Archie Lee Parker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing                          Dec 23 2019, 6:42 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                         Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    John Andrew Goodridge                                   Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Evansville, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Benjamin J. Shoptaw
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Archie Lee Parker,                                      December 23, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-1658
    v.                                              Appeal from the Vanderburgh
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    82D03-1511-F5-7252
    Altice, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1658 | December 23, 2019              Page 1 of 6
    Case Summary
    [1]   A jury found Archie Lee Parker guilty of aggravated battery as a Level 3 felony,
    and he admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Parker
    to ten years for the Level 3 felony and enhanced such sentence by ten years for
    his habitual offender status. On appeal, Parker argues that his sentence is
    inappropriate.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   Allison Skelton and Raelene Stinson were neighbors. John Jackson was
    Skelton’s boyfriend and the father of one of Skelton’s children, and Parker was
    Stinson’s boyfriend. In early November 2015, Jackson asked Parker to move
    Parker’s broken-down vehicle that had been parked in front of Skelton’s
    residence for months to another location because it was impacting Skelton’s
    and his ability to park near Skelton’s home. Parker indicated that “he was fine
    with that” and that it would be “no problem.” Transcript Vol. II at 20. A couple
    hours later, Parker was yelling obscenities and stating that he would not move
    his vehicle. Parker left for a short time, and when he returned, he continued
    screaming profanities and saying that he was going to kill Skelton, Jackson, and
    their children.
    [4]   Two weeks later, on November 23, 2015, Jackson was taking trash out the back
    door at Skelton’s house when Parker approached him and said, “I got you
    now,” and then Jackson felt a punch or touch “like somebody pinched [him]”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1658 | December 23, 2019   Page 2 of 6
    below his left chest. 
    Id. at 49.
    Jackson threw two punches to gain separation
    from Parker. Jackson did not feel right and then observed that his shirt was
    ripped and that there was “trickling blood.” 
    Id. He picked
    up the trashcan and
    threw it at Parker, who appeared to be holding something “shiny.” 
    Id. at 51.
    [5]   Skelton was on her way toward the back door when she heard commotion
    outside. When she looked through the kitchen window, she saw Jackson
    coming toward the house and observed that there was blood on his shirt.
    Skelton ran outside and saw Parker holding something and watched as Jackson
    threw the trashcan at him. When Parker saw Skelton, he ran from the scene.
    Skelton helped Jackson into the house and called 911. She helped Jackson
    apply pressure to his wound until emergency personnel arrived.
    [6]   On November 24, 2015, the State charged Parker with Count I, Level 5 felony
    battery by means of a deadly weapon. On February 1, 2016, the State filed a
    habitual offender enhancement. On February 11, 2016, the State charged
    Parker with Count II, Level 3 felony aggravated battery and Count III, Level 5
    felony bribery. 1 A two-day jury trial commenced on February 28, 2019. The
    jury was unable to reach a verdict on Count I and rendered a guilty verdict on
    Count II and a not guilty verdict on Count III. On June 3, 2019, Parker pled
    1
    The bribery charge stemmed from an encounter in August 2017 when Parker approached Jackson and
    asked if he could “offer . . . some type of money and we make this all go away – make this disappear.” 
    Id. at 52.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1658 | December 23, 2019                 Page 3 of 6
    guilty to the habitual offender enhancement in exchange for dismissal of Count
    I and four counts under another cause.
    [7]   The trial court held a sentencing hearing on June 18, 2019. The trial court
    identified Parker’s criminal history and the circumstances of the offense as
    aggravating circumstances and found no mitigating factors. The court
    sentenced Parker to ten years for aggravated battery enhanced by ten years for
    Parker’s status as a habitual offender. Parker now appeals. Additional facts
    will be provided as necessary.
    Discussion & Decision
    [8]   We may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the
    trial court's decision, we find the sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of
    the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).
    Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate
    sentence to the circumstances presented and the trial court’s judgment “should
    receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1224 (Ind.
    2008). The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the
    outliers.” 
    Id. at 1225.
    Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the
    end of the day turns on “our sense of culpability of the defendant, the severity
    of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to
    light in a given case.” 
    Id. at 1224.
    Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless
    overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the
    offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the
    defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1658 | December 23, 2019   Page 4 of 6
    of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 
    29 N.E.3d 111
    , 122 (Ind. 2015). The
    burden is on the defendant to persuade us his sentence is inappropriate in light
    of both the nature of the offense and his character. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006) (emphasis supplied).
    [9]    In order to assess the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the
    statutory range established for the classification of the relevant offense. Parker
    was convicted of a Level 3 felony, the sentencing range for which is three to
    sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.
    [10]   In challenging his sentence, Parker advances no argument as to how the nature
    of the offense makes his sentence inappropriate. Parker has therefore waived
    any appellate consideration of the nature of the offense. See Anderson v. State,
    
    989 N.E.2d 823
    , 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Waiver
    notwithstanding, the circumstances of the offense are not deserving of a lesser
    sentence. Parker instigated an unprovoked attack on his unsuspecting victim.
    Indeed, Johnson suffered a slash-type wound below his left chest that required
    thirteen staples. As the trial court found, the circumstances “could easily have
    gone very badly . . . given the nature of the wound and how it was inflicted.”
    Transcript Vol. II at 225.
    [11]   With regard to his character, Parker notes that prior to the instant offense, his
    last felony conviction was in 2011, and before that in 2007 and 1999. He
    asserts that such demonstrates that he “was able to live in society for
    considerable amounts of time without committing felony offenses.” Appellant’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1658 | December 23, 2019   Page 5 of 6
    Brief at 12. He argues that the staleness of his criminal history, in conjunction
    with his age (55 years old), his health, and his ties with his family, render his
    twenty-year sentence inappropriate.
    [12]   In considering Parker’s character, we note that his criminal history includes
    felony convictions for dealing in cocaine, along with numerous misdemeanor
    convictions for dealing in marijuana, battery/domestic battery, residential
    entry, invasion of privacy, and criminal mischief, among others. Some of the
    time periods Parker claims to have led a law-abiding life can be explained by
    the fact that Parker was incarcerated. Contrary to Parker’s claim, his criminal
    history shows that he has consistently been committing crimes since 1994. The
    record also discloses that Parker has a problem with alcohol and other illegal
    substances. Although Parker admitted to the habitual offender enhancement,
    such was in exchange for dismissal of five other charges. His decision to admit
    to the habitual enhancement was likely a pragmatic decision.
    [13]   Parker has failed to show us anything about the nature of the offense or his
    character that would overcome the deference we give to the trial court’s
    decision. In short, Parker has failed to establish that his twenty-year sentence is
    inappropriate.
    [14]   Judgment affirmed.
    Robb, J. and Bradford, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1658 | December 23, 2019   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-1658

Filed Date: 12/23/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/23/2019