Roy Dale Weber v. State of Indiana ( 2015 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                 Jan 20 2015, 9:32 am
    court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    JERRY J. LUX                                    GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Lux & Lux, P.A.                                 Attorney General of Indiana
    Shelbyville, Indiana
    KARL M. SCHARNBERG
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    ROY DALE WEBER,                                 )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                     )
    )
    vs.                               )       No. 73A01-1401-CR-8
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                               )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                      )
    APPEAL FROM THE SHELBY SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable David N. Riggins, Judge
    Cause No. 73D02-1305-FD-166
    January 20, 2015
    MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    RILEY, Judge
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Appellant-Defendant, Roy Dale Weber (Weber), appeals the trial court’s
    revocation of his probation.
    We affirm.
    ISSUE
    Weber raises four issues on appeal, one of which we find dispositive and which
    we restate as: Whether the trial court properly concluded that Weber had violated the
    terms of his probation.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On November 4, 2013, Weber entered into a plea agreement with the State in
    which he pled guilty to intimidation, a Class D felony, in exchange for the trial court
    imposing 1095 days of incarceration, with 8 days of credit and the remainder suspended
    to probation. As one of the conditions of his probation, Weber had to “serve 365 days on
    House Arrest complying with all rules of the program including payment of any and all
    associated fees.” (Appellant’s App. p. 19). After informing Weber of the standard terms
    and conditions of probation, as well as the associated fees, the trial court allowed Weber
    to report to the Johnson County community corrections, his county of residence, instead
    of the Shelby County community corrections, the location of the charge. The trial court
    cautioned him:
    I don’t care where you do [house arrest], all right? But if you’re not on
    house arrest, I’ll revoke your [] probation. [] So in other words, if Johnson
    County won’t accept, you better move across the county line and find a
    place in Shelby County.
    2
    (Transcript p. 48). The sentencing order reflects that as a special term of probation,
    Weber must “successfully complete 365 days of Home Detention following all rules of
    that program and pay all associated fees directly to Johnson County [c]ommunity
    [c]orrections.” (Appellant’s App. p. 24). The trial court then set the matter for a status
    hearing on November 14, 2013.
    Weber was absent at the status hearing on November 14, 2013 and an arrest
    warrant was issued and executed that same day. Weber appeared before the trial court on
    November 15, 2013. During the status hearing, Weber reported that he had attempted to
    enroll in Johnson County community corrections but had been refused acceptance into
    the home detention program. Weber explained that on the day he attempted to enroll he
    initially did not have sufficient money with him for the “start-up fees,” however, he
    returned later that same day with the correct amount. (Tr. p. 56). Weber testified that the
    intake officer then refused to enroll him because she didn’t anticipate him being able to
    pay the weekly fee and she didn’t “like” his employment as a part-time independent
    scrapper. (Tr. p. 57). At the conclusion of the status hearing, the trial court ordered
    Weber “to jail” and set the matter for a probation revocation hearing. (Tr. p. 58).
    On December 12, 2013, the trial court conducted a probation revocation hearing.
    Finding that Weber was not on home detention as ordered, the trial court concluded that
    he had violated the terms of his probation and imposed a sentence of 365 days at the
    Indiana Department of Correction.
    Weber now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    3
    Both probation and community corrections programs serve as alternatives to
    commitment to the Department of Correction and both are made at the sole discretion of
    the trial court. Treece v. State, 
    10 N.E.3d 52
    , 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A defendant is not
    entitled to serve a sentence in either a probation or a community corrections program;
    rather, placement in either is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not
    a right. 
    Id. The standard
    of review of an appeal from the revocation of a community
    corrections placement mirrors that for revocation of probation. 
    Id. That is,
    a revocation
    of community corrections placement hearing is civil in nature, and the State need only
    prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Id. Probation revocation
    is a two-step process. First, the court must make a factual
    determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually has occurred. 
    Treece, 10 N.E.3d at 56
    . If a violation is proven, then the trial court must determine if the
    violation warrants revocation of the probation. 
    Id. At the
    plea hearing, Weber requested to be placed on home detention through
    community corrections in Johnson County, not through Shelby County—the location of
    the charge. Weber’s counsel testified that he had contacted Johnson County, which had
    pre-approved Weber. This was confirmed by the intake officer’s testimony during the
    probation revocation hearing. See I.C. § 35-38-2.5-5.5(a) (a court in one county may not
    place an offender who resides in another county on home detention in the other county
    where the offender resides until and unless the offender is eligible for home detention in
    his county of residence and supervision will be conducted by either . . . or community
    corrections program located in the offender’s residence county). Weber now maintains
    4
    that because the Johnson County community corrections arbitrarily and illegally denied
    him enrollment in the home detention program as ordered by the trial court, the trial court
    improperly found him in violation of the terms of his probation. We find Weber’s
    argument to be without merit.
    During the plea hearing, the trial court, as a gesture of goodwill, allowed Weber to
    report to Johnson County community corrections. Nevertheless, the trial court warned
    him in very explicit terms that if Johnson County would not accept him, he had to find a
    place in Shelby County. Despite the trial court’s specific pronouncement that he had to
    be on home detention either in Johnson County or Shelby County, Weber failed to
    comply with the order. Weber acknowledged that he was rejected by Johnson County
    community corrections, and despite the approval received from Shelby County
    community corrections that they would be willing to enroll Weber into an adult day
    reporting program, the trial court rejected this proposal because it did not fit the plea
    agreement’s requirement of home detention. The trial court determines the conditions of
    probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Kincaid v. State, 
    736 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Because Weber failed to enroll in a home
    detention program, the trial court properly found Weber in violation of the conditions of
    his probation.
    CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of Weber’s
    probation.
    Affirmed.
    5
    MATHIAS, J. and CRONE, J. concur
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 73A01-1401-CR-8

Filed Date: 1/20/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/20/2015