Joseph Waldron v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Mar 29 2019, 6:52 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Emilee L. Stotts Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Huntington County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Marion, Indiana Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Joseph Waldron, March 29, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1723
v. Appeal from the Huntington
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jennifer E.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Newton, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
35D01-1610-F1-192
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 1 of 12
[1] Joseph Waldron appeals his convictions for battery with a deadly weapon as a
level 5 felony, battery on a child as a level 5 felony, two counts of child
molesting as level 1 felonies, and child molesting as a level 4 felony. Waldron
raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for mistrial. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At the start of Waldron’s jury trial on May 22, 2018, he faced the following
charges for acts against his daughter, A.W., who was in kindergarten during the
2015-2016 school year: Count I, battery with a deadly weapon as a level 5
felony; Count II, battery on a child as a level 5 felony; Count III, child
molesting as a level 1 felony; Count IV, child molesting as a level 1 felony; and
Count V, child molesting as a level 4 felony. The State presented the testimony
of seventeen witnesses, including A.W.’s teacher, the counselor at the school
which A.W. attended, A.W.’s foster mother, A.W.’s half-sibling, and a sexual
assault nurse examiner at the Fort Wayne Sexual Assault Treatment Center
who conducted an interview with A.W. on June 7, 2016. A.W.’s teacher
testified that, on the morning of May 10, 2016, A.W. had disclosed to her that
her bottom hurt and during that day’s school dismissal that “her dad got on her
bottom with a taser.” Transcript Volume II at 37. The sexual assault nurse
examiner testified that A.W. had told her: that Waldron “tased [her] on the
back when [she] was going potty” and “tased [her] again when [she] asked if
something happened” and that it hurt and she was bleeding; that Waldron
“sticked his private in [her] bottom” “[l]ots of times” and that it felt bad and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 2 of 12
hurt; and that Waldron “made [her] put my mouth on his private” “[l]ots of
times” and that she “almost puked from it.” Transcript Volume IV at 23.
[3] On the fourth day of trial, Waldron presented his first witness, the principal at
A.W.’s school from August 2002 until February 25, 2016. He testified that
A.W. was “a student who loved to be at school . . . who struggled . . .
academically . . . and at times, struggled, maybe, behaviorally,” that she was
sent to his office a few times for issues involving “another student, . . . not
wanting to be with the group, wanting to be by herself, not follow[ing] the
directions of the teacher,” and that she was involved in a “couple incidents,
maybe, where she was in the bathroom” and “she would put enough toilet
paper in there that there would cause an issue.” Id. at 97-99. Shortly after his
testimony began, the court took a break to review a previously-entered child
hearsay order pertaining to an objection about the principal’s testimony.
[4] After a ten-minute recess, the court brought Juror No. 4 into the courtroom,
and the following exchange occurred outside the presence of the other jurors:
[The Court]: And you had told – you notified the, um, Bailiff at
the close of our last break that the, um, witness, who was just on
the stand, when we took the break, um, that you have a close
friend, who’s a resource teacher at [A.W.’s school], that disclosed
information to you about – about him, um, about things that
occurred during that time frame, is that correct?
[Juror No. 4]: Yes, and in conversation of, you know, just visiting
and I would ask her how things were going at school and she
would just make comments regarding [the principal’s] presence or
lack of presence on several occasions. Now, I don’t – I’m not – I
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 3 of 12
know that she worked there when he was there because she had
worked at Re-Roanoke previously and was transferred to [A.W.’s
school]. And, you know, as a Resource teacher she was to work
with students that were having behavioral problems and on one-
on-one and that type of thing. She never revealed any names or of
students or anything but, you know, in conversation she would
talk about things going at school. And that –
[The Court]: Anything that regards this case?
[Juror No. 4]: I have no idea, like I said, she –
[The Court]: Okay, nothing that connected it to this case that she
said to you?
[Juror No. 4]: No, but – but she would just – just describe
incidents that would happen at school and it sounds like some of
these behaviors may have been related to [A.W.] but I do not
know that and she did not say any specific names, but I don’t – I
don’t want to do anything that is going to cause a mistrial or
something like that and –
[The Court]: . . . I’m glad you let [the bailiff] know it as soon as
you realized that. . . . [H]ave you stated any of that information in
the presence of any of the other jurors?
[Juror No. 4]: We just talked about it –
[The Court]: You and [the bailiff]?
[Juror No. 4]: What I told [the bailiff]?
[The Court]: Yes.
[Juror No. 4]: We just discussed it as – in the room.
[The Court]: Who discussed it in the room?
[Juror No. 4]: Well, they asked me what it was about and I said –
[The Court]: Can you tell me what you told them exactly?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 4 of 12
[Juror No. 4]: Exactly what I told you that I have a close personal
friend who works at [A.W.’s school], and that’s all I said.
[The Court]: Okay. You didn’t tell them that – or did you tell
them anything else other than you had a friend? Did you tell them
anything about not being able to be objective to this witness?
[Juror No. 4]: I told them that I wasn’t sure if I could be objective
to this witness.
Id. at 104-106. Juror No. 4 indicated she had conveyed that her friend had
relayed information regarding the principal, that she had not said anything to the
jury “about thinking any of the information . . . from [her] friend was – had to do
with [A.W.],” and that she “didn’t go into any detail as to what was confided
regarding him” to the jury. Id. at 106. When the court asked if she could set
aside what she had heard from her friend and be objective as to how the facts
pertain to the case, she stated, “[w]ell, as [the principal] was saying I don’t
remember, that – that’s what brought all these conversations back to mind were
things that she told me, that she had complaints as – .” Id. The court asked if she
meant “like to him not being able to remember things,” and she clarified, “[n]o,
not remember things. Availability.” Id.
[5] The State and Waldron’s counsel also questioned Juror No. 4. Id. at 107. She
answered in the negative when asked, “[w]hen you said you didn’t go into any
detail with the jurors, did you tell the jurors what your friend had told you”
about the principal and when asked whether she went into detail with the jury
about her concerns regarding the principal. Id. In answering the question of
whether she told the jurors anything that would make them “either not believe
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 5 of 12
or have heightened belief” of the principal, Juror No. 4 stated, “I don’t know, I
may have rolled my eyes trying to think how I should – what I should respond”
and “I don’t know if any of my body language may have been interpreted as
negative towards the witness, I don’t know.” Id. She indicated that when the
jurors went into the jury room, she was the first one in and stayed by the door,
the other jurors “went to their – they were standing” “around their chairs,” and
she “approached the Bailiff and . . . said I have some concerns.” Id. at 108.
She indicated that she and the bailiff were “very close together”; that she
expressed that she felt like she needed to speak to the judge about the principal;
and that, when the bailiff inquired into what she wanted to share, she had a
quiet conversation with the bailiff and explained she “had a friend who [was
employed at A.W.’s school] at this time [who] relayed information” regarding
the principal and that she “wasn’t sure [she] could be objective” “to this
witness.” Id. at 108-109. In response to being asked whether she believed any
jurors were able to hear the conversation, she responded that she did not know.
[6] Waldron’s counsel moved for a mistrial and argued that what the other jurors
overheard from Juror No. 4’s conversation with the bailiff was unascertainable
and that the other jurors “may be tainted” by Juror No. 4’s “inside
information” regarding the principal. Id. at 110. His counsel stated, “[e]ven if
her stating that she can’t be objective, the logical conclusion would be then
there must be a problem with this witness, and that problem could only be
either credibility or non-credibility, they go hand and hand [sic]. If you can’t be
objective.” Id. at 111. The court responded, “Correct, I believe it could be
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 6 of 12
either one,” “but what I’m saying is it’s not – he’s not credible or it’s not he is
credible,” and “the word objective leaves that open for debate.” Id.
[7] Determining that it would question the jurors without examination by the
parties, the court brought each juror into the courtroom individually and asked
whether he or she overheard any specifics of the conversation between Juror No.
4 and the bailiff. Each juror besides Juror Nos. 12 and 38 responded in the
negative to the court’s inquiry. Juror No. 12 indicated:
Um, no pacifics [sic], just that she has a friend that used to either
work at [A.W.’s school] or worked in the school system, that she
has previously had a conversation of this incident but she was
just now aware when [the principal] was giving his testimony
that it all came together to her about what she was talking about
back at [A.W.’s school] with the incident.
Id. at 115. The court asked Juror No. 12 whether Juror No. 4 shared any
specifics about any incidents, and Juror No. 12 stated, “[n]o, there were no
pacifics [sic] and no names given of what she told.” Id. Juror No. 38 stated,
“the only thing I heard was that she knew [the principal] and that there was, uh,
she had information from a co-worker” and “[t]hat’s the only thing I heard.”
Id. at 120.
[8] The court asked whether Waldron wished for Juror No. 4 to be dismissed, and
his counsel answered affirmatively and renewed his request for a mistrial. After
the request was denied, Waldron’s counsel stated, “then, yes, we would be fine
with striking” Juror No. 4. Id. at 121. The court dismissed Juror No. 4 and, in
addressing the jury collectively, stated:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 7 of 12
We did excuse Juror #4, she didn’t do anything wrong, it wasn’t
that . . . just sometimes during the court [sic] of a trial, there’s so
many witnesses and I know when we’re going through . . . the
jury selection process, the attorneys are asking all these questions
about people you know, . . . and sometimes you just don’t realize
certain events until they occur. So . . . it’s one of the reasons we
have alternates. So, I will – I do just want to admonish you that
if you . . . heard any – if you did over hear anything, and I know
I asked each of you individually . . . that you just . . . not consider
any of that. Not discuss any of that with any of your fellow
jurors and just resume as though that . . . information never
occurred[.]
Id. at 123. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Waldron guilty as
charged.
Discussion
[9] The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Waldron’s
motion for mistrial. “[A] mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only justified
when other remedial measures are insufficient to rectify the situation.” Isom v.
State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 481 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927,
929 (Ind. 2001)), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). The Indiana
Supreme Court has explained:
A trial court is in the best position to evaluate whether a mistrial
is warranted because it can assess first-hand all relevant facts and
circumstances and their impact on the jury. We therefore review
denial of a motion for mistrial only for abuse of discretion.
However, the correct legal standard for a mistrial is a pure
question of law, which we review de novo.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 8 of 12
Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 935 (Ind. 2014) (citations omitted).
[10] “An impartial jury is the cornerstone of a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 of our Indiana Constitution.” Id. at 936.
“Defendants seeking a mistrial for suspected jury taint are entitled to the
presumption of prejudice only after making two showings, by a preponderance
of the evidence: (1) extra-judicial contact or communications between jurors
and unauthorized persons occurred, and (2) the contact or communications
pertained to the matter before the jury.” Id. at 939 (citing Currin v. State, 497
N.E.2d 1045, 1046 (Ind. 1986)). On the other hand, if a defendant fails to make
the initial two-part showing, the presumption does not apply. Id. “Instead, the
trial court must apply the probable harm standard for juror misconduct,
granting a new trial only if the misconduct is ‘gross and probably harmed’ the
defendant.” Id. (quoting Henri v. Curto, 908 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Ind. 2009)).
[11] Waldron maintains that he showed by a preponderance of the evidence that a
prohibited extra-judicial conversation occurred between Juror No. 4 and the
bailiff. He contends extra-judicial contact and communication occurred during
the course of his trial and asserts that:
[Juror No. 4’s] statements in response to the court coupled with
the fact that two jurors overheard this conversation when
questioned by the trial court satisfies by preponderance of the
evidence that there was a conversation between the bailiff and
[Juror No. 4] that this extrajudicial communication occurred and
that the communication pertained to the matter of a witness for
the appellant in his case in chief.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 9 of 12
Appellant’s Brief at 13.
[12] To the extent that Waldron argues he is entitled to a presumption of prejudice
based on Juror No. 4’s conversation with the bailiff in the jury room, he does
not develop an argument that extra-judicial contact or communications
occurred between jurors and unauthorized persons. Our review of the record
reveals that, as soon as she realized that she had prior information about a
witness, Juror No. 4 informed the bailiff. Specifically, when the court took a
ten-minute break from the witness’s testimony, Juror No. 4 entered the jury
room, approached the bailiff, and expressed that she had some concerns and felt
like she needed to speak to the judge. We do not find that Waldron is entitled
to a presumption of prejudice under these circumstances.
[13] We turn to the probable harm standard for juror misconduct and will grant a
new trial only if the misconduct is “gross and probably harmed” the defendant,
which we review for an abuse of discretion. See Henri, 908 N.E.2d at 202.
Waldron contends that, “since this improper conversation took place prior to
the witness testifying, one cannot know the extent that it tainted the jurors,”
and highlights “the total circumstances of [Juror No. 4’s] body language in
conjunction with the conversation with the bailiff.” Appellant’s Brief at 13-14.
[14] We find that Juror No. 4’s conduct did not constitute gross misconduct. This
Court found that a juror’s misconduct was gross and probably harmed the
defendant in Dickenson v. State, 732 N.E.2d 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). In that
case, during voir dire, a potential juror was asked whether she had a relationship
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 10 of 12
with the defendant or potential witnesses that would affect her ability to be an
impartial juror, and she “did not acknowledge that she had such a relationship
with Dickenson, who had been her neighbor during childhood” and instead
“stated that she knew a few of the potential witnesses, but that her ability to
weigh the testimony of those witnesses would not be affected.” 732 N.E.2d at
240. She also did not respond when asked whether she had prior knowledge
about the facts of the case. Id. The potential juror was chosen as a juror, and,
following the verdict of guilty, a member of Dickenson’s family recognized her
while she was being examined. Id. Further investigation, the submission of
affidavits, and the testimony of four witnesses revealed that the juror “had lied
about her relationship to . . . the victim’s wife, and her pre-trial knowledge of
the case.” Id. On appeal from the denial of the defendant’s petition for post-
conviction review, this court reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that
the juror’s act of lying during voir dire constituted juror misconduct and that
“because the evidence reveals that [the juror] had knowledge of the case prior to
trial, and was friendly with the victim’s wife, who testified at trial . . . the
misconduct was gross and probably harmed the defendant.” Id. at 242.
[15] Here, by contrast, there is no indication that Juror No. 4 lied or otherwise made
misrepresentations. When the principal testified, Juror No. 4 became aware of
who he was and that they shared a personal connection, and she approached
the bailiff to discuss her concerns. When the court learned of her concerns, it
questioned Juror No. 4 and determined that it would question the other jurors.
The record reveals that all of the jurors indicated that they did not hear specifics
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 11 of 12
of Juror No. 4’s conversation with the bailiff. Juror No. 38 stated that she only
heard that Juror No. 4 knew the principal and “that there was, uh, she had
information from a co-worker.” Transcript Volume IV at 120. The court
removed Juror No. 4 and admonished the jury to not discuss what they heard
and to resume as though the information never occurred.
[16] Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied Waldron’s motion for mistrial. See Henri, 908 N.E.2d at 202-
204 (holding that the defendant failed to show misconduct which was gross and
probably harmed the defendant based upon claims that one juror’s receipt of a
cell phone call created pressure to reach a hasty verdict, and that the alternate
juror communicated with the regular jurors during deliberations).
Conclusion
[17] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Waldron’s convictions.
[18] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1723 | March 29, 2019 Page 12 of 12