Katrina Morgan v. Lake County Juvenile Center, Lake Superior Court, Juvenile Division and Juvenile Division Judge (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Aug 24 2016, 10:42 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Darnail Lyles Gregory F. Zoeller
Gary, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Frances Barrow
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Katrina Morgan, August 24, 2016
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
37A03-1603-CT-693
v. Appeal from the Jasper Superior
Court
Lake County Juvenile Center, The Honorable James R. Ahler,
Lake Superior Court, Juvenile Judge
Division and Juvenile Division Trial Court Cause No.
Judge, 37D01-1308-CT-621
Appellees-Defendants
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Baker, Judge.
[1] Katrina Morgan appeals the grant of summary judgment by the trial court in
favor of the Lake County Superior Court, Juvenile Division (the Juvenile
Court), and the Judge of that Court (the Judge). She argues that the tort claim
notice she served on other defendants constituted substantial compliance with
the notice requirements of the Indiana Tort Claims Act.1 Finding that Morgan
did not timely notify the Juvenile Court or the Judge, we affirm.
Facts
[2] In November 2008, fourteen-year-old D.M. was residing in the Lake County
Juvenile Detention Center (the Detention Center). On November 16, 2008,
D.M. was in the facility’s gym when he suddenly became unresponsive. Within
the hour, he passed away.
[3] On May 12, 2009, Katrina Morgan’s counsel served a tort claim notice on the
Detention Center, the Lake County Board of Commissioners (the Board), and
the Indiana Political Subdivision Risk Management Commission. Morgan
never served any notice to Indiana’s Office of Attorney General (Attorney
General). The May 12 notice, however, was brought to the Attorney General’s
attention, and the office responded to Morgan on June 10, 2009: “Based on the
information provided, it does not appear that the State of Indiana has any
1
Ind. Code § 34-13-3-1, et seq.
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connection with this case. Unless you have some theory that would include the
State of Indiana as a party, this claim will be filed with no further action.”
Appellant’s App. p. 221. On December 9, 2009, Morgan filed a complaint for
wrongful death against the Detention Center and the Board.
[4] Nearly four years after she sent out her tort claim notice, on March 12, 2013,
Morgan filed a motion to join the Judge as a defendant. The trial court granted
the motion and granted Morgan leave to file an amended complaint. Her
amended complaint also added the Juvenile Court as a defendant.
[5] On March 6, 2015, the Juvenile Court and the Judge (collectively, the New
Defendants) moved to file an amended answer, adding the affirmative defense
of lack of tort claim notice. After this motion was granted and the answer
amended, the New Defendants moved for summary judgment. After a hearing,
the trial court granted the New Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It
explained:
In this case it is undisputed that on May 12, 2009, Morgan
directed a tort claim notice (the “Notice”) to the Lake County
Juvenile Center, the Lake County Board of Commissioners, and
the Indiana Political Subdivision Risk Management
Commission. The Court finds that, as a matter of law, the
Notice is not sufficient under the ITCA to put the Lake Superior
Court, Juvenile Division and the Juvenile Division Judge on
timely notice of her claim.
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Appellant’s App. p. 315-16. Morgan now appeals.2
Discussion and Decision
[6] When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on summary judgment, we stand in the
shoes of the trial court, applying the same standards in deciding whether to
affirm or reverse. Kramer v. Focus Realty Group, LLC, 51 N.E.3d 1240, 1243
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Therefore, we look to whether there are genuine issues of
material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56 (C).
[7] Under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA), a claim for monetary damages
against the state is barred unless notice is filed with the Attorney General or the
state agency involved within 270 days after the loss. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-6.
The notice must describe in a short and plain statement the facts on which the
claim is based. I.C. § 34-13-3-10. A claimant’s failure to provide the notice
required by the ITCA entitles the state to a dismissal. Ind. Dep’t of Corr. v. Hulen,
582 N.E.2d 380, 380-81 (Ind. 1991).
[8] Morgan claims that she substantially complied with the ITCA notice
requirements. As the claimant, she bears the burden of establishing substantial
compliance. Chang v. Purdue Univ., 985 N.E.2d 35, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In
determining whether substantial compliance is established, we look to the
2
Morgan’s claims against the other defendants are still ongoing.
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purpose of the notice requirements, which is “to inform state officials with
reasonable certainty of the accident or incident and surrounding circumstances
and to advise of the injured party’s intent to assert a tort claim so that the state
may investigate, determine its possible liability, and prepare a defense to the
claim.” Id. Whether a party has substantially complied with the notice
requirement of the ITCA is a question of law. Id.
[9] Morgan argues that the New Defendants had notice of her claim on May 12,
2009, when she served the Detention Center, because the Detention Center was
established by the Juvenile Court and operated under the Judge. She also
points to the Attorney General’s letter of June 10, 2009; she argues that this
proves that the Attorney General knew of her claim within the prescribed 270
days, and that she therefore substantially complied with the ITCA notice
requirements.
[10] We disagree. While the Attorney General was aware of Morgan’s tort claim
notice, it was unaware that Morgan intended to seek recovery from a state
entity. As our caselaw makes clear, the ITCA notice requirements are intended
to notify governmental entities that litigation is imminent so that they may
prepare a defense. Although Morgan timely notified several county-level
entities that litigation was imminent, the Juvenile Court and the Judge have
gone nearly four years without the opportunity to prepare any defense because
they were never notified that they were being sued.
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[11] We would like to commend the Attorney General for the June 10, 2009, letter,
which informed Morgan that she had not served notice on any state entities.
Although it was not required to do so, the Attorney General went out of the
way to enable Morgan to properly notify the state in case she planned to sue a
state entity. When Morgan received the letter, she still had two more months to
send a timely notice indicating her intent to sue the state. Instead, she waited
nearly four years to add the New Defendants.
[12] While we are hesitant to deny a claimant’s day in court based on minor and
harmless technical violations of the ITCA, e.g., Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis,
253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225 (1970), we do not believe that Morgan has fallen
into a trap for the unwary. She knew that the state did not believe that it was a
possible defendant in her lawsuit, and she had ample time to file a tort claim
notice to that effect, but she chose not to. Therefore, her claims against the
New Defendants are barred, and the trial court did not err by entering summary
judgment in their favor. Her claims against the properly-notified defendants
may continue.
[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded for further
proceedings with regard to the remaining defendants.
Vaidik, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.
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