G.B.W., A Child Alleged to be a Delinquent Child v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                       FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                   Dec 19 2019, 8:57 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                             Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                       and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    Mark F. James                                            Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    South Bend, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Angela N. Sanchez
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    G.B.W.,                                                  December 19, 2019
    A Child Alleged to be a                                  Court of Appeals Case No.
    Delinquent Child,                                        19A-JV-1385
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate
    Court
    v.
    The Honorable Jason Cichowicz,
    Judge
    State of Indiana,
    Trial Court Cause No.
    Appellee-Petitioner.                                     71J01-1807-JD-218
    71J01-1811-JD-389
    Tavitas, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1385 | December 19, 2019                Page 1 of 8
    Case Summary
    [1]   G.B.W. appeals her commitment to the Indiana Department of Correction
    (“DOC”) after her adjudication as a delinquent and subsequent probation
    violations. We affirm.
    Issue
    [2]   G.B.W. raises a single issue, which we restate as whether the juvenile court
    abused its discretion when it committed G.B.W. to the DOC.
    Facts
    [3]   On July 17, 2018, Keontah White reported that her vehicle was stolen while
    parked outside a food mart. The following day, while on routine patrol, Officer
    Martin Mullins, with the South Bend Police Department, saw White’s stolen
    vehicle. In his fully marked patrol car, Officer Mullins turned on his lights and
    sirens to initiate a traffic stop.
    [4]   The vehicle reduced its speed but did not stop. Eventually, the vehicle slowed
    down significantly due to nearby road construction; at that point, Officer
    Mullins was able to pull in front of the vehicle to force it to stop. After the
    vehicle stopped, the front passenger and back seat passenger fled. Fourteen-
    year-old G.B.W. was the vehicle’s driver. G.B.W. was detained, and while in
    detention, G.B.W. told a probation officer that she stole the vehicle because she
    was “bored.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 20.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1385 | December 19, 2019   Page 2 of 8
    [5]   On July 25, 2018, the State filed a petition alleging G.B.W was a delinquent for
    committing: Count I, an act that would be considered resisting law enforcement
    if committed by an adult, a Level 6 felony; Count II, an act that would be
    considered theft if committed by an adult, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count
    III, an act that would be considered operating a motor vehicle without ever
    receiving a license if committed by an adult, a Class C misdemeanor. G.B.W.
    entered an admission agreement on August 1, 2018, and the juvenile court
    adjudicated G.B.W. a delinquent on Counts I and II; Count III was dismissed.
    The juvenile court ordered G.B.W. to home detention with GPS electronic
    monitoring.
    [6]   On August 24, 2018, G.B.W. cut off the ankle bracelet of her electronic home
    monitoring device and left her home in violation of the juvenile court’s home
    detention order. G.B.W. escaped for forty-six days. On November 11, 2018,
    the State filed another petition alleging delinquency for committing an act that
    would be considered escape if committed by an adult, a Level 6 felony.
    [7]   The predispositional report prepared on December 4, 2018, stated:
    [G.B.W.] herself is on a dangerous path. Taking little
    responsibility for her actions and watching from across the street
    while the victim was in distress after losing her car is insensitive
    and cold. Denying a gang affiliation while clearly displaying it
    on social media is a serious concern. Stealing a car and evading
    police at 14 years old is brazen. Removing a GPS monitor and
    remaining on the run for 46 days cannot be minimalized because
    she turned herself in. While she may argue that she willingly
    turned herself in, the amount of time on the run is close to seven
    weeks. Should the probation department discount the days she
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1385 | December 19, 2019   Page 3 of 8
    was gone simply because she decided on a random day to turn
    herself in? For 45 days, she decided to NOT turn herself in,
    which is far longer than the one day in which she decided to turn
    herself in. [G.B.W.] has shown little ability to follow simple
    orders of the Court as mentioned in a previous portion of this
    report. Most recently, when given the opportunity to return
    home on GPS for the second time, she continued to disregard the
    Court by barely attending school and arguing with teachers.
    For any juvenile to succeed within our court system, a parent
    (whether ordered to do so or not) must buy in to the services that
    have been ordered. It is with great misfortune that [G.B.W.],
    with her serious criminogenic thoughts and actions, may never
    receive that buy in from [her mother].
    
    Id. at 32.
    Accordingly, probation recommended that G.B.W. be placed in DOC
    at Indiana Girls School.
    [8]   On December 5, 2018, G.B.W. entered an admission to the escape charge. The
    juvenile court proceeded to disposition and sentenced G.B.W. to twenty days
    suspended in juvenile detention, home detention for sixty days, “[s]trict and
    [i]ndefinite [p]robation,” and ordered G.B.W. to participate in services,
    including the Juvenile Justice Center Day Reporting Program (“JJC program”).
    
    Id. at 39.
    [9]   On February 26, 2019, a modification report was filed, which alleged that
    G.B.W. has accumulated eight absences from the JJC program since she began
    the program on December 31, 2018. The report also alleged that, on February
    24, 2019, G.B.W. “was brought into secure detention . . . for Criminal
    Trespass, Resisting Law Enforcement, False Informing and Unauthorized
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1385 | December 19, 2019   Page 4 of 8
    Entry of a Motor Vehicle.” 
    Id. at 47.
    Furthermore, the report alleged that
    G.B.W. tested positive for marijuana on February 25, 2019.
    [10]   On March 6, 2019, the trial court held a joint initial hearing on the February
    delinquency petition and the petition for modification. G.B.W. admitted to the
    allegations regarding false informing and resisting law enforcement. As to the
    modification report, the juvenile court ordered G.B.W. to the DOC. G.B.W.
    now appeals her commitment to the DOC.
    Analysis
    [11]   G.B.W. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in sentencing her to
    the DOC because less restrictive alternatives for G.B.W. were available and
    should have been utilized. “The juvenile court has discretion in choosing the
    disposition for a juvenile adjudicated delinquent.” D.E. v. State, 
    962 N.E.2d 94
    ,
    96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing L.L. v. State, 
    774 N.E.2d 554
    , 556 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2002), reh’g denied). “The discretion is subject to the statutory considerations of
    the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy of favoring
    the least harsh disposition.” 
    Id. “We may
    overturn [G.B.W.’s] disposition
    order only if the court abused its discretion.” 
    Id. “An abuse
    of discretion
    occurs when the juvenile court’s judgment is clearly against the logic and effect
    of the facts and circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
    deductions to be drawn therefrom.” 
    Id. [12] Indiana
    Code Section 31-37-18-6 states:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1385 | December 19, 2019   Page 5 of 8
    If consistent with the safety of the community and the best
    interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional
    decree that:
    (1) is:
    (A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most
    appropriate setting available; and
    (B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best
    interest and special needs of the child;
    (2) least interferes with family autonomy;
    (3) is least disruptive of family life;
    (4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child
    and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and
    (5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by
    the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
    [13]   G.B.W. compares her case to D.P. v. State, 
    783 N.E.2d 767
    (Ind. Ct. App.
    2003). In D.P., a panel of this Court reversed the juvenile court’s placement of
    the juvenile in the DOC. In reaching its conclusion, the panel considered that
    the juvenile “was not on probation”; the juvenile “did not show any
    unresponsiveness to ‘less-restrictive alternatives’”; the juvenile’s only other
    contact with the juvenile justice system was successful; and the juvenile’s
    “commission of two crimes in a short period of time hardly amounts to the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1385 | December 19, 2019   Page 6 of 8
    sustained period of criminal conduct” our Court has considered in other cases.
    
    D.P., 783 N.E.2d at 770-71
    .
    [14]   G.B.W. argues her situation is similar because she too committed only two
    offenses within a short period of time, had minimal contact with the juvenile
    justice system, and had only a short experience with probation services. In
    other words, she argues, her conduct does not rise to the level of “repetitive and
    serious misconduct.” 
    Id. at 771.
    We disagree and find D.P. distinguishable.
    Unlike the juvenile in D.P., G.B.W. committed several offenses in a short
    period of time, and significantly, committed two of those offenses while on
    probation.
    [15]   At the dispositional hearing on G.B.W.’s escape offense, which was the result
    of G.B.W. cutting off her ankle bracelet, the probation department
    recommended G.B.W. be committed to the DOC. Still, the juvenile court
    ordered a less restrictive alternative in the form of home detention. G.B.W.
    then admitted to false reporting and resisting law enforcement, and she did not
    adhere to the juvenile court’s dispositional order. The juvenile court’s previous
    dispositional orders regarding G.B.W. demonstrate that the trial court
    considered and utilized a less restrictive alternative twice, prior to placing
    G.B.W. in the DOC. The decision to place G.B.W. in the DOC was not clearly
    against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. See D.E. v.
    State, 
    962 N.E.2d 94
    , 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (finding no abuse of discretion
    when the juvenile was committed to DOC when the juvenile was on probation
    at the time of the delinquent acts; already violated probation once before by
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1385 | December 19, 2019   Page 7 of 8
    testing positive for marijuana; and was suspended or expelled from multiple
    schools). Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in placing
    G.B.W. in the DOC.
    Conclusion
    [16]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in placing G.B.W. in the DOC. We
    affirm.
    [17]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-1385 | December 19, 2019   Page 8 of 8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-JV-1385

Filed Date: 12/19/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/19/2019