Kevin D. Speer v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Feb 06 2017, 8:47 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
CLERK
precedent or cited before any court except for the Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stephen T. Owens Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Corrine J. Lightner Ellen H. Meilaender
Lindsay Van Gorkom Deputy Attorney General
Deputy Public Defenders Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kevin D. Speer, February 6, 2017
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A05-1608-PC-1736
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Randy J. Williams,
Judge
Appellee-Respondent.
Trial Court Cause No. 79D01-1311-
PC-13
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] In September of 2011, Appellant-Petitioner Kevin Speer and Jason Ferguson
were observed leaving the home of David Balser, who was suspected by police
of being involved in illegal drugs. Police stopped the truck in which Speer and
Ferguson were driving, and officers indicated they would be conducting a dog
sniff of the truck and attached trailer. When the dog indicated the presence of
contraband, officers searched the truck and a black bag on the ground next to
the truck, uncovering methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and numerous
materials used in the consumption and manufacture of methamphetamine. A
search conducted pursuant to a warrant uncovered more such evidence.
[2] The State charged Speer with Class B felony conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine, Class B felony methamphetamine manufacture, Class D
felony methamphetamine possession, Class D felony possession of precursors,
Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance, and Class A misdemeanor
possession of paraphernalia and alleged that Speer was a habitual substance
offender. A jury found Speer guilty as charged. On appeal, this court vacated
Speer’s conviction for possession of precursors, correspondingly reduced his
aggregate sentence by two and one-half years, and otherwise affirmed his
convictions and sentence.
[3] Speer filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), alleging that he had
received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. After a hearing,
the post-conviction court denied Speer’s PCR petition. Speer contends that the
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post-conviction court erred in denying his PCR petition. Because we disagree,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] The facts underlying this appeal are as follows:
On September 25, 2011, Detective Chad Robinson of the
Lafayette Police Department was conducting surveillance at the
residence of David Balsar [sic], who was suspected of
participation in drug activity. Around 10:00 p.m., a red truck
with an attached trailer left the residence. Detective Robinson
followed the vehicle and noticed the license plates on both the
trailer and the truck were partially obscured. He initiated a traffic
stop.
Speer who [sic] was driving the vehicle and Jason Ferguson was
his passenger. Detective Robinson discovered the plates on the
truck were registered to a different vehicle. Back-up officers
arrived at the scene, and Detective Robinson told Speer he would
be conducting a dog sniff investigation of the vehicle. The dog
alerted for the presence of narcotics near the driver’s door.
Detective Robinson searched the cab of the truck and found a
black pouch containing syringes, methamphetamine, and digital
scales; a bag of syringes; two glass smoking pipes; and a device
for smoking marijuana. He also found plastic aquarium tubing,
more syringes, a funnel, measuring cups, Heet starting fluid,
lithium batteries, coffee filters, and pseudoephedrine pills. The
officers on scene recognized an odor consistent with that of a
methamphetamine manufacture lab. Detective Robinson filed an
affidavit in support of a search warrant, which was issued, and
the rest of the truck and trailer were searched. The subsequent
search yielded additional items that could be used to
manufacture methamphetamine.
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Speer v. State, 995 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The additional
items found in the truck and trailer included bottles of lye; organic solvents;
sulfuric acid bottles; Coleman fuel bottles; empty pseudoephedrine boxes and
blister packs; ammonia; and receipts for the purchase of pseudoephedrine,
lithium batteries, and lye. The State charged Speer with Class B felony
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, Class B felony
methamphetamine manufacture, Class D felony methamphetamine possession,
Class D felony possession of precursors, Class D felony maintaining a common
nuisance, and Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia and alleged
that Speer was a habitual substance offender.
[5] Ferguson testified against Speer at his trial. Ferguson testified that he and Speer
were using methamphetamine the day they were pulled over, they provided
Balser with the ingredients to make methamphetamine, they purchased
materials at Menard’s, Balser was teaching Speer how to make
methamphetamine, Shannon Carnahan was present at Balser’s home, and he
and Speer took some of the bottles with them when they left. Ferguson also
testified that he met Balser through Kevin Douglas, Douglas co-owned the
truck they were driving the day they were pulled over, they were on their way
to Douglas’s to see if he had any Coleman fuel, and Douglas and Balser were
co-defendants in a separate criminal case.
[6] The jury heard that Ferguson had already pled guilty to Class D felony
methamphetamine possession, Class D felony illegal drug lab, and to being a
habitual substance offender; that the State would not oppose his participation in
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the Forensic Diversion Program pursuant to the plea agreement; and that he
had to provide a clean-up statement and testify in this case and that failure to do
so would constitute a violation of the terms of his probation. The jury was not
informed that Ferguson had been granted use immunity for his testimony or
that more serious charges against him had been dropped pursuant to his plea
agreement.1
[7] Carnahan, who was in a relationship with Balser, also testified. Carnahan
testified that she had been at Balser’s house, Balser was teaching Speer how to
manufacture methamphetamine, people would bring ingredients to Balser’s
house for him to use in manufacturing methamphetamine, and Douglas also
drove the truck used by Balser the day he was pulled over and searched. The
jury also heard that Carnahan had been arrested and charged in a separate case
with methamphetamine manufacture and illegal drug lab, she had pled guilty to
Class B felony conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and been
sentenced to thirteen years with three suspended, and she was required to testify
truthfully against Speer. The jury was not told that Carnahan received use
immunity for her testimony.2
[8] Detective Robinson and another officer testified that when Speer was informed
that a dog would sniff his truck, Speer commented that police dogs “suck”
1
There is no allegation or indication that the State withheld this information from Speer.
2
As with Ferguson, there is no allegation or indication that the State withheld this information from Speer.
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because, anytime he is stopped, the dogs always indicate the presence of
contraband but nothing is ever found. Trial Tr. p. 86. And, during the State’s
opening and closing arguments, the prosecutor referred to the
methamphetamine “subculture” of which Speer was allegedly a part. Tr. pp.
57-64, 315-23, 335-41.
[9] The jury found Speer guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to an
aggregate term of thirty-three and one-half years of incarceration. Attorney
David Mattingly represented Speer on direct appeal and raised the following
issues: (1) the validity of the traffic stop, (2) the validity of the search warrant,
(3) the denial of his mistrial motion, (4) the sufficiency of the evidence, (5) a
double jeopardy violation in his convictions for methamphetamine manufacture
and possession of precursors, and (6) the appropriateness of his sentence. Speer,
995 N.E.2d at 3-4. This court accepted Speer’s double jeopardy argument
(vacating his conviction for possession of precursors and reducing his aggregate
sentence by two and one-half years) and otherwise affirmed his convictions and
sentence. Id. at 14.
[10] On October 15, 2013, Speer filed a PCR petition, which he amended on
October 2, 2015. Speer argued that he received ineffective assistance of trial
and appellate counsel in several respects. The post-conviction court held an
evidentiary hearing on April 11, 2016. On July 7, 2016, the post-conviction
court denied Speer’s PCR petition in full.
Discussion and Decision
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Standard of Review
[11] Speer contends the post-conviction court erred in denying his PCR petition.
Our standard for reviewing the denial of a PCR petition is well-settled:
In reviewing the judgment of a post-conviction court, appellate
courts consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences
supporting its judgment. The post-conviction court is the sole
judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. To
prevail on appeal from denial of post-conviction relief, the
petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads
unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite to that
reached by the post-conviction court.… Only where the evidence
is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-
conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion, will its
findings or conclusions be disturbed as being contrary to law.
Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 468, 469 (Ind. 2006) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
I. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
[12] Speer contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in several
respects. We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the
principles enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
requires a showing that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient
by falling below an objective standard of reasonableness based on
prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel’s performance
prejudiced the defendant so much that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 687, 694,
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104 S. Ct. 2052; Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1041 (Ind.
1994). …. Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to
fail. Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 1999).
French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002).
[13] Moreover, counsel is given wide discretion in determining strategy and tactics,
and therefore courts will accord these decisions deference. Timberlake v. State,
753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001). “A strong presumption arises that counsel
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise
of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. “Whether a lawyer performed
reasonably under the circumstances is determined by examining the whole of
the lawyer’s work on a case.” Oliver v. State, 843 N.E.2d 581, 591 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006), trans. denied.
A. Failure to Inform Jury that Witnesses Received use
Immunity and/or had Serious Charges Dropped
[14] Speer contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform the jury
that Ferguson and Carnahan were granted use immunity 3 and that the State had
dropped some criminal charges against Ferguson in return for his testimony.
Under the circumstances of this case, however, Speer has failed to establish that
he was prejudiced by any error his trial counsel might have made in this regard.
3
Use immunity is “where the testimony compelled of the witness may not be used at a subsequent criminal
proceeding[.]” In re Caito, 459 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (Ind. 1984).
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[15] First, the jury was all but explicitly told that both Ferguson and Carnahan
received a benefit in exchange for their testimony against Speer. The jury was
informed that, pursuant to the terms of his probation, Ferguson had to testify
truthfully or he would be in violation of those terms. Similarly, the jury was
informed that Carnahan pled guilty in another case to Class B felony
methamphetamine manufacture and, pursuant to the terms of her plea
agreement, was required to testify truthfully. We believe the jury was more
than capable of putting two and two together and concluding that both
Ferguson and Carnahan had received a benefit in exchange for agreeing to
testify in other cases, including Speer’s. Moreover, the jury was aware that
Ferguson was Speer’s co-defendant in this case, knew what charges Speer was
charged with, and knew that the crimes to which Ferguson pled guilty were
lesser in severity. The jury almost certainly did not have to be told that serious
charges against Ferguson were dropped in at least partial exchange for his
testimony against Speer. In short, the jury was already aware that neither
Ferguson nor Carnahan were totally disinterested witnesses.
[16] Moreover, our review of the record indicates that the evidence of Speer’s guilt
was overwhelming even without Ferguson’s and Carnahan’s testimony.
Detective Robinson followed Speer’s truck as he left Balser’s home, Balser
being known to Detective Robinson because he had previously arrested him on
a Clinton County warrant for methamphetamine manufacture. Police found
extensive evidence of methamphetamine manufacture in the truck, including
syringes and glass pipes, a piece of burnt aluminum foil, digital scales, a coffee
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filter with methamphetamine on it, pill dough, tubing, funnels, a measuring
cup, lithium batteries, multiple empty pseudoephedrine packaging, starter fluid
bottles, bottles of lye, organic solvents, ammonia, sulfuric acid, Coleman fuel,
an empty slat container, HCl generators, Walgreens receipts for the purchase of
lithium batteries and pseudoephedrine, and a Menards receipt for bottles of lye.
Speer could not plausibly claim to have been ignorant of the contents of the
truck and trailer—or their nature—in light of the distinctive odor associated
with methamphetamine manufacture emanating from the truck and
surveillance video showing Speer purchasing lye at Menards. Even if Speer’s
trial counsel was deficient in failing to inform the jury of Ferguson’s and
Carnahan’s use immunity and the dropped charges against Ferguson, Speer has
failed to establish that he was prejudiced thereby.
B. Failure to Object to Speer’s Comment About Police Dogs
[17] Speer also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
his statement to police that their canine units “suck” because they had sniffed
his vehicles in the past and indicated the presence of contraband even though
none had ever been found. Speer contends that an objection on the ground that
his statement was evidence of a prior bad act would have been sustained. See
Ind. Evidence Rule 4004(b)(1) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”). Speer argues
that his statement revealed to the jury that he had prior contacts with police,
who suspected him of drug activity during these contacts, and that police dogs
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had alerted on his vehicles. We conclude, however, that Speer’s statement does
not amount to evidence of a prior bad act, as it contains no admission that he
had ever previously committed a crime or been found to be in possession of
illegal drugs. Speer’s statement is, if anything, an assertion that he had not been
in possession of illegal drugs at various times in the past. Even if we take as
true Speer’s assertion that police dogs falsely indicate the presence of drugs, that
does not reflect poorly on Speer. Because a 404(b) objection would not have
been sustained, Speer has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in
this regard.
C. Failure to Object to Certain Evidence and Comments
About Methamphetamine “Subculture”
[18] Speer contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor’s comments during the State’s opening and closing arguments
regarding a “methamphetamine subculture” in which Speer was involved.
Moreover, Speer contends that his trial counsel should have objected to
evidence regarding the actions of Balser, Carnahan, and Ferguson and brief
references to four other persons. As the State points out, however, Speer’s trial
counsel was not asked about why he did not object to the prosecutor’s
statements or any of the evidence in question at the hearing on Speer’s PCR
petition. Consequently, Speer has failed to produce any evidence that might
overcome the presumption that the decisions were made for valid strategic
reasons. See, e.g., Myers v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1077, 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“It
is Myers’s burden to overcome the presumption that there were strategic
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reasons for the decisions trial counsel made. If Myers cannot satisfy that
burden, he cannot establish deficient performance.”), trans. denied.
D. Failure to Raise Alleged Double Jeopardy Violation
[19] Speer contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his
convictions for Class D felony methamphetamine possession and Class D
felony maintaining a common nuisance violate prohibitions against double
jeopardy. In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999), the Indiana
Supreme Court held “that two or more offenses are the ‘same offense’ in
violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to
… the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged
offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Id.
at 49-50.
To show that two challenged offenses constitute the “same
offense” in a claim of double jeopardy, a defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts
used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one
offense may also have been used to establish the essential
elements of a second challenged offense.
Id. at 53. “In determining the facts used by the fact-finder to establish the
elements of each offense, it is appropriate to consider the charging information,
jury instructions, and arguments of counsel.” Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231,
1234 (Ind. 2008) (citing Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d at 832 (Ind. 2002);
Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 54 n.48).
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[20] Based on evidence presented at trial, Speer’s conviction for methamphetamine
possession could only have been based on evidence that he constructively
possessed the coffee filter containing methamphetamine residue that was found
inside the metal canister inside the black case located just outside the passenger
door of the truck. The charge that Speer maintained a common nuisance was
that he knowingly or intentionally maintained a vehicle that was used by
persons “to unlawfully use controlled substances; or for unlawfully keeping,
offering for sale, selling, delivering, or financing the delivery of controlled
substances, or items of drug paraphernalia[.]” Direct Appeal Appellant’s App.
p. 27; see also Ind. Code § 35-48-4-13 (now Ind. Code § 35-45-1-5). To support
this conviction, the State presented evidence that Speer and Ferguson used
methamphetamine in the truck at various times that day before obtaining the
methamphetamine found on the coffee filter, used the truck to purchase and
transport items they needed in methamphetamine manufacture, and had
paraphernalia in the truck, and that Speer took methamphetamine
manufacturing bottles from Balser’s residence and transported them in the
truck. Moreover, the prosecutor’s argument with respect to the maintaining a
common nuisance charge did not mention the methamphetamine found on the
coffee filter but focused entirely on evidence of previous methamphetamine use
and the transport of manufacturing materials.
[21] We conclude that there was no reasonable possibility that the jury relied on the
same actual evidence to sustain both guilty verdicts. In short, the evidence used
to support the two convictions does not seem to overlap at all, much less to the
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extent that it is reasonably possible that the actual evidence used to establish all
of the essential elements of one crime was used to establish all of the essential
elements of the other. Based on the evidence presented and arguments of the
prosecutor, Speer has failed to establish that a double jeopardy challenge to his
convictions for methamphetamine possession and maintaining a common
nuisance would have been successful. Speer has failed to establish that he
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
[22] We review claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel using the same
standard applicable to claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. Ben-Yisrayl v.
State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000). The petitioner must show that appellate
counsel was deficient in his performance and that the deficiency resulted in
prejudice. Id. Ineffective assistance claims at the appellate level of proceedings
generally fall into three basic categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal; (2)
waiver of issues; and (3) failure to present issues well. Bieghler v. State, 690
N.E.2d 188, 193-95 (Ind. 1997). Speer’s claims fall into the second category,
waiver of what he contends were meritorious claims.
A. Failure to Raise Methamphetamine
“Subculture” Comments and Evidence
[23] Speer contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
the prosecutor’s comments about a “methamphetamine subculture” on direct
appeal or evidence regarding the activities of persons other than Speer. Because
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neither the comments nor evidence was objected to below, the claim could only
have been made on direct appeal as one of alleged fundamental error.
Appellate courts may, on rare occasions, resort to the
fundamental error exception to address on direct appeal an
otherwise procedurally defaulted claim. But fundamental error is
extremely narrow and available only when the record reveals a
clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles,
where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and
which violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as
to make a fair trial impossible.
Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind. 2008).
[24] We conclude that Speer has failed to establish that this issue has any merit,
much less that it is clearly stronger than the issues his appellate counsel did
raise. We see nothing particularly wrong in arguing that Speer was a member
of the “methamphetamine subculture” in a case where he was charged with
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Furthermore, because the State
alleged that Speer was part of a conspiracy, the actions of the other members of
this conspiracy were relevant, even members not specifically named in the
charge. Speer cites to no law requiring the State to mention all members of an
alleged conspiracy in a charging information, and we are aware of none.
[25] With that in mind, the only individuals other than Speer whose conduct was
mentioned in any significant detail were Ferguson, Carnahan, Balser, and
Douglas, and all of them were directly connected to this case and the charged
crimes. Ferguson, who was Speer’s co-defendant, and Carnahan, were
eyewitnesses who testified to Speer’s involvement in methamphetamine
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manufacture and provision of Balser with necessary ingredients. The record
shows that Balser was teaching Speer how to manufacture methamphetamine,
Speer and Ferguson had just left Balser’s house when they were stopped,
Douglas was co-owner of the truck, and Speer and Ferguson were on their way
to see if Douglas had any Coleman fuel. All of this evidence is plainly relevant
to establish that Speer was a member of a conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine.
[26] Speer also challenges the mentions of four other persons, including three who
were charged as co-defendants in Carnahan’s case and one other, the person
who allegedly introduced Balser and Carnahan. The mentions of these persons
was very brief and contained no details of any crimes alleged against them.
Any negative inferences the jury might have drawn from the brief mention of
four persons is a matter of pure conjecture. Because Speer has failed to
establish error in this regard, much less fundamental error, he has failed to
establish that challenging the so-called “methamphetamine subculture”
evidence on fundamental error grounds would have been successful.
B. Failure to Raise Alleged Double Jeopardy Violation
[27] We have already concluded that Speer’s trial counsel was not ineffective for
failing to raise a double jeopardy claim regarding his convictions for
methamphetamine possession and maintaining a common nuisance. Because
Speer has failed to establish that this claim has merit, he cannot have been
prejudiced by the appellate counsel’s failure to raise it on appeal. Speer has
failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
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[28] We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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