Timothy B. Hopper v. Angela C. Hopper (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                            Aug 24 2016, 9:17 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                             CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Matthew J. McGovern                                      Thomas A. Massey
    Anderson, Indiana                                        Evansville, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Timothy B. Hopper,                                       August 24, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    65A01-1510-DR-1603
    v.                                               Appeal from the Posey Circuit
    Court
    Angela C. Hopper,                                        The Honorable James M.
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Redwine, Judge
    The Honorable S. Brent Almon,
    Special Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    65C01-1405-DR-192
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   Timothy Hopper and Angela Hopper were married in 1999 and had one child.
    In 2014, Angela filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The trial court
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016    Page 1 of 13
    dissolved the parties’ marriage, determined custody of the minor child, set child
    support, valued the parties’ assets, and divided the marital estate. On appeal,
    Timothy challenges the trial court’s valuation of his business for purposes of
    dividing the marital estate. Timothy presents two issues for our review:
    1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in valuing the business
    at $200,000?
    2. Did the trial court rely on impermissible hearsay evidence in
    valuing the business?
    Angela cross-appeals, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in
    awarding her only $3000 toward her attorney fees.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   The parties were married on January 15, 1999. In September 2009, Timothy
    and a business partner purchased Carter Plumbing and Heating, LLC, (Carter
    Plumbing) for $167,500. The business purchase included all intangibles such
    as, but not limited to, the exclusive rights to use the name Carter Plumbing and
    the goodwill associated with the business through execution of a covenant not
    to compete by the seller. In 2012, Timothy bought out his business partner’s
    fifty-percent interest in Carter Plumbing for $10,000. As part of the purchase
    agreement, Timothy’s business partner signed a non-compete agreement.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016   Page 2 of 13
    [4]   Angela filed a verified petition for dissolution of marriage on April 14, 2014.
    During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Timothy hired an appraiser,
    George Pritchett, to value all tangible and intangible assets of Carter Plumbing.
    As directed by Timothy, Pritchett used April 14, 2014 as the date upon which to
    base his appraisal. As of that date, Carter Plumbing’s balance sheet reflected an
    ownership equity1 of negative $43,460.
    [5]   In addition to considering the ownership equity, Pritchett collected various
    information and industry data, which informed him that approximately seventy
    percent of the selling price of similar businesses represented the value of
    intangibles and non-compete agreements. Pritchett also took into account that
    Timothy stated he would not sign a covenant not to compete. He therefore did
    not include personal goodwill in his calculation. Based on the information he
    compiled, Pritchett prepared an appraisal report in which he concluded that, if
    sold, Carter Plumbing had a nominal value of $1,000. Pritchett opined that
    even though Carter Plumbing had a negative ownership equity, a potential
    buyer might pay $1,000 for use of the name Carter Plumbing.
    [6]   In contrast to the valuation provided by Pritchett, Angela presented evidence
    that Timothy provided his bank with a verified personal financial statement,
    dated August 25, 2014, in which he asserted that Carter Plumbing was an asset
    valued at $200,000. Timothy attached a balance sheet dated that same day that
    1
    Pritchett explained that ownership equity is the value of the assets minus the value of the liabilities.
    Ownership equity does not include a value for intangibles.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016               Page 3 of 13
    showed Carter Plumbing had an ownership equity of $197,315.72.2 Angela also
    presented evidence that in 2013 Timothy retained Strategic Tax Advisors (STA)
    to provide tax strategies and business recommendations for Carter Plumbing
    and paid them $15,000 for the services provided. STA prepared a report
    wherein it was noted that Timothy informed STA that Carter Plumbing had a
    value of $400,000.
    [7]   Finally, Angela presented the expert testimony of Jerry Peters, a Certified
    Public Accountant, who noted that Carter Plumbing had a substantial increase
    in ownership equity from April 14, 2014, the date used by Pritchett in his
    appraisal, and August 25, 2014. Specifically, Peters noted that Carter
    Plumbing’s ownership equity increased from negative $43,460 to positive
    $197,315. In subsequent months, the balance sheet continued to reflect that the
    ownership equity for Carter Plumbing remained steady around $200,000.
    Peters acknowledged that his analysis of Carter Plumbing’s balance sheets was
    not a valuation of the worth of the business as it did not include a value for
    intangible assets (including goodwill).
    [8]   In contrast to Peters’s testimony, Timothy presented the August 25, 2014
    balance sheet to Pritchett. Pritchett testified that some of the entries on the
    2
    During discovery, Angela requested numerous times that Timothy provide her with financial information
    pertaining to Carter Plumbing and Timothy did not comply with those discovery requests. Angela obtained
    Timothy’s personal financial statement and accompanying balance sheet through her own efforts. With the
    court’s intervention during a hearing, Timothy provided to Angela additional financial information in the
    form of monthly balance sheets for Carter Plumbing from September 2014 through March 2015.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016        Page 4 of 13
    balance sheet were “probably” accounting-related entries that had not been
    “marked to market.” Transcript Day 1 at 57. Pritchett further testified that if he
    had used the August 25, 2014 balance sheet for his valuation, he would have
    valued Carter Plumbing at between $40,000 and $50,000.
    [9]    The final hearing was held on May 8, 2015, and July 29 through July 30, 2015.
    The trial court issued its final decree of dissolution of marriage on September
    16, 2015, and a corrected decree on September 17, 2015. In the corrected
    decree, the trial court dissolved the parties’ marriage, determined custody of the
    parties’ only child, set child support, valued the parties’ assets, and divided the
    marital estate.
    [10]   With respect to the property division, the trial court valued Carter Plumbing at
    $200,000 and awarded the business in its entirety to Timothy, bringing the
    value of his share of the marital estate to $237,580.83. The total value of
    Angela’s share was $49,684.98. Finding that the marital estate should be
    divided equally, the trial court ordered Timothy to make an equalization
    payment of $93,911.93 to Angela.3 The trial court also ordered Timothy to pay
    $3000 of Angela’s attorney fees at a rate of $250 per month. Timothy now
    3
    The trial court allowed Timothy to pay this amount at a rate of $5000 per quarter with statutory interest
    accruing at 8% per annum, with the first payment to commence on January 15, 2016. The trial court also
    awarded Angela a lien against Carter Plumbing and certain rental property until Timothy paid the
    equalization payment in full.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016           Page 5 of 13
    appeals and Angela cross-appeals. Additional facts will be provided as
    necessary.
    Discussion & Decision
    [11]   Where, as here, the trial court enters findings and conclusions sua sponte, the
    findings control only with respect to the issues they cover, while a general
    judgment standard applies to issues on which there are no findings. In re
    Marriage of Sutton, 
    16 N.E.3d 481
    , 484-85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We affirm a
    general judgment entered with findings if it can be sustained on any legal theory
    supported by the evidence. Hurt v. Hurt, 
    920 N.E.2d 688
    , 691 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2010). When the court has made findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we
    review those findings and conclusions using a clearly erroneous standard.
    
    Sutton, 16 N.E.3d at 485
    . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the record
    contains no facts to support the findings, either directly or by inference. 
    Hurt, 920 N.E.2d at 691
    . “A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong
    legal standard to properly found facts.” 
    Id. In conducting
    our review, we first
    determine whether the evidence supports the findings; then we determine
    whether the findings support the judgment. 
    Id. 1. Business
    Valuation
    [12]   Timothy argues that the trial court abused its discretion by assigning a value of
    $200,000 to Carter Plumbing. The trial court’s valuation of marital assets is
    within its sound discretion and will only be disturbed for an abuse of discretion.
    Morey v. Morey, 
    49 N.E.3d 1065
    , 1069 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing In re Marriage
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016   Page 6 of 13
    of Nickels, 
    834 N.E.2d 1091
    , 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). As long as the
    evidence is sufficient and reasonable inferences support the valuation, an abuse
    of discretion does not occur. 
    Id. We will
    not weigh the evidence and will
    consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. 
    Id. “Although the
    facts and reasonable inferences might allow for a different
    conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.”
    
    Nickels, 834 N.E.2d at 1095
    (quoting Bizik v. Bizik, 
    753 N.E.2d 762
    , 766 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied).
    [13]   During the final hearing, Timothy and Angela both put forth evidence
    pertaining to the value of Carter Plumbing. The trial court ultimately
    determined “the most credible value of Carter Plumbing to be $200,000.00,”
    which value Timothy assigned to Carter Plumbing in the August 25, 2014
    verified personal financial statement he submitted to his bank.4 Appellant’s
    Appendix at 103. This value corresponded with an August 25, 2014 balance
    sheet for Carter Plumbing that showed Carter Plumbing had an ownership
    equity of $197,315.
    4
    Generally, the marital pot closes on the date the dissolution petition is filed. Smith v. Smith, 
    854 N.E.2d 1
    , 6
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, a trial court has broad discretion in determining the date upon which to
    value the marital assets, and the trial court may select any date between the date of filing the petition of
    dissolution and the date of the final hearing. 
    Id. Here, Timothy
    asked his expert to value Carter Plumbing as
    of April 14, 2014, the day Angela filed the petition for dissolution. Timothy accepts that the trial court
    apparently chose to value Carter Plumbing as of August 25, 2014. See Appellant’s Brief at 15 (noting without
    argument that August 25, 2014 was “the date on which the trial court determined that the business should be
    valued”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016               Page 7 of 13
    [14]   Here, Timothy does not dispute that he identified Carter Plumbing as an asset
    valued of $200,000 in the August 25, 2014 personal financial statement he
    submitted to his bank. Nevertheless, Timothy argues that the trial court could
    not rely on his valuation because there is no basis for that assigned value. See
    Court View Centre, L.L.C. v. Witt, 
    753 N.E.2d 75
    , 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
    (holding that a business owner is competent to offer an opinion as to the value
    of his business so long as there is a basis for that valuation). Timothy asserts
    that there is a lack of evidence regarding the methodology he used or what
    information he included in arriving at the value he assigned to Carter Plumbing
    at that time. Timothy claims that the value the court assigned to Carter
    Plumbing may have included his personal goodwill, which is not a marital asset
    subject to distribution. Timothy also claims that the balance sheet on which he
    relied may not have used figures that had been reduced to market value.
    [15]   We disagree with Timothy that there is no basis for the $200,000 valuation of
    Carter Plumbing he submitted to his bank. Timothy’s $200,000 valuation
    directly correlated with the August 25, 2014 balance sheet that he attached to
    his personal financial statement. As described by the parties’ experts, the
    balance sheets compared Carter Plumbing’s assets and liabilities, with the
    ultimate calculation being the ownership equity for Carter Plumbing. As
    indicated by the August 25, 2014 balance sheet, Carter Plumbing had
    ownership equity of $197,315.22.
    [16]   We also disagree with Timothy that the $200,000 value assigned to Carter
    Plumbing included items that are not marital property subject to disposition.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016   Page 8 of 13
    The experts’ testimony made it clear that ownership equity is the difference
    between the hard assets and hard liabilities and does not include the value of
    intangibles, such as personal or enterprise goodwill. Yoon v. Yoon, 
    711 N.E.2d 1265
    , 1268 (Ind. 1999) (citing In re Marriage of Talty, 
    652 N.E.2d 330
    , 333 (Ill.
    1995)) (noting goodwill that is personal to one spouse is not a divisible marital
    asset, but enterprise goodwill is a marital asset subject to property division).
    [17]   To the extent Timothy asserts that the August 25, 2014 balance sheet could not
    be relied upon because it was not adjusted to market value, we find that such
    claim is not supported by the record. After being shown the August 25, 2014
    balance sheet, Pritchett testified that “a lot of those entries in there are probably
    accounting related entries and have not been marked to market.” Transcript Day
    1 at 57 (emphasis supplied). Pritchett’s testimony does not establish that the
    values used in the August 25, 2014 balance sheet were incorrect or improper
    and Timothy presented no other evidence suggesting that the August 25, 2014
    balance sheet was not accurate. We also find it curious that Timothy found the
    August 25, 2014 balance sheet sufficiently accurate to claim in a personal
    financial statement submitted to his bank that Carter Plumbing was an asset
    valued at $200,000, but that the same balance sheet is not accurate for purposes
    of valuing and dividing the marital estate.
    [18]   Finally, we note that Pritchett, in explaining his appraisal, made much of the
    fact that Timothy would not sign a covenant not to compete. Pritchett
    therefore did not include any value for goodwill attributable to Pritchett
    himself. Pritchett’s appraisal was essentially a valuation of Carter Plumbing
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016   Page 9 of 13
    based on the April 14, 2014 balance sheet. The $1000 value Pritchett assigned
    to Carter Plumbing was the value if the business name was sold.
    [19]   Here, the trial court based its valuation of Carter Plumbing on the ownership
    equity as reflected on the balance sheet as of August 25, 2014. The trial court
    did not have to accept Pritchett’s uninformed opinion that such figures had not
    been adjusted to market value or assign a value to Carter Plumbing consistent
    with its fair market value if sold. See Crider v. Crider, 
    15 N.E.3d 1042
    , 1061 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a trial court is vested with discretion in choosing a
    methodology to use and is not required to use fair market value), trans. denied.
    [20]   As noted above, we will not second-guess the manner in which the trial court
    determined the value to assign to Carter Plumbing so long as there is evidence
    in the record or reasonable inferences that support the valuation. We find the
    trial court’s findings with respect to its valuation of Carter Plumbing are
    supported by the evidence and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in relying upon Carter Plumbing’s balance sheet in deciding to value
    Carter Plumbing at $200,000 for purposes of dividing the marital estate.
    2. Hearsay
    [21]   Timothy also argues that the trial court relied on impermissible hearsay
    evidence in valuing Carter Plumbing. Specifically, Timothy asserts that, over
    his objection, the trial court erroneously admitted and then considered the STA
    report that included his statement in 2013 that he believed Carter Plumbing had
    a value of $400,000.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016   Page 10 of 13
    [22]   In its findings of fact, the trial court summarized the evidence as it pertained to
    the STA report. Contrary to Timothy’s assertion, however, there is no
    indication in the trial court’s conclusions that the court “likely used this
    valuation as it narrowed the eventual valuation down to $200,000.” Appellant’s
    Brief at 16. Indeed, in its conclusions of law, the trial court referenced only
    Timothy’s post-filing assertion in his personal financial statement that Carter
    Plumbing was an asset valued at $200,000, which the court found to be “the
    most credible” value of Carter Plumbing. Appellant’s Appendix at 103. Thus,
    even if the trial court erroneously admitted the STA report into evidence and
    then considered it, any error would have been harmless as the evidence likely
    did not contribute to the court’s determination regarding the value of Carter
    Plumbing. See Techna-Fit, Inc. v. Fluid Transfer Products, Inc., 
    45 N.E.3d 399
    , 411
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that an error is harmless when the probable impact
    of the erroneously admitted evidence on the factfinder, in light of all the
    evidence presented, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect a party’s substantial
    rights).
    3. Cross-Appeal
    [23]   Angela filed a cross-appeal in which she maintains that the trial court abused its
    discretion in not ordering Timothy to pay all of her claimed amount of attorney
    fees. Angela maintains that a majority of her attorney fees were incurred as a
    result of Timothy’s failure to comply with discovery requests.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016   Page 11 of 13
    [24]   We review a trial court’s decision to award or deny attorney fees in connection
    with a dissolution decree using an abuse of discretion standard. Troyer v. Troyer,
    
    987 N.E.2d 1130
    , 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court has
    broad discretion in assessing attorney fees, and we will reverse only if its
    decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
    before it or if it misapplies the law. Fackler v. Powell, 
    923 N.E.2d 973
    , 981 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2010).
    [25]   Pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-15-10-1, a trial court may order a party in a
    marriage dissolution proceeding to pay a reasonable amount of the attorney fees
    of the other party. “When making such an award, the court must consider the
    resources of the parties, their economic condition, the ability of the parties to
    engage in gainful employment and to earn adequate income and other factors
    that bear on the reasonableness of the award.” Hendricks v. Hendricks, 
    784 N.E.2d 1024
    , 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “‘When one party is in a superior
    position to pay fees over the other party, an award of attorney fees is proper.’”
    Hartley v. Hartley, 
    862 N.E.2d 274
    , 287 (quoting Ratliff v. Ratliff, 
    804 N.E.2d 237
    ,
    249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). Where the parties’ resources are relatively on par
    with each other, the only basis for an award of attorney fees are the improper
    actions of one party necessitating the incurrence of attorney fees by the other
    party. 
    Hendricks, 784 N.E.2d at 1028
    (stating that the misconduct that directly
    results in additional litigation expenses may be properly taken into account in
    trial court’s decision to award attorney fees).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016   Page 12 of 13
    [26]   Here, the trial court found that Timothy “habitually failed to comply” with
    Angela’s “reasonable and necessary” discovery requests even after being
    encouraged by the court and then admonished. Appellant’s Appendix at 97, 99.
    The trial court specifically noted Timothy’s most egregious violations and
    further noted that even after being ordered to comply, Timothy only reluctantly
    did so. Upon considering Angela’s request for attorney fees, the trial court
    determined that $3000 was a reasonable amount to order Timothy to pay given
    the difficulties created by his failure to comply with discovery requests.
    [27]   Aside from Timothy’s actions concerning discovery matters, Angela asserts no
    other basis upon which to support an award of all of her attorney fees. Indeed,
    the trial court found that the marital estate should be divided equally and
    ordered Timothy make an equalization payment to Angela, thereby putting
    them relatively on par with each other. Having reviewed the record, we cannot
    say that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding not to award Angela all
    of her attorney fees.5
    [28]   We affirm.
    [29]   Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.
    5
    In addition to arguing that she should have been awarded all of her attorney fees she incurred at the trial
    level, Angela seeks an award of appellate attorney fees. Angela, however, fails to cite any relevant authority
    or assert any basis upon which an award of appellate attorney fees may be warranted. She has therefore
    waived the issue for our consideration.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 65A01-1510-DR-1603 | August 24, 2016           Page 13 of 13