Kevin S. Wang v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
May 13 2015, 10:33 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Patrick Magrath Gregory F. Zoeller
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Madison, Indiana
Larry D. Allen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kevin S. Wang, May 13, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
40A05-1409-CR-442
v. Appeal from the Jennings Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jon W. Webster,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Cause No. 40C01-1403-FB-16
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Kevin Wang appeals his convictions for dealing in methamphetamine, as a
Class B felony; two counts of possession of chemical reagents or precursors
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-442| May 13, 2015 Page 1 of 10
with intent to manufacture controlled substances, both as Class D felonies; and
maintaining a common nuisance, as a Class D felony. Wang presents two
issues for our review, which we revise and restate as follows:
1. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it
admitted certain evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant.
2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his
convictions.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Wang owns a home in Jennings County with a detached garage (“Wang
residence”). On December 11, 2013, deputies with the Jennings County
Sheriff’s Department responded to a request for assistance from detectives with
the Bartholomew County Sheriff’s Department regarding a hot tub and flatbed
trailer stolen from a store in Bartholomew County but recovered at a driveway
shared by the Wang residence. Deputies from both Departments responded to
the Wang residence, where they observed the stolen goods.
[3] While assisting the Bartholomew County detectives with their investigation
related to the trailer and hot tub, two plastic totes—one clear and one an
opaque blue—placed outside of the front of the detached garage caught the
attention of Detective Jeffrey Jones with the Jennings County Sheriff’s
Department, who had specialized training in the identification and processing
of methamphetamine labs. The totes were covered in several inches of snow,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-442| May 13, 2015 Page 2 of 10
and the clear tote was stacked on top of the blue tote, which was full of
apparent refuse and open at its top. Despite the snow, Detective Jones could
see through the clear tote, in which he observed yellow aerosol cans labeled
“starting fluid.” Tr. at 207. And, through the open top of the blue tote,
Detective Jones observed lithium battery hulls.1 Because of his training,
Detective Jones recognized both items as common ingredients used in the
manufacturing of methamphetamine.
[4] On this basis, Detective Jones requested and received a search warrant for the
Wang residence. Further, Detective Jones contacted Trooper Marty Mead,
who worked in the methamphetamine suppression section of the Indiana State
Police. As a member of that section, Trooper Mead had specialized training in
the processing and disassembly of methamphetamine labs. Together, Trooper
Mead, Detective Jones, and other Jennings County deputies executed the
search warrant at the Wang residence.
[5] The officers had difficulty accessing the garage to conduct the search because its
side door was reinforced with steel, locked at the handle, and padlocked. As a
result, the officers could not kick open the door but had to cut the padlock,
break a window, and unlock the door from the inside. The home, however,
provided easy access to the officers. It lacked electricity and was unlocked to
1
Detectives Jones’ initial search of the totes was entirely visual. He did not physically search the totes until
he had obtained a search warrant.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-442| May 13, 2015 Page 3 of 10
allow a running generator to connect the home to power by means of a cracked
sliding-glass door through which the generator’s extension cords ran.
[6] While executing the search warrant, the officers discovered security cameras
and, in both the garage and home, large quantities of ingredients and
instrumentalities used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, which
indicated to the officers that the operation was active and ongoing. The
discovered items were found intermixed with Wang’s personal property,
including a laptop bearing the login name “Kevin Wang,” a letter to Wang
dated December 2, 2013, and a local newspaper dated December 8, 2013.
Three vehicles registered to Wang were also located at the home, two of which
were snow covered but one of which showed signs of having been recently
cleared of snow. And, inside the home, police located Wang’s two dogs, which
looked nourished and cared for,2 and a kerosene heater in the bedroom.
Although Wang was not at the home when officers executed the search
warrant, the home demonstrated signs of having been lived in, such as dirty
dishes in the kitchen sink and clean dishes in a drying rack located on the
kitchen counter.
[7] On March 21, 2014, the State charged Wang3 with one count of dealing in
methamphetamine, as a Class B felony; two counts of possession of chemical
reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture controlled substances, both as
2
Wang contended that a neighbor cared for the dogs.
3
A warrant was issued for Wang’s arrest on March 24, which was served on April 11.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-442| May 13, 2015 Page 4 of 10
Class D felonies; possession of marijuana, as a Class D felony; and maintaining
a common nuisance, as a Class D felony. The trial court held Wang’s jury trial
on August 5 through August 7, 2014, at which Wang argued in defense that his
home was frequently burglarized,4 he had been absent from his home for some
time, and the methamphetamine lab was established in his absence by burglars.
[8] At the conclusion of his trial, the jury acquitted Wang of possession of
marijuana but convicted him on all other charges. Following a sentencing
hearing on September 4, 2014, the trial court “merged” Wang’s other
convictions with his conviction for dealing in methamphetamine and sentenced
him to eighteen years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction.
Appellant’s App. at 135. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Admission of Evidence
[9] Wang first contends that the trial court committed fundamental error when it
admitted certain evidence against him. As our supreme court stated in
Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013):
“Failure to object at trial waives the issue for review unless
fundamental error occurred.” Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621,
633 (Ind. 2010). The fundamental error doctrine is an exception
4
In rebuttal, the State offered evidence that Wang had not called 9-1-1 to report a burglary since 2008 and
that neither the home nor the garage exhibited signs of damage or forced entry. While, because of the
generator, the home was unlocked when police arrived, Wang testified that he had left the generator in the
garage the last time he was present at the home.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-442| May 13, 2015 Page 5 of 10
to the general rule that the failure to object at trial constitutes
procedural default precluding consideration of the issue on
appeal. See Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002). We
have elaborated on the underlying rationale for this exception:
There are very strong reasons to require objections
at trial to preserve error. Important among them is
that the trial court can often correct an error if it is
called to the court’s attention. This can result in
enormous savings in time, effort and expense to the
parties and the court, including avoiding an appeal
and retrial. Moreover, if matters can be heard on
appeal despite failure to object at trial, parties
detecting such an error may be encouraged to take
their chances on the result in the trial court despite
the error, secure in the knowledge that a retrial is
available. Despite these considerations, the doctrine
of fundamental error has been invoked to ensure
failure to object where appellate courts have found
an error to be sufficiently egregious.
State v. Daniels, 680 N.E.2d 829, 835 (Ind. 1997). Hence, “[t]he
‘fundamental error’ exception is extremely narrow, and applies
only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic
principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the
resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.”
Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006). “The error
claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute
clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of
due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010)
(internal quotation omitted). “This exception is available only in
egregious circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
[10] Wang asserts that the trial court committed fundamental error when it admitted
the evidence discovered during the search of the Wang residence. Specifically,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-442| May 13, 2015 Page 6 of 10
he contends that the initial search of the totes located outside of his garage was
conducted without a warrant and did not satisfy the requisites of the plain view
exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover, he argues, because the
evidence discovered during the search of those totes provided the basis for the
search warrant itself, the search warrant and everything discovered pursuant to
its execution constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree. Therefore, Wang contends
that all evidence admitted against him was obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,5 and, because this evidence
provided the sole basis for his conviction, he concludes that it was fundamental
error for the trial court to admit the evidence, even in the absence of an
objection. We disagree.
[11] Although the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, it “does not protect objects,
activities, or statements that a citizen has exposed to the ‘plain view’ of
outsiders because the individual has expressed no intention of keeping those
activities private.” Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Ind. 2006).6 For the
plain view doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be met: “(1) police
5
Wang also states that the search also violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, but he
presents no separate argument on this issue. Thus, his State constitutional argument is waived, and we
consider only his arguments related to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., White v. State, 772 N.E.2d
408, 411 (Ind. 2002).
6
Although Wang presents no argument that the totes were within the curtilage of his home, we note that
“the mere fact that an area subjected to police observation is within the curtilage [does not] transform[] a
warrantless observation or inspection into an unconstitutional search.” Trimble, 842 N.E.2d at 801. “[T]here
is no Fourth Amendment protection for activities or items that, even if within the curtilage, are knowingly
exposed to the public.” Id. at 802.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-442| May 13, 2015 Page 7 of 10
[must] have a legal right to be at the place from which the evidence can be
plainly viewed; (2) the incriminating character of the evidence [must be]
immediately apparent; and (3) police [must] have a lawful right of access to the
object itself.” Eaton v. State, 889 N.E.2d 297, 301 (Ind. 2008).
[12] Here, Wang concedes that officers had a legal right to be in his driveway, from
which they observed the totes, but he asserts that “the record fails to
demonstrate that [Detective Jones] was able to identify items of a clearly
criminal nature or that the officer had legal access to the items in the tote[s].”
Appellant’s Br. at 9. However, rather than challenging each element of the
plain view test individually, Wang proffers a single, overlapping argument: he
contends that the snow present on top of the totes precluded Detective Jones
from seeing the starting fluid cans and the lithium battery hulls. And, although
Wang recognizes that Detective Jones testified that, despite the snow, he could
see the starting fluid cans and the battery hulls, Wang asserts that Detective
Jones’ testimony “is[,] on its face[,] directly contradicted by the photographic
evidence.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. Specifically, Wang points to exhibits 5 and 6
to support his argument.
[13] But Wang’s argument asks that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
See State v. Figgures, 839 N.E.2d 772, 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
Detective Jones’ testimony supports the trial court’s decision to admit the
evidence. Further, as the State correctly notes, Detective Jones testified to
exhibits 47 through 50, which he stated were photographs that depicted the
totes in the condition they were in when he first saw them, not exhibits 5 and 6,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-442| May 13, 2015 Page 8 of 10
which were photographs taken during the execution of the search warrant and
testified to by Detective Mead. Therefore, we cannot state that the trial court
erred, much less committed fundamental error, when it admitted the evidence
discovered during the execution of the search warrant against him.
Issue Four: Sufficiency of the Evidence
[14] Next, Wang contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
support his convictions. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence
claims is well-settled. Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 2000).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the
verdict. We do not assess witness credibility, nor do we reweigh
the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to support a
conviction. Under our appellate system, those roles are reserved
for the finder of fact. Instead, we consider only the evidence
most favorable to the trial court ruling and affirm the conviction
unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pillow v. State, 986 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
[15] Again, Wang does not challenge any specific element of the offenses for which
he was convicted but, instead, proffers one overlapping argument regarding all
of his convictions: “Wang was not caught with any contraband in his
possession.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. In this respect, however, Wang simply asks
us to credit his testimony that “he was not actually in possession of the
property . . . while an untold number of people would have had unwelcome
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-442| May 13, 2015 Page 9 of 10
access to the home given the fact that it was unsecured and the doors were
open.” Id. at 13.
[16] Once more, Wang requests that we reweigh the evidence, which is the province
of the trial court. The trial court heard evidence that supports a determination
that Wang was in possession of his home. Namely, three vehicles registered to
Wang were located at his home, including one that had recently been cleared of
snow. Moreover, a recent piece of mail addressed to Wang was found inside of
his home, as was a newspaper dated only three days before the execution of the
search warrant. The home also demonstrated signs of having been recently
lived in. Finally, intermixed with ingredients and instrumentalities used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine, officers found Wang’s two dogs, which
were fed and cared for, and personal items that belonged to Wang, such as a
computer bearing his name on its login screen. Therefore, we hold that Wang’s
conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.
[17] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-442| May 13, 2015 Page 10 of 10