Jamie Rice v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mar 19 2015, 9:56 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stanley F. Wruble III Gregory F. Zoeller
Wruble & Associates Attorney General of Indiana
South Bend, Indiana
Graham T. Youngs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jamie Rice, March 19, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A03-1407-CR-265
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior
Court
The Honorable John M. Marnocha,
State of Indiana, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff Cause No. 71D02-1404-FD-23
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] On the evening of January 13, 2014, Appellant-Defendant Jamie Rice went to
the home of his ex-girlfriend, Kelly Hostetler. Upon arriving at Hostetler’s
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home, Rice went into Hostetler’s detached garage and rifled through her
unlocked vehicle. Rice took the car key out of the ignition, a makeup bag
containing makeup, and two medication bottles out of the vehicle and placed
the items in his pockets. Rice left Hostetler’s property once she detected his
presence. Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (“the State”) subsequently
charged Rice with Class D felony theft. Rice was convicted of this charge
following a jury trial. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to a term of
three years, with two years served in community corrections and one year
suspended to probation.
[2] On appeal, Rice contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Rice and Hostetler had been involved in a romantic relationship. However, as
of January 13, 2014, Rice no longer lived with Hostetler and was “not allowed”
to be at Hostetler’s residence. Tr. p. 123. At approximately 6:30 p.m. on
January 13, 2014, Rice went to Hostetler’s home. Upon arriving at Hostetler’s
home, Rice parked his moped near Hostetler’s back porch and entered
Hostetler’s detached garage without first knocking on any of the doors of
Hostetler’s home.
[4] Hostetler’s 2006 Chevy Malibu was parked, unlocked, inside her garage.
Hostetler had left her key to the vehicle inside the vehicle. She had also left two
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different medications, one of which she took three times a day, papers, clothing,
and a makeup bag containing makeup in her vehicle. None of Rice’s
possessions where in the vehicle. Hostetler had not given Rice permission to
enter her garage or to take any of her personal possessions from her vehicle.
[5] At some point, Hostetler walked through the kitchen of her home and noticed
that a light was on in her garage. Hostetler had not left the light on in her
garage. Hostetler also saw Rice’s moped near her back porch. Hostetler, who
had not given Rice permission to enter her garage, then “opened the door and
… yelled out the door … ‘Jamie, you need to get out of my garage, you need to
leave, you’re not allowed to be here.’” Tr. p. 125.
[6] Hostetler “instantly” shut the door to her home after Rice appeared from within
the garage because she did not “feel safe around [Rice].” Tr. p. 125. Hostetler
was also concerned about arguing with Rice in front of her children, who were
inside her home. Hostetler had previously seen Rice upset and believed that he
appeared upset on January 13, 2014. Hostetler threatened to call the police if
Rice did not leave her property. Rice initially appeared to be leaving, but
turned around and “started screaming” at Hostetler. Tr. p. 143. Hostetler then
called the police.
[7] Lakeville Police Officer Jess Fisher and Police Chief Patrick Howard responded
to Hostetler’s call. Hostetler informed Officer Fisher and Chief Howard that
Rice had likely traveled to his father’s house, which was located approximately
three miles from Hostetler’s home. Upon arriving at Rice’s father’s home,
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Officer Fisher and Chief Howard observed Rice through a window in the
garage. Rice was parking his moped. When Officer Fisher and Chief Howard
knocked on the garage door, identified themselves, and asked to speak with
Rice, Rice retorted “Who the ‘F’ is it?” Tr. p. 154. Officer Fisher and Chief
Howard identified themselves three times before Rice’s father came out of the
house and opened the garage door. Rice then met with Officer Fisher and
Chief Howard. Rice “seemed agitated,” smelled of alcohol, and acted
aggressively toward Officer Fisher and Chief Howard. Tr. p. 154.
[8] Officer Fisher and Chief Howard placed Rice in handcuffs and informed him of
his Miranda1 rights. Rice admitted to Officer Fisher and Chief Howard that he
went to Hostetler’s home “to try to get his stuff.” Tr. p. 157. Rice was
“uncooperative” and “aggressive” as he was led to the patrol vehicle. Tr. p.
163. Before Rice was placed in the patrol vehicle, Officer Fisher searched
Rice’s person. During this search, Officer Fisher found makeup, a car key, and
two bottles of medication. Both of the bottles of medication had Hostetler’s
name on them.
[9] On January 15, 2014, the State charged Rice with Class D felony theft and
Class D felony intimidation. Following a jury trial, Rice was found guilty of
Class D felony theft and not guilty of Class D felony intimidation. On July 2,
2014, the trial court sentenced Rice to three years, with two years served in
1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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community corrections and one year suspended to probation. This appeal
follows.
Discussion and Decision
[10] Rice contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for Class
D felony theft.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence
and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s
role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and
weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a
conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are
confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most
favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Appellate courts affirm the
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not
necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably
be drawn from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and
quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be
reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence
presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in
original). Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess
the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind.
2002).
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[11] In charging Rice with Class D felony theft, the State alleged that “[o]n or about
the 13th day of January, 2014, … [Rice] did knowingly exert unauthorized
control over the property of [Hostetler], to-wit: various items of personal
property, by possessing same, with the intent to deprive [Hostetler] of any part
of the use or value of the property.” Appellant’s App. p. 141. The offense of
theft is governed by Indiana Code section 35-42-4-2, which, on the date in
question, read as follows: “(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts
unauthorized control over property of another person with intent to deprive the
other person of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class D felony.”
Thus, in order to prove that Rice committed theft, the State had to show that
Rice (1) knowingly exerted unauthorized control (2) over the personal property
of Hostetler, (3) with the intent to deprive Hostetler of the property’s value or
use.
[12] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his theft conviction,
Rice concedes that, at the time the items in question were recovered, the items
were found in his possession. He argues, however, that the State failed to prove
that he intended to deprive Hostetler of her possessions.
“Intent” is “a mental function, and without a confession, it must be
determined from a consideration of the conduct and the natural
consequences of the conduct giving rise to the charge that the
defendant committed theft.” Duren v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1198, 1202
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Brant v. State, 535 N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1989)), trans. denied. Accordingly, intent may be proven by
circumstantial evidence, and it may be inferred from a defendant’s
conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct
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logically and reasonably points. Duren, 720 N.E.2d at 1201.
Long v. State, 867 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). On appeal, a court
“need not find that the circumstantial evidence is adequate to overcome every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence but only that an inference may reasonably
be drawn therefrom which supports the verdict.” Lovell v. State, 474 N.E.2d
505, 507 (Ind. 1985) (citing McCann v. State, 466 N.E.2d 421, 423 (Ind. 1984)).
[13] Upon review, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence from
which the jury could reasonably infer that Rice intended to deprive Hostetler of
the value and use of her personal possessions, i.e., her makeup bag, car keys,
and medications. The record demonstrates that as of January 13, 2014, Rice no
longer lived with Hostetler and was “not allowed” to be at Hostetler’s
residence. Tr. p. 123. Although Rice claimed he went to Hostetler’s residence
on the night in question because he wanted to speak to Hostetler or to “try to
get his stuff”, tr. p. 157, Rice sought to avoid detection by parking his moped
near Hostetler’s back porch and entering Hostetler’s detached garage without
first knocking on any of the doors of Hostetler’s home. Hostetler only noticed
Rice’s presence because she happened to be walking through the kitchen of her
home when she noticed that a light was on in her garage and saw Rice’s moped
near her back porch. Hostetler, who had not given Rice permission to enter her
garage, then “opened the door and … yelled out the door … ‘Jamie, you need
to get out of my garage, you need to leave, you’re not allowed to be here.’” Tr.
p. 125. By the time Rice left Hostetler’s garage, he had placed Hostetler’s
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possessions in his pockets. He then returned to his father’s home, taking
Hostetler’s possessions with him.
[14] We have previously concluded that taking someone’s property from their house
and hiding it in your own vehicle is evidence of intent to deprive that person of
her use of the property. McIntosh v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1269, 1277-78 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994). We can think of no reason why taking someone’s property out of
the person’s vehicle, without the person’s permission, and taking it to the
residence where you are living would not similarly be evidence of intent to
deprive that person of her use of her property. Accordingly, because Rice took
Hostetler’s property from her vehicle without permission, placed the property in
his pockets, removed it from Hostetler’s garage, and took it to his father’s
home, we conclude that the State provided sufficient evidence from which the
jury could reasonably infer that Rice intended to deprive Hostetler of the value
and use of her property. Rice’s claim to the contrary effectively amounts to an
invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768
N.E.2d at 435.2
2
Furthermore, to the extent that Rice argues that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain his conviction because the State failed to prove motive, we conclude that because
motive was not included in the statutory element of theft, the State was not required to prove
motive in order to obtain a conviction. See generally Coates v. State, 534 N.E.2d 1087, 1093
(Ind. 1989) (providing that “[m]otive is not an element of robbery and, therefore, is not
required to be proven for a conviction”); Armstrong v. State, 429 N.E.2d 647, 654 (Ind. 1982)
(providing that the fact that the evidence showed no motive for the appellant to kill the victim
does not negate any element of the crime of attempted murder because motive is not an
element of murder).
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[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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