Antonio Garcia v. State of Indiana ( 2015 )

Feb 03 2015, 10:10 am
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Heath Y. Johnson Gregory F. Zoeller
Suzy St. John Attorney General of Indiana
Johnson, Gray & MacAbee
Larry D. Allen
Franklin, Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ANTONIO GARCIA, February 3, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1402-CR-61
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
The Honorable Jose D. Salinas,
STATE OF INDIANA, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff Case No. 49G14-1208-FD-54147
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Antonio Garcia appeals his conviction for class D felony possession of a
schedule III controlled substance (a hydrocodone/acetaminophen pill). He
argues that the pill found in a container discovered in his pants pocket during a
search incident to arrest was taken in contravention of his state constitutional
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right against unreasonable search and seizure and was therefore inadmissible.
Specifically, he contends that even though he was lawfully arrested and the
search of his person incident to arrest was reasonable, it was unreasonable for
the police to open the container. We conclude that the search of the container
was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution, and therefore the pill was
inadmissible. Accordingly, we reverse Garcia’s conviction.
Facts and Procedural History1
[2] On August 6, 2012, just before 9:00 p.m., Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Officer Philip Robinett saw Garcia driving a white Chevrolet Trailblazer.
Although it was dusk, Garcia did not have the car’s headlights on. Garcia also
failed to signal when he moved from the travel lane to park along the street.
Officer Robinett turned on his emergency lights to make a traffic stop. When
he stopped behind Garcia, Garcia got out of his car. Officer Robinett ordered
him to get back into the car, and Garcia complied. Officer Robinett
approached the driver’s side of Garcia’s vehicle and an assisting officer
approached the passenger side. They saw that Garcia was alone in the car.
Garcia’s first language is Spanish. Officer Robinett does not speak Spanish.
1
We heard oral argument on January 15, 2015, at the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of
Law in Indianapolis. We commend counsel for the quality of their advocacy, and we thank the school for its
hospitality.
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Officer Robinett testified that communication was a “little bit more difficult”
and that there was a “slight language barrier, but based off of hand gestures and
common questions between the police and citizens, we were able to easily
navigate through the traffic stop.” Tr. at 32.2 Officer Robinett asked Garcia if
he had a driver’s license. Garcia did not have a driver’s license, but he gave
Officer Robinett his Mexican identification card. Officer Robinett searched the
BMV database with the name on the identification card and found that Garcia
did not have a valid driver’s license.
[3] Officer Robinett arrested Garcia for class C misdemeanor driving without a
license, although he also had the option of issuing a summons for this particular
offense. Officer Robinett conducted a patdown search of Garcia incident to the
arrest. He found a small metallic cylinder in Garcia’s left front pants pocket.
Officer Robinett had seen similar containers many times, “anywhere between
two to ten times a year” over the previous five years. Id. at 26. In his
experience, these containers held either illegal substances or properly prescribed
medication.3 He opened the container and found half a pill with specific
2
At trial, Garcia used a translator. He testified that he is fine speaking either English or Spanish, but wanted
an interpreter for trial because it made him feel more comfortable. Tr. at 38.
3
The parties dispute Officer Robinett’s testimony regarding the probability that the container held legal
drugs. Garcia states that there was a “strong possibility” that the contents of the container were legal.
Appellant’s Br. at 9. The State asserts that “this kind of container usually carried illegal drug[s].” Appellee’s
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markings on it indicating that it was hydrocodone/acetaminophen, a schedule
III controlled substance. Garcia stated in English, “That’s my narcotic for
pain.” Id. at 29. Officer Robinett did not find a valid prescription for the
medication on Garcia’s person or in the car.
[4] The State charged Garcia with class C misdemeanor driving without a valid
license and class D felony possession of a controlled substance. At trial, Garcia
moved to suppress the evidence found in the container on the grounds that
opening the container was unreasonable under the United States and Indiana
Constitutions. The trial court ultimately denied Garcia’s motion to suppress.
Garcia testified that he lived with his wife and their nine-year-old son and that
his wife’s elderly aunt had also lived with them until she died three days before
his arrest. On the day of his arrest, Garcia cleaned out the aunt’s room and
found the container. He recognized it as a container for medicine and put it in
his pocket so that his son would not get it. He forgot that he had it in his pocket
when he drove the car later that night. Garcia submitted a pharmacy record
showing that the aunt had a prescription for hydrocodone/acetaminophen pills.
Br. at 5. Officer Robinett testified as follows: “Every time I’ve either – I’ve located either some type of illegal
substance or – unless it is a pill that is properly prescribed. That’s the only time I’ve seen it to where the
substance inside this cylinder is a legal substance.” Tr. at 26-27.
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The trial court found Garcia guilty as charged. Garcia appeals his felony
conviction for possession of a schedule III controlled substance.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Garcia argues that the evidence found in the container was inadmissible
because opening the container was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of
the Indiana Constitution. We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility
of evidence “for abuse of [] discretion and reverse only when admission is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error
affects a party’s substantial rights.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind.
2013). “We consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s decision
and any uncontradicted evidence to the contrary.” Lee v. State, 916 N.E.2d 706,
707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). When an appellant’s challenge to the admission of
evidence is based on the argument that the search or seizure of the evidence was
unconstitutional, it raises a question of law, which we review de novo.
Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 41 (Ind. 2014).
[6] Article 1, Section 11 reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
[7] The purpose of Section 11 is to protect the privacy of Indiana citizens from
unreasonable police activity. State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 339-40 (Ind. 2006).
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Thus, “[w]e construe Section 11 liberally in favor of protecting individuals from
unreasonable intrusions on their privacy.” Grier v. State, 868 N.E.2d 443, 444
(Ind. 2007). Although the language of Section 11 tracks the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution verbatim, “Indiana has explicitly rejected
the expectation of privacy as a test of the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”
Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). Under the Indiana
Constitution, the legality of a governmental search “turns on an evaluation of
the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. (citing Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ind. 1994)).
Although other factors may exist, the reasonableness of a search or seizure
turns on a balance of “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a
violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or
seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law
enforcement needs.” Id. at 361. “We place the burden on the State to show
that under the totality of the circumstances its intrusion was reasonable.”
Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340.
[8] Garcia concedes that Officer Robinett had probable cause to arrest him for
driving without a valid license and that the search of his person incident to
arrest was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution. Garcia challenges only
the reasonableness of Officer Robinett’s search of the container itself to discover
its contents. This issue has been settled under the Fourth Amendment. See
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (upholding constitutionality
of officer’s search of crumpled cigarette package found in defendant’s coat
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pocket during search incident to arrest for driving while his license was
revoked); Klopfenstein v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1181, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)
(Fourth Amendment not violated when officer found Tylenol bottle in plastic
bag on defendant’s person during search incident to arrest, saw pills in bottom
of plastic bag, removed pill bottle from bag, opened it, and discovered hashish).
[9] However, the State acknowledges that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does
not dictate the result under the Indiana Constitution.
[W]hile experience has shown that analysis under the Indiana
reasonableness standard generally obtains the same result as that of the
federal Fourth Amendment, it would appear that where a “blanket”
exception to the warrant requirement has been created for federal
purposes it is appropriate to effect a different result which is based
upon the actual considerations at hand according to Indiana’s
constitutional protections.
State v. Moore, 796 N.E.2d 764, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied (2004).
Accordingly, Section 11 requires us to consider the reasonableness of opening the
container based on the totality of the circumstances.
[10] In so doing, we apply the Litchfield factors to the search of the container. As for
the first factor, the degree of concern, knowledge, or suspicion that a criminal
violation had occurred with respect to the pill vial was low prior to opening the
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container.4 As for the degree of intrusion, Garcia contends that it was high
because “Hoosiers would regard the contents of a pill container as private.”
Appellant’s Br. at 6. The State asserts that the degree of intrusion was low
because the opening of the container occurred during a search incident to arrest
supported by probable cause. Each of these arguments addresses a different
aspect of the intrusiveness of this kind of search, and they both have merit.
[11] The next factor to consider is the extent of law enforcement needs. “A search
incident to arrest serves important purposes, such as ensuring that the arrestee is
unarmed, preventing the arrestee from bringing contraband into jail, and
preventing the destruction of evidence.” Edmond v. State, 951 N.E.2d 585, 592
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Garcia argues that “without reasonable concern for
safety, or a reasonable belief [that] it contained evidence relating to the offense
[or] arrest that might be destroyed, the extent of law enforcement needs to
search the metal cylinder was very low.” Id. at 6-7. The State asserts that law
enforcement needs were significant because even if Officer Robinett suspected
4
Because we are examining the reasonableness of opening the container, it would appear that the degree of
concern, knowledge, or suspicion that a violation occurred should be applied to the container rather than the
arrest.
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that the container held either legal or illegal drugs, he did not know exactly
what was in it, and unknown objects always pose potential risks.
[12] Officer Robinett testified that he did not open the container out of safety
concerns. Throughout the traffic stop and arrest, Garcia was completely
cooperative. Also, Officer Robinett testified that he was familiar with these
types of containers and they had always held either illegal or properly
prescribed medication. Although there could be situations in which the police
find an unfamiliar object on a person through a search incident to arrest that
may justify further investigation, that situation did not occur here. There is no
evidence in the record that Officer Robinett had any concern or suspicion that
the container held anything that threatened his or the public’s safety.
[13] As far as discovering or preserving evidence is concerned, the State conceded at
oral argument that probable cause did not exist to support a warrant to search
the container. In fact, there is no evidence in the record that would even
establish reasonable suspicion that Garcia was carrying illegal drugs. He was
pulled over because he did not have his headlights on at dusk and failed to use
his turn signal while parking. He was arrested for a class C misdemeanor
driving offense. Thus, there was no need for law enforcement to preserve
evidence relating to the offense for which Garcia was arrested. Also, there were
no circumstances unrelated to the reason for the arrest that led Officer Robinett
to suspect that Garcia was impaired, had engaged in any illegal drug use, or
was involved in any illegal drug dealing. Officer Robinett testified that he knew
that containers like Garcia’s were used to hold properly prescribed drugs. The
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simple fact that these containers could also be used to hold illegal substances,
without more, does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Garcia’s
container held illegal substances. Where there was no reasonable suspicion that
illegal substances were present, the need of law enforcement to discover and/or
preserve evidence was nonexistent.5
[14] In sum, Officer Robinett had no safety concerns to justify opening the container
and also had no reasonable suspicion that it held any illegal substances. We
conclude that given the facts of this case, it was unreasonable under the Indiana
Constitution to open the container found in Garcia’s pants pocket during a
search incident to arrest. Accordingly, the pill was inadmissible. Therefore, we
reverse Garcia’s conviction for class D felony possession of a schedule III
controlled substance.
[15] Reversed.
Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
5
Given that the container was seized incident to a lawful arrest and Garcia was being taken to jail and
booked, it may be that the container could have or would have been seized and opened as part of routine
booking procedures and inventory purposes. However, the State acknowledges that the container was not
opened for inventory or booking procedures.
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