Colleen Chaplin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Feb 27 2015, 10:17 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Dave Welter Gregory F. Zoeller
Supervising Attorney Attorney General of Indiana
Ashley Gilbert-Johnson Christina D. Pace
Legal Intern Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Christina Espar
Legal Intern
Valparaiso University Law Clinic
Valparaiso, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Colleen Chaplin, February 27, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
64A03-1408-CR-276
v. Appeal from the Porter Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey Clymer,
Judge Pro Tempore
Appellee-Plaintiff
Cause No. 64D02-1401-FC-649
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Colleen Chaplin (“Chaplin”) was convicted in Porter Superior Court of Class D
felony theft. At sentencing, Chaplin was ordered to pay restitution in the
amount of $54,378.25 to the Indiana Department of Workforce Development
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(“IDWD”). Chaplin appeals the restitution order and argues that $54,378.25
exceeds the actual loss suffered by the IDWD.
[2] We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In October 2010, Chaplin applied for unemployment compensation benefits
with the IDWD. For approximately two years, Chaplin periodically received
benefits in the amount of $390 per week. During that time period, Chaplin
certified to the IDWD that she was unemployed and had no other earnings.
[4] In September 2013, the IDWD discovered that Chaplin was employed at a
hospital and that she had received weekly unemployment compensation
benefits while she also earned wages from her employer. Ultimately, the IDWD
determined that Chaplin wrongly received $34,145.00 in unemployment
compensation benefits.
[5] Thereafter, Chaplin was charged with Class C felony welfare fraud. She
pleaded guilty to the lesser-included charge of Class D felony theft on May 23,
2014. Chaplin agreed to pay restitution but in an amount to be determined at a
later date.
[6] The IDWD requested restitution in the amount of $54,831.92. In an itemized
statement, the IDWD listed the “fraud overpayment total” as $34,145.00, a
“penalty total” of $20,233.25, and total interest accrued in the amount of
$453.67.
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[7] At sentencing, the State argued that Chaplin should be ordered to pay the
“fraud overpayment total” and the “penalty total” in the aggregate amount of
$54,378.25. Chaplin objected to the amount and argued that it exceeded the
IDWD’s actual loss. Chaplin argued she should only be ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $34,145.00, the “fraud overpayment” amount.
[8] Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court ordered Chaplin to
serve three years but suspended the sentence and placed her on formal
probation. The trial court then ordered Chaplin to pay restitution in the amount
of $54,378.25. Chaplin now appeals the restitution order.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Chaplin argues that the trial court’s restitution order was improper because
$54,378.25 exceeds the IDWD’s actual loss. We reverse a trial court’s order to
pay restitution only for an abuse of discretion. Gil v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1231,
1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A trial court abuses its discretion if its “decision is
clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before it” or if
it “misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id.; see also Kelley v. State, 11 N.E.3d
973, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (stating that a trial court abuses its discretion if it
misinterprets or misapplies a statute relating to a restitution order).
[10] “[T]he principal purpose of restitution is to vindicate the rights of society and to
impress upon the defendant the magnitude of the loss the crime has caused, and
that restitution also serves to compensate the victim.” Iltzsch v. State, 981 N.E.2d
55, 56 (Ind. 2013) (citing Pearson v. State, 883 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Ind. 2008)). An
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order of restitution is part of a criminal sentence. Gonzalez v. State, 3 N.E.3d 27,
30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Because restitution is penal in nature, the restitution
statute must be ‘strictly construed against the State to avoid enlarging [it] by
intendment or implication beyond the fair meaning of the language used.’”
Cherry v. State, 772 N.E.2d 433, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v.
Shelton, 692 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)), trans. denied.
[11] Trial courts are statutorily required to base restitution orders “upon a
consideration of . . . property damages of the victim incurred as a result of the
crime, based on the actual cost of repair (or replacement if repair is
inappropriate)[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3(a); see also Smith v. State, 990 N.E.2d
517, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied (stating that a restitution award must
reflect actual losses incurred by the victim for actions attributable to the
defendant’s crimes).
[12] Here, the IDWD proved that Chaplin fraudulently received $34,145.00 in
unemployment compensation benefits. This is the actual cost suffered by the
IDWD.
[13] The penalty total, i.e. $20,233.25, exceeds the IDWD’s actual loss caused by
Chaplin’s crime. The penalty amount constitutes additional punishment the
IDWD may statutorily impose on an individual who “knowingly fails to
disclose or falsifies any fact that if accurately reported to the department would
disqualify the individual for benefits, reduce the individual’s benefits, or render
the individual ineligible for benefits or extended benefits[.]” Ind. Code § 22-4-
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13-1.1. For each instance of false reporting, the penalty increases from an
amount equal to 25% of the benefit overpayment for the first instance, to 50%
of the benefit overpayment for the second instance, and finally to 100% of the
benefit overpayment for the third and each subsequent instance. Id.[14] In addition to the character of the challenged amount as part of a restitution
order, we are mindful that this case comes to us from a guilty plea, rather than
as a result of a conviction after a trial. Because the penalty calculated by the
IDWD and awarded by the court was not an actual cost incurred as a result of
Chaplin’s crime, we reverse as to the restitution order only and remand this
case with instructions to enter a restitution order in the reduced amount of
$34,145.00.
[15] Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Najam, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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