In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights of A.R. and M.R. (Minor Children), S.R. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 18 2019, 9:12 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark K. Leeman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Leeman Law Office and Attorney General of Indiana
Cass County Public Defender
Robert J. Henke
Logansport, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination April 18, 2019
of Parental Rights of A.R. and Court of Appeals Case No.
M.R. (Minor Children), 18A-JT-2673
S.R. (Mother), Appeal from the Cass Circuit
Court
Appellant-Respondent,
The Honorable Leo T. Burns,
v. Judge
The Honorable Stephen R. Kitts,
Judge
The Indiana Department of
Trial Court Cause Nos.
Child Services,
09C01-1805-JT-5
Appellee-Petitioner 09C01-1805-JT-6
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2673 | April 18, 2019 Page 1 of 4
[1] S.R. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights of her two minor
children, A.R. and M.R. She argues that Indiana’s burden of proof in
termination of parental rights cases violates the Indiana Constitution. Finding
no constitutional violation, we affirm.
[2] Mother has two children, A.R., born in 2003, and M.R., born in 2004. After
Mother was convicted of several offenses, in 2017, the Department of Child
Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging A.R. and M.R. to be Children in Need
of Services (CHINS). A hearing took place during which Mother admitted the
children were CHINS. In 2018, DCS filed a petition for termination of the
parent-child relationship as to both children. Following a fact-finding hearing,
the juvenile court entered an order to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Mother now appeals.
[3] Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that Indiana’s burden of proof standard for
termination of parental rights is unconstitutional.1 When we review the
constitutionality of an Indiana statute, the statute comes before us afresh,
“‘clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a
contrary showing.’” State v. Buncich, 51 N.E.3d 136, 141 (Ind. 2016) (quoting
Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind. 1996)). We resolve all
doubts in favor of the legislation, and if there are multiple interpretations, we
1
Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings of fact; therefore, these unchallenged facts stand as
proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Likewise, Mother does not challenge the
juvenile court’s legal conclusions, the result of which is waiver of any argument as to the sufficiency of such
findings. See A.D.S. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
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will choose the path that upholds the statute. Id. The party seeking to strike
down the statute bears the burden of proof, and that burden is particularly
heavy where, as here, she challenges the statute on its face: the claimant must
show “‘no set of circumstances under which the statute can be constitutionally
applied.’” Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind. 1999)).
[4] Indiana Code section 31-34-12-2 provides that “a finding in a proceeding to
terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence.”
Mother contends that the “clear and convincing” standard in termination cases
is unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution,
which provides in relevant part that “[a]ll courts shall be open; and every
person, for injury done to him in his person, property, and reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law.” She contends that the burden should be
“beyond a reasonable doubt” based on possible injuries to reputation that could
arise from a termination case.
[5] In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court held that, in
termination proceedings, a “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof
“adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his
factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process.” 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
The Court further held “that determination of the precise burden equal to or
greater than that standard is a matter of state law properly left to state
legislatures and state courts.” Id. at 769-70. Following Santosky, Indiana
adopted the clear and convincing standard as its burden of proof in termination
cases. See Ellis v. Knox Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 433 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. Ct. App.
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1982). Our Court has previously found that the clear and convincing burden of
proof standard in termination cases does not violate any constitutional rights.
See, e.g., In re Wardship of R.B., 615 N.E.2d 494, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
[6] Here, Mother argues that because termination of parental rights is among the
most damaging injuries that the State can inflict on a person’s reputation,
termination proceedings should require the highest burden of proof. Yet “[t]he
legislature has wide latitude in defining the existence and scope of a cause of
action and in prescribing the available remedy,” KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 72
N.E.3d 892, 906 (Ind. 2017), and our legislature was within its right to
determine the burden of proof in termination cases to be the clear and
convincing standard. Mother has not met her burden to show that this standard
of proof for termination proceedings is unconstitutional.
[7] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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