In Re the Marriage of: J.D.S. v. B.S. (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Apr 10 2015, 7:34 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Laurie Baiden Bumb                                        Kelly A. Lonnberg
    Bumb & Vowels, LLP                                        Trisha S. Dudlo
    Evansville, Indiana                                       Bamberger Foreman Oswald & Hahn,
    LLP
    Evansville, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In Re the Marriage of:                                   April 10, 2015
    Court of Appeals Cause No.
    J. D. S.,                                                82A05-1407-DR-331
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Appeal from the Vanderburgh
    Superior Court.
    v.
    The Honorable Mary Margaret
    Lloyd, Judge.
    B. S.,                                                   The Honorable J. August Straus,
    Appellee-Petitioner.                                     Magistrate.
    Cause No. 82D04-1307-DR-708
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015         Page 1 of 12
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Petitioner, J.D.S. (Father), appeals the trial court’s Order modifying
    his extended summer parenting time.
    [2]   We remand with instructions.
    ISSUE
    [3]   Father raises one issue on appeal which we restate as: Whether the trial court
    abused its discretion in modifying Father’s extended summer parenting time.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   Father and B.S. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) were married on March 17,
    2001. During their marriage, they had two children, S.S., born in September
    2002, and N.S., born in March 2006 (collectively, the Children). In the spring
    of 2011, Parents separated, and Father moved out of the marital home in
    Evansville, Indiana. On December 27, 2013, the trial court entered a Decree of
    Dissolution, which incorporated the Mediated Settlement Agreement
    (Agreement) reached by Parents.
    [5]   Pursuant to the Agreement, Mother had primary physical custody of the
    Children and Father would exercise parenting time, but Parents shared joint
    legal custody. Father would have the Children on Father’s Day, on his
    birthday, and on the 4th of July of each year, while Mother would have the
    Children on Mother’s Day and on her birthday. As for the 2013 Christmas
    break, Parents agreed on an elaborate parenting time schedule. However,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015   Page 2 of 12
    Parents agreed that the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (Guidelines) would
    apply for the 2014 Christmas break.
    [6]   When Parents entered into the Agreement, Father had relocated from
    Evansville to Florida. Parents agreed that the Children would remain in
    Evansville and attend a Catholic parochial school. Father agreed that parenting
    time during the school year would be exercised in Indiana. Because Father
    resided in Florida, Parents agreed that they “shall work together, taking into
    consideration [] Father’s work and travel schedule and the [C]hildren’s
    activities to maximize [] Father’s parenting time . . . .” (Appellant’s App. p. 5).
    Distance being a factor, it was agreed that Father would have an extra week of
    parenting time during the summer of each year. Parents also settled that in the
    event Father would relocate to Evansville, Father would have the Children on
    alternate weekends and a mid-week overnight. In addition, Father agreed to
    pay $275.00 per week in child support, but Parents were to equally share the
    costs of the Children’s extracurricular activities.
    [7]   Also, Parents decided that they would sell their two homes—2166 and 2162 E.
    Powell Ave. in Evansville, Indiana. 2166 was their marital residence, and
    Parents used 2162 as a rental property. As for the Parents’ matrimonial home,
    Parents agreed that it shall be sold by a realtor of Father’s choosing and the net
    proceeds to be applied to the “Target, Chase and Evansville Teacher Federal
    Credit Union credit card debt, limited to a maximum of $31,000.00” and the
    remainder of the proceeds if any, to be applied to the “IRS debt.” (Appellant’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015   Page 3 of 12
    App. p. 7). As for the Parents’ rental home, it was agreed that any equity or
    liability should be split equally.
    [8]   On January 3, 2014, Mother filed a petition requesting Father to be held in
    contempt. The trial court set a hearing for February 28, 2014. On February 7,
    2014, Father filed a notice of intent to relocate from “his current residence in []
    Florida to a nearby residence.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 2). The Chronological Case
    Summary (CCS) shows that on February 28, 2014, at the contempt hearing, the
    trial court ordered that Mother would have the Children “[one] night whenever
    Father has parenting time of [seven] days in a row.” (Appellant’s App. p. 7).
    On March 7, 2014, Father filed a second notice of intent to relocate, this time,
    back to Evansville, Indiana. Three days later, on March 10, Mother filed a
    Verified Petition to Modify and/or Clarify Information for Contempt and
    Objection to Notice of Relocation. In that petition, Mother alleged that Father
    had failed to comply with the most recent order. Mother also claimed that
    Father interfered with the Children’s sporting activities and had failed to pay for
    the Children’s extracurricular activities. In addition, Mother stated that Father
    had failed to list the marital home for sale and his intention to move back to the
    home is inconsistent with his obligation under the Agreement to sell the home
    and apply the proceeds to the marital debt. Also, Mother alleged that Father’s
    income had since improved because Father was able to travel twice a month
    from Florida on alternating weekends, and that his visits, at some point, turned
    into a week-long event. Due to her suspicion that Father’s income had since
    increased, Mother claimed that there should be an adjustment to the existing
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015   Page 4 of 12
    child support payments. In addition, Mother sought modification from the
    ordered payment of extracurricular expense from the 50/50 ratio, to Father
    being responsible for 75% and Mother for 25%. As for parenting time, Mother
    argued that it should be modified in accordance with the Guidelines because of
    Father’s ability to be in the Evansville area for a lengthy period of time during
    his visits or in the event that Father moves back to Evansville. Lastly, Mother
    argued that Father should not have the Children for more than a week during
    the school year or for more than six weeks at a time during the summer,
    particularly, if Father moved back to Evansville.
    [9]   On May 12, 2014, Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s petition. Father
    alleged that the Agreement did not set a timeline to list their marital home for
    sale, and he explained that the listing was delayed due to repair and insurance
    issues of which Mother was made aware. As for Mother’s claim that he had
    interfered with the Children’s sporting events, Father stated that he had missed
    one event due to Mother over-scheduling of activities. Father also stated that
    his salary remained unchanged. Father explained that the only reason he was
    able to travel twice a month was due to budget rates on Allegiant Air. In
    addition, Father claimed that Mother had failed to share the Children’s events
    through Google calendar, and due to that omission, Father had missed N.S.’
    first holy communion, a major life event. Lastly, Father claimed that there
    would be no negative impact on the Children if he moved back to their
    unoccupied marital home.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015   Page 5 of 12
    [10]   The trial court scheduled a hearing on May 14, 2014, to hear Mother’s petition
    and Father’s motion to dismiss. At the commencement of the hearing, Parents
    informed the court that they had reached a partial agreement, which was recited
    in open court. Mother’s counsel expressed that Father was no longer relocating
    to Evansville; however, Parents had agreed that Father would exercise eight
    overnights per month during the school year but not for more than four
    consecutive days at a time. As for the four-day rule, Mother’s counsel stated it
    would not apply to Father’s parenting time over spring break or Christmas
    break. It was stated that Mother was withdrawing her request to modify the
    child support, and costs of the extracurricular activities. Parents also agreed
    that during Father’s visits in Evansville, Father would maintain the Children’s
    extracurricular activities, including scouting, tennis, archery, karate, and S.S.
    service in Church. Lastly, Mother’s counsel stated that Parents settled that the
    Children’s scheduled activities would be posted on Google calendar and that
    Parents would keep each other informed about the Children’s major life events,
    incidents, or accidents.
    [11]   A summary hearing on all pending issues ensued. The most important issue on
    appeal is Father’s extra week of summer parenting time. According to the
    December 27, 2013 Agreement, Parents agreed that summer parenting time will
    be in accordance with the Guidelines with one exception: Father was entitled
    to an extra week of parenting time during the summer of each year. Mother
    posited that because Father would be exercising all the parenting time as per the
    Guidelines—alternating weekends and mid-week overnights—Father should
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015   Page 6 of 12
    not be entitled to the extra week of parenting time in the summer. Father’s
    counsel argued that distance being a factor, he should continue to have his extra
    week of parenting time in the summer. In addition, Father wished to exercise
    his parenting time in one consecutive block whereas Mother wished that it be
    split in several blocks.
    [12]   In determining whether Father would continue to have his extended parenting
    time in the summer, the trial court resolved that “there won’t be that bonus
    extra week because [Father] is getting his eight days during the summer . . . or,
    during the month.” (Tr. p. 42). In addition, the trial court’s Order modifying
    custody stated that:
    5. [] Father shall be entitled to parenting time in Evansville for eight
    (8) days per month, consistent with regular parenting time schedule in
    the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines as if he were residing in
    Indiana. Because he does not reside in Indiana, he may take those
    days no more than four (4) consecutive days at a time. Spring Break,
    Christmas Break and Summer Break parenting time shall not be
    restricted to four-day limit, per [A]greement.
    6. [] Father shall be entitled to one-half (½) of the summer break for
    parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.
    He may take his half of the summer in one extended visit rather than
    breaking up his visit. During each party’s block of summer parenting
    time, the other parent is not entitled to interrupt with temporary
    interim parenting time unless agreed upon by the parties. [] Father
    shall return the [C]hildren to [] Mother at least one week prior to the
    beginning of school, to get them ready and back into a routine.
    (Appellant’s App. p. 9).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015   Page 7 of 12
    [13]   On June 13, 2014, Father filed a motion to correct error, alleging that pursuant
    to their Agreement, he was entitled to an extra week of summer parenting time.
    In addition, Father contended that “Mother’s [c]ounsel added an issue” as to
    the extra week of parenting time, to which Father “did not agree with nor seek
    to address at [the summary] hearing.” (Appellant’s App. p. 38). Father
    maintained that modification of his extra week of parenting time required
    detailed findings by the trial court, which did not ensue. On June 17, 2014, the
    trial court denied Father’s motion.
    [14]   Father now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    [15]   When reviewing a trial court’s determination of a parenting time issue, we will
    grant latitude and deference to our trial courts, reversing only when the trial
    court abuses its discretion. Gomez v. Gomez, 
    887 N.E.2d 977
    , 983 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2008). No abuse of discretion occurs if there is a rational basis supporting the
    trial court’s determination. 
    Id. We will
    not reweigh the evidence or judge the
    credibility of the witnesses. 
    Id. In all
    parenting time issues, courts are required
    to give foremost consideration to the best interest of the child. 
    Id. [16] We
    note a parent’s right as the noncustodial parent to visit his Children is a
    “precious privilege.” Duncan v. Duncan, 
    843 N.E.2d 966
    , 969 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2006), trans. denied. Therefore, a noncustodial parent is generally entitled to
    reasonable visitation rights. 
    Id. The trial
    court’s modification of a parent’s
    parenting time is governed by Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2, which provides:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015   Page 8 of 12
    The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting time
    rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the
    child. However, the court shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time
    rights unless the court finds that the parenting time might endanger the
    child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional
    development.1
    [17]   The record shows that at the start of the summary hearing, Parents arrived at a
    partial agreement where Father would have regular parenting time during the
    school year—eight overnights per month. However, Mother requested the trial
    court to equally split the summer parenting schedule as recommended by the
    Guidelines. The trial court granted Mother’s wish by stating “there won’t be
    that bonus extra week because [Father] is getting his eight days during the
    summer . . . or, during the month.” (Tr. p. 42). Father maintains that the trial
    court’s “adherence” to the Guidelines so as to modify his summer parenting
    time is flawed and is not a substitute for modifying parenting time. (Appellant’s
    Br. p. 10). According to Father, because the trial court did not issue any finding
    as to whether that modification would serve the Children’s best interest, we
    should remand this cause. We agree. After combing through the record, there
    was no mention as to whether modification of Father’s summer parenting
    1
    Because we are remanding this cause, we need not address Father’s claim as to whether modification
    amounted to a restriction of his parenting time.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015        Page 9 of 12
    would be in the best interest of the Children. See Hill v. Ramey, 
    744 N.E.2d 509
    ,
    513 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that modification of visitation was “improper
    because the order includes no finding that modification would serve the child’s
    best interests”). Here, the trial court failed to articulate at the hearing or in its
    written order whether modification of his parenting time would serve the
    Children’s best interests. Under these circumstances, we remand for the trial
    court to determine and make findings as to whether the modification of Father’s
    summer parenting time would serve the Children’s best interests.
    CONCLUSION
    [18]   For the reasons mentioned above, we conclude that the trial court abused its
    discretion in modifying Father’s summer parenting time without a finding that
    modification is in the best interest of the Children. In this regard, we remand
    for the trial court to make necessary determination consistent with this opinion.
    [19]   Remanded with instructions.
    [20]   Vaidik, C. J. concurs
    [21]   Baker, J. dissents with separate opinion
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015   Page 10 of 12
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In re the Marriage of:                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    82A05-1407-DR-331
    J.D.S.,
    Appellant-Respondent,
    v.
    B.S.,
    Appellees-Petitioner.
    Baker, Judge, dissenting.
    [22]   I respectfully dissent. The trial court here was presented with a very complex
    set of circumstances to consider. The parties’ prior arrangement was
    complicated to begin with, and Father’s decision to relocate back to Indiana,
    followed by his decision to remain in Florida, taking into account his ability to
    spend more time with the Children during the school year than the parties had
    originally anticipated, left the trial court with quite a knot to untangle.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015   Page 11 of 12
    [23]   In my view, the trial court did a superb job managing the interests of the parents
    and Children, and arrived at a fair result for all concerned. It is readily
    apparent to me that the trial court took the best interests of the Children into
    account in modifying the parties’ parenting time arrangement. That the trial
    court did not explicitly state as much does not, in my opinion, warrant a
    remand. I believe that would be an unnecessary use of judicial resources, as
    well as the parties’ time and money. Consequently, I would affirm the trial
    court’s order.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion | 82A05-1407-DR-331 | April 10, 2015   Page 12 of 12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 82A05-1407-DR-331

Filed Date: 4/10/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/10/2015