Carlton Hart v. State of Indiana , 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 400 ( 2015 )

May 15 2015, 8:22 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Lisa M. Johnson Gregory F. Zoeller
Brownsburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Christina D. Pace
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Carlton Hart, May 15, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1404-CR-191
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Lisa F. Borges,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Lower Court Cause No.
49G04-1211-MR-80845
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Carlton Hart (“Hart”) appeals his convictions, after a jury trial, for murder,1
Class B felony criminal confinement,2 and Class B felony conspiracy to commit
criminal confinement.3 On appeal, Hart argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions as an accomplice and that the trial court
erroneously allowed the State to redact details of a peace treaty he brokered
between rival rap groups from his statements to police. Concluding that the
evidence supported Hart’s convictions as an accomplice and that the trial court
did not err in excluding the details of the peace treaty, we affirm Hart’s
convictions.
[2] We affirm.
Facts
[3] On November 11, 2012, Hart’s cousin, Brandon McMitchell (a.k.a. “Bango”), a
rapper, was shot and killed. Hart owned a music recording studio in
Indianapolis, and, on November 15, 2012, he allowed James McDuffy
(“McDuffy”) to use his studio, ostensibly to arrange a tribute mixtape for
1
IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1.
2
IND. CODE § 35-42-3-3. We note that, effective July 1, 2014, a new version of this criminal confinement
statute was enacted and that Class B felony criminal confinement is now a Level 3 felony. Because Hart
committed his crimes in 2012, we will apply the statute in effect at that time.
3
IND. CODE §§ 35-41-5-2; 35-42-3-3.
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Bango. In truth, the intention was to question Marvin Finney (“Finney”) and
Thomas Keys (“Keys”), two local deejays, about Bango’s murder.
[4] Prior to the meeting, Hart, McDuffy, and Darin Jackson (“Jackson”) went to a
Lowes hardware store around 3:00 p.m. Brandon Pothier (“Pothier”), a loss
prevention manager at Lowes, started observing McDuffy because he first
selected a box cutter, a common tool used by shoplifters to open and take items.
Pothier then observed McDuffy and Jackson near zip ties, and the men made
motions crossing their wrists in front of their bodies. Hart, McDuffy, and
Jackson purchased a 2x4 piece of lumber, a package of zip ties, three 12x2 flat
washers, the box cutter, duct tape, and four open bar door holders. Hart,
Jackson, and McDuffy then returned to the studio. Hart later took Jackson to
work and then picked up his daughter, leaving McDuffy at the studio.
[5] Finney picked Keys up in his mother’s minivan and drove to the studio,
arriving at about 5:00 p.m. They were greeted by Dontee Robinson
("Robinson"), an associate of McDuffy’s who was at the studio. Finney was
familiar with Robinson through music videos on YouTube. McDuffy and Keys
began talking and exchanging telephone numbers, but the conversation shifted
to McDuffy asking Keys about Bango’s homicide. Keys denied knowing
anything about the murder.
[6] Meanwhile, Finney sent text messages and waited for the music to start.
Finney then noticed an unknown man walking around the backdoor area who
was short with a light-skin complexion and slanted eyes. McDuffy told Finney,
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“you all are not leaving here until you all tell us what we need to know.” (Tr.
128).
[7] McDuffy looked through Finney’s phone to see who he had been texting, and
Robinson looked through Keys’s phone. McDuffy pulled out a handgun from
his jacket and sat it in his lap. McDuffy and Robinson then patted Finney and
Keys down and took their wallets, keys, and jackets. Finney attempted to exit
through a back door, but the unknown man pointed a chrome revolver at him
and told him to sit down. Keys and Finney were then tied up with duct tape
and zip ties.
[8] Dominique Hamler (“Hamler”) eventually came into the studio through the
back door. He pointed an assault rifle at Keys and Finney and asked, “which
one of you all killed Bango?” (Tr. 136). Another man, Nathaniel Armstrong
(“Armstrong”) came through the back door, grabbed the box cutter, and slashed
Keys’s leg. An older bald-headed man, who Finney did not recognize, also
came into the studio, looked at a phone, pointed to Keys, and said, "that’s
him." (Tr. 145-46).
[9] Finney’s phone kept ringing with calls from his mother and his girlfriend.
Finney’s mother then sent a message stating that if he did not return her van,
she would call the police. McDuffy then said, “we need to go ahead and get
gloves and finish this.” (Tr. 147).
[10] Hamler, Robinson, Armstrong, and the older man came back with black and
brown work gloves. Someone put duct tape over Keys’s and Finney’s faces and
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zip ties around their necks. The lights were turned out, the group left the room,
and then one of the men came back and shot a firearm into the room. A bullet
struck Finney in the wrist, and he acted as if he were dead. Once the shooting
stopped and Finney thought the room was clear, he freed himself and told Keys
that they needed to leave; Keys did not respond.
[11] Finney, with duct tape and zip ties still on his body, ran down the street to a
CVS store where he sought help and tried to remove the remaining zip ties and
duct tape from his neck. Finney told people in front of the store and the
responding officers that he had been shot at the studio and that Keys was still
there. Officers went to the music studio and found Keys’s body inside. Keys
had been shot several times, including what was later determined to be a fatal
gunshot to his chest.
[12] While Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Detective Brian Schemenaur
(“Detective Schemenaur”) was at the studio, Hart arrived and stated that he
was the owner. Detective Schemenaur had Hart transported to the homicide
office for an interview. Hart was interviewed a total of four times.
[13] During Hart’s first statement on the day of the murder, Hart told Detective
Schemenaur that he had received a phone call to come to his studio because
police officers had it surrounded. Hart also told Detective Schemenaur that he
did not know Keys or Finney and that he was not expecting anyone to be in his
studio.
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[14] About two weeks later on November 26, Hart gave a second statement and told
Detective Schemenaur that he had been receiving threats. Specifically, Hart
stated that someone had been calling his phone repeatedly but would not say
anything. Hart also told the detective there was a rumor that Keys’s murder
was in retaliation for Bango’s murder. Detective Schemenaur showed Hart
some photos, and McDuffy’s was one of the photos he recognized. However,
Hart told Detective Schemenaur that he had not seen McDuffy for about four
weeks.
[15] Hart’s third statement took place on November 29. In this statement, Hart
mentioned talking to McDuffy the day of the murder. Hart told Detective
Schemenaur that McDuffy was already in his studio the day of the murder, and
that he and Jackson went to the studio once he received the phone call from
McDuffy. The detective told Hart that he knew that he was leaving critical
details out of his statement. Yet, Hart maintained that he was telling the
detective everything he knew.
[16] On the same day, the State charged Hart with: two counts of murder; Class A
felony kidnapping; Class A felony attempted murder; Class A felony robbery;
two counts of Class B felony criminal confinement; Class A felony conspiracy
to commit kidnapping; and Class B felony conspiracy to commit criminal
confinement.
[17] Hart gave his fourth statement to Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy Corey
McGriff, (“Deputy McGriff”) on December 6, 2012. In his fourth statement,
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Hart admitted that he had taken McDuffy and Jackson to Lowes and that he
had driven the men back to his studio. Hart told Deputy McGriff that he did
not tell Detective Schemenaur these details because he was afraid for his life.
[18] A four-day jury trial was held from March 24 through March 27, 2015.
Previously on January 21, 2014, the trial court granted the State’s motion in
liminie allowing the State to redact details surrounding a peace treaty Hart
brokered between rival rap groups from his statements to police. The State
argued that the peace treaty was not relevant, but Hart wanted to discuss the
peace treaty to show his peaceful character. Hart objected to the redacted
statements when the State introduced them at trial and incorporated his
arguments from prior hearings to preserve the issue for appeal.
[19] In addition to the aforementioned facts, the State used phone records at trial to
show that Hart was in contact with McDuffy and Hamler from right before the
time Keys and Finney arrived at the studio to one half hour after Finney arrived
at the CVS seeking help. Hart testified on his own behalf and stated that he had
no idea what was going to take place that day, and that he had only called
McDuffy multiple times to get him out of his studio. The jury found Hart
guilty of murder, criminal confinement, and conspiracy to commit criminal
confinement, and not guilty of the remaining counts. Hart now appeals.
Discussion
[20] Hart makes two arguments on appeal. First, he claims that the evidence is
insufficient to support his convictions as an accomplice. Specifically, he argues
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that the circumstantial facts used to secure his convictions “are all equally
susceptible to inferences which are consistent with [his] innocence.” (Hart’s Br.
9). Second, he claims the trial court committed reversible error by excluding
evidence of a peace treaty he brokered between two rival rap groups, claiming
that it would have displayed his peaceful character. We address each of his
arguments in turn.
1. Sufficiency of Evidence
[21] Hart argues that the State did not prove that he knowingly or intentionally
aided, induced, or caused others to confine Finney and confine and kill Keys.
[22] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the [jury’s verdict].
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks,
citations, and footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
[23] At trial and on appeal, the State argued that Hart was guilty of the charged
offenses as an accomplice. To convict Hart of murder and criminal
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confinement as an accomplice, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally aided, induced or caused
another person to confine and kill Keys. See IND. CODE § 35-41-2-4. To convict
Hart of conspiracy to commit criminal confinement, the State had to prove that
he agreed with Armstrong, McDuffy, Robinson, Hamler, and/or Jackson to
commit the crime of criminal confinement and performed an overt act in
furtherance of the agreement. See I.C. §§ 35-41-5-2; 35-42-3-3.
[24] It is well established that a person who aids another in committing a crime is
just as guilty as the actual perpetrator. Vandivier v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1047, 1054
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. To be convicted as an accomplice, it is not
necessary for a defendant to have participated in every element of the crime.
Bruno v. State, 774 N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ind. 2002), reh’g denied. While mere
presence at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to establish accomplice
liability, presence may be considered along with the defendant’s relation to the
one engaged in the crime and the defendant’s actions before, during, and after
the commission of the crime. Alvies v. State, 905 N.E.2d 57, 61 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009).
[25] Here, the evidence most favorable to the verdict shows that: (1) before the
crime, Hart took McDuffy and Jackson to Lowes where they purchased the
duct tape and zip ties used to confine Keys and Finney; (2) the murder and
confinement took place in Hart’s studio; and (3) during the approximate time of
Keys’s and Finney’s confinement, Hart was not present at the scene but placed
and received numerous calls to and from McDuffy and Hamler.
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[26] In addition, the jury was free to consider Hart’s behavior after the crime when
he gave multiple conflicting interviews to detectives. During Hart’s first two
interviews with Detective Schemenaur, Hart did not mention McDuffy,
Jackson, or himself going to Lowes and coming back to the studio. Instead,
Hart claimed that McDuffy was already at the studio that afternoon. During
the third interview, Detective Schemenaur confronted Hart about leaving out
significant details, but Hart maintained he was telling the detective everything.
It was not until Hart’s fourth statement—after being placed in custody and
having access to the probable cause affidavit—that Hart admitted to going to
Lowes and having contact with McDuffy and Hamler that day.
[27] As previously stated, Hart claims that the circumstantial facts used to secure his
convictions “are all equally susceptible to inferences which are consistent with
[his] innocence.” (Hart’s Br. 9). Indeed, the jury heard Hart’s four statements,
and Hart testified on his own behalf, offering his explanation for the
inconsistences. In the end, the jury weighed Hart’s credibility in light of the
evidence and chose to convict. Hart’s argument on appeal is simply a request
to reweigh the evidence and his credibility, which we will not do. See Drane,
867 N.E.2d at 146-47.
[28] Based on the above-mentioned facts, the jury could have reasonably inferred
that Hart aided, induced, or caused the resulting confinement of Finney and the
confinement and murder of Keys.
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2. Exclusion of Character Evidence
[29] At a pretrial hearing on the State’s motion in limine, the Court granted the
State’s request to redact statements made by Hart about a peace treaty that he
brokered from his interviews with Detective Schemenaur. The State moved to
exclude the details of the peace treaty on relevancy grounds, while Hart
objected to the redactions and wanted to testify about the peace treaty to show
his peaceful character. Hart claims that the trial court erred in excluding the
details of the peace treaty in violation of the “completeness doctrine.”
[30] The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of
evidence. Sallee v. State, 785 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied,
cert. denied. A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will be
disturbed on review only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the
logic, facts, and circumstances presented. Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222, 229
(Ind. 1992).
[31] Indiana Evidence Rule 106 embodies the “completeness doctrine.” Sanders v.
State, 840 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ind. 2006). It provides that, “[i]f a party introduces
all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the
introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded
statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at that time.” Ind. Evidence
Rule 106 (emphasis added). The doctrine’s purpose “is to provide context for
otherwise isolated comments when fairness requires it.” Sanders, 840 N.E.2d at
323 (quoting Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 882 (Ind. 1994), reh’g denied). A
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court need not admit the remainder of the statement, or portions thereof, that
are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the portions already introduced. Id.
[32] Here, Hart wanted to use the “completeness doctrine” to introduce details of
the peace treaty he had organized as a means of showing his peaceful character.
However, the admitted portions of his police statements already contained his
assertions that he was a peaceful, harmless person. In addition, the peace treaty
took place almost five months before the shooting in his studio, and there is no
showing that either Finney or Keys were members of the rival groups involved
in the treaty. Thus, details about the peace treaty are irrelevant and
unnecessarily add details that are likely to confuse the issues. Because
excluding details about the peace treaty does not alter the context of Hart’s
other assertions of peaceful character, the trial court did not err in allowing the
redactions. See, e.g., id. (no error in refusing to admit excluded portion of letter
where the redacted material would have added more information, but the
context of letter stayed the same).
[33] Sufficient evidence supports Hart’s convictions as an accomplice, and the trial
court did not err in excluding details of the peace treaty from evidence.
[34] Affirmed.
[35] Barnes, J., and May, J., concur.
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