Juan Humberto Lara-Molina v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                  Mar 26 2015, 6:15 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Adam Lenkowsky                                           Gregory F. Zoeller
    Roberts & Bishop                                         Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Monika Prekopa Talbot
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Juan Humberto Lara-Molina,                               March 26, 2015
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    12A02-1409-CR-645
    v.                                               Appeal from the Clinton Circuit
    Court
    The Honorable Bradley K. Mohler,
    State of Indiana,                                        Judge
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Cause No. 12C01-1311-FA-1101
    Bradford, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   On November 20, 2013, Appellant-Defendant Juan Humberto Lara-Molina
    was stopped while driving on Interstate 65 in Clinton County. Lara-Molina,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1409-CR-645 | March 26, 2015        Page 1 of 9
    who initially provided a false name to the Indiana State Trooper who stopped
    him, was found to be in possession of approximately 1238 grams of cocaine and
    did not have a valid driver’s license. Soon thereafter, Lara-Molina was charged
    with Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class D felony synthetic identity
    deception, and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle without ever having
    received a license. Lara-Molina subsequently pled guilty as charged. Lara-
    Molina’s plea agreement left sentencing to the discretion of the trial court and
    did not include a sentence recommendation from Appellee-Plaintiff the State of
    Indiana (the “State”).
    [2]   At sentencing, the State notified the trial court that the parties wished to amend
    Lara-Molina’s guilty plea for dealing in cocaine from a Class A felony to a
    Class B felony and that the State wished to add a recommendation for a seven-
    year executed sentence. Both the State and Lara-Molina conceded that the trial
    court would not be bound by this recommended sentence, however, because the
    original plea agreement contained no such recommendation. The trial court
    ultimately allowed the parties to amend Lara-Molina’s plea to dealing in
    cocaine from a Class A felony to a Class B felony, but declined to impose the
    seven-year executed sentence recommended by the State. Finding that the
    aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and noting that Lara-
    Molina received a substantial benefit from the reduction of his plea from a Class
    A felony level to a Class B felony level, the trial court imposed an aggregate
    eighteen-year executed sentence. We affirm.
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    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   The factual basis entered during the March 31, 2014 guilty plea hearing
    provides as follows: on November 20, 2013, Lara-Molina was stopped by
    Indiana State Police Trooper Ryan Winters while driving a vehicle in Clinton
    County. At the time he was stopped, Lara-Molina possessed, with the intent to
    deliver, more than three grams of cocaine. Lara-Molina, who was driving
    without ever receiving a driver’s license, falsely identified himself to Trooper
    Winters as Juan Carlos Gomez Esparza.
    [4]   On November 22, 2013, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the “State)
    charged Lara-Molina with Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class D felony
    synthetic identity deception, and Class C misdemeanor operating a motor
    vehicle without ever receiving a license.1 On March 31, 2014, Lara-Molina pled
    guilty as charged. According to the terms of Lara-Molina’s guilty plea,
    sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court as the State did not make a
    sentencing recommendation.
    [5]   The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on August 18, 2014, during
    which the State informed the trial court that:
    the history of this case is that Mr. Lara-Molina pleaded guilty to the
    Class A felony … but due to circumstances that have occurred since
    1
    The State filed an amended charging information on December 2, 2013. The amended charging
    information is identical to the original charging information filed on November 22, 2013, except that
    it appears to correct a spelling error that was contained in the original charging information.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1409-CR-645 | March 26, 2015      Page 3 of 9
    the time of the plea, uh, the State now wishes to provide Mr. Lara-
    Molina with a consideration uh, that is not possible uh, under the
    potential sentencing for the Class A felony to which he -- he pleaded.
    And so in order to be able to recommend to the Court uh, the
    consideration that we wish him to have uh, we uh, would need to --
    and then propose to do so today, amend the uh, Count 1, Dealing in
    Cocaine, a Class A felony, to a Class B felony, uh, carrying a range of
    penalties of six to twenty years. Uhm, and the recommendation we
    would then make is that the executed portion of the sentence be uh,
    seven years. Uh, now that recommendation would be non-binding
    because we stand here today uh, poised for a sentencing in a situation
    in which there was no agreement uh, between the parties at the time
    that the plea agreement was entered. So even if we make a
    recommendation today at the Class A level, it would not be binding on
    the Court and we don’t propose to make it binding on the Court at the
    Class B level. But, it is an attempt to uh, be able to make the
    recommendation to the Court, the consideration that we think uh, we
    would like Mr. Lara-Molina to have. Now we recognize also and we
    hope he does that the minute we uh, amend the Class A to a Class B if
    the court approves that and he is in agreement with it, he gets a fairly
    substantial consideration anyway because the maximum on a Class B
    is the minimum on a Class A, and uh, so that -- that’s a meaningful
    opportunity for him. But, at any rate, that’s what the State proposes
    here uh, if the defense table is in agreement with our proceeding in that
    manner.
    Tr. pp. 15-16. Defense counsel indicated that the State’s comments were
    consistent with counsel’s understanding. In addition, through the aid of an
    interpreter, the trial court and Lara-Molina engaged in the following discussion:
    The Court: And -- Mr. Lara-Molina, have you been able to
    understand the attorney’s summary and outlining of the changes to the
    Plea Agreement that they are proposing?
    Interpreter:     Yes.
    The Court: Do you understand that I would not uh, authorize or
    accept any changes at this point until accepting a plea pursuant to this
    agreement? And what that means is you’ve already pled guilty to a
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    Class A felony. We’re scheduled for sentencing on that Class A felony
    today. Uh, the attorneys have further negotiated and are proposing
    that, that Plea Agreement be modified to a Class -- … So then the Plea
    Agreement if accepted, would be modified so that the Dealing in
    Cocaine would be a Class B felony as opposed to Class A felony.
    Additionally in the portion of that Plea Agreement that originally said
    the State would not make a sentencing recommendation, the parties
    would be making the recommendation that has just been outlined.
    Understand though that the Court is not bound by that
    recommendation. As an A felony or as you originally pled and were
    originally charged, the penalty range is anywhere from twenty to fifty
    years with thirty years being the advisory sentence and the fine
    possible from Zero to Ten Thousand Dollars. If the Court would
    accept this modification, the penalty would range for a B felony would
    be anywhere from six years to twenty years. The advisory sentence
    would be ten years and the fine could range from Zero to Ten
    Thousand Dollars. Do you understand those possible penalties both
    for the charge as it currently stands as an A felony and as a reduced B
    felony charge that is contemplated with these amendments?
    Interpreter:     Yes sir.
    The Court: And again, do you understand that any
    recommendations to the sentence that would be made either by the
    attorneys individually or by the attorneys jointly, would be just that,
    only recommendations and the Court would still have the authority to
    sentence you within the full range for that [B] felony, which is six to
    twenty years of incarceration? Do you understand that?
    Interpreter:     Yes.
    ****
    The Court: Other than what I have reviewed with you and what has
    been outlined by the attorneys, have you been promised anything else,
    threatened or forced to get you to plead guilty?
    Interpreter:     No sir.
    The Court: Have you been able to understand everything I’ve said
    through the translation provided by Miss Garza?
    Interpreter:     Yes sir.
    ****
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1409-CR-645 | March 26, 2015   Page 5 of 9
    The Court: Okay. And again just to make sure you’re aware of this,
    if the Court does accept this new plea to a B felony level, the Court has
    the full range of possible penalties, which would be six to twenty years
    and the attorneys can make arguments and recommendations, but
    none of those arguments or recommendations are binding on the
    Court and the Court will decide upon the pos -- the actual penalty
    within that six to twenty year range. Do you understand that?
    Interpreter:     Yes sir.
    Tr. pp. 16-21. Lara-Molina also again admitted that he possessed cocaine, with
    the intent to deliver, on November 20, 2013.
    [6]   At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court allowed Lara-Molina to amend
    his guilty plea from a plea of guilty to a Class A felony to a plea of guilty to a
    Class B felony. The trial court, however, found that the seven-year sentence
    recommended by the State was inadequate, instead sentencing Lara-Molina to
    an aggregate eighteen-year term. In arriving at this sentence, the trial court
    found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. 2 The trial
    court also found that Lara-Molina was a high risk to re-offend and noted that
    Lara-Molina received a substantial benefit from the reduction of his conviction
    for dealing in cocaine from a Class A felony level to a Class B felony level.
    2
    Lara-Molina does not challenge the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the trial court on
    appeal. The aggravating factors include: Lara-Molina’s criminal history, which includes convictions
    for crimes of violence, several weapons charges, and at least one federal conviction for illegal re-
    entry; his status as an illegal alien; and the fact that he had previously been deported. The mitigating
    factors include: Lara-Molina accepted responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty, cooperated
    with law enforcement, and had family obligations.
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    Discussion and Decision
    [7]   On appeal, Lara-Molina contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
    sentencing him. Generally, sentencing decisions rest within the sound
    discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of
    discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other
    grounds on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
     (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if
    the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
    before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
    therefrom.” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted).
    [8]   Specifically, Lara-Molina argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
    failing to give him an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea after the trial
    court determined that it would not impose the seven-year executed sentence
    that was recommended by the State. The record establishes, however, that both
    parties understood that the seven-year executed sentence recommendation
    presented for the first time by the State at sentencing would not be binding upon
    the trial court.
    Under a “nonbinding” sentence recommendation, the defendant
    extracts a promise from the prosecutor to advocate the imposition of a
    particular sentence (or that the prosecutor will remain mute at the
    sentencing hearing), but the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and
    intelligently submits to the agreement with the understanding that the
    sentence recommendation is “nonbinding” and that he or she is not
    entitled to withdraw the guilty plea if the trial court rejects the
    recommended sentence. This type of sentence recommendation is
    made as another fact relevant to sentencing for the trial court to
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    consider when it exercises its sentencing discretion.
    Walker v. State, 
    420 N.E.2d 1374
    , 1378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); see also Hedger v.
    State, 
    824 N.E.2d 417
    , 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (providing that where the
    defendant’s written plea agreement included no specific sentence term, the trial
    court was not bound to follow the State’s oral sentence recommendation), trans.
    denied.
    [9]    Again, both the State and Lara-Molina explicitly stated that they understood
    that the State’s recommendation of a seven-year executed sentence would not
    be binding on the trial court. After both counsel for the State and defense
    counsel indicated that the sentence recommendation would not be binding
    upon the trial court, the trial court, through the aid of an interpreter, engaged in
    a discussion with Lara-Molina in which the trial court repeatedly asked Lara-
    Molina whether he understood that the sentence recommendation was
    nonbinding and sentencing would be left to the trial court. Each time, Lara-
    Molina indicated that he understood. Lara-Molina further indicated that he
    had been able to understand everything that the trial court had said through the
    translation.
    [10]   The record clearly demonstrates that all of the relevant parties, including
    counsel for the State, defense counsel, and Lara-Molina, understood that the
    seven-year sentence recommendation was not binding upon the trial court and
    that the trial court retained the discretion to sentence Lara-Molina as the trial
    court saw fit. We therefore conclude that the trial court acted within its
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    discretion in sentencing Lara-Molina to an aggravated eighteen-year term
    without first offering Lara-Molina the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.
    [11]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1409-CR-645 | March 26, 2015   Page 9 of 9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12A02-1409-CR-645

Filed Date: 3/26/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021