Michael Mansfield v. Micah Mansfield (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                       FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                              Dec 23 2019, 5:31 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                 Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                            and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Christopher M. Forrest                                  Timothy M. Pape
    Forrest Legal, LLC                                      Jamie C. Slotsema
    Fort Wayne, Indiana                                     Carson, LLP
    Fort Wayne, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Michael Mansfield,                                      December 23, 2019
    Appellant-Respondent,                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-DR-2983
    v.                                              Appeal from the Allen Superior
    Court
    Micah Mansfield,                                        The Honorable Charles F. Pratt,
    Appellee-Petitioner.                                    Judge
    The Honorable Lori K. Morgan,
    Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    02D07-1511-DR-1411
    Mathias, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019               Page 1 of 19
    [1]   Michael Mansfield’s (“Husband”) and Micah Mansfield’s (“Wife”) marriage
    was dissolved in Allen Superior Court. Husband appeals the trial court’s
    dissolution decree and raises four issues, which we restate as:
    I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Wife
    primary physical custody of the parties’ two children;
    II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Husband’s
    child support calculation retroactive to October 17, 2017;
    III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in valuing Husband’s interest
    in L. Mansfield & Heirs, LLC; and,
    IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it included Husband’s
    January 2016 employment bonus in the marital estate.
    We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   The parties were married on August 4, 2007. They have two children: J.M.,
    born in 2010, and E.M., born in 2011. Wife was a nurse, and Husband is
    employed in the information technology field. Husband often worked
    significant hours during the marriage, and Wife was the primary caregiver for
    the children. After the children were born, Wife stayed at home with the
    children for a period of time. When she returned to work, she worked part-time.
    [3]   Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on November 16, 2015.
    Initially, the parties agreed to a “bird’s nest” arrangement where the children
    remained in the marital residence at all times. The parties exercised their
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 2 of 19
    parenting time and overnights with the children at the marital residence. Wife
    was hopeful that the “bird’s nest” arrangement would help the children
    transition and adjust to the parties’ separation. Under the parties’ agreed
    parenting time schedule, in every two-week period, Wife exercised 8 of the 14
    overnights with the children.
    [4]   In August 2016, Wife decided that the “bird’s nest” arrangement was confusing
    the children because it gave the children the impression that the parties were
    still living together. She believed that maintaining her own residence would
    help the children understand that the parties were in the process of dissolving
    the marriage. Therefore, Wife obtained her own residence and exercised
    parenting time with the children in her new home. Shortly thereafter, the
    children began to experience separation anxiety when they would leave Wife’s
    home to go to Husband’s home for his overnights. E.M.’s separation anxiety
    was particularly severe. J.M. began acting out at school.
    [5]   The children began to participate in counseling to help them deal with their
    anxiety. The parties were receptive to the counselor’s suggestions and tried to
    incorporate them into their parenting routines. However, Husband would not
    agree to testing that the counselor recommended for J.M. due to the behaviors
    that J.M. exhibited at school.
    [6]   On October 17, 2017, the trial court granted the parties’ joint stipulation to
    dissolve their marriage but bifurcated the child custody determination and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 3 of 19
    division of the marital estate. Thereafter, final hearings were held in this case on
    September 22 and 28, 2017, January 22, 2018, and April 23, 2018.
    [7]   Child custody and the parenting time schedule were significant sources of
    conflict between the parties at the hearing. The trial court found
    the testimony credible that the children are experiencing anxiety
    related to the current parenting time schedule especially given a
    consideration of their young ages, the instability in their living
    arrangements, the frequency of the parenting time exchanges as
    well as the confusion that sometimes occurs during parenting
    time exchanges. [Wife] has functioned in the role of the
    children’s primary caregiver during the marriage and the children
    have developed a strong bond and attachment with her. The
    Court finds that the entry of an order modifying the current
    parenting time schedule to provide the children with more
    stability in their home environment is in the children’s best
    interests. The Court further finds that the entry of an order
    awarding [Wife] primary physical custody of the minor children
    is in the minor children’s best interests.
    Appellant’s App. p. 49.
    [8]   Husband was awarded parenting time as set forth in the Indiana Parenting
    Time Guidelines, except Husband was awarded a mid-week overnight on
    Wednesdays. Husband, who did not pay child support during the dissolution
    proceedings, was ordered to pay $141 per week in child support, and child
    support was ordered to be paid retroactive from October 17, 2017, the date the
    marriage was dissolved.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 4 of 19
    [9]   With regard to the parties’ marital assets, the parties presented significantly
    different valuations for Mansfield & Heirs, LLC. The assets held by the
    company consist of a remainder interest in four tracts of farmland in Ohio
    previously owned by Husband’s grandfather, Gilbert Schick. The trial court
    found that
    . . . Subsequently, the [Wife] and [Husband] created a Limited
    Liability Corporation called L. Mansfield & Heirs, LLC (the
    “LLC”) and transferred their interest in the real estate to be held
    by the LLC. [Husband’s] sister transferred her one-half
    Remainder Interest in the land into the LLC as well. The LLC’s
    Remainder Interest in one of the four underlying tracts of land is
    subject to a life estate vested in [Husband’s] uncle. The other
    three tracts of land are subject to a life estate vested in
    [Husband’s] mother, Lesa Mansfield. The real estate is subject to
    [Husband’s] uncle’s ability to farm the land for life. [Husband]
    and his sister each own a 50% membership interest in the LLC
    and [Husband’s] mother serves as the manager of the LLC. She
    may only be removed as the manager by a majority of the
    members. The Remainder Interest is the sole asset of the LLC . . .
    ***
    In connection with the transfer of the Remainder Interest to the
    LLC, during the marriage, [Wife] was asked to, and ultimately
    did, execute Quit Claim Deeds quit-claiming and relinquishing
    any right, title, or interest to the underlying real estate. [Husband]
    then retained a 50% ownership interest in the LLC. According to
    [Husband’s] testimony at trial, during the marriage, the parties
    did not receive a financial benefit as a result of the Remainder
    Interest or the LLC, nor did they make plans or decisions during
    the marriage based upon the expectation of realizing such
    interest. He advises that he and [Wife] did not discuss the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 5 of 19
    Remainder Interest of LLC much during the marriage and that
    he only recently began to understand the kind of interest that he
    holds. He contends that [Wife] had knowledge of all of the
    communications that occurred during the marriage regarding the
    Remainder Interest and the LLC. He further advised at trial that
    he had always believed that the Remainder Interest and/or
    interest in the LLC was a future inheritance that he would
    receive upon the death of several family members and did not
    understand until recently, that he held a present right to the
    Remainder Interest and/or LLC. He testified that at trial that he
    was still attempting to understand the exact nature of the interest
    that he and/or the LLC holds.
    
    Id. at 52,
    54–55.
    [10]   Each party hired experts to value the remainder interest held by the LLC.
    Wife’s expert concluded that Husband’s 50% interest in the LLC was worth
    $252,800.00. Husband’s expert determined that Husband’s 50% ownership
    interest in the LLC was worth $38,000.00. The trial court adopted the value
    calculated by Wife’s experts after concluding that they were reliable and their
    opinions were “based upon sound valuation principles.” 
    Id. at 58.
    [11]   The parties also could not agree whether a bonus Husband received from his
    employer in January 2016 was a marital asset. The trial court also concluded
    that it was and included it in the marital estate because the bonus was for work
    performed in the 2015 calendar year.
    [12]   Husband now appeals the trial court’s November 16, 2018 order addressing
    custody and parenting time of the parties’ children and dividing the marital
    estate. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 6 of 19
    Standard of Review
    [13]   Husband requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, first we
    determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s findings, and second
    we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Lechien v. Wren, 
    950 N.E.2d 838
    , 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We will set aside the trial court’s specific
    findings only if they are clearly erroneous, that is, when there are no facts or
    inferences drawn therefrom to support them. 
    Id. A judgment
    is clearly
    erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a
    mistake has been made. 
    Id. We neither
    reweigh the evidence nor assess the
    credibility of witnesses but consider only the evidence most favorable to the
    judgment. 
    Id. The findings
    control only as to the issues they cover, and a
    general judgment standard applies to issues upon which the trial court made no
    findings. 
    Id. I. Custody
    and Parenting Time
    [14]   Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Wife
    primary physical custody of the children and awarded him “minimum”
    parenting time. See Appellant’s Br. at 24. Our standard of review of initial child
    custody determinations is well settled. Child custody decisions fall within the
    trial court's sound discretion. Swadner v. Swadner, 
    897 N.E.2d 966
    , 973 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2008).
    [15]   In an initial custody determination, both parents are presumed equally entitled
    to custody. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 
    103 N.E.3d 690
    , 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018),
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 7 of 19
    trans. denied. The trial court shall determine custody and enter a custody order
    in accordance with the best interests of the child by considering all relevant
    factors, including:
    (1) The age and sex of the child.
    (2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.
    (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
    child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
    (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
    (A) the child's parent or parents;
    (B) the child's sibling; and
    (C) any other person who may significantly affect the
    child’s best interests.
    (5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:
    (A) home;
    (B) school; and
    (C) community.
    (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
    (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
    parent.
    (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
    custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall
    consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.
    Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 8 of 19
    [16]   In deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues, we do not reweigh the
    evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Hughes v. Rogusta, 
    830 N.E.2d 898
    , 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Instead, we consider the evidence most
    favorable to the judgment, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the
    judgment. 
    Id. We will
    affirm the trial court’s custody determination absent an
    abuse of discretion. 
    Swadner, 897 N.E.2d at 973
    .
    [17]   Husband argues that he was exercising near equal parenting time, with Wife’s
    agreement, during the dissolution proceedings. Therefore, he argues that the
    trial court should have treated the custody and parenting time issues as
    modifications of custody and parenting time and should have applied the more
    stringent modification standard.1
    [18]   Throughout these proceedings, Husband was on notice that the trial court
    would make an initial custody determination when issuing its decree, and the
    parties’ provisional agreement was temporary. Moreover, during the pendency
    of the dissolution proceedings, Wife expressed her belief to Husband that their
    provisional custody and parenting time arrangement was causing the children
    1
    A party who seeks modification of custody must prove modification is in the child’s best interests and a
    substantial change in one or more of the statutory factors enumerated in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8. In
    support of his argument that the modification standard should apply, Father relies on In re Paternity of
    Winkler, 
    725 N.E.2d 124
    , 127–28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). But in that case, Mother had sole legal custody of the
    child for twelve years, and Father “acquiesced to the custody arrangement for this long period of time.” 
    Id. at 128.
    Therefore, “the same concerns about stability and continuity present in sole and joint custody
    modifications are present.” 
    Id. Moreover the
    paternity statute effectively provides that the child’s mother will
    have sole custody of a child born out-of-wedlock. 
    Id. at 127.
    Although the dissolution proceedings in this case
    pended for nearly three years, the circumstances present in this appeal are not legally or factually analogous
    to those in Winkler.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019                  Page 9 of 19
    to suffer from anxiety, and she sought to change the arrangement. But Husband
    would not agree to any changes. For these reasons, Husband has not persuaded
    us that the trial court was required to consider its custody and parenting time
    decisions under the more stringent modification standard.
    [19]   Wife was the children’s primary caretaker throughout the marriage. After the
    children were born, when she returned to work, Wife worked part-time until
    June 2015. Wife adjusted her work schedule to take care of the children’s needs.
    Husband would often work overtime and assist at his family’s business.
    However, during the parties’ separation, Husband cared for the children six out
    of every fourteen overnights. Husband substantially relies on this fact to support
    his argument that the trial court should have awarded joint physical custody.
    [20]   But the children began to suffer anxiety during the parties’ provisional custody
    arrangement, and J.M. began acting out at school. Husband’s challenge to the
    trial court’s finding that the children suffered anxiety throughout the parties’
    separation is simply a request to reweigh the evidence and the credibility of the
    witnesses. With Husband’s agreement and support, the children were in
    counseling to deal with their anxiety. The parties have implemented strategies
    suggested by the children’s counselor, and the children’s anxiety has lessened
    over their two years of counseling. But the children’s issues with anxiety still
    persist. And Husband refused to consider changing the parties’ parenting time
    schedule even though the children struggled to adjust to the multiple parenting
    exchanges each week.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 10 of 19
    [21]   This evidence supports the trial court’s award of primary physical custody to
    Wife. The trial court considered the statutory factors and determined that the
    children need more stability and less parenting time exchanges. The court also
    considered that the children have a stronger bond and attachment to Wife.
    Finally, the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that awarding
    Wife primary physical custody is in the children’s best interests.
    [22]   Husband also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding him
    minimal parenting time. In all parenting time controversies, courts must give
    foremost consideration to the best interests of the child. Hazelett v. Hazelett, 
    119 N.E.3d 153
    , 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We review a trial court’s parenting time
    determination under an abuse of discretion standard. 
    Id. If the
    record reveals a
    rational basis supporting the trial court’s decision, no abuse of discretion
    occurred. 
    Id. In reviewing
    a trial court’s determination, we will not reweigh the
    evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
    Id. [23] The
    trial court awarded Husband parenting time consistent with the guidelines,
    but in addition, awarded Husband a mid-week overnight. Husband was
    awarded more than minimal parenting time. The trial court’s parenting time
    decision took into account the children’s ages, their need for more stability and
    fewer exchanges between the parents, but also the fact that Husband has had
    significant parenting time with the children throughout the dissolution
    proceedings. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court acted within its
    discretion when it entered its parenting time order.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 11 of 19
    II. Child Support Calculation and Retroactivity
    [24]   Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered his
    child support obligation retroactive to October 17, 2017. There was no child
    support order in place during the dissolution proceedings.
    [25]   A trial court’s calculation of child support is presumptively valid. Young v.
    Young, 
    891 N.E.2d 1045
    , 1047 (Ind. 2008). We will reverse a trial court’s
    decision in child support matters only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to
    law. 
    Id. A decision
    is clearly erroneous if it is clearly against the logic and effect
    of the facts and circumstances that were before the trial court. 
    Id. [26] It
    is well settled that an initial child support order can be retroactive to the date
    of the petition for dissolution. Mitten v. Mitten, 
    44 N.E.3d 695
    , 705 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2015) (citing Boone v. Boone, 
    924 N.E.2d 649
    , 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).
    The trial court chose October 17, 2017 for the effective start date of the child
    support order because that is the date the court granted the parties’ joint
    stipulation to dissolve their marriage. It was well within the trial court’s
    discretion to do so.
    [27]   Husband argues that “even if the support obligation is retroactive to October
    17, 2017, Husband should have been provided an appropriate parenting time
    credit from October 17, 2017 to November 16, 2018” because during those
    dates, he was exercising more overnight visitation than provided for in the
    decree. Appellant’s Br. at 31.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 12 of 19
    [28]   In its child support calculation, the trial court gave Husband credit for 150
    overnights per year. The evidence presented at the hearing established that
    Husband was exercising 6 overnights with the children in every two-week
    period while the dissolution was pending. Therefore, from October 17, 2017 to
    November 16, 2018 (the date of the dissolution decree), Husband exercised
    approximately 156 overnights annually with the children. Husband has not
    provided us with a calculation of his child support obligation giving him credit
    for 156 overnights as opposed to 150 overnights. After reviewing the child
    support obligation worksheet, we conclude that giving Husband credit for 156
    annual overnights will result in a change in the calculation of his weekly,
    retroactive child support obligation to the amount of $134 per week, or an
    aggregate difference of $395. For this reason, we remand this case to the trial
    court to recalculate Husband’s weekly retroactive child support obligation
    accordingly.
    III. The Value of L. Mansfield & Heirs, LLC
    [29]   Next, Husband argues that the value the trial court assigned to L. Mansfield &
    Heirs, LLC (“LLC”) is not supported by the evidence. A trial court’s decision
    in assigning a value to property in a dissolution action is reviewed for an abuse
    of discretion. Del Priore v. Del Priore, 
    65 N.E.3d 1065
    , 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016),
    trans. denied. Generally, there is no abuse of discretion if a trial court’s chosen
    valuation is within the range of values supported by the evidence. 
    Id. “A valuation
    submitted by one of the parties is competent evidence of the value of
    property in a dissolution action and may alone support the trial court's
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 13 of 19
    determination in that regard.” 
    Id. (citing Alexander
    v. Alexander, 
    927 N.E.2d 926
    ,
    935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). On appeal, “we resist the temptation to
    get deeply involved in analyzing the valuation evidence presented at trial.”
    Quillen v. Quillen, 
    671 N.E.2d 98
    , 100 (Ind. 1996). Finally, when we review a
    trial court’s valuation of property in a dissolution, we will neither reweigh the
    evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Del 
    Priore, 65 N.E.3d at 1076
    –
    77.
    [30]   The LLC’s assets consist solely of remainder interests in the four parcels of
    Ohio farmland that are subject to Husband’s uncle’s right to farm the land, and
    the life estates granted to his uncle or his mother, depending on the parcel. Both
    parties had the farmland appraised, and then each hired a certified public
    accountant to value the interest owned by the LLC. Each expert testified at trial
    and explained their respective methodologies for calculating the remainder
    interest held by the LLC. Wife’s expert concluded that Husband’s 50%
    ownership interest in the LLC was worth $252,800, and Husband’s expert
    concluded that it was worth $38,000.2
    [31]   The trial court found both Husband’s and Wife’s experts’ testimonies and
    evidence “to be credible regarding the value of the land and the value of
    [Husband’s] 50% ownership interest in the LLC[.]” Appellant’s App. p. 58. But
    the trial court specifically found that the testimony of Wife’s experts was
    2
    The appraisers concluded that the four parcels of land were collectively worth between $1,187,000 and
    $1,311,000.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019             Page 14 of 19
    “reliable and based on sound valuation principles.” 
    Id. Therefore, the
    trial court
    found that Husband’s interest in the LLC was worth $252,800. The trial court
    acted within its discretion when it determined that Wife’s expert’s methodology
    of calculating Husband’s 50% interest in the LLC was reliable.
    [32]   However, the most significant difference between the two experts’ opinions was
    whether the LLC owns a 100% remainder interest in the four parcels of
    farmland or a 50% remainder interest, subject to the life estates of Robert Schick
    and Lesa Mansfield. The trial court’s conclusion in finding number 31 that
    Husband’s grandfather transferred a remainder interest in one-half of the
    farmland to Husband and one-half to Husband’s sister, who then both
    transferred their interests to the LLC, is not supported by the evidence.
    [33]   The quit claim deeds for each transfer were admitted into evidence. The quit
    claim deed for parcel number 27-24S-010-00 states that “Ruth Ann Bair and
    Dana Bair, her husband; and Gloria Grimes and Eugene H. Grimes, her
    husband, for valuable consideration paid, grant to L. Mansfield & Heirs, LLC”
    the real estate described “subject to the life estate granted to Robert A.
    Schick[.]” Ex. Vol. 1, p. 108. Therefore, as to this parcel, the entire remainder
    interest was transferred to the LLC.
    [34]   However, the quit claim deed for parcel number 27-24S-010-03 establishes that
    Husband and his sister transferred to L. Mansfield and Heirs, LLC, a
    “remainder interest in an undivided one-half” of the described real estate,
    subject to the life estate granted to Lesa Mansfield. 
    Id. at 111.
    Finally, the quit
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 15 of 19
    claim deed for parcel number 08-28S-001-00, which consists of two separate
    tracts of farmland, established that the several family members, including
    Husband and his sister, transferred to “Lesa Mansfield, for and during the term
    of her natural life, the remainder to L. Mansfield & Heirs, LLC. . . an
    undivided one-half interest” in the described real estate. 
    Id. at 116.
    [35]   Therefore, on the face of the deeds, 100% of the remainder interest in parcel
    number 27-24S-010-00 was transferred to the LLC, but as to parcel numbers 27-
    24S-010-03 and 08-28S-001-00 only one-half of the remainder interest was
    transferred to the LLC. For this reason, neither of the experts appropriately
    calculated the value of the remainder interests owned by the LLC.3
    [36]   For all of these reasons, the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded
    that Husband’s 50% interest in the LLC was worth $252,800. Therefore, we
    remand this case with instructions to recalculate the value of Husband’s
    interest.
    IV. Husband’s January 2016 Bonus
    [37]   Finally, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
    included the bonus he received from his employer in January 2016, after the
    dissolution petition was filed, in the marital estate.
    3
    Wife’s expert calculated the value as if the LLC owned 100% of the remainder interest, and Husband’s
    expert calculated the value as if the LLC owned only a 50% remainder interest in all four parcels.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019            Page 16 of 19
    The division of marital assets is within the trial court’s discretion,
    and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. A party
    challenging the trial court's division of marital property must
    overcome a strong presumption that the trial court considered
    and complied with the applicable statute, and that presumption is
    one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration
    on appeal. We may not reweigh the evidence or assess the
    credibility of the witnesses, and we will consider only the
    evidence most favorable to the trial court's disposition of the
    marital property.
    O’Connell v. O’Connell, 
    889 N.E.2d 1
    , 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citations and
    quotations omitted).
    [38]   All property, whether acquired before or during the marriage, is included in the
    marital estate for property division. Webb v. Schleutker, 
    891 N.E.2d 1144
    , 1149
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The marital pot usually closes on the date the dissolution
    petition is filed. Sanjari v. Sanjari, 
    755 N.E.2d 1186
    , 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
    [39]   Wife argued and the trial court found that Husband received the bonus for work
    performed in 2015. “Indiana's ‘one pot’ theory prohibits the exclusion of any
    asset in which a party has a vested interest from the scope of the trial court's
    power to divide and award.” Falatovics v. Falatovics, 
    15 N.E.3d 108
    , 110 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2014). Whether a right to a present or future benefit constitutes an
    asset that should be included in the marital pot depends mainly on whether it
    has “vested” by the time of dissolution. Ford v. Ford, 
    953 N.E.2d 1137
    , 1142
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). That is, “vesting is both a necessary and sufficient
    condition for a right to a benefit to constitute an asset.” 
    Id. (quoting Bingley
    v.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 17 of 19
    Bingley, 
    935 N.E.2d 152
    , 154 (Ind. 2010)). There are two ways in which a right
    to a benefit can vest: (1) vesting in possession or (2) vesting in interest. 
    Id. Vesting in
    possession connotes an immediately existing right of present
    enjoyment, while vesting in interest implies a presently fixed right to future
    enjoyment. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Preston, 
    704 N.E.2d 1093
    , 1097 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 1999)).
    [40]   The only testimony on this issue came from Husband, who testified that annual
    employment bonuses he receives are based on the profitability of the company.
    Tr. Vol. 3, p. 43. He stated that if he had not been employed with the company
    in January 2016, he would not have received a bonus.
    [41]   Because Husband did not have a right to his bonus on November 16, 2015, the
    evidence leads to the conclusion that Husband’s 2016 bonus had not vested on
    the date Wife filed her petition for dissolution. Wife did not present any
    contrary evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court should not
    have included Husband’s January 2016 bonus in the marital estate.
    Conclusion
    [42]   Husband has not established any reversible error concerning the trial court’s
    custody and parenting time. However, we remand this case to the trial court
    with instructions to recalculate Husband’s retroactive child support obligation,
    as set forth in this opinion. In addition, the value the trial court assigned to the
    Mansfield, LLC is not supported by the evidence and Husband’s January 2016
    bonus should not have been included in the marital estate. We therefore
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 18 of 19
    remand this case with instructions to recalculate the value of Husband’s interest
    in Mansfield, LLC and to exclude his 2016 bonus from the marital estate.
    [43]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    May, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2983 | December 23, 2019   Page 19 of 19