Joseph D. Haskins III v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Dec 19 2014, 10:20 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JACK QUIRK GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
GRAHAM T. YOUNGS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JOSEPH D. HASKINS III, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 18A02-1408-CR-553
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE DELAWARE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Kimberly S. Dowling, Judge
Cause No. 18C02-0909-FC-23
December 19, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Joseph D. Haskins III appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation.
Haskins raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented
sufficient evidence to support the revocation of his probation. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 20, 2010, Haskins pleaded guilty to criminal recklessness, as a Class C
felony. The trial court sentenced Haskins to four years, with two years suspended to
probation. As a condition of his probation, Haskins was ordered to not commit new
crimes. On December 1, 2011, the State filed a notice of probation violation after
Haskins had been charged with intimidation, as a Class D felony. Haskins admitted to
the probation violation and the court ordered him to serve an additional eighteen months
on probation.
On July 25, 2013, the State filed a second notice of probation violation, in which
the State alleged that Haskins had been arrested and charged with unlawful possession of
a firearm by a serious violent felon, as a Class B felony; receiving stolen property, a
Class D felony; and resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor. The State
later amended its petition to add that Haskins had also been charged with intimidation, as
a Class D felony, and obstruction of justice, a Class D felony.
On July 10, 2014, the court held a fact-finding hearing on the State’s amended
second notice. At that hearing, Haskins’ probation officer, Connie Pickett, identified
Haskins in court and testified that he was one of her probationers. The State then offered
into evidence a bench trial order of the Delaware Circuit Court—the same court hearing
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Haskins’ probation-revocation hearing—which identified the defendant as “Joseph D.
Haskins” and his attorney as “Jack A. Quirk.” State’s Ex. 1. Haskins was represented at
his probation-revocation hearing by Jack Quirk. The bench trial order further stated that
Haskins had been found guilty of “Carrying a Handgun Without a License . . . , enhanced
to a Class C felony.” Id. And the bench trial order was signed by Judge Dowling, the
same judge presiding over Haskins’ probation-revocation hearing.
Following the parties’ arguments, the court revoked Haskins’ probation and
ordered him to serve eighteen months in the Department of Correction. This appeal
ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
On appeal, Haskins argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked
his probation. As our supreme court has explained:
Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to
which a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court determines the
conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are
violated. Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation
rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in
deciding how to proceed. If this discretion were not afforded to trial courts
and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be
less inclined to order probation to future defendants. Accordingly, a trial
court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using
the abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion occurs where the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances.
Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citations omitted).
Haskins’ only argument on appeal, which spans all of one paragraph, is that
“[t]here was no evidence presented to the court that Joseph Haskins was the same Joseph
Haskins who was convicted” on the firearm charge. Appellant’s Br. at 6. In support,
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Haskins relies on Baxter v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1037, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans.
denied. In Baxter, we held that the trial court erred when it admitted a law enforcement
incident report that was uncertified, unverified, and unsigned by a relevant officer. Id. at
1043. As this report was the State’s only evidence that the probationer had violated the
conditions of his probation, we held that, “[a]bsent the erroneously admitted incident
report, the State presented no evidence of probative value” and “failed to identify” the
probationer “as a participant in the alleged” other offenses. Id. at 1044.
That is not the case here. Haskins has not objected to the State’s Exhibit 1, the
bench trial order. And that order was prepared by the same judge who presided over the
probation-revocation hearing; it followed a bench trial in the same court as the probation-
revocation hearing; it named “Joseph D. Haskins”; and it stated that Haskins was
represented by the same attorney who represented Haskins at the probation-revocation
hearing. State’s Ex. 1. At the very least, the trial judge was in a position to take judicial
notice that the man against whom she had entered a judgment of conviction on the
firearm charge was the same man before her in the probation-revocation hearing. Baxter
is inapposite, and the State presented sufficient evidence to support the revocation of
Haskins’ probation. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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