Marco Webster v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Feb 26 2015, 9:18 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Small Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Marco Webster, February 26, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1404-CR-253
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark D. Stoner,
Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Cause No. 49G06-1301-FB-6
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 1 of 14
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Marco L. Webster (Webster), appeals his conviction of
four Counts of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, Class B felonies,
Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2013); and one Count of robbery resulting in serious
bodily injury, a Class A felony, I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (2013).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[3] Webster raises three issues on appeal, two of which we find dispositive and
restate as follows:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence resulting
from six show-up identifications; and
(2) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to uphold Webster’s
conviction of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On New Year’s Eve of 2012, around 12:30 p.m., construction worker Randall
Crouch (Crouch) had completed a job on the northwest side of Indianapolis,
Indiana, and was loading tools into his 2004 Ford Econoline work van. A
black male wearing a brown coat, a hoodie, and a mask over his face
approached Crouch, pointed a semi-automatic pistol at his face, and ordered
him to unlock the van and start the ignition. Crouch complied, and after the
robber had driven out of sight, he reported the carjacking to the Indianapolis
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 2 of 14
Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD), describing the van as half blue and
half white, with ladders on the roof rack.
[5] Later that day, shortly before 3:00 p.m., a man armed with a semi-automatic
handgun walked into the International Parts Store, located at 5360 N. Tacoma
Avenue in Indianapolis, and yelled for everyone to get down on the floor. At
that time, three employees were in the building: Todd Norris (Norris), Brian
Smith (Smith), and Eric Thompson (Thompson). At the gunman’s command,
Smith removed the cash from the register, and all three gave him the cash from
their wallets. After the gunman ran out of the store, Smith called 9-1-1 and
reported that the store had been robbed at gunpoint by “a black male wearing a
blue and white plaid jacket with a dark hoodie.” (Transcript p. 197).
[6] Minutes later, a black male “wearing dark pants, . . . a bluish-black plaid jacket
with a hoodie on, and with a scarf on his face[,]” entered the Harris Tire &
Automotive Service, located across the street from the International Parts Store
at 5425 N. Keystone Avenue. (Tr. p. 218). The man aimed a semi-automatic
handgun at an employee, Danny Stumm (Stumm), and instructed him to empty
the cash drawer. As Stumm was unlocking the register, the robber noticed a
customer, Kenneth Rush (Rush), and demanded his wallet. When the
perpetrator detected movement by another employee, Joshua Scholl (Scholl), he
immediately turned and shot Scholl in the hip. Scholl retreated to the garage
bays, where the company’s owner, William Harris (Harris), was servicing a
vehicle. Scholl, in the midst of calling 9-1-1, alerted Harris to the fact that he
had been shot. Due to the noise of the compressor, Harris was unaware of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 3 of 14
ongoing robbery. When Harris opened the door to the showroom to
investigate, the robber fired a second shot in Harris’ direction. Although the
bullet missed Harris, shrapnel hit him on the side of his face. The gunman
exited the store, and Harris and Scholl observed through the window as he
entered the driver-side door of a Ford service van, half white and half blue, with
ladders on top. Harris noted that the license plate number was 1562534.
[7] Within minutes of the robberies, IMPD officers responded to both locations
and commenced investigations. The witnesses were all separated for
interviews, and Scholl was transported to the hospital. In general, they
described the suspect as a black male in his twenties or thirties and of “average”
or “medium” height and build. (Tr. pp. 160, 257). The witnesses also
confirmed that the suspect was wearing a very distinctive blue and white plaid
coat, dark pants, a dark hoodie that was pulled over his head, and a dark-
colored scarf that left only his eyes exposed. Norris, Thompson, and Stumm
described the scarf as having a camouflage pattern. In addition, while ordered
to lie on the ground, Norris and Thompson observed that the suspect wore
brand new tennis shoes that “were black and what I remember distinctly was
the very clean white edges, around the bottom.” (Tr. p. 259). Thompson
identified the brand of shoes as “Jordans” and further noted that the suspect
had facial hair “around his nose.” (Tr. pp. 303-04).
[8] On that same afternoon, IMPD Officer Gary Toms (Officer Toms) was working
an off-duty security job at Inverness Apartments, located on the northwest side
of Indianapolis, about a fifteen-to-twenty-minute drive from the International
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 4 of 14
Parts Store and the Harris Tire & Automotive Service. At approximately 3:15
p.m., a blue and white Ford Econoline van pulled into the parking lot. When it
passed by Officer Toms’ squad car, he observed that the driver, later identified
as Webster, was the sole occupant of the van. Immediately recognizing the van
as the one described in the carjacking reported earlier that day, Officer Toms
radioed for assistance. Officer Michael Roach (Officer Roach) was in the area
and arrived moments later. They followed the van’s route to the rear of the
apartment complex and observed Webster walking on the sidewalk, wearing a
dark-colored hoodie and carrying a “plaid flannel looking coat or jacket.” (Tr.
p. 361). When they instructed him to stop, Webster took off running.
[9] As the officers pursued him on foot, they saw Webster throw the coat and
several other items down. Officer Roach apprehended Webster, placed him in
handcuffs, and escorted him to his squad car. Retracing Webster’s steps, the
officers found a black nine-millimeter handgun and $682 in cash strewn
throughout the snow, along with the blue and white plaid jacket. Inside the
jacket pocket was a camouflage-patterned scarf and Rush’s wallet. The van was
registered to Crouch and had the license plate number 1562534.
[10] In the midst of his investigation at the International Parts Store, Detective Brent
Hendricks (Detective Hendricks) received a report that Webster had been
stopped with a van matching the one described by the Harris Tire &
Automotive Service employees. Detective Hendricks told the witnesses that
IMPD “had a person stopped that I wanted them to look at. . . . I specifically
informed them that it may or may not be the person that robbed them but I did
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 5 of 14
want them to take a look.” (Tr. p. 487). Between 4:00 p.m. and 5:15 p.m.,
Norris, Smith, Thompson, Harris, Stumm, and Rush were separately
transported to Inverness Apartments in order to identify whether Webster was
the robbery suspect.
[11] Because Webster had discarded the plaid coat when he fled, Officer Roach held
the coat up near Webster for the first witness and subsequently draped it over
Webster’s shoulders for the rest. Each of the six witnesses unequivocally
identified the jacket as being the same one worn by the robber. In addition to
the jacket and hoodie, Harris immediately identified the van as the one used by
the robber, and Rush noted that Webster’s “build and everything seemed to be
the same.” (Tr. pp. 162-63). Norris also indicated that Webster’s “shoes were
the dead giveaway.” (Tr. p. 265). Finally, Thompson stated that he “was a
hundred percent positive that the clothes and the shoes were the same. And I
could tell from the upper half of [Webster’s] face that it was the same facial
features as the guy who came and robbed us.” (Tr. p. 303).
[12] On January 2, 2013, the State filed an Information charging Webster with
Count I, carjacking, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35-42-5-2 (repealed 2014); Counts
II through V, criminal confinement, Class B felonies, I.C. § 35-42-3-
3(a),(b)(2)(A) (2013); Counts VI through IX and Count XI, robbery while
armed with a deadly weapon, Class B felonies, I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (2013); Count
X, battery, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(3) (2013); and Count XII,
unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Class B felony,
I.C. § 35-47-4-5 (2013). On January 11, 2013, the State amended the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 6 of 14
Information by adding Count XIII, robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, a
Class A felony, I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (2013). On March 14, 2013, the State filed an
Information alleging Webster to be a habitual offender. On December 9, 2013,
Webster filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the show-up identifications.
At the suppression hearing on January 10, 2014, Webster withdrew his motion.
[13] On February 24 and 25, 2014, the first phase of the bifurcated jury trial was
conducted. Prior to the introduction of evidence, Webster reinstated his motion
to suppress the evidence resulting from the show-up identifications. The trial
court held a hearing outside of the jury’s presence and granted the suppression
motion to the extent that the witnesses were precluded from making in-court
identifications of Webster. However, the trial court ruled that the witnesses
would “be allowed to make identification[s] of the clothing but only if . . . there
is a clear independent basis for being able to identify the clothing.” (Tr. p. 103).
At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a guilty verdict on Counts III
through XI and Count XIII. Webster was found not guilty of Counts I and II.
Following the verdict, Webster waived his right to a jury for the second phase
of his trial concerning his charge as a serious violent felon (Count XII) and his
habitual offender enhancement.
[14] On March 18, 2014, the trial court held a bench trial, at which time the State
dismissed Count XII, and Webster stipulated to the habitual offender charge.
The trial court adjudicated Webster to be a habitual offender and proceeded to
the sentencing hearing. Based on double jeopardy considerations, the trial
court merged Counts III, IV, and V into Counts VI, VII, and VIII, respectively,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 7 of 14
and merged Counts IX and X into Count XIII. A judgment of conviction was
entered on Counts VI, VII, VIII, and XI, Class B felony robberies of Smith,
Thompson, Norris, and Rush; and Count XIII, Class A felony robbery of
Stumm resulting in serious bodily injury to Scholl. The trial court imposed
concurrent fifteen-year sentences on Counts VI, VII, and VIII; fifteen years on
Count XI; and seventy years on Count XIII. The trial court ordered the
sentence on Count XIII to run concurrently with Count XI and consecutively to
Counts VI, VII, and VIII, for an aggregate, executed term of eighty-five years.
[15] Webster now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Admissibility of Identification Evidence
[16] Webster claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of
the identifications because the one-on-one show-ups were “overly suggestive.”
(Appellant’s Br. p. 14). Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of
evidence are left to the trial court’s sound discretion and are subject to review
only for an abuse of that discretion. Hale v. State, 976 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012). Our court will find an abuse of discretion where “the trial court’s
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court.” Id.
[17] The due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires the suppression of evidence if “the procedure used during
a pretrial identification is impermissibly suggestive.” Id. It is well established
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 8 of 14
that one-on-one show-up identifications are inherently suggestive. Wethington v.
State, 560 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Ind. 1990). Nevertheless, evidence acquired from a
show-up confrontation “is not subject to a per se rule of exclusion.” Mitchell v.
State, 690 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), reh’g denied; trans. denied.
Instead, “the admissibility of a show-up identification turns on an evaluation of
the totality of the circumstances and whether they lead to the conclusion that
the confrontation was conducted in a manner that could guide a witness into
making a mistaken identification.” Hale, 976 N.E.2d at 123-24.
[18] When reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding an identification,
we consider:
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the offender at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention while observing the
offender; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the
offender; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification.
Rasnick v. State, 2 N.E.3d 17, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Although
inherently suspect, one-on-one confrontations have been found proper where
they occurred “shortly after the commission of the crime ‘because of the value
of permitting a witness to view a suspect while the image of the perpetrator is
fresh in the witness’s mind.’” Hubbell v. State, 754 N.E.2d 884, 892 (Ind. 2001)
(quoting Head v. State, 443 N.E.2d 44, 55 (Ind. 1982)).
[19] In the present case, Webster contends that the one-on-one show-ups were
impermissibly suggestive because the police officers wrapped the plaid jacket
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 9 of 14
around him after he was detained. According to Webster, the witnesses based
their identifications on the jacket, so an “[i]dentification . . . would not have
been made but for police holding apparel up next to [him].” (Appellant’s Br. p.
19). We disagree.1
[20] It is evident that the witnesses identified Webster at the show-ups based, in
significant part, on the plaid jacket. See Williams v. State, 398 N.E.2d 674, 678
(Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (“The fact that the clerk based her identification on the
clothes worn by the suspects rather than any distinguishing physical
characteristics affects the credibility of her identification but not its
admissibility.”). However, at trial, each witness testified that the jacket that
was displayed at the show-up was the same one worn by the robber, but—as the
State posits—the witnesses did not positively identify Webster as the perpetrator
of the robberies. Rather, to link the jacket to Webster, Officer Toms and Officer
Roach testified that they observed the jacket in Webster’s possession and that
he threw it onto the ground when he tried to flee. Thus, we find that whether
the police officers held the jacket up next to Webster, wrapped it around him, or
left it laying in the snow is irrelevant because the witnesses recognized the
jacket itself with a high degree of certainty.
1
The State argues that Webster failed to properly preserve his claim that “the ‘show-up’ identification of the
clothing was impermissible” because his motion to suppress “was aimed squarely at the witness[es’] ability to
identify [Webster]—not the clothing.” (State’s Br. p. 8). Because arguments concerning the identification of
Webster himself, the clothing in isolation, and the clothing on Webster’s person were intermingled during the
suppression hearing, we will address Webster’s claim.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 10 of 14
[21] Furthermore, looking to the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that
the show-ups were unduly suggestive. The evidence establishes that, prior to
the show-ups, Norris, Smith, Thompson, Harris, Stumm, and Rush each
provided consistent and accurate accounts of the suspect’s clothing. See
Dishman v. State, 525 N.E.2d 284, 285 (Ind. 1988). Additionally, the robberies
occurred in broad daylight, and even though the robber wore a mask, the
witnesses had ample opportunity to discern very specific details about the
suspect, including that his mask had a camouflage pattern and that his gun was
black and had a “square” front. (Tr. p. 293). Norris and Thompson had a clear
view of the robber’s feet when forced to lie on the ground, and they described
both the brand and the style of his shoes.
[22] Within two hours of the robberies, each of the six witnesses identified Webster’s
jacket and hoodie as being the same worn by the perpetrator, and they
confirmed that the camouflage scarf found in Webster’s pocket was the same
one used by the robber. See Lyles v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1035, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (noting that an identification occurring several hours after the crime may
be permissible), trans. denied. Norris and Thompson identified Webster’s shoes
without hesitation, and—without any prompts from the officers—Harris
noticed the van in the parking lot and confirmed that it was the same one used
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 11 of 14
in the robbery. See Rasnick, 2 N.E.3d at 24-25. Therefore, we find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence from the show-ups.2
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[23] Webster also claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. When reviewing a sufficiency claim, our standard of review is well
settled. We do not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility, and we will
consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences that support the
verdict. Gray v. State, 903 N.E.2d 940, 943 (Ind. 2009). Our court will affirm
the conviction so long as “there is probative evidence from which a reasonable
jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
[24] In order to uphold Webster’s conviction of robbery as a Class A felony, the
State was required to prove that Webster knowingly or intentionally took
property from Stumm by either using or threatening the use of force or by
putting any person in fear, the commission of which resulted in serious bodily
injury to Scholl. I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (2013). As for his conviction of four Counts
of robbery as Class B felonies, the State had to establish that Webster, while
armed with a deadly weapon, knowingly or intentionally took property from
Norris, Smith, Thompson, and Rush by either using or threatening the use of
force or by putting any person in fear. I.C. § 35-42-5-1 (2013). Webster does
2
Webster next claims that his conviction of both Count X, battery as a Class C felony, and Count XIII,
robbery as a Class A felony, violates his constitutional rights against double jeopardy. During the sentencing
hearing, the trial court merged Count X into Count XIII in order to avoid double jeopardy implications,
entering a judgment of conviction solely on Count XIII. Thus, we find no merit in Webster’s argument.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 12 of 14
not dispute that these crimes occurred; rather he argues that “[n]o witness could
positively identify [him] as the robber. The only reference the witnesses had
was to clothing Webster had in his possession when he was taken into
custody.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 22). Again, we disagree.
[25] In addition to the descriptions provided by the witnesses, the armed robbery at
the Harris Tire & Automotive Service was recorded by video surveillance. As
such, the jury was able to clearly view that the perpetrator wore a blue and
white plaid jacket, a dark-colored hoodie and dark pants, black shoes with
white edges, and a camouflage-patterned scarf over his face. An exterior
camera captured an image of the blue and white van, and Harris recorded the
license plate number. Approximately fifteen minutes after the second robbery,
Officer Toms observed Webster driving a blue and white van with the same
license plate number.
[26] When Webster exited the van, he was wearing a dark hoodie and was carrying
a blue and white plaid jacket, which he threw on the ground in the officers’
presence. The officers discovered that the jacket had been concealing a nine-
millimeter handgun, a camouflage-patterned scarf, Rush’s wallet, and $682 in
cash. During the trial, Harris testified that the standard practice at Harris Tire
& Automotive Service for counting the cash drawer is to bundle the one-dollar
bills in groups of twenty, securing each bundle with a staple and a post-it note.
Among the cash that Webster had dropped during the foot chase, the officers
found two bundles of twenty one-dollar bills that were secured with a staple and
a post-it note. Moreover, the nine-millimeter gun found in Webster’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 13 of 14
possession had a magazine with the capacity to hold fifteen bullets. When the
evidence technician collected the gun, there were twelve bullets in the magazine
and one in the chamber. Two nine-millimeter shell casings were found at the
Harris Tire & Automotive Service.
[27] Webster further argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his
identity because the witnesses did not provide a precise height estimate of the
perpetrator and because there were no fingerprints linking Webster to the
robbery. While we first note that the surveillance footage clearly reveals that
the robber wore gloves, thereby reducing the likelihood of leaving a fingerprint,
we find that Webster’s arguments amount to a request that we reweigh
evidence, which we decline to do. Taken together, the evidence establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was Webster who perpetrated the robberies.
CONCLUSION
[28] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted within its
discretion in admitting evidence regarding the pre-trial identification of
clothing. We further conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to
support Webster’s conviction of one Count of Class A felony robbery and four
Counts of Class B felony robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.
[29] Affirmed.
[30] Vaidik, C. J. and Baker, J. concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1404-CR-253| February 26, 2015 Page 14 of 14