Keevin G. Rassi v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                       FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                               Aug 16 2019, 8:56 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                 Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                            and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Donald R. Shuler                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Barkes, Kolbus, Rife & Shuler, LLP                       Attorney General
    Goshen, Indiana
    Benjamin J. Shoptaw
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Keevin G. Rassi,                                         August 16, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-459
    v.                                               Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Gretchen S. Lund,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    20D04-1804-CM-918
    Crone, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019                  Page 1 of 11
    Case Summary
    [1]   Following a bench trial, the court found Keevin G. Rassi guilty of class A
    misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) and class B
    misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. The court imposed concurrent
    sentences of one year and 180 days, respectively, all suspended to probation.
    Rassi contends that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and
    that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his
    character. We agree with Rassi that his leaving the scene of an accident
    conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and therefore reverse that
    conviction. In all other respects, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   The facts most favorable to the trial court’s judgment are as follows. At 1:45
    a.m. on April 22, 2018, Bristol Police Department Officer Jerrid Arnold was
    driving westbound on U.S. Highway 20 and approached the intersection of
    County Road 27. At the northeast corner of the intersection, he saw a pickup
    truck with its headlights on approximately five feet off the roadway in a ditch
    owned by the Elkhart County Highway Department. The officer continued
    westbound on Highway 20 “until [he] could safely turn around, then [he] went
    back to the intersection to check on the vehicle[,]” which was facing southeast.
    Tr. at 14. When he returned to the truck, its headlights were off. Officer
    Arnold looked inside the truck and smelled the odor of “burnt rubber inside the
    cabin of the vehicle.” 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019   Page 2 of 11
    [3]   The roadside area north of Highway 20 is “a marsh.” 
    Id. at 15.
    “It has
    standing water, it has cattails, it’s overgrown, it’s muddy[.]” 
    Id. Officer Arnold
    saw that “vegetation had been knocked over” and also saw “fresh” ruts “about
    a foot deep and about […] four foot in length” where the truck “had attempted
    to […] spin out and […] free itself.” 
    Id. at 16,
    15. The road surface was dry,
    and Officer Arnold saw one set of “fresh wet footprints that left the vehicle and
    headed northbound on County Road 27.” 
    Id. at 16.
    The footprints led “to a
    residence on the west side of the roadway.” 
    Id. at 17.
    The officer also saw tire
    marks on the road that led to the residence, which was owned by Logan
    Hartsough. The driveway of the residence had “burnout marks in it.” 
    Id. at 41.
    Officer Arnold saw Rassi walking to the front door of the residence, which
    “was approximately 40 to 50 yards north of” the accident site. 
    Id. at 18.
    [4]   Rassi’s “pants were wet from about the knee down” and had mud and “cattail
    fur” on them. 
    Id. The tread
    pattern of his boots matched that of the wet
    footprints on the road. Officer Arnold saw that Rassi “had glassy, bloodshot
    eyes” and “swayed on occasion[.]” 
    Id. He also
    had “slurred speech” and
    “smelt of an alcoholic beverage.” 
    Id. at 20.
    Officer Arnold asked Rassi “if he
    had crashed his vehicle.” 
    Id. at 19.
    Rassi was “very uncooperative.” 
    Id. at 19.
    The officer handcuffed Rassi and conducted a patdown search, which
    uncovered a set of keys to the truck in his right front pocket.
    [5]   Officer Arnold asked Rassi to perform three field sobriety tests, all of which he
    failed. Rassi refused to take a certified breath test. Officer Arnold read him his
    Miranda rights, and Rassi replied that “he would not answer questions.” 
    Id. at Court
    of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019   Page 3 of 11
    51. Officer Arnold obtained a search warrant for a blood draw, which revealed
    a blood alcohol concentration of .182. As the officer transported Rassi to jail,
    Rassi “made the unprovoked statement that he had had six beers.” 
    Id. at 45.
    [6]   The State charged Rassi with class A misdemeanor OWI and class B
    misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. At Rassi’s bench trial,
    Hartsough testified that he and Rassi had been listening to loud music and
    drinking “in excess” at Hartsough’s home that evening and that he told Rassi
    “he needed to stay.” 
    Id. at 64.
    Hartsough told Rassi that he had an air mattress
    that he would blow up for him, and he went to the garage to turn his air
    compressor on. At that time, Rassi’s truck was parked in Hartsough’s
    driveway. Hartsough “brought the air hose in, and proceeded to blow up the
    mattress and at that point, [Rassi] had stepped outside[,]” presumably to smoke
    a cigarette. 
    Id. at 65.
    “Maybe a little bit more than five minutes” after
    Hartsough went to get the mattress, Hartsough saw “red and blue lights” on the
    wall as he was inflating the mattress. 
    Id. at 73,
    66. He “went to the door” and
    saw “police officers, squad cars outside[.]” 
    Id. at 66.
    He also saw Rassi “in the
    road” and Rassi’s “vehicle farther down the road.” 
    Id. Hartsough is
    “completely deaf on the right hand side[,]” so he could not have heard Rassi’s
    truck leave the driveway “if the stereo was on or the compressor was on, or the
    multitude of both[.]” 
    Id. at 72.
    [7]   The trial court found Rassi guilty as charged and sentenced him to concurrent
    terms of one year for the class A misdemeanor and 180 days for the class B
    misdemeanor, all suspended to probation. This appeal followed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019   Page 4 of 11
    Discussion and Decision
    Section 1 – Rassi’s OWI conviction is supported by sufficient
    evidence.
    [8]   Rassi asserts that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence.
    “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we
    must affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the
    evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant
    guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Abd v. State, 
    121 N.E.3d 624
    , 629 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2019), trans. denied. “It is not our job to reweigh the evidence or to judge
    the credibility of the witnesses, and we consider any conflicting evidence most
    favorably to the trial court’s ruling.” 
    Id. “Furthermore, a
    criminal conviction
    may properly rest entirely upon circumstantial evidence.” 
    Id. “It is
    not
    necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
    innocence.” Hopson v. State, 
    95 N.E.3d 531
    , 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “The
    evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support
    the judgment.” 
    Id. [9] To
    convict Rassi of class A misdemeanor OWI, the State had to establish
    beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a vehicle while intoxicated in a
    manner that endangered a person. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b). Rassi first contends
    that the State failed to prove that he operated his truck. The abovementioned
    circumstantial evidence that Rassi operated his truck is overwhelming, and we
    may not reweigh that evidence in his favor. He also contends that the State
    failed to prove that he operated his truck in a manner that endangered a person.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019   Page 5 of 11
    Section 9-30-5-2 “requires more than intoxication to prove endangerment.”
    Burnett v. State, 
    74 N.E.3d 1221
    , 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Dorsett v.
    State, 
    921 N.E.2d 529
    , 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). “The element of
    endangerment can be established by evidence showing that the defendant’s
    condition or operating manner could have endangered any person, including
    the public, the police, or the defendant.” 
    Id. The State
    showed that Rassi drove
    his truck off the road and into a ditch; this evidence was sufficient to establish
    that he operated his vehicle in a manner that could have endangered himself.
    Therefore, we affirm his conviction for class A misdemeanor OWI.
    Section 2 – Rassi’s leaving the scene of an accident conviction
    is not supported by sufficient evidence.
    [10]   Indiana Code Section 9-26-1-1.1 reads in pertinent part,
    (a) The operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident shall
    do the following:
    (1) Except as provided in section 1.2 of this chapter, the
    operator shall immediately stop the operator’s motor
    vehicle:
    (A) at the scene of the accident; or
    (B) as close to the accident as possible;
    in a manner that does not obstruct traffic more than is
    necessary.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019   Page 6 of 11
    (2) Remain at the scene of the accident until the operator
    does the following:
    (A) Gives the operator’s name and address and the
    registration number of the motor vehicle the
    operator was driving to any person involved in the
    accident.
    (B) Exhibits the operator’s driver’s license to any
    person involved in the accident or occupant of or
    any person attending to any vehicle involved in the
    accident.
    ….
    (4) If the accident involves a collision with an unattended
    vehicle or damage to property other than a vehicle, the
    operator shall, in addition to the requirements of
    subdivisions (1) and (2):
    (A) take reasonable steps to locate and notify the
    owner or person in charge of the damaged vehicle
    or property of the damage; and
    (B) if after reasonable inquiry the operator cannot
    find the owner or person in charge of the damaged
    vehicle or property, the operator must contact a law
    enforcement officer or agency and provide the
    information required by this section.
    An operator of a motor vehicle who knowingly or intentionally fails to comply
    with this subsection commits class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of the
    accident. Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(b).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019   Page 7 of 11
    [11]   In its charging information, the State alleged in pertinent part that Rassi
    damaged unspecified “property of [the] Elkhart County Highway Department”1
    and failed to “take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in
    charge of the damaged property[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 17. Rassi argues
    that “[t]here is simply insufficient evidence to establish that [he] was involved in
    an accident that resulted in property damage.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. He
    further argues that, “[d]ue to the quickness in which the police were at the
    scene, [he] was never given the opportunity to take reasonable steps to identify
    the owner of any damaged property and notify them accordingly.” 
    Id. at 16.
    [12]   Assuming, without deciding, that Rassi damaged the property of the Elkhart
    County Highway Department by gouging large ruts in the ditch, we agree with
    Rassi that he did not have an opportunity to take reasonable steps to locate and
    notify the Highway Department of the damage. Hartsough’s undisputed
    testimony establishes that approximately five minutes (or less) elapsed between
    Rassi driving his truck into a ditch and his apprehension by police outside
    Hartsough’s home in the middle of the night. Under these circumstances, we
    cannot conclude that Rassi had sufficient time to take reasonable steps to locate
    and notify the owner of the damaged ditch. Consequently, we reverse his
    conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.
    1
    Rassi did not assert below, and does not assert on appeal, that the charging information is
    unconstitutionally vague.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019                 Page 8 of 11
    Section 3 – Rassi has failed to establish that his sentence for
    OWI is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
    his character.
    [13]   Finally, Rassi asks us to reduce his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule
    7(B), which provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if,
    after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
    offender. “Sentence review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is very deferential to the
    trial court.” Conley v. State, 
    972 N.E.2d 864
    , 876 (Ind. 2012). “[W]hen
    reviewing a sentence, our principal role is to ‘leaven the outliers’ rather than
    necessarily achieve what is perceived as the ‘correct’ result.” 
    Id. (quoting Cardwell
    v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1225 (Ind. 2008)). “We do not look to
    determine if the sentence was appropriate; instead we look to make sure the
    sentence was not inappropriate.” 
    Id. “Whether a
    sentence is inappropriate
    ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime,
    the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a
    given case.” McFall v. State, 
    71 N.E.3d 383
    , 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “In
    assessing whether a sentence is inappropriate, appellate courts may take into
    account whether a portion of the sentence is ordered suspended or is otherwise
    crafted using any of the variety of sentencing tools available to the trial judge.”
    
    Id. The burden
    is on Rassi to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate.
    
    McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 390
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019   Page 9 of 11
    [14]   The maximum sentence for a class A misdemeanor is one year of
    imprisonment. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2.2 Rassi received a one-year sentence for
    his class A misdemeanor conviction, but it was all suspended to probation.
    Rassi argues that this offense was not especially egregious. We agree, and the
    trial court’s imposition of a fully suspended sentence properly reflects the nature
    of the offense.
    [15]   He further argues that his character merits a reduced sentence. “A defendant’s
    life and conduct are illustrative of his or her character.” Morris v. State, 
    114 N.E.3d 531
    , 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied (2019). “Even a minor
    criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant’s character, and the significance
    of the prior record varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior
    offenses in relation to the current offense.” 
    Id. (citation and
    quotation marks
    omitted). Rassi, who was born in 1983, was convicted of class A misdemeanor
    marijuana possession in 2002 and was sentenced to one year of probation; he
    violated probation twice and received an unsatisfactory discharge. In 2006, he
    was charged with class D felony marijuana possession; the trial court elected to
    enter judgment of conviction as a class A misdemeanor and imposed a sentence
    of one year “good behavior status[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 58. Rassi later
    admitted to violating that status but ultimately received a satisfactory discharge
    2
    Contrary to the State’s suggestion, there are no advisory sentences for misdemeanors. Cf. Appellee’s Br. at
    17 (“While Defendant was not sentenced to the advisory sentence on both counts ….”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019                  Page 10 of 11
    from probation in March 2010. He was not charged with any other offenses
    until this proceeding.
    [16]   Although Rassi apparently lived a law-abiding life for eight years after he was
    discharged from probation, his prior substance-related encounters with the
    criminal justice system reflect poorly on his character. Given his criminal
    history and multiple probation violations, Rassi has not met his burden of
    persuading us that his one-year suspended sentence is inappropriate in light of
    the nature of the offenses or his character. Therefore, we affirm his sentence.
    [17]   Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
    Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-459 | August 16, 2019   Page 11 of 11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-459

Filed Date: 8/16/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/16/2019