Jonathan G. McPherson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 28 2015, 6:33 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elizabeth A. Bellin Gregory F. Zoeller
Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jonathan G. McPherson, April 28, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A04-1409-CR-428
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable George W.
Biddlecome, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Case No. 20D03-1206-FA-30
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Jonathan G. McPherson sold cocaine twice to a confidential informant from his
house, which was directly across the street from a Boys and Girls Club.
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McPherson was convicted of two counts of Class A felony dealing in cocaine
(within 1000 feet of youth-program center), Class D felony maintaining a
common nuisance, and Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a
serious violent felon (SVF); he was also found to be a habitual offender. The
trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of ninety-three years.
[2] McPherson appeals raising several issues. First, he contends that his habitual-
offender enhancement and SVF conviction are an impermissible double
enhancement because they are based on the same prior felony. Second, he
contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he dealt cocaine within
1000 feet of a youth-program center. Last, he contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support his habitual-offender enhancement because the State did
not prove that he was the one who committed the prior unrelated felonies.
[3] We conclude that the trial court erred by ordering McPherson’s SVF sentence
and habitual-offender enhancement to run consecutively. We therefore remand
this case with instructions to run McPherson’s sentence for unlawful possession
of a firearm by a SVF concurrently, resulting in a new aggregate sentence of
seventy-five years. However, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
prove that the Boys and Girls Club is a youth-program center and that the
“Jonathan G. McPherson” in this case is the same person who was convicted of
the prior unrelated felonies.
Facts and Procedural History
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[4] On May 16 and May 18, 2012, McPherson sold cocaine to different
confidential informants working with the Elkhart Police Department.
McPherson conducted both sales at his house, 412 Brady Street, in Elkhart.
Directly across the street from McPherson’s house, located at 411 Brady Street,
is “Cornerstone Ministries Boy’s and Girl’s Club.” The sign on the building
reads:
Cornerstone Ministries Boy’s and Girl’s Club
By Sandy Ridge Mennonite Church
Meet Every Wednesday 5:30 p.m.
Ex. 9 (phone numbers omitted). Detective Tim Freel, who used to live in the
neighborhood, explained that the Boys and Girls Club “would have different
groups of children come in there; typically, on a Wednesday night they had a
program called ‘Wednesday Night Club.’”1 Tr. p. 391. He added that children
often played basketball outside at the Club. Id. at 391-92. In addition,
Detective Andrew Whitmyer, who participated in the surveillance of
McPherson’s house on May 16, recalled seeing more children than usual at the
Boys and Girls Club that day. Id. at 272. He observed both “younger” and
“older” kids playing and said that the activities appeared to be organized. Id. at
272, 273.
1
Detective Freel testified that he lived in a house in the neighborhood as part of the “Officer Next Door”
program, which provided rent-free housing to officers who lived in troubled neighborhoods. Tr. p. 391.
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[5] Elkhart police officers obtained and executed a search warrant for McPherson’s
house on May 29. McPherson and his girlfriend were home at the time. The
officers found two digital scales with powdery residue and baggies with cut-off
corners. The officers also found a loaded .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol
inside a purse, a box of .40 caliber ammunition in a tote, and a loaded
magazine for the pistol inside the pocket of a red sweatshirt—all in the master
bedroom that McPherson used.
[6] Detective Freel read McPherson his Miranda rights and then began to question
him. McPherson admitted to “selling drugs from the house,” “admitted to a
firearm that was found inside the house,” knew that his house was directly
across the street from the Boys and Girls Club, and admitted that the $804 in
cash found on his person was “proceeds from drug sales.” Id. at 382. Although
no drugs were found during the search of McPherson’s house, McPherson
explained that he “was currently out of drugs and that he was planning to . . .
re-up, or purchase more drugs, so that he could sell those drugs later on that
afternoon.” Id. at 383. Finally, McPherson admitted that he had a prior felony
conviction for dealing in cocaine and that as a result of that felony conviction,
he could not possess a firearm. Id. at 493-94.
[7] The State charged McPherson with two counts of Class A felony dealing in
cocaine (within 1000 feet of youth-program center) for the controlled buys on
May 16 and 18, 2012; Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance for drug
activities at his house on or between May 16 and 29; and Class B felony
unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF for the firearm found during the May
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29 search of his house. The State alleged that McPherson was a SVF as a result
of his 1997 conviction in Elkhart County for Class B felony dealing in cocaine.
State’s Ex. 201; see also Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-4-5(b)(23) (West 2012)
(classifying dealing in cocaine as a serious violent felony). The State also
alleged that McPherson was a habitual offender. For the two prior unrelated
felony convictions, see Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-8 (West 2012), the State used
McPherson’s 1997 dealing-in-cocaine conviction as well as McPherson’s 2008
conviction in Elkhart County for criminal recklessness resulting in serious
bodily injury.
[8] McPherson’s jury trial was conducted in three phases. During the first phase,
the jury found McPherson guilty of both dealing counts and maintaining a
common nuisance. During the second phase, the jury found McPherson guilty
of unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF. During the third and final phase,
the jury found that McPherson was a habitual offender. The trial court
sentenced McPherson to an aggregate term of forty-five years for the dealing
and maintaining-a-common-nuisance convictions. The court then sentenced
McPherson to a consecutive term of eighteen years for unlawful possession of a
firearm by a SVF. Finally, for the habitual-offender finding, the court
sentenced McPherson to “an additional thirty (30) years” at the DOC; the court
explained that the habitual-offender enhancement “applies only to the Dealing
in Cocaine [convictions] and not to the [SVF] in Possession of a Handgun”
conviction. Tr. p. 579. The court reasoned:
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[T]he law is clear that you cannot use the same crime to elevate a
conviction to a B felony for . . . [SVF] in Possession of a Firearm, and
also an Habitual Offender Enhancement that applies to that
conviction. However, I don’t think that . . . there’s any prohibition of
using the two felonies which the [S]tate used to establish that the
defendant is an habitual criminal, even though one of the two was the
same one that enhanced the [SVF] in Possession of a Firearm to a “B”
felony.
Id. at 579-80.
[9] McPherson now appeals his aggregate sentence of ninety-three years.
Discussion and Decision
[10] McPherson raises four issues on appeal, which we reorder and restate as
follows. First, he contends that his habitual-offender enhancement and SVF
conviction are an impermissible double enhancement because they are based on
the same prior felony. Second, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to
prove that he dealt cocaine within 1000 feet of a youth-program center. Last,
he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his habitual-offender
enhancement because the State did not prove that he was the one who
committed the prior unrelated felonies.
I. Double Enhancement
[11] McPherson contends that his habitual-offender enhancement and SVF
conviction “constitute an impermissible double enhancement” since they are
based on the same prior felony: his 1997 dealing-in-cocaine conviction.
Appellant’s Br. p. 8. Citing Sweatt v. State, 887 N.E.2d 81 (Ind. 2008), and
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Pedraza v. State, 887 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 2008), the State concedes that the “trial
court’s decision that McPherson’s SVF sentence could be served consecutively
to his habitual-offender enhanced sentences is incorrect.” Appellee’s Br. p. 6.
[12] We agree that the trial court erred in ordering McPherson’s SVF sentence and
habitual-offender enhancement to run consecutively. In Sweatt, a jury found
Sweatt guilty of Class B felony burglary, Class B felony unlawful possession of
a firearm by a SVF, and also of being a habitual offender. The trial court
sentenced Sweatt to twenty years for each count, to be served consecutively,
and then enhanced the burglary conviction by thirty years for the habitual-
offender finding, for an aggregate term of seventy years. On appeal, Sweatt
argued that the trial court erred by enhancing his burglary sentence under the
habitual-offender statute because the same prior felony conviction—his 1994
rape conviction— was used to establish that he was a SVF. The Indiana
Supreme Court framed the issue as whether a given felony conviction can be
the basis for an SVF count and also serve as grounds for a habitual-offender
finding. Sweatt, 887 N.E.2d at 83. The Court concluded:
Sweatt’s conviction for possession of a firearm by an SVF, based on
his 1994 rape conviction, and his status as an habitual offender, based
on the same 1994 rape but applied to the burglary conviction, do not
by themselves create a double enhancement.
Id. at 84. The Court explained that a trial court may avoid double enhancement
by attaching the habitual “to some offense other than the SVF, but, when
counts are ordered served consecutively this is a distinction without a
difference.” Id. The Court continued:
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In sentencing an offender who has committed multiple crimes, trial
courts face a decision as to whether the sentence on each count should
run consecutively or concurrently, or a combination of both. Ind.
Code Ann. § 35-50-1-2 (West 2007). In a case where separate counts
are enhanced based on the same prior felony conviction, ordering the
sentences to run consecutively has the same effect as if the
enhancements both applied to the same count. This result is different
only in form from the multiple enhancements the Court of Appeals
found improper in Conrad [v. State, 747 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001), trans. denied]. On the other hand, if the trial court orders the
sentences to run concurrently, the enhancements, though duplicative
in name, operate just once to increase the defendant’s term of
imprisonment.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The Court remanded the case to the trial court to
consider “whether to alter Sweatt’s sentence to remedy this defect.” Id. at 84-
85.
[13] Here, the trial court thought it was avoiding an impermissible double
enhancement by attaching the habitual to McPherson’s dealing convictions 2—
as opposed to his SVF conviction—but still ordering the sentences to run
consecutively. However, as our Supreme Court explained in Sweatt,
consecutive sentences are “a distinction without a difference.” Id. at 84. The
Court reasoned that when the sentences are run concurrently, the
enhancements “operate just once to increase the defendant’s term of
2
“It is well settled that an ‘habitual offender finding does not constitute a separate crime nor does it result in a
separate sentence, rather it results in a sentence enhancement imposed upon the conviction of a subsequent
felony.’” Stephens v. State, 10 N.E.3d 599, 603 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Hendrix v. State, 759 N.E.2d
1045, 1048 (Ind. 2001)); see also Lewis v. State, 774 N.E.2d 941, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that a habitual-
offender enhancement “can only be imposed upon one felony conviction” and that the trial court has discretion to
choose which felony sentence to enhance). Accordingly, the trial court here should have attached the habitual-
offender enhancement to just one of McPherson’s dealing convictions. On remand, the trial court should fix this
error.
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imprisonment.” Id. Because running the sentences concurrently cures any
error, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to run
McPherson’s sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF
concurrently.3 This will result in an aggregate sentence of seventy-five years as
opposed to ninety-three years.4
II. Youth-Program Center
[14] Next, McPherson contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he
dealt cocaine within 1000 feet of a youth-program center, which elevated his
dealing convictions to Class A felonies. Our standard of review for sufficiency
claims is well settled. In reviewing a claim challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the
witnesses. Sewell v. State, 973 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We
consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We will affirm if the evidence and those
3
McPherson also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to object to the trial court
running” the sentences consecutively. Appellant’s Br. p. 8. In light of our resolution above, we do not need
to reach the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
4
McPherson appears to argue that we should extend the Indiana Supreme Court’s rehearing opinion in Dye
v. State, 984 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 2013). In Dye, our Supreme Court held that “the State is not permitted to
support [a defendant’s] habitual offender finding with a conviction that arose out of the same res gestae that
was the source of the conviction used to prove [the defendant] was a serious violent felon.” Id. at 630. We,
however, decline McPherson’s invitation to extend Dye. See Appellant’s Br. p. 14 (“The Defendant contends
that this Court should go further, re-examine Anderson v. State, 774 N.E.2d at 906, and find that based on the
rationale set forth in Dye v. State that any sentence, regardless of multiple counts, where the same prior felony
conviction is used to enhance a person’s conviction and sentence is an impermissible double enhancement.”).
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inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the
verdict. Id.
[15] When McPherson committed the crimes in this case, dealing in cocaine could
be enhanced to a Class A felony if it occurred “within one thousand (1,000) feet
of . . . a youth program center.”5 Ind. Code Ann. § 35-48-4-1(b)(3)(B)(iv) (West
2012) (formatting altered). Youth-program center is defined as:
(1) A building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational,
vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons
less than eighteen (18) years of age.
(2) The real property on which a building or structure described in
subdivision (1) is located.
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-357(a). This statute “neither explicitly nor implicitly
places any limitation on the content of the programs offered or the purposes for
which children are present.” Whatley v. State, 928 N.E.2d 202, 207 (Ind. 2010).
The only relevant characteristic of the programs and services offered is whether
they were provided on a regular basis to people less than eighteen years of age.
Id.
5
Under the newly amended criminal code, a youth-program center no longer can be used to enhance the
level of the crime. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1; Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-117.5; Ind. Code § 35-48-1-16.5.
Specifically, Indiana Code section 35-48-1-16.5(3)(B), which became effective July 1, 2014, provides that a
conviction can be enhanced if the person committed the offense within 500 feet of:
(i) school property while a person under eighteen (18) years of age was reasonably
expected to be present; or
(ii) a public park while a person under eighteen (18) years of age was reasonably expected
to be present.
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[16] McPherson argues that the State failed to prove that the Boys and Girls Club,
which was located directly across the street from him, “provided regular
recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs to youth.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 18. To the contrary, evidence was presented at trial that
Cornerstone Ministries and Sandy Ridge Mennonite Church operated the Boys
and Girls Club and that the Club offered meetings, called the “Wednesday
Night Club,” every Wednesday at 5:30 p.m. Ex. 9; Tr. p. 391. In addition, the
evidence also showed that children were often playing basketball outside the
Club. This evidence is sufficient to prove that the Boys and Girls Club is a
youth-program center. See Sewell, 973 N.E.2d at 100-01 (holding that evidence
that showed the church held weekly meetings for students in junior high school
and high school and on Sundays for youth choir and youth group was sufficient
to establish that the church was a youth-program center). We therefore affirm
McPherson’s Class A felony dealing convictions.
III. Habitual-Offender Enhancement
[17] Last, McPherson contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he is
the one who committed the two prior unrelated felonies that the State used to
establish that he was a habitual offender. The standard of review for sufficiency
of a habitual-offender enhancement is the same as for any other sufficiency
claim. See Woods v. State, 939 N.E.2d 676, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
denied.
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[18] The sentence of a person convicted of a felony may be enhanced by up to thirty
years if he is a habitual offender. Dexter v. State, 959 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind.
2012). Under the statute in effect when McPherson committed the crimes in
this case, the habitual-offender enhancement was available when the State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been convicted of two
prior unrelated felonies. Id.; see also Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-8 (West 2012).
In order to prove that McPherson was a habitual offender, the State alleged that
the two prior unrelated felonies were his 1997 dealing-in-cocaine conviction in
Case No. 20D02-9606-CF-55 and his 2008 criminal-recklessness conviction in
Case No. 20D01-0701-FC-1. Appellant’s App. p. 509. McPherson claims that
the State failed to meet its burden of proving that he was the one who was
convicted of the 1997 and 2008 felonies because his first name is spelled
“Jonathon” in the certified documents for the 1997 case but “Jonathan” in the
certified documents for the 2008 case. Compare Ex. 201 (1997 documents) with
Ex. 301 (2008 documents). McPherson also points out that one of the habitual-
offender jury instructions incorrectly lists the Case No. of the 1997 case as
ending in “51” when in fact it ends in “55.” See Appellant’s App. p. 222
(Instruction No. 4).
[19] Certified copies of judgments or commitments containing a defendant’s name
or a similar name may be introduced to prove the commission of prior felonies.
Tyson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 715, 718 (Ind. 2002). While there must be supporting
evidence to identify the defendant as the person named in the documents, the
evidence may be circumstantial. Id. If the evidence yields logical and
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reasonable inferences from which the finder of fact may determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who was convicted of the prior
felony, then a sufficient connection has been shown. Id.
[20] Here, the evidence yields logical and reasonable inferences linking McPherson
to the 1997 and 2008 felonies. First, McPherson admitted during his interview
with Detective Freel that he had a prior felony conviction for dealing in cocaine
and that as a result of that felony conviction, he could not possess a firearm.
Tr. p. 493-94.6 The certified documents for McPherson’s 1997 dealing-in-
cocaine conviction, State’s Exhibit 201, corroborate his admission that he was
convicted of dealing in cocaine. These documents also list McPherson’s
birthdate as April 21, 1975, and his middle initial as “G.” Ex. 201. Notably,
the same birthdate and middle initial also appear in the certified documents for
McPherson’s 2008 criminal-recklessness conviction, State’s Ex. 301. Although
the captions of the certified documents in State’s Exhibit 201 appear to misspell
McPherson’s first name with an “o” instead of an “a,” the plea agreement in
State’s Exhibit 201 contains McPherson’s signature, which he signs
“Jonathan.” State’s Ex. 201 (plea agreement filed April 28, 1997). The plea
agreement in State’s Exhibit 301 also contains McPherson’s signature. See
State’s Ex. 301 (plea agreement filed September 22, 2008). And although
Instruction No. 4 erroneously lists the Case No. as ending in “51” when it
6
The trial court incorporated the evidence from the first two phases of trial into the habitual-offender phase.
Tr. p. 533.
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actually ends in “55,” the Case No. is correct in all of the certified documents
contained in State’s Ex. 301. Moreover, another jury instruction, Instruction
No. 1, includes a copy of the habitual-offender charging information, which
correctly lists the Case No. as ending in “55.” Appellant’s App. p. 218-19.
[21] Although the trial court acknowledged the “paucity of information with respect
to [McPherson’s] identity,” Tr. p. 561, the court concluded that the evidence
was sufficient to support the habitual-offender enhancement because
McPherson’s “date of birth was stated on those documents, so his date of birth
is not subject to dispute.”7 Id. at 561-62. The trial court also noted that the plea
agreements in the 1997 and 2008 cases “were signed by the same person.” Id.
at 562. We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to prove that the “Jonathan
G. McPherson” in this case is the same person who was convicted of the 1997
and 2008 felonies. See Lewis v. State, 769 N.E.2d 243, 246-47 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (finding sufficient evidence to support habitual-offender enhancement
where the defendant’s social-security number, weight, and height in the
documents supporting the two prior unrelated felony convictions matched the
defendant’s identifying information in the documents supporting the current
conviction), aff’d on reh’g, 774 N.E.2d 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied; see
also Tyson, 766 N.E.2d at 718 (finding sufficient evidence to support habitual-
offender enhancement because “the name [of] the offender and other
7
During the sentencing hearing in this case, McPherson testified that his birthdate was April 21, 1975. Tr. p.
567.
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identifying information match the defendant.”). We therefore affirm
McPherson’s habitual-offender enhancement.
[22] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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