In the Matter of M.R. and T.L. (Children in Need or Services) A.R. Mother v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 14 2019, 8:42 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Gregory L. Fumarolo Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of M.R. and T.L. March 14, 2019
(Children in Need of Services) Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JC-2076
Appeal from the Allen Superior
A.R. (Mother), Court
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Charles F. Pratt,
Judge
v.
The Honorable Sherry A. Hartzler,
Magistrate
The Indiana Department of
Trial Court Cause Nos.
Child Services,
02D08-1712-JC-758
Appellee-Petitioner. 02D08-1712-JC-759
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] A.R. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order adjudicating M.R., aged sixteen,
and T.L., aged thirteen, (“Children”) as Children in Need of Services
(“CHINS”), upon the petition of the Allen County Department of Child
Services (“DCS”). Mother presents a single issue: whether the CHINS
determination is clearly erroneous. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On December 7, 2017, Fort Wayne Police Officer Christopher Brautzsch
(“Officer Brautzsch”) was dispatched to Mother’s residence in response to a 9-
1-1 call from M.R.’s boyfriend, K.J., reporting that Mother had battered M.R.
Although M.R. and K.J. maintained a relationship, K.J. was subject to a
protection order forbidding him from contacting Mother or M.R.
[3] K.J. met Officer Brautzsch outside the residence. Mother answered the door
and began yelling vulgarities, insisting that the police leave, and threatening
K.J. that he was going to “end [up] dead” for seeing M.R. and threatening
Mother. (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 8.)
[4] Officer Brautzsch attempted to speak with Children but Mother stood between
the officer and her daughters. Officer Brautzsch asked if Children were okay,
and each nodded in response. However, M.R. broke down in tears and Mother
“shut the door in [the officer’s] face.” Id. at 9. Officer Brautzsch persisted,
threatened forced entry, and eventually entered the house through a back door.
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He could see that M.R. had a cut inside her mouth and it appeared to be a fresh
cut. According to Officer Brautzsch, Mother was behaving toward both the
police and K.J. in a manner that was “angry,” “hostile,” and “vulgar.” Id. at
10. Mother was handcuffed and placed on the sofa so that officers could
conduct their investigation and interview M.R. in private.
[5] M.R. reported to officers that Mother had become very angry about M.R.
seeing K.J. at their mutual workplace and then bringing home a backpack
containing K.J.’s shoes. M.R. alleged that she and Mother had struggled over
the backpack, Mother ordered the younger sibling, T.L., to get a knife to cut the
backpack strap, and Mother had then taken the knife and stabbed the backpack.
Unable to wrest the backpack away from M.R., Mother grabbed M.R.’s hair,
repeatedly struck her in the face, and sat on her. M.R. complained to Mother
that she could not breathe, and Mother responded “[she] didn’t care.” Id. at 25.
M.R. stated that she was able to escape to her bedroom and text K.J. to get
help.
[6] Mother was arrested, and Children were placed in relative care. T.L. returned
to Mother’s home a few days later, while M.R. remained in relative placement.
[7] Evidence was heard at a fact-finding hearing conducted on March 21 and
March 22, 2018. Mother testified and denied that her disagreements with M.R.
had been anything other than verbal. In contrast, M.R. testified that Mother
had struck and injured her on December 7, 2017, and she also described a
physical altercation one or two weeks earlier. Finally, she described an incident
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where Mother had confronted S.R., the relative with whom M.R. had been
placed. M.R. testified that Mother followed her out after a counseling session,
blocked in S.R.’s vehicle with her own, and then used her fist to strike S.R.’s
vehicle on the window and door.
[8] S.R. testified to the same incident, adding that Mother threatened her by
saying, “bitch you better watch your back.” Id. at 44. M.R. was crying and
shaking while Mother shouted obscenities. S.R. believed that Mother had
become enraged because she wanted DCS to place M.R. with her maternal
grandmother as opposed to S.R. The grandparent placement was eventually
arranged but, in the meantime, communications between M.R. and Mother
were problematic. S.R. testified that Mother telephoned M.R. from various
phone numbers, and would direct loud vulgarities toward M.R. and S.R. S.R.
also testified that she saw texts from Mother to M.R., blaming M.R. for their
circumstances, and that Mother inappropriately focused upon M.R.’s
entitlement to Social Security benefits from her father’s death.
[9] Visitation supervisor Paige Walker testified that she had supervised four visits
between Mother and M.R. and had recommended that the visits be changed to
therapeutic visits. The basis for her recommendation was that Mother could
become very angry, she had expressed suspicion that she would be slandered or
“lied about” in visitation notes, and she brought up M.R.’s Social Security
benefits excessively. Id. at 64. Mother testified in response that M.R. told lies
and “the State” had “lied several times.” Id. at 87. Mother reiterated that she
did not engage in either physical or verbal aggression.
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[10] On May 29, 2018, the trial court entered its findings, conclusions, and order.
Among the factual findings were specific findings that: Mother struck and
injured M.R., Mother ordered T.L. to retrieve a knife and stabbed a backpack
while M.R. was holding it, T.L. witnessed M.R.’s struggle to breathe, Mother
attacked S.R. and made threats, and “Mother cannot control her anger and
provide for a stable home free of verbal and physical violence.” Appealed
Order at 3. The court concluded that both children were neglected due to the
domestic violence and that M.R.’s physical health was seriously endangered.
The court acknowledged that M.R. had been involved in two years of
counseling (following her father’s death) but further observed that M.R.
reported she was not being heard and she had requested additional services.
The trial court concluded that Children needed services directed toward the
prevention of domestic violence that they were unlikely to receive without
coercive intervention and adjudicated Children as CHINS.
[11] Mother appeals, asserting that Children are now both in her care and the fact-
finding order should be reversed to “avoid the stigma and negative implication
of a CHINS finding.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[12] A CHINS proceeding is a civil action, and thus the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d
102, 105 (Ind. 2010) (citing Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3). In reviewing a CHINS
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adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the
witnesses. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). We consider only the
evidence that supports the court’s decision and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom. Id. We will reverse only upon a showing that the trial court’s
decision was clearly erroneous. Id.
[13] Where, as here, the trial court has entered sua sponte findings of fact and
conclusions thereon,1 our review is governed by Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). In re
S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). As to issues covered by the findings, we
apply a two-tiered standard of review: first we consider whether the evidence
supports the factual findings, and then whether those findings support the
court’s judgment. Id. We review the remaining issues under the general
judgment standard where we will affirm the judgment if it can be sustained on
any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id.
Adjudication of Children as CHINS
[14] For the trial court to adjudicate a child a CHINS, DCS must prove three
elements: (1) the child is under the age of eighteen; (2) one of eleven statutory
circumstances (codified in Indiana Code Sections 31-34-1-1 to -11) exist that
would make the child a CHINS; and (3) the child needs care, treatment, or
rehabilitation that he or she is not receiving and that is unlikely to be provided
1
The CHINS statutes do not require that findings of fact and conclusions thereon be entered as part of a
CHINS fact-finding order. Here, neither party made a written request for Trial Rule 52 findings and
conclusions.
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or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. In re K.D., 962
N.E.2d at 1253 (citing In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105). DCS alleged that
Children were CHINS under Section 31-34-1-1, the general neglect provision,
which states:
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes
eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply
the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
education, or supervision; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive
intervention of the court.
I.C. § 31-34-1-1.
[15] DCS also alleged that M.R. was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section
31-34-1-2(b), which provides in relevant part:
A child is a child in need of services if, before the child becomes
eighteen (18) years of age, the child:
(1) is a victim of … an offense under IC 35-42-2-1 [battery]; and
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(2) needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive
intervention of the court.
[16] The trial court found that both children were CHINS under the general neglect
statute and that M.R. was a CHINS because she had been a victim of battery.
[17] Not every endangered child is a CHINS, permitting the State’s parens patriae
intrusion into private family life. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. The proper focus
is upon the best interests of the child and whether the child needs help that the
parent will not be willing or able to provide – not whether the parent is guilty or
deserving of a CHINS adjudication. Id. at 1285.
[18] A CHINS adjudication under the general neglect provision “requires three basic
elements: that the parent’s actions or inactions have seriously endangered the
child, that the child’s needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those
needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” Id. at 1287. The coercive
intervention prong exists to protect families from unnecessary state intrusion.
Id. A CHINS finding should consider the family’s condition when the case was
filed, but also when the case is heard. Id. at 1290.
[19] Mother denies that M.R. was a victim of battery and that she enlisted T.L.’s
help. Mother also denies that DCS established that Children’s needs are
unlikely to be met without State coercion.
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[20] M.R. testified that Mother battered her and caused injuries consisting of a
“busted lip” and red marks from slaps. (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 29.) She also testified
that Mother directed her younger sibling to bring a knife to Mother. T.L. was
witness to her mother using the knife in M.R.’s vicinity, striking M.R., and
impeding M.R.’s efforts to breathe. Multiple witnesses described events
indicating that Mother was openly angry and hostile toward those trying to
assist her. The responding police officer found Mother to be “angry, hostile,
and vulgar” and described her efforts to keep officers from directly
communicating with Children. (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 10.) The relative caregiver
testified that she was confined, threatened, and cursed. The visitation
supervisor described Mother as erupting in anger and expressing suspicions that
she would be unfairly portrayed in visitation notes. In sum, there is evidence
that Mother battered M.R. in T.L.’s presence and generally opposed assistance.
Upon this evidence, the trial court properly concluded that coercion was needed
to cause Mother to deal with her anger that had erupted in domestic violence.
[21] Mother observes that M.R. had continuously been in family counseling since
the death of her father and this was not court-ordered. However, Mother
makes no claim that the counseling sessions have ever addressed Mother’s
perpetration of domestic violence or verbal opposition to service providers.
Indeed, a major premise of Mother’s appellate arguments is her denial that she
initiated or participated in any family violence. She does not attack any finding
of fact as lacking evidentiary support. Rather, Mother simply requests that we
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reweigh the evidence that was before the trial court and re-assess the credibility
of M.R. We cannot do so. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.
[22] Mother alternatively suggests that our review of the adjudication should include
consideration of her uncontested claim that Children are both in her physical
custody. Mother takes the position that, even if State intervention was needed
at one time, it is now unnecessary, and we should reverse the trial court so that
Mother can avoid stigma or future collateral consequences. She identifies no
authority for the proposition that an appellate court reviews a CHINS
adjudication in hindsight with the benefit of post-adjudication events. The
evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and the findings of fact
support the CHINS adjudication. Mother cannot obtain reversal on grounds
that a CHINS adjudication may have future consequences.
Conclusion
[23] The order adjudicating Children as CHINS is not clearly erroneous.
[24] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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