over the phone. Appellant’s Appendix at 16. Hayes later admitted
    to police officers that in late 2016, he had sexual intercourse with K.P. Hayes
    also admitted that K.P. gave him one or two “hand jobs” and oral sex on at
    least three occasions from late 2016 to late 2017. 
    Id. at 15-16.
                          Police officers
    1
    The police narrative indicates that Hayes was twenty-two years old at the time of the police interview on
    November 15, 2017.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1402 | December 18, 2019                 Page 2 of 7
    obtained consent from K.P.’s parents to search her phone and they discovered
    that Hayes and K.P. had called each other thirty times in October 2017.
    [3]   Following a lengthy investigation, on April 5, 2019, the State charged Hayes
    with four counts of sexual misconduct with a minor as Level 4 felonies and one
    count of sexual misconduct with a minor as a Level 5 felony. The trial court
    issued a bench warrant on May 2, 2019, and set Hayes’s bond at $50,000.
    Hayes acknowledged at his May 8 initial hearing that he owned no real estate,
    was unemployed, and that his father controls all of his income that he receives
    from social security. The trial court determined that the number and nature of
    the charges, along with concerns for K.P.’s safety, warranted a $50,000 bond.
    [4]   On May 20, 2019, Hayes filed a motion for bond reduction. At the hearing,
    Hayes’s father testified that Hayes has lived with him for eleven years, had
    never previously been charged with any criminal offenses, and was receiving
    $750 per month in social security income. Hayes’s father further testified that
    he was away from the residence nearly twelve hours a day, and that Hayes had
    a driver’s license and a motorcycle license. The State objected to the bond
    reduction request, citing the nature of the charged offenses, Hayes’s admissions,
    and the fact that Hayes was a licensed driver, in support of its argument that
    Hayes remained a danger to K.P. and should be considered a flight risk. The
    trial court denied Hayes’s motion for bond reduction based on the nature of the
    charges and the strength of the State’s case against him. Hayes now appeals.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1402 | December 18, 2019   Page 3 of 7
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits excessive bail. “Bail
    is excessive if set at an amount higher than reasonably calculated to ensure the
    accused party’s presence in court.” Lopez v. State, 
    985 N.E.2d 358
    , 360 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2013), trans. denied. The amount of bail and the denial of a request to
    reduce a defendant’s bond is within the trial court’s sound discretion and will be
    reversed only for an abuse of discretion. 
    Id. An abuse
    of discretion occurs if
    the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
    before the trial court. Smith v. State, 
    754 N.E.2d 502
    , 504 (Ind. 2001); Sneed v.
    State, 
    946 N.E.2d 1255
    , 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We will not reweigh the
    evidence and will consider any conflicting evidence in favor of the trial court’s
    ruling. Collins v. State, 
    822 N.E.2d 214
    , 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
    [6]   When the trial court exercises its discretion to reduce a defendant’s bond, it
    “considers the same statutory factors relevant to the initial setting of bail
    provided in Indiana Code Section 35-33-8-4(b).”[ 2] 
    Lopez, 985 N.E.2d at 361
    .
    2
    I.C. § 35-33-8-4(b) provides as follows:
    Bail may not be set higher than that amount reasonably required to assure the defendant’s
    appearance in court or to assure the physical safety of another person or the community if
    the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a risk to the
    physical safety of another person or the community. In setting and accepting an amount
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1402 | December 18, 2019                   Page 4 of 7
    While the statute sets forth a number of factors for the trial court’s
    consideration in setting and reducing a defendant’s bond, our Supreme Court
    has recognized that, aside from the defendant’s financial resources to meet
    bond, the magnitude of the possible penalty to be imposed for the charged
    offense is the main factor to be considered in setting a bond amount. Hobbs v.
    Lindsey, 
    240 Ind. 74
    , 79, 
    162 N.E.2d 85
    , 88 (1959); see also 
    Sneed, 946 N.E.2d at 1258
    . Once bond is set, I.C. § 35-33-8-5(a) provides for the alteration or
    revocation of bond “upon a showing of good cause” by either the State or the
    defendant. This statute “implicitly places the burden on the defendant to
    establish that the trial court’s setting of bail was excessive.” 
    Id. at 1257-58.
    [7]   Here, the trial court was fully aware of Hayes’s charges and the potential
    penalties involved when it set the initial bond amount. Moreover, the gravity of
    the offenses charged and the potential penalties that Hayes faced is magnified
    of bail, the judicial officer shall take into account all facts relevant to the risk of
    nonappearance, including:
    (1) the length and character of the defendant’s residence in the community;
    (2) the defendant’s employment status and history and his ability to give bail;
    (3) the defendant’s family ties and relationships;
    (4) the defendant’s character, reputation, habits, and mental condition;
    ...
    (7) the nature and gravity of the offense and the potential penalty faced, insofar as these
    factors are relevant to the risk of nonappearance . . . .
    (Emphasis added).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1402 | December 18, 2019                              Page 5 of 7
    by the State’s overwhelming evidence against him, including Hayes’s own
    admissions that he engaged in many separate instances of sexual misconduct
    with K.P. over a one-year span. See I.C. § 35-33-8-4(b)(7). That said, the
    primary fact to be considered weighed substantially against Hayes at the time of
    the initial bond determination and his incentive to flee to avoid a lengthy
    sentence was high. See 
    Hobbs, 240 Ind. at 79
    , 162 N.E.2d at 88.
    [8]   Additionally, Hayes stated at his initial hearing that he owned no real estate,
    was unemployed, and did not have a spouse or children. The lack of significant
    ties to the community further warranted the trial court’s determination that bail
    in the amount of $50,000 was necessary to ensure Hayes’s return to court if he
    posted bond. See Shanholt v. State, 
    448 N.E.2d 308
    , 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)
    (observing that the trial court properly considered the defendant’s lack of a “job
    in the community” in setting bail). When considering the nature of the charges
    against Hayes, the likelihood of conviction, the potential sentences, and the lack
    of community ties that would encourage Hayes to remain in the jurisdiction,
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting Hayes’s bond at $50,000.
    [9]   We further note that Hayes’s father testified during the bond reduction hearing
    that he is employed and is away from the residence for twelve hours a day.
    Hayes has a driver’s license and thus the ability to flee the jurisdiction in the
    face of these serious criminal charges. Moreover, it was not established that
    Hayes had ceased communicating with K.P., hence supporting the trial court’s
    observation that K.P. remained in danger. These factors all support the trial
    court’s decision to deny Hayes’s request for a bond reduction.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1402 | December 18, 2019   Page 6 of 7
    [10]   Finally, although Hayes claims that the trial court abused its discretion because
    it did not specifically identify the factors set forth in I.C. § 35-38-8-4(b), there is
    no requirement that the trial court explain its reasons on the record for not
    reducing a defendant’s bail. 
    Sneed, 946 N.E.2d at 1259
    . Although the trial
    court must evaluate the relevant statutory factors, we will not infer from a silent
    record in this instance that the trial court did not consider and appropriately
    apply those factors. See 
    id. Rather, we
    presume that the trial court knew and
    followed the law. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 
    863 N.E.2d 1232
    , 1239 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2007).
    [11]   In short, the trial court was presented with both aggravating and mitigating
    evidence at the bond reduction hearing, and the record demonstrates that it
    properly considered and weighed those factors when considering Hayes’s
    request. Hence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    denying Hayes’s motion for a bond reduction.
    [12]   Judgment affirmed.
    Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1402 | December 18, 2019   Page 7 of 7