Jared Allen Mynatt v. State of Indiana , 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 605 ( 2015 )

Aug 28 2015, 9:49 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Glen E. Koch Gregory F. Zoeller
Boren Oliver & Coffey, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Martinsville, Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jared Allen Mynatt, August 28, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
55A05-1501-CR-41
v. Appeal from the Morgan Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Christopher L.
Burnham, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Cause No. 55D02-1408-FB-1224
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jared Mynatt (Mynatt), appeals his conviction for aiding
inducing or causing armed robbery, a Class B felony, Ind. Code §§ 35-41-2-4; -
42-5-1 (2013).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Mynatt raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Mynatt’s request for counsel during trial.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On January 28, 2014, Mynatt, Jamie Hicks (Hicks)—who was Mynatt’s
girlfriend—and Justin Cherry (Cherry) all drove in Hicks’ car from Indianapolis
to Mooresville, Indiana. In Mooresville, they stopped at some apartments
located behind a Marathon gas station. At some point, Hicks exited the vehicle
to use the Marathon’s restroom. Mynatt accompanied her. Toni Wilson
(Wilson) was the clerk that day. Because the restroom was for employees only,
Hicks stated that she was pregnant and she needed to use it. At first, Wilson
informed Hicks that she could not use the restroom but she then changed her
mind. While Hicks was in the restroom, Mynatt waited by the door. When
both returned to the vehicle, Cherry exited the vehicle and entered the gas
station. Cherry obtained a two-litter drink from the back of the store and then
approached Wilson for two packs of cigarettes. When Wilson asked Cherry for
his identification, Cherry stated that he “was not going to need it today.”
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(Transcript p. 128). Cherry then pulled out a gun and ordered Wilson to open
the register and give him all the money. A nervous Wilson complied, and
Cherry ran out of the store. When Cherry returned to the car, he jumped into
the backseat and Mynatt sped off. After Cherry left, Wilson locked the door
and called her employer, who in turn called the police. Cherry was arrested in
connection with an Indianapolis robbery in February 2014 and he was later
identified as a suspect in the instant case. The police later learned of Hicks’ and
Mynatt’s involvement and identified them from Marathon’s security footage.
In August of 2014, the police arrested Mynatt.
[5] On August 14, 2014, the State filed an Information, charging Mynatt with a
Class B felony aiding, inducing or causing armed robbery. During Mynatt’s
initial hearing on September 2, 2014, he indicated that he would be proceeding
pro se. Three days later, Mynatt filed a motion for a speedy trial. On November
3, 2014, Mynatt filed a written objection to a trial setting that was outside the
seventy-day period. The trial court issued an entry citing court congestion and
set the trial date for December 16, 2014. Shortly before Mynatt’s trial, at the
pretrial hearing scheduled on December 1, 2014, the trial court advised Mynatt
that he had been charged with a Class B felony and that, if found guilty, he
would face anywhere from six to twenty years in prison. Mynatt still indicated
that he wanted to proceed pro se and that he understood the penalty. Mynatt
added that on a prior occasion, he had been “involved in some B felony
robberies in Marion County” and that he successfully defended all Counts
which led to a dismissal. (Tr. p. 8). Mynatt also informed the trial court that he
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was not worried about picking a jury for his trial, and in any event, “the most
they can give me is twenty. They didn’t even file a habitual on me. I’m happy
with that. I go to the joint, I get maxed out, [and] that’s ten. I go to the joint, I
get a time cut, [and] I’ll be out in six. I can live with that.” (Tr. p. 8). The trial
court then informed Mynatt that it was important for him to understand the
rules of evidence prior to trial. The trial court further explained to Mynatt the
contents of the pretrial order and the jury selection process. In addition, the
trial court went through the names of the State’s witnesses and asked Mynatt if
he wanted to add his own witnesses. Mynatt indicated that he would only
question the State’s witnesses. Mynatt again confirmed that he wanted to
represent himself.
[6] Mynatt’s jury trial was held on December 16-17, 2014. At the start of trial, the
trial court asked Mynatt if he had any questions regarding jury selection.
Mynatt stated that he did not. The trial court, however, proceeded to explain
the jury selection process, and after the jury was empaneled, Mynatt made an
opening statement. During Hicks’ cross-examination, Mynatt asked her
whether she had sexual relations with Cherry, to which the State objected.
However, the trial court allowed the question, and Hicks answered in the
negative. Mynatt then asked more questions, such as whether they stopped at
Hicks’ parents’ home on the way to Mooresville and whether Hicks asked the
men where they were going. On all questions, Hicks answered in the negative.
Frustrated by her answers, Mynatt blurted out, “Your honor, I am lost. I don’t
know how to do this. I know she is lying.” (Tr. p. 7). The trial court explained
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to Mynatt that if he had something to present that would contradict Hicks’
testimony, he would have to wait for his time to present it under oath. After
Hicks was excused from the witness stand, Myatt stated, “Your honor, I want
to stop this. I need counsel.” (Tr. p. 165). The trial court then excused the jury
from the court room and the following dialogue ensued:
Mynatt: I guess I need counsel. I mean I can’t ask what I want
to ask . . .
Court: [] Mynatt, if you recall, we had this discussion about you
representing yourself many times. And I told you what the
danger was of doing so . . .
Mynatt: Yeah, Well I . . .
Court: Listen to me. All right, you listen to me now, okay? You
adamantly told me that you didn’t want counsel. You wanted to
represent yourself. You know how to do it. You had no
problems doing it. Fine. That is your right. You choose that
right and go forward to a trial and you cannot stop the trial
midstream and say I want counsel now. Yes, you are not very
good at asking questions because you don’t understand the rules
of evidence. I told you that. But, you made your conscious
decision to proceed without an attorney, and I am not going to
stop this trial.
Mynatt: Can I get co-counsel?
Court: I’m not going to ask some attorney to walk in the middle
of a trial and try and help you.
(Tr. pp. 166-67).
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[7] After the jury returned to the court room, the trial resumed. At the close of the
evidence, the jury found Mynatt guilty as charged. On January 21, 2015, the
trial court sentenced Mynatt to twenty years in the Department of Correction.
[8] Mynatt now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[9] “The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to the states via the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and guarantees the assistance
of counsel at critical stages of prosecution up through trial, sentencing, and
various post-trial matters.” Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 604 (Ind. 2009).
“Correlative to the constitutional right to counsel is the right of a defendant in a
criminal proceeding to appear pro se.” Koehler v. State, 499 N.E.2d 196, 198
(Ind. 1986). The defendant “must be free personally to decide whether in his
particular case counsel is to his advantage.” Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
[10] In Koehler, our supreme court held that where a defendant seeks to abandon a
pro se defense and reassert the right to counsel, “[r]elevant factors must be
considered by the trial court in order for it to exercise a meaningful discretion in
ruling on defendant’s request to change from self-representation to counsel-
representation.” Id. at 199.
Relevant factors should include, among others, the following: (1)
defendant’s prior history in the substitution of counsel and in the
desire to change from self-representation to counsel-
representation; (2) the reasons set forth for the request; (3) the
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length and stage of the trial proceedings; (4) disruption or delay
which reasonably might be expected to ensue from the granting
of such motion; and (5) the likelihood of defendant’s
effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to
continue to act as his own attorney.
Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ind. 2008) (citing Koehler, 499 N.E.2d at
199). Mynatt argues that an analysis of the Koehler factors reveals that the trial
court should have granted his request for appointment of counsel. We will
review each of the Koehler factors in turn.
[11] Turning to the first factor, Mynatt’s prior history in the substitution of counsel
and in the desire to change from self-representation to counsel-representation,
the facts speak for themselves. Mynatt made the decision to proceed pro se at
the beginning of his case and did not change his mind until mid-trial. During
his initial pretrial hearing, the trial court informed Mynatt that if found guilty of
the charged offense, he would face six to twenty years in prison and a fine up to
$10,000. Mynatt informed the trial court that he understood the penalty
involved. Mynatt also indicated that he had successfully defended himself
against ten felony robbery charges which were dismissed for lack of evidence.
He also indicated that he was not worried about picking out a jury.
Furthermore, Mynatt stated that the worst sentence he could receive was
twenty years, which meant that he would serve a maximum of ten years, and
with good behavior, he would be out in six years. When asked whether he
understood the rules of evidence, Mynatt stated “I can comprehend the
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paperwork I’m getting sent [].” (Tr. p. 9). From the foregoing facts, we find
that this first Koehler factor weighs against the appointment of counsel.
[12] With regards to the second factor, the reasons set forth for the request, we note
that Mynatt’s reason for requesting counsel representation mid-trial happened
during Hicks’ cross examination where Mynatt believed that Hicks was lying
and he did not know how to impeach her. At that point, Mynatt informed the
trial court that he needed a lawyer. This was the first time he had indicated that
he wanted to change from self-representation to counsel-representation, and
Mynatt had not previously made requests for substitution of counsel. Hicks
was the second State witness and the record shows that his performance prior to
this stage of the trial had been effective. Moreover, Mynatt had expressed
confidence that he would effectively represent himself without the assistance of
counsel. In light of the foregoing, we find that this second Koehler factor weighs
against the trial court appointing counsel.
[13] On the third factor, the length and stage of the trial proceedings, the trial was
midstream. The trial court stated that it did not want to appoint a counsel
halfway through trial. A jury had been picked, opening statements had been
made, and Mynatt was in the process of cross-examining the State’s second
witness—Hicks. Similarly, we find that this factor weighs against appointment
of counsel.
[14] As with the fourth factor, disruption or delay which reasonably might be
expected to ensue from the granting of such motion, we agree with the State
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that allowing counsel to intervene mid-trial would have caused a delay. A
continuance would have been necessary for counsel to become familiar with the
case. (Compare with Koehler, 499 N.E.2d at 199, where defendant had standby
counsel and no continuance would have been necessary because standby
counsel was familiar with the case). In this regard, we find that this factor
weighs against appointment of counsel.
[15] Finally, with regards to the fifth Koehler factor, the likelihood of defendant’s
effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to continue to act as
his own attorney, Mynatt claims to have previously represented himself
successfully against ten felony Counts. Also, Mynatt had indicated that he had
a college education and was familiar with the legal system. Mynatt also knew
the penalty of his charged offense and how many years he would serve if
convicted.
[16] Applying the Koehler factors to the case at bar, and weighing them against each
other, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mynatt’s request for counsel. When a defendant elects self-representation, the
trial court must elicit a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to
counsel. McKeown v. State, 556 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), reh’g denied,
trans. denied. The trial court must also establish a record demonstrating that the
defendant was made aware of the nature, extent, and importance of the right to
counsel and the dangers and disadvantages of waiving it. Id.
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[17] Here, Mynatt was advised at his pretrial hearing about the dangers of
proceeding pro se. Even in light of these warnings, Mynatt was confident that
he would successfully defend himself without the assistance of counsel. Mynatt
stated that he had managed to have ten felony Counts dismissed for lack of
evidence. Mynatt was also not concerned about picking out a jury or serving
prison time if found guilty. Moreover, a continuance would have been
imminent to enable the newly appointed counsel to become familiar with the
case. As such, our analysis of the Koehler factors, in conjunction with Mynatt’s
expression that he would adequately represent himself, leads us to conclude
that the trial court did not violate Mynatt’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
CONCLUSION
[18] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by failing to appoint counsel for Mynatt.
[19] Affirmed.
[20] Friedlander, J. and Brown, J. concur
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