Kenneth Jaquin Washington v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this                    Aug 18 2015, 9:17 am
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Marce Gonzalez, Jr.                                       Gregory F. Zoeller
    Dyer, Indiana                                             Attorney General of Indiana
    Jodi Kathryn Stein
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Kenneth Jaquin Washington,                               August 18, 2015
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    45A03-1501-CR-11
    v.                                               Appeal from the Lake County
    Superior Court;
    The Honorable Salvador Vasquez,
    State of Indiana,                                        Judge;
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      45G01-1401-FA-4
    May, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1501-CR-11 | August 18, 2015    Page 1 of 4
    [1]   Kenneth Jaquin Washington appeals his five-year sentence for Class C felony
    possession of cocaine. 1 As his sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On April 3, 2013, Washington sold cocaine to a confidential informant.
    Washington was charged with three counts of Class B felony dealing in
    cocaine, 2 two counts of Class D felony possession of cocaine, 3 and one count of
    Class C felony possession of cocaine. Washington agreed to plead guilty to
    Class C felony possession of cocaine with a sentencing cap of six years. The
    remaining charges were dismissed.
    [3]   At sentencing, the trial court found as mitigators that Washington took
    responsibility and agreed to plead guilty. As aggravators, the trial court
    considered Washington’s criminal history, which included two prior felony
    convictions involving cocaine, and it noted prior judicial leniency had no
    deterrent effect on Washington’s behavior. The trial court sentenced
    Washington to five years in the Department of Correction.
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   When a defendant enters a plea agreement but the trial court retains sentencing
    discretion, even within an agreed-upon cap, a defendant “is entitled to contest
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a)(b)(1)(A) (2006).
    2
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006).
    3
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a) (2006).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1501-CR-11 | August 18, 2015   Page 2 of 4
    the merits of a trial court’s sentencing discretion.” Tumulty v. State, 
    666 N.E.2d 394
    , 396 (Ind. 1996). We may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of
    the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Williams v. State, 
    891 N.E.2d 621
    , 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)). We
    consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but
    also any other factors appearing in the record. Roney v. State, 
    872 N.E.2d 192
    ,
    206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The appellant bears the burden of
    demonstrating his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    ,
    1080 (Ind. 2006).
    [5]   When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting
    point to determine the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 
    878 N.E.2d 218
    (Ind. 2007). The
    sentencing range for a Class C felony is “a fixed term of between two (2) and
    eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years.” Ind. Code §
    35-50-2-6 (2005). Washington requests we reduce his five-year sentence to the
    advisory four years.
    [6]   Regarding the nature of his offense, Washington was contacted by a
    confidential informant wanting to purchase cocaine. Washington employed the
    services of third parties to be “his mules.” (Tr. at 5.) He was trying to “ga[me]
    the system.” (Id.) In this way, he sought to protect himself from prosecution.
    [7]   When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the
    defendant’s criminal history. Rutherford v. State, 
    866 N.E.2d 867
    , 874 (Ind. Ct.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1501-CR-11 | August 18, 2015   Page 3 of 
    4 Ohio App. 2007
    ). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant’s
    character varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in
    relation to the current offense. 
    Id. Washington’s criminal
    history includes
    felony convictions of dealing and possession of cocaine, along with various
    misdemeanors. Washington was sentenced to two years in a work release
    program for one felony and seven years in DOC for the other. Neither deterred
    him from reoffending.
    [8]   Washington’s assertion that his cocaine addiction is a mitigator is not supported
    by the record. Washington states he uses cocaine only “in his cigarettes and
    smoke[s] it once a month.” (App. at 70.) 4 Washington has not sought
    treatment despite two previous convictions involving cocaine. See Caraway v.
    State, 
    959 N.E.2d 847
    , 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (no error when trial court found
    as an aggravator that Caraway recognized addiction but did not seek
    treatment), trans. denied.
    [9]   Washington has not demonstrated his five-year sentence is inappropriate in
    light of his character and his offense. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
    4
    Per Indiana Administrative Rule 9(G)(2)(b), the presentence investigation (PSI) report must be excluded
    from public access. We have included confidential information in this decision only to the extent it “is
    essential to the resolution” of Washington’s claim on appeal. Ind. Admin. Rule 9(G)(7)(a)(ii)(c).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1501-CR-11 | August 18, 2015             Page 4 of 4