J.P. v. Mid American Sound , 25 N.E.3d 165 ( 2015 )

Jan 14 2015, 9:50 am
FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ANTHONY W. PATTERSON GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Lebanon, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ROBERT S. PECK THOMAS M. FISHER
Washington, D.C. Solicitor General
HEATHER HAGAN MCVEIGH
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
VanDam Estate v. Mid-America Sound, et al., ) Consolidated
49D02-1111-CT-044823-001, )
Urschel v. Mid-America Sound, et al., )
49D02-1111-CT-044823-002, )
Brennon v. Mid-America Sound, et al., )
49D02-1111-CT-044823-003, ) No. 49A04-1405-CT-207
Porter v. Mid-America Sound, et al., )
49D02-1111-CT-044823-004, )
Santiago Estate v. Mid-America Sound, et al., )
49D02-1111-CT-044823-005, )
BigJohny Estate v. Mid-America Sound, et al., )
49D02-1111-CT-044823-006, )
Vinnegar v. Mid-America Sound, et al., )
49D02-1111-CT-044823-007, )
Indiana Farmers v. Dave Lucas Ent., et al., )
49D02-1111-CT-044823-008. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Theodore M. Sosin, Judge
Cause No. 49D02-1111-CT-44823
January 14, 2015
OPINION – FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Jordyn Polet was injured when the stage collapsed at a concert at the Indiana State
Fair. Polet declined the State’s settlement offer, and the State distributed, to the claimants
who were willing to settle, all the money available under the Indiana Tort Claims Act
(ITCA) cap of five million dollars. After her parents sued the State and others, the State
asserted, as an affirmative defense, that the ITCA made it immune to Polet’s claim.
Polet moved for partial summary judgment on the State’s affirmative defense it was
immune under the ITCA. The trial court denied her motion. Polet argues the limits on the
State’s aggregate tort liability, as applied to her, violate the Indiana Constitution’s open
courts and equal privileges guarantees. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
Before a concert at the Indiana State Fair in 2011, there was severe weather and the
stage roof collapsed, causing a number of deaths and injuries. Some of the victims sued
the State of Indiana, the Indiana State Fair Commission, the Indiana State Police
(collectively, “the State”), and various private entities. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-4 provides
that when a governmental entity or employee is not immune from liability, the combined
aggregate liability of all governmental entities and of all public employees is capped at
seven hundred thousand dollars for injury to or death of one person in any one occurrence
1
We heard oral argument December 15, 2014 in Indianapolis. We commend counsel on the quality of
their advocacy.
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and at five million dollars for injury to or death of all persons in that occurrence.
The five million dollar limit was made available to settle the victims’ claims. Polet
was offered $1690.75, which she declined. She was the only claimant who did not settle.
The other sixty-four claimants accepted the State’s settlement offers, and those settlements
exhausted the five million dollar cap.
The following year the legislature made available an additional six million dollars
to compensate the victims, but it specified the money was available only to victims who
had already released the State from liability: “To receive a distribution under this chapter
for an occurrence, an eligible person must have already released all governmental entities
and public employees from any liability for loss resulting from the occurrence.” Ind. Code
§ 34-13-8-6. Polet was therefore not eligible for any of that money either.
The trial court determined the statutory liability cap did not violate Polet’s
constitutional rights, and it denied her motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule
56(C). On review of a summary judgment, we face the same issues that were before the
trial court and follow the same process. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754
N.E.2d 905, 908 (Ind. 2001). The party appealing from a summary judgment has the
burden of persuading us the grant or denial of summary judgment was erroneous. Id. When
a trial court grants summary judgment, we carefully scrutinize that determination to ensure
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a party was not improperly prevented from having its day in court. Id. On a motion for
summary judgment, all doubts as to the existence of material issues of fact must be resolved
against the moving party. Id. at 909. All facts and reasonable inferences from those facts
are construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. If there is any doubt as to what
conclusion a jury could reach, then summary judgment is improper. Id.
When a statute is challenged as violating the Indiana Constitution, our standard of
review is well settled. A statute is presumed constitutional until the party challenging its
constitutionality clearly overcomes the presumption by a contrary showing. Sims v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 782 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ind. 2003). If a statute has two reasonable
interpretations, one constitutional and the other not, we will choose the interpretation that
will uphold the constitutionality of the statute. Id. We do not presume the General
Assembly violated the constitution unless the unambiguous language of the statute so
mandates. Id. A reviewing court should nullify a statute on constitutional grounds only
where such result is clearly rational and necessary. Id.
1. Open Courts
Ind. Const. art. I, § 12 provides: “All courts shall be open; and every person, for
injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without
denial; speedily, and without delay.” The application of the ITCA liability cap to Polet did
not violate the open courts clause.
There is no right under the open courts clause to any particular cause of action and
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the legislature may create, modify, or abolish a particular cause of action. Smith v. Indiana
Dep’t of Correction, 883 N.E.2d 802, 810 (Ind. 2008). But to the extent there is an existing
cause of action, the courts must be open to entertain it. Id. The constitution does not
preclude the General Assembly from modifying or eliminating a common law tort, but
Section 12 requires legislation that deprives a person of a complete tort remedy must be a
rational means to achieve a legitimate legislative goal. McIntosh v. Melroe Co., a Div. of
Clark Equip. Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 979 (Ind. 2000). The ITCA aggregate liability cap is a
rational means to achieve a legitimate legislative goal, and we cannot find its application
to Polet unconstitutional.
Polet characterizes herself as “a claimant with a valid, accrued cause of action
authorized by statute,” but who “has no practical means of asserting it” just because she
declined a settlement offer she felt was inadequate and because the State paid the maximum
amount of its liability to others. (Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Br. (hereinafter “Polet
Br.”) at 12.)
We note initially the aggregate liability caps in the ITCA have been found
constitutional: “The legislative purpose behind the liability limitations was to protect the
financial integrity of a governmental entity, and this statutory provision cannot be deemed
repugnant to the constitution merely because it restricts the amount of damages available
to the Class.” In re Train Collision at Gary, Ind. on Jan. 18, 1993, 654 N.E.2d 1137, 1149
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
“Article I, Section 12 does not specify any particular remedy for any particular
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wrong. Rather, it leaves the definition of wrongs and the specification of remedies to the
legislature and the common law.” Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 499 (Ind. 2006). It
is within the legislature’s authority to expand or restrict the scope of sovereign immunity
through the ITCA. State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1337 (Ind. 1992). The
Rendleman Court held the law enforcement immunity section of the Act was a
constitutional exercise of legislative authority. Id. That the immunity section “may result
in Rendleman bearing the full economic burden of his injuries and damages without the
ability to insure himself against such losses, is a matter of policy for the legislature, not
this Court, to address.” Id. at 1333.
Because the open courts clause does not prevent the legislature from modifying or
restricting common-law rights or remedies, the State argues Polet has “no protectable
interest” in a tort claim against the State. (State’s Br. at 12.) The State asserts Polet’s
“right to bring her claim is subject to the Act’s restrictions,” including the liability cap. (Id.
at 15.) The State notes Polet was not precluded from pursuing a claim; in fact, she did and
the State offered her a settlement. It was not lack of access to the courts that prevented
Polet’s recovery – it was the statutory limit on the State’s liability.
Even if the effect of the application of the ITCA’s aggregate cap left Polet “no
practical means of asserting” her tort claim, the restriction on Polet’s right to bring her
claim did not violate the open courts clause. There is a right of access to the courts, and
the legislature cannot unreasonably deny citizens the right to exercise this right. Martin v.
Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1283 (Ind. 1999). Nor can the legislature deprive a person of a
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complete tort remedy arbitrarily and unreasonably, consistent with the protections Section
12 affords. Legislation that restricts such a right must be a rational means to achieve a
legitimate legislative goal. Id. And see McIntosh v. Melroe Co., a Div. of Clark Equip.
Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 979-80 (Ind. 2000) (Section 12 requires that legislation that deprives
a person of a complete tort remedy must be a rational means to achieve a legitimate
legislative goal).
One of the main concerns the ITCA was intended to address was protection of the
public treasury from a multitude of tort lawsuits. Harrison v. Veolia Water Indianapolis,
LLC, 929 N.E.2d 247, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). See also Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization
and Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share the Sovereign’s Immunities from
Exemplary Damages?, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 175, 199 (1997) (noting the concept of sovereign
immunity “may be substantially predicated on protecting the public treasury, and thereby
the taxpayers at large, from what could be enormous monetary liabilities if government
were held legally accountable in civil litigation in exactly the same fashion as private
entities and persons”). The aggregate liability cap is a rational means to achieve the
legitimate legislative goal of protecting the public treasury. See Thompson v. State, 425
N.E.2d 167, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (there is a rational basis to the legislature’s attempt
to protect the public treasury from unlimited liability in tort).
2. Equal Privileges
Ind. Const. Art. I, § 23 provides “[t]he General Assembly shall not grant to any
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not
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equally belong to all citizens.” Where a statute grants unequal privileges or immunities to
different classes of persons, proper constitutional inquiry under Section 23 requires
consideration of two factors. First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must
be reasonably related to inherent characteristics that distinguish the unequally treated
classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally
available to all persons similarly situated.2 Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 78-79. The test for a
rational relationship for legislative classifications under Article 1, § 23 is very similar to
the requirement of rationality under Article 1, § 12 discussed above. Morrison v. Sadler,
821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
The protections assured by Section 23 apply fully, equally, and without diminution
to prohibit any and all improper grants of unequal privileges or immunities, including not
only those grants involving suspect classes or impinging upon fundamental rights but other
such grants as well. Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80. In determining whether a statute violates
Section 23, we exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion. Id.
The considerations embodied in the first factor focus on the nature of the
classifications of citizens on which the legislature is basing its disparate treatment. Where
the legislature singles out one person or class of persons to receive a privilege or immunity
not equally provided to others, such classification must be based on distinctive, inherent
characteristics that rationally distinguish the unequally treated class, and the disparate
2
As we find no disparate treatment that raises a section 23 concern, we do not address whether any
“preferential treatment” was “uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated.”
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treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to such distinguishing
characteristics. Id. at 78-79.
Legislative classification becomes a judicial question when the lines drawn appear
arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. Id. If the classification is based on substantial
distinctions with reference to the subject matter, we will not substitute our judgment for
that of the legislature; nor will we inquire into the legislative motives prompting such
classification. Id.
Polet characterizes the “class of citizens” she is in as persons who are victims of the
“[S]tate’s negligence that results in injuries to multiple persons” as opposed to “persons
who are the sole victims of the [S]tate’s negligent acts.” (Polet Br. at 13.) When there are
many victims, none can be eligible for damages at the individual cap amount of seven
hundred thousand dollars. The disparate treatment between a small group of injured
persons and a large group violates the first prong of the Collins analysis, Polet says, because
it is not reasonably related to inherent characteristics that distinguish the unequally treated
classes. She asserts no such inherent characteristics distinguish claimants injured by
themselves from claimants injured along with numerous other persons, nor is there
anything that distinguishes Polet’s claim from that of anyone else who was injured in the
stage collapse “that would justify complete foreclosure of her claim.” (Polet Br. at 15.) “It
is the claim, not any innate characteristic of the person, that defines the class.” McIntosh,
729 N.E.2d at 981.
We note initially that nothing in the ITCA classifies claimants or “promises
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recovery to some while denying it to others.” (State’s Br. at 20.) The State characterizes
Polet’s proposed classification as just “an incidental effect of the Act,” which treats all
claimants the same, not differently. Id. at 21. In limiting the amount recoverable by
individual and by incident, the ITCA applies equally to all claims and all incidents, and
both categories Polet defines are subject to the individual and aggregate caps. We therefore
cannot find there is a classification in the case before us that implicates the equal privileges
clause.
We acknowledge that in Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla.
2014), the Florida Supreme Court found unconstitutional the classification of tort claimants
when there are multiple victims rather than a single victim. Even if we were to recognize
such a classification in Indiana, its application would not violate the Indiana equal
privileges clause.
Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages in medical
negligence actions provided for a limit of five hundred thousand dollars per claimant. “The
total noneconomic damages recoverable by all claimants from all practitioner defendants
under this subsection shall not exceed $1 million in the aggregate.” Fla. Stat § 766.118(2).
The McCall Court determined the statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic
damages imposed “unfair and illogical” burdens on injured parties when an act of medical
negligence gave rise to multiple claimants. Id. at 901. That type of classification was
“purely arbitrary and unrelated to a true state interest.” Id. In such circumstances, medical
malpractice claimants do not receive the same rights to full compensation because of
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arbitrarily diminished compensation for legally cognizable claims:
[T]he death of a wife who leaves only a surviving spouse to claim the
$250,000 is not equal to the death of a wife who leaves a surviving spouse
and four minor children, resulting in five claimants to divide $250,000. We
fail to see how this classification bears any rational relationship to the
Legislature’s stated goal of alleviating the financial crisis in the medical
liability industry. Such a categorization offends the fundamental notion of
equal justice under the law and can only be described as purely arbitrary and
unrelated to any state interest. Further, the statutory cap on wrongful death
noneconomic damages does not bear a rational relationship to the stated
purpose that the cap is purported to address, the alleged medical malpractice
insurance crisis in Florida.
Id. (quoting St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961, 972 (Fla. 2000), reh’g
denied) (emphasis supplied by the McCall Court).
The dual-cap system in Indiana has the same effect, Polet argues, because it is
inherently discriminatory when applied without regard to the number of claimants who are
entitled to recover. No inherent characteristic of the class justifies the differential treatment
of identical claims. The State’s consent to be sued, as represented by the ITCA, therefore
is not uniformly applied and available to all qualified claimants, as required by Collins.
McCall is distinguishable. There, the distinction between single claimant and
multiple-claimant classes had no rational relationship to the legislature’s goal of alleviating
a purported crisis in the medical liability insurance industry. The aggregate cap in the
ITCA, by contrast, does bear a rational relationship to the legislative goal of protecting the
public treasury against unlimited tort liability. The ITCA’s aggregate cap does not classify
tort victims, but only occurrences, and the legislature may properly decide that occurrences
that generate over five million dollars in liability place too great a burden on the treasury.
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CONCLUSION
The application of the ITCA aggregate liability cap to Polet did not violate the open
courts clause of the Indiana constitution, nor was Polet in a class of persons treated
unequally compared to other claimants seeking relief under the ITCA. We accordingly
affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
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