James Satterfield v. State of Indiana , 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 394 ( 2015 )

May 12 2015, 9:44 am
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James H. Voyles, Jr. Gregory F. Zoeller
Jennifer M. Lukemeyer Attorney General of Indiana
Voyles Zahn & Paul
Michael Gene Worden
Indianapolis, Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James Satterfield, May 12, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
49A02-1409-CR-659
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
State of Indiana, The Honorable Lisa Borges, Judge.
Cause No. 49G04-1404-MR-17426
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 1 of 16
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, James Satterfield (Satterfield), appeals the trial court’s
denial of his motion to let bail following his arrest and charge for murder.
[2] We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
ISSUES
[3] Satterfield raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the
State established that the proof of Satterfield’s guilt for murder is evident or the
presumption of that guilt strong despite his claim of self-defense.
[4] The State raises one issue on cross-appeal, which we restate as follows:
Whether Satterfield filed a timely notice of appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[5] On the morning of April 2, 2014, Satterfield met Maegan Biddle (Biddle) at the
Bankers Lane Apartments located on the near east side of Indianapolis,
Indiana. Biddle was a prostitute in the area and she and Satterfield had
engaged in illicit sex for money a couple of times previously. Biddle and her
friend, Andre Brown (Brown), had just returned from visiting Biddle’s mother
in Ohio, and she decided to prostitute herself that morning to raise money to
buy crack cocaine.
[6] Satterfield picked up Biddle along Washington Street and proceeded to the
apartments where he parked under a carport. As usual, he locked the car’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 2 of 16
doors prior to parking. Biddle began performing fellatio on Satterfield for
thirty-five dollars. Shortly thereafter, Satterfield noticed a man, later identified
as Brown, walking through the parking lot and towards the rear of his car.
Noticing Brown approach his vehicle, Satterfield became nervous and retrieved
his gun1 from behind the passenger side seat. Despite the locked doors, Brown
opened the passenger’s side door and leaned down, saying “hey” in a forceful
voice and holding a shiny object. (Transcript p. 45). Satterfield fired a single
shot. As Brown fell backward, Biddle recognized him as her friend. Satterfield
drove away quickly. After driving around for a couple of minutes, Satterfield
paid Biddle and she left the car.
[7] Around 9:30 a.m. that morning, a maintenance man from the apartment
complex found Brown’s body. Detective Marcus Kennedy (Detective
Kennedy) of the Indianapolis Police Department was notified. By the time
Detective Kennedy arrived on the scene, Brown’s body had been removed but a
claw hammer was located in close proximity to where Brown’s body was
discovered. In a subsequent forensic investigation, the hammer tested positive
for Brown’s DNA. Brown’s car was also found behind the carport, and inside
the officers found some of Biddle’s possessions. Within twenty-four hours of
learning that Brown was dead, Satterfield arranged, through counsel, to turn
himself in and to provide a voluntary statement. Satterfield has no criminal
1
Satterfield is licensed to carry a gun.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 3 of 16
history, has never before been arrested, and has been employed in lawn care
irrigation since 1988.
[8] On April 7, 2014, the State filed an Information, charging Satterfield with
murder, a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. On July 18, 2014, Satterfield filed a
motion to let bail, which the trial court considered during a hearing on August
15, 2014. During the bail hearing, witnesses testified and exhibits were
admitted. At the close of the evidence, the trial court denied Satterfield bail.
On August 29, 2014, Satterfield filed a motion to reconsider, which was again
denied by the trial court.
[9] Satterfield now appeals and the State cross-appeals. Additional facts will be
provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[10] Because the State presents us with a threshold procedural question, we will first
address the merits of its cross-appeal.
CROSS-APPEAL
[11] In its cross-appeal, the State maintains that Satterfield forfeited his right to
appeal the trial court’s denial of his bail by failing to file a notice of appeal
within the requisite thirty days of the trial court’s order. Because the trial
court’s order constituted a final appealable judgment and the motion to
reconsider did not toll the running of time, the State maintains that the notice of
appeal was due eight days prior to Satterfield’s filing of his notice of appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 4 of 16
[12] A trial court’s denial of bail is deemed a final judgment and appealable as of
right. Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 106 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. In order to
perfect an appeal, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the final
judgment being appealed. Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1). A motion to reconsider
does not “extend the time for any further required or permitted action, motion,
or proceedings[.]” Ind. Trial Rule 53.4(A). Accordingly, with the trial court’s
issuance of its order on August 15, 2014, Satterfield’s notice of appeal was due
on September 15, 2014, not on September 23, 2014.
[13] In an effort to avoid a forfeiture of his appeal, Satterfield contends that he
labored under the mistaken impression that the trial court took the case under
advisement at the conclusion of the bail hearing. “In this case, the trial court
made an initial ruling but demonstrated some hesitancy in that it asked for
guidance from other jurisdictions, which counsel then provided at a later date.
The parties below were operating under the assumption that the initial order
was not final until the trial court ha[d] a chance to consider the authority from
other jurisdictions.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. pp. 1-2). After reviewing the
transcript of the bail hearing, we find Satterfield’s argument is, at best,
disingenuous.
[14] While we agree with Satterfield insofar as the transcript reflects his counsel’s
request to undertake more research with respect to the applicability of justifiable
defenses in a bail hearing, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
nevertheless reiterated that its “ruling is going to stand.” (Tr. p. 76).
Satterfield’s counsel affirmed that she “understand[s] the ruling stands now.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 5 of 16
(Tr. p. 76). Consequently, the trial court’s denial of Satterfield’s request for bail
was a final, appealable order.
[15] However, In the Matter of the Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014),
our supreme court clarified that
[t]he untimely filing of a Notice of Appeal is not a jurisdictional defect
depriving the appellate courts of the ability to entertain an appeal.
Instead, the timely filing of a Notice of Appeal is jurisdictional only in
the sense that it is a Rule-required prerequisite to the initiation of an
appeal in the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals. Timely filing relates neither to the
merits of the controversy nor to the competence of the courts on
appeal to resolve the controversy. . . . [T]he right to appeal having
been forfeited, the question [then becomes] whether there are
extraordinarily compelling reasons why this forfeited right should be
restored.
In this case, we answer the question in the affirmative.
[16] The right to bail is “a traditional and cherished right.” Bozovichar v. State, 103
N.E.2d 680, 681 (Ind. 1952), abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990
N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2013). As such, “[t]he right to freedom by bail pending trial is
an adjunct to that revered Anglo-Saxon aphorism which holds an accused to be
innocent until his guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hobbs v. Lindsey,
162 N.E.2d 85, 88 (Ind. 1959). “Unless [that right] is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose
its meaning.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). Despite the broad language,
the right to bail, as enshrined in the Indiana Constitution, is not unqualified as
“[o]ffenses, other than murder or treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties.
Murder or treason shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 6 of 16
presumption strong.” Ind. Const. art. I, § 17. Because of these strictly defined
qualifiers in the case of murder or treason, each request for bail in those
instances must be reviewed upon its individual merits. Thus, the denial of the
right to award bail where the proof of guilt is not evident or the presumption of
guilt is not strong would be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law,
in violation of the Constitution, which would—rightly—call for prompt
corrective action. See Ex Parte McDaniel, 97 So. 317, 318 (Fla. 1923).
Ultimately, though, the criminal jurisprudence of Indiana and any
corresponding discussion of bail is founded on a presumption of individual
innocence. See Bozovichar, 103 N.E.2d at 681; see U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
755 (1987) (“[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is
the carefully limited exception.”). It is the unique confluence of this
fundamental liberty interest along with one of the most valued rights in our
culture—the right to bail—that we conclude that Satterfield’s otherwise
forfeited appeal deserves a determination on its merits.
APPEAL
I. The Fry Decision
[17] The Indiana Constitution specifically provides that “[o]ffenses, other than
murder or treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. Murder or treason
shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or the presumption strong.”
Ind. Const. art. I, § 17. “This qualification was proper because murder is ‘the
most serious charge that can be lodged by the [S]tate against an individual and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 7 of 16
carries with it the possibility of the imposition of a sentence of death, society’s
hashest penalty,’ and the purpose of bail would likely be disserved by an
unqualified right in such a case.” Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429, 435 (Ind. 2013)
(quoting Phillips v. State, 550 N.E.2d 1290, 1294-95 (Ind. 1990), abrogated on
different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2013)). Until recently, the
burden was placed on the defendant to show that either of those two separate
and distinct circumstances exist—i.e., to show that in his or her murder case the
proof is not evident, or the presumption is not strong. Fry, 990 N.E.2d at 435.
[18] In Fry, our supreme court disregarded the well-established maxim of stare decisis
and, in one fell swoop, overruled nearly 150 years of precedent going back to
the Civil War era. Shifting the burden of proof, the Fry court held that “when a
criminal defendant is charged with murder or treason, whether by indictment or
information, the burden lies with the State to show that ‘the proof is evident, or
the presumption strong,’ if it seeks to deny bail to that defendant.” Id. at 443-
44. Reversing the course of Indiana precedent, the court concluded that “the
contrary procedure used in the past [is] incompatible with the fundamental
guarantee presuming an accused’s innocence until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 444.
[19] Recognizing this complete disapproval of stare decisis, the Fry court also set out
“to articulate what is contemplated by the burden [this court] ha[s] now
assigned to the State” and endeavored to “provide some guidance by placing
this standard somewhere on the proof spectrum, which is bounded generally at
the low end by ‘reasonable suspicion’ and at the high end by ‘beyond a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 8 of 16
reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 444, 445. “Like Goldilocks in the home of the three
bears, [the Fry court] search[ed] for a formulation that is not too low, and not
too high, but instead is just right.” Id. at 446. After review of our sister states’
jurisprudence in this area, our supreme court concluded that
the State must show that the defendant “more likely than not”
committed the crime of murder (or treason). Such a showing, at such
an early stage of the process, seems sufficient to justify the denial of
bail given the severity of the proposed offense and the attendant
consequences. After all, at that point the trial court—while not pre-
judging the ultimate guilt or innocence of the defendant—can
reasonably say “the defendant most likely did it.”
Id. at 448. As such,
the State must [] present competent evidence either upon which those
charging documents relied or upon which the State intends to rely at
trial. Additionally the evidence cannot simply be statements by the
prosecutor as to what the proof will—or might—be at trial. The
magistrate must be shown information at the hearing from which he
can make his own independent determination whether there is
admissible evidence against an accused that adds up to strong or
evident proof of guilt. . . . [T]he evidence presented by the State must
show culpability of the actual capital crime for which bail may be
wholly denied—i.e., murder or treason—and not simply implicate a
lesser-included offense such as voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.
Id. at 449 (internal citations omitted).
[20] Although the Fry court shifted the burden of proof and clarified the standard of
necessary evidence to establish an ‘evident proof’ or ‘strong presumption’ to
deny bail for murder or treason, the court cautioned that its opinion “should
not be construed to modify—either to enhance or diminish—the due process
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 9 of 16
protections we have always required at bail hearings.” Id. at 449 (citing Phillips,
550 N.E.2d at 1295).
[21] In light of this reassessment of the burden of proof in bail hearings, we are
called upon today to determine whether a defendant is allowed to present
evidence of an affirmative defense to rebut the State’s strong presumption that
the defendant more likely than not committed the murder (or treason) accused
of.
[22] While Satterfield answered this issue of first impression in the affirmative and
suggests that we should impose on the trial court a requirement to assess a
defendant’s justifiable defenses during a bail proceeding, the State maintains
that “[p]ossible defenses have no bearing on the bail issue.” (State’s Br. p. 13).
“Requiring the State to negate a defense—such as the self-defense claim made
here—could result in a bail hearing becoming a mini-trial that in some cases
could consume countless hours of the trial court’s time.” (State’s Br. p. 13).
After hearing the parties’ respective arguments, the trial court opined it was not
allowed to “weigh potential defenses.” (Tr. p. 74). We disagree.
[23] Although the text of Article I, § 17 shows that the framers of the Indiana
Constitution wanted to establish a high threshold of proof before a person could
be held without bail when charged with murder or treason, the words
themselves do not suggest any limit on the kind of evidence that would be
admissible in a proceeding to determine bail. Just like our supreme court in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 10 of 16
Fry, we will turn to Indiana’s Civil War precedents and their progeny to seek
guidance as to the nature of evidence admissible in bail proceedings.
[24] In Ex Parte Moore, 30 Ind. 197, 199-200 (Ind. 1868), the supreme court, faced
with habeas proceedings in a murder case, considered it “proper” to “weigh the
evidence, and determine the facts, as if trying the case originally” in answering
the question “whether the proof of the prisoner’s guilt is so clear, or the
presumption so strong, as to render the offense a non-bailable one.” Turning its
analysis to the establishment of “express malice,” the court noted that if the
killing, “though voluntary, was the result of sudden heat, or transport of
passion, upon a sufficient provocation, it rebuts the presumption of malice, and
reduces the offense to manslaughter.” Id. at 200. After considering the facts of
the case, the Moore court concluded that
in view of the provocation given by the deceased, the high state of
excitement and passion produced upon the mind of the prisoner
thereby, the hasty manner in which he went to his house and returned
to the saloon with the pistol, and the short period of time, not
exceeding five minutes, that intervened between the provocation and
the act, [] it seems to us that it cannot be fairly said that it is clear that
there was sufficient time between the provocation and the act for the
passion to cool and reason to resume control, or that the proof is
evident, or the presumption strong, that the killing was malicious.
Id. at 201-02. Finding the existence of provocation, the court held that “the
prisoner is entitled to be let to bail.” Id. at 202. See also Schmidt v. Simmons, 36
N.E.516, 516 (Ind. 1894) (defendant was refused bail after an indictment for
murder even though “there were circumstances immediately preceding the fatal
act . . . to incite hot blood” and a “conflict in the evidence as to whether the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 11 of 16
deceased, at the time the fatal shot was fired, was making an effort to assault
the appellant”),abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind.
2013); Brown et al. v. State, 46 N.E. 34, 36 (Ind. 1897) (“It is, however, in the
absence of any countervailing facts, a necessary presumption that the homicide
was committed purposely.”), abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990
N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2013).
[25] Several years later, the supreme court issued its ruling in State v. Hedges, 98 N.E.
417 (Ind. 1912), abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429(Ind. 2013), in which it granted an application for bail after a murder
indictment. In Hedges, the court was presented with an objection by the State
that the applicant of the bail hearing “can only introduce the evidence of
witnesses upon whose evidence the State [had] relied for conviction” before the
grand jury. Id. at 417. Considering whether only the evidence that was
presented before the grand jury can be presented during a bail hearing, the court
unambiguously declared:
The rule is that the applicant must introduce the evidence of witnesses
indicated by the indictment, and he must also introduce such witnesses
as the [S]tate indicates that it does rely upon, or claim it relies upon,
but [the State] cannot foreclose the inquiry by simply declaring as to
any witness that it does not rely upon his testimony.
The inquiry necessarily requires the court to travel over much of the
ground to be heard by a traverse jury, in so far as the degree of the
offense is concerned, but it is an acknowledged constitutional and
statutory right of very ancient usage on proper showing.
If it is to be of any consequence or avail, it must overcome the prima
facie case made by the indictment, but it will readily be seen that that
might be an impossibility, and, presumptively, if only the witnesses
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 12 of 16
upon whom the [S]tate relies are offered, and might be a barren right,
and subject persons to cruel and unusual hardship, if not punishment,
if there be not a full and fair inquiry from these who really have
information.
Id. at 418 (internal citations omitted). See also State ex. rel. Post-Tribune Pub. Co.
v. Porter Superior Court, 412 N.E.2d 748, 418-19 (Ind. 1980) (where our supreme
court acknowledges that a bail hearing amounts to a mini-trial, and includes the
presentation of evidence that may or may not be admissible at the later trial).
[26] Continuing on the path of allowing the presentation of incriminating and
exculpatory evidence during bail proceedings, our supreme court reaffirmed in
Phillips that the appellant in a bail hearing must be afforded all constitutional
protections guaranteed to the criminally accused: the right to counsel, the right
to present witnesses in his defense and to confront and cross-examine those
against him, and the right against self-incrimination. Phillips, 550 N.E.2d at
1295. And most recently, in Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 623-24 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012), trans. denied, we reversed the trial court’s denial of bail in a murder
charge, where Shuai offered evidence to support alternate explanations that led
to the minor victim’s death and called into question the credibility of the
autopsy report. Relying on the evidence presented by both parties, we
concluded—in a premonition of shifting burdens in Fry—that Shuai “presented
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption” that the proof of guilt is evident
and the presumption of guilt is strong. Id. at 625.
[27] Based on a long and consistent history of Indiana precedents, we do not find
that the State’s argument prevails. Permeated within the right to bail is the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 13 of 16
presumption of innocence for all purposes while awaiting trial. See Fry, 990
N.E.2d at 440, 441. Although the right to bail is not absolute, but rather
severely qualified by our Constitution in the case of murder (or treason), the
“‘proof’ and ‘presumption’ that Article I, § 17 refers to are the ‘proof’ and
‘presumption’ of guilt.” Id. at 421. Even though the Fry court shifted the
burden of proof in bail proceedings to the State, the nature of the evidence
establishing that the proof is evident or the presumption strong that the
defendant committed murder (or treason) remained untouched. The Fry court
admonished that “our opinion today should not be construed to modify—either
to enhance or to diminish—the due process protections we have always
required at bail hearings.” Id. at 449. Considering all of our precedent, it
appears that in its argument on appeal the State attempts to use Fry to diminish
the due process protections that we have historically required.
[28] In order to preserve the presumption of innocence and to fully retain the
constitutional due process rights, a defendant must be awarded the opportunity
to present evidence and witnesses on his or her behalf in an endeavor to rebut
the State’s burden that he or she “more likely than not committed the crime of
murder (or treason).” See id. at 448; see also Phillips, 550 N.E.2d at 1295 (a
defendant must be afforded the type of procedural due process hearing that will
guarantee that bail is not denied unreasonably or arbitrarily). If a defendant
would be prevented from presenting evidence indicating a possible justification
to the murder charge, then no bail would be possible as the constitutional
qualification on the presumptive right to bail would become absolute. The right
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 14 of 16
to bail when charged with murder or treason would then indeed become a
“barren right.” Hedges, 98 N.E. at 418. Accordingly, after the Fry decision re-
evaluated the bailment landscape, we pay homage to the ancient principle of
stare decisis and reaffirm a defendant’s right to present exculpatory evidence as to
his or her culpability during a bail proceeding and the trial court’s duty to take
this evidence into account when considering a request for bail.
II. Application to the Facts
[29] When reviewing a trial court’s denial of bail in a murder case, we reverse only
for an abuse of discretion. Rohr v. State, 917 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009). A decision is an abuse of discretion when it “is clearly against the logic
and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188
(Ind. 2007). We will not reweigh the evidence, and we consider any conflicting
evidence in favor of the trial court’s ruling. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
[30] Here, Satterfield was charged with knowingly killing Brown. Despite
Satterfield’s admission that he shot Brown, he presented evidence that he might
have used this deadly force in self-defense. The evidence reflects that while
Satterfield was in his own vehicle, Brown forcefully attempted to enter the car
while holding a shiny object. Satterfield fired a single shot.
[31] However, after being presented with Satterfield’s evidence, the trial court
refused to weigh any evidentiary facts alluding to a possible self-defense and,
thus, abused its discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 15 of 16
Satterfield’s bail and remand to the trial court with instructions to conduct a
new bail hearing in accordance with our opinion today.
CONCLUSION
[32] Based on the foregoing, we hold that even though Satterfield forfeited his right
to appeal due to his failure to timely file a notice of appeal, extraordinarily
compelling reasons warrant a review of Satterfield’s argument on the merits.
Upon review of the evidence, we reverse the trial court’s denial of bail and
remand for a new bail hearing with instructions to weigh Satterfield’s evidence
of self-defense.
[33] Reversed and remanded.
[34] May, J. concurs
Bradford, J. concurs in result
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 49A02-1409-CR-659 | May 12, 2015 Page 16 of 16