Elmer Dean Baker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral Dec 12 2018, 10:48 am
estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elmer Dean Baker Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Elmer Dean Baker, December 12, 2018
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PC-354
v. Appeal from the DeKalb Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable J. Scott
Appellee-Respondent. VanDerbeck, Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
17D01-1604-PC-3
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] In August of 2008, Elmer Dean Baker was convicted of two counts of Class A
felony child molestation and Class C felony child molestation and found to be a
habitual offender, for which he was sentenced to 106 years of incarceration. We
affirmed Baker’s convictions on direct appeal, as did the Indiana Supreme
Court on transfer.
[2] In 2016, Baker filed his amended petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”),
contending, inter alia, that he was entitled to relief because he received
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (“IAAC”). The post-conviction court
denied his petition in full. Baker contends that the post-conviction court erred
by denying him PCR. Because we conclude that Baker has failed to establish
that he received IAAC, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The underlying facts leading to Baker’s appeal of the denial of his PCR petition
are as follows:
On July 3, 2006 the State charged then fifty-nine-year-old Elmer
Dean Baker with two counts of child molesting as Class A
felonies. The victims of the alleged offenses were two of Baker’s
grandchildren, C.B. and J.A. And the offenses were alleged to
have occurred in “June and July of 2003.” After a jury trial in
June of 2007 the trial court declared a mistrial when the jury
could not reach a verdict. Thereafter the State sought leave to
amend the charging information to reflect the time period “from
October 2000 through August 2003.” An additional count of
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child molesting as a Class C felony was also added. The alleged
victim was A.H., a cousin of C.B. who is unrelated to Baker.
This offense was alleged to have occurred “in or about 2002.”
Baker was also alleged to be a habitual offender.
Over Baker’s objection the trial court permitted the amendments.
And a retrial began on August 13, 2008. Evidence presented by
the State is summarized in part as follows: C.B., who was
eighteen years of age at the time of trial, testified that she was
born in September 1990, her cousin J.A. was born in December
1990, and that during the period between 2000 and 2003 she,
J.A., and A.H. were close friends. C.B. also testified that during
that period of time her family lived at various locations in
DeKalb County including houses and apartments in Spencerville,
Auburn, and Garrett, Indiana. According to C.B., Baker first
began touching her inappropriately when she was about nine or
ten years old. Specifically C.B. recounted an incident in which
she and J.A. spent the night at Baker’s apartment in Auburn
which was next door to her own home where she lived with her
parents. J.A. and C.B. were first sleeping in the living room but
became frightened for some reason and went into Baker’s room
to lie down on his bed. C.B. testified that at that point “he started
to touch us and he pulled me on top of him.... He [ ] pretended
like he was having sex with me but we had, like I had my
underwear on.... He like touched our vaginas.” She went on to
say, “He like placed my hand on his penis and made like the
motion of masturbating.”
When C.B. was ten or eleven years old Baker, who was a long
distance truck driver, often took C.B. with him on overnight
truck trips several weekends during the summer months of 2001
and 2002. According to C.B. most of the “sexual stuff” happened
“in the semi” and it happened “a lot.” When asked by the
prosecutor “what kind of stuff happened in the semi truck?” C.B.
responded “my grandpa had sex, my grandpa had sex with me.”
When asked “[w]hat other sex acts took place in the semi truck?”
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C.B. recounted an incident in which she and J.A. were together
on one of the truck trips and both of them fellated Baker; on
another occasion Baker digitally penetrated her and touched her
breast.
By the summer of 2003 Baker owned a small house on Story
Lake in DeKalb County. At that point C.B. was twelve years of
age. On July 3rd of that year C.B. and J.A. were present for a
family gathering and spent the night at Baker’s house. At some
time during the course of the night C.B. and J.A. went into
Baker’s room and according to C.B. “[u]m, he had sex with
me.... Um, he inserted his penis into my vagina.” C.B. further
testified, “he like touched us and had us touch him ... on the
private parts.” The “us” referred to J.A. C.B. also testified that
both she and J.A. “would take turns” fellating Baker.
C.B. recounted another incident occurring at a trailer that Baker
owned at the North Pointe Crossing Mobile Home park just
north of where she lived in Garrett. The precise date is unclear
but the record suggests sometime between 2001 and 2003. C.B.,
J.A., and A.H. were present at Baker’s trailer. The three girls
went into Baker’s bedroom where he pretended to be asleep.
According to C.B. she and J.A. “took turns” fellating Baker, and
all three of the girls “touch[ed] his penis.”
J.A., who was seventeen years of age at the time of trial, testified
that C.B. is her step first cousin and that she refers to Baker as
“Grandpa Dean.” She also testified that during 2000 to 2003 she,
C.B., and A.H. were good friends. She offered testimony that
tended to corroborate that of C.B. including an incident
involving A.H. According to J.A. the three girls were present at
Baker’s house. Baker was present and pretending to be asleep.
The three girls went into his bedroom where A.H. fellated Baker
and J.A. played with his scrotum. “And then me and [A.H.]
switched.” She further recalled that C.B. was on top of Baker and
he was “sucking on her [breast].”
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A.H., who was also seventeen at the time of trial, was the third of
the alleged victims to testify. Although no specific dates were
given, A.H. largely corroborated the testimony of C.B. and J.A.
concerning the alleged incident occurring at Baker’s house at the
mobile home park. Among other things she confirmed that C.B.
fellated Baker, and “then [J.A.] did it and then after that I tried
it.” A.H. also recounted an occasion when she and J.A. were
together on a trucking trip with Baker in his semi. The truck was
equipped with a bed. While J.A. was in the passenger seat, A.H.
went to sleep in the bed. A.H. testified that when she awoke
Baker was lying next to her, and her clothing had been removed.
Baker rubbed his fingers over her “private area,” got on top of
her, and “humped [her] stomach until he ejaculated.”
Baker testified on his own behalf. He acknowledged occasionally
taking all of his grandchildren on semi trucking trips at one time
or another and acknowledged owning a house on Story
Lake. However, Baker denied engaging in any sexual activity
with C.B., J.A., or A.H. In response to his attorney’s question
“[a]nd you’re saying to me that they are lying,” Baker responded,
“[t]hey absolutely are.” Essentially he testified that he believed
C.B. had organized the girls to offer false testimony as part of a
conspiracy to get even with him after he caught C.B. in a car with
a boy at three in the morning as a result of which “she got
grounded.” According to Baker, about two weeks later C.B.
started a “rumor” about him engaging in inappropriate sexual
activity.
Following a five-day jury trial Baker was convicted as charged,
and he pleaded guilty to the habitual offender allegation. The
trial court sentenced him to a consecutive term of imprisonment
on each of the three child molest counts for a total of seventy-six
years. One of the counts was enhanced by thirty years for the
habitual offender adjudication. The total executed term was 106
years.
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Baker appealed framing his contentions as follows: (1) the
convictions are not sustained by evidence of jury unanimity, (2)
the trial court’s ruling allowing amendment of the information
was in violation of proscriptions under the state and federal
constitutions against ex post facto laws; if the amendment can be
lawfully applied in this case, it was not applied properly, (3) the
trial court committed fundamental error in giving its preliminary
instruction 6 and final instruction 5, and (4) defendant’s
convictions should be set aside due to ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Court of Appeals rejected Baker’s arguments and
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1171–73 (Ind. 2011) (internal citations
omitted).
[4] The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to explore Baker’s jury unanimity
claim, ultimately holding that any instructional error regarding jury unanimity
was not fundamental and summarily affirming the balance of the decision by
the Court of Appeals. Id. at 1173. On April 19, 2016, Baker filed an amended
PCR petition, alleging that he received IAAC. On December 12, 2017, the post-
conviction court held a hearing on Baker’s PCR petition, at which Baker’s
appellate counsel Latrielle Wheat testified, and it was ultimately denied on
January 16, 2018.
Discussion and Decision
[5] The standard of review for appeals from the denial of PCR is well-settled.
Petitioners who have exhausted the direct-appeal process may challenge the
correctness of their convictions and sentences by filing a post-conviction
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petition. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002). Petitioner bears the
burden of establishing grounds for PCR by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.By appealing from a negative judgment, Petitioner faces a rigorous standard of
review. Wesley v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Ind. 2003). Denial of PCR will
be affirmed unless, “the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably
to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Id. We do not
defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusion but do accept its factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746. The post-
conviction process does not provide petitioner with a “super-appeal” but,
rather, a “narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions,
challenges which must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction
rules.” Rouster v. State, 705 N.E.2d 999, 1003 (Ind. 1999). Issues that were
known and available but not raised on direct appeal are waived, and issues
raised but decided adversely are res judicata. Id.I. Sufficiency of Evidence
[6] Baker contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the two
counts of Class A felony child molestation because there was no evidence of
penetration. Although Baker has tried to frame this as a new issue, it is nothing
more than a freestanding claim that is waived. See Rouster, 705 N.E.2d at 1003
(noting that an issue known and available but not raised on direct appeal is
waived by petitioner).
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II. IAAC
[7] Baker contends that he received ineffective assistance from Wheat when she
represented him on direct appeal. The standard for determining whether
appellate counsel’s performance was ineffective is the same as that for trial
counsel. McKnight v. State, 1 N.E.3d 193, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We review a
claim for IAAC based on the standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984):
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
requires a showing that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient
by falling below an objective standard of reasonableness based on
prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel’s performance
prejudiced the defendant so much that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different” Id. at 687, 694, 104
S.Ct. 2052; Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1041 (Ind. 1994).
[…] Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail.
Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 1999).
French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). Counsel’s performance is
presumed effective, and instances of isolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad
tactics are not necessarily ineffective assistance; thus a defendant must offer
strong and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of effective
assistance. McKnight, 1 N.E.3d at 200.
[8] “Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims generally fall into three basic
categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure
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to present issues well.” Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (Ind. 2006).
“Judicial scrutiny is highly deferential regarding a claim that counsel was
ineffective in failing to raise an issue on appeal thus resulting in waiver for
collateral review, and the [petitioner] must overcome the strongest presumption
of adequate assistance.” McKnight, 1 N.E.3d at 204. Rarely is ineffective
assistance found where petitioner contends that appellate counsel failed to raise
an issue on direct appeal, because the decision of which issue to raise is one of
the most important strategic decisions made by appellate counsel. Id.
A. IAC Claim Brought on Direct Appeal
[9] Baker contends that Wheat was ineffective for bringing an IAC claim on direct
appeal rather than leaving the claim for a post-conviction proceeding. Baker
contends that Wheat raised the claim ineffectively by failing to obtain testimony
from Baker’s trial counsel regarding trial counsel’s decision not to obtain a
medical expert to refute the State’s medical expert’s testimony at trial. Although
post-conviction proceedings are usually the preferred avenue for bringing IAC
claims, they are not prohibited from being brought on direct appeal. Rogers v.
State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Post-conviction
proceedings are preferred because presenting such a claim can require
developing new facts that are not present in the trial record. Id.[10] Baker has offered no proof of the testimony that needed to be elicited from his
trial counsel to develop facts that were not already in the trial record. Arguing
that his appellate counsel was ineffective by not eliciting testimony from trial
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counsel, without more, is merely speculation. Further, it is Baker’s burden to
make a record, and because his trial counsel was never called to testify during
his PCR hearing, the post-conviction court was not required to believe that trial
counsel would have corroborated Baker’s allegation. See Culvahouse v. State, 819
N.E.2d 857, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied (finding that “[w]hen
counsel is not called as a witness to testify in support of a petitioner’s
arguments, the post-conviction court may infer that counsel would not have
corroborated the petitioner’s allegations.”). We cannot conclude that Wheat
was ineffective by bringing an IAC claim on direct appeal.
B. Alleged Juror Prejudice
[11] Baker contends that Wheat provided ineffective assistance by failing to claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for a mistrial based on juror
exposure to prejudicial newspaper articles. Baker relies on two newspaper
articles which discuss his initial arrest and his first trial that resulted in a
mistrial. Because at his PCR hearing Baker never admitted these newspaper
articles nor any evidence that jurors were exposed to these articles, there was
never any evidence of juror prejudice properly before the post-conviction court.
Therefore, his claim is unsupported by evidence and therefore groundless.
C. Alleged Juror Taint
[12] Baker also contends that Wheat provided ineffective assistance by failing to
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for a mistrial based on a
juror’s conversation with the prosecutor’s husband. “Defendants seeking
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mistrial for suspected jury taint are entitled to the presumption of prejudice only
after making two showings, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) extra-
judicial contact or communications between jurors and unauthorized persons
occurred, and (2) the contact or communications pertained to the matter before
the jury.” Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 939 (Ind. 2014). Even assuming that
the prosecutor’s husband was an unauthorized person, the communication was
not related to Baker’s case. The conversation solely consisted of whether the
prosecutor’s husband was going to play on the same soccer team as the juror
that year. (Appellant’s App. Vol. VI p. 14). Baker failed to establish that
Wheat’s performance was ineffective in this regard.
D. Statute of Limitations
[13] Baker contends that Wheat was ineffective on direct appeal for failing to raise
that the State’s amended charge of Count III, Class C felony child molestation,
violated the applicable statute of limitations. Disregarding trial counsel’s failure
to object, Baker’s claim has no merit. “A charging information must only state
the date of the offense with sufficient particularity to show that the offense was
committed within the period of limitations applicable to that offense.” Blount v.
State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Ind. 2014) (internal citations admitted). We have
noted that when it comes to child molesting cases, time is not of the essence
because it is difficult for children to remember specific dates, especially when
these incidents of molestation are not immediately reported. Baber v. State, 870
N.E.2d 486, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The statute of limitations
for amended Count III in this case was five years. See Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(b)
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(2002). On June 18, 2007, the State filed amended Count III, Class C felony
child molestation, alleging that the molestation occurred “in or about 2002[.]”
The State argues, and Baker does not contest, that trial testimony established
that at least one instance of molestation involving all three victims occurred
after the conclusion of one Buzz Wilkens’s trial, which concluded on October
30, 2002. Thus, that instance involving all three girls occurred after June 18,
2002, which is within the five-year statute of limitations. Baker has failed to
establish that Wheat provided IAAC in this regard.
E. Waiver of Jury
[14] Baker contends that Wheat was ineffective for failing to claim that Baker did
not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. The
waiver Baker is referring to occurred, through trial counsel, during the
determination of his habitual offender status, at which the State presented
evidence of his previous convictions and after which the trial court determined
Baker to be a habitual offender. In support of his contention, Baker cites Horton
v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1160 (Ind. 2016), in which the Indiana Supreme Court
held that a defendant’s right to a jury trial in a felony prosecution may only be
waived by the defendant personally. Assuming, arguendo, that the holding in
Horton extends to the determination of habitual offender status, said precedent
did not exist when Baker’s direct appeal was filed in 2009. When choosing the
issues to raise on Baker’s direct appeal, Wheat could not have been ineffective
for failing to foresee legal developments seven years down the road.
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F. Sentencing
[15] Baker contends that Wheat was ineffective for failing to make the following
sentencing challenges on direct appeal: (1) his sentence violated the United
States Supreme Court’s holdings in Blakely1 and Apprendi,2 (2) the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to explain why it imposed consecutive sentences,
and (3) his sentence was manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of his
offense and his character.
[16] Although Baker contends that his sentence violated the United States Supreme
Court’s precedent in Blakely and Apprendi because the trial court considered
aggravating circumstances not found by the jury, he fails to recognize that by
the time he was sentenced, steps had been taken to conform Indiana’s
sentencing statutes with said precedent. In 2005, the Indiana General Assembly
enacted new sentencing statutes to resolve the Sixth Amendment issues
presented by Blakely. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007), clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218. In doing so, the General Assembly
eliminated fixed terms and enacted sentencing statutes that did not contain a
maximum sentence a judge may impose without any additional findings. Id.(internal quotations admitted). “As a result, even with judicial findings of
aggravating circumstances, it is now impossible to increase the penalty for a
1
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
2
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” Id. (internal quotations
admitted). Therefore, even though the trial court found aggravating
circumstances in Baker’s case, it did not impose—nor could it have imposed—a
sentence that was beyond the prescribed statutory maximum in violation of
Blakely and Apprendi.
[17] Baker also contends that Wheat was ineffective for failing to claim that the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to explain why it was imposing
consecutive sentences. However, the trial court found Baker to have been
convicted of multiple offenses against multiple victims, which is sufficient
reasoning for ordering consecutive sentences. See O’Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d
943, 952 (Ind. 2001) (emphasizing that multiple crimes or victims constitute a
valid aggravating circumstance for imposing consecutive sentences).
[18] Finally, Baker contends that Wheat was ineffective for failing to argue that his
sentence was manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of his offenses and
his character. We note that at the time of Baker’s sentencing, the current
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) was effective, which uses “inappropriate” as the
standard rather than “manifestly unreasonable.” We may revise a sentence if,
“after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character
of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). “Sentencing is principally a
discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive
considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)
(internal citations omitted). The defendant bears the burden of proving that his
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sentence is inappropriate in the light of both the nature of his offense and his
character. Gil v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1231, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
[19] The nature of Baker’s offenses does not support a reduction in his sentence.
Baker was convicted of two counts of Class A felony child molestation and one
count of Class C felony child molestation. Baker committed these offenses
against two of his granddaughters and C.B.’s step-cousin, requiring them to
have intercourse with and fellate him while in his tractor trailer and home.
[20] Baker’s character also does not support a reduction in his sentence. Baker has
been convicted of Class B felony criminal confinement, Class D felony theft,
Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanor battery,
Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and two counts of Class A
misdemeanor criminal confinement. Despite Baker’s many contacts with the
criminal justice system, starting in 1969, he has been unwilling to conform his
behavior to societal norms. Baker’s sentence was not inappropriate, therefore he
was not prejudiced by Wheat’s failure to raise a 7(B) challenge on direct appeal.
Baker has failed to establish that Wheat provided ineffective assistance in this
regard.
G. Prosecutorial Misconduct
[21] Baker contends that Wheat provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a
claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Baker specifically contends that the
prosecutor committed improper vouching and elicited sympathy for the State’s
witnesses. Of the prosecutor’s numerous statements which Baker alleges as
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misconduct, the one alleged as the most blatant example was in the State’s
closing argument when the prosecutor, regarding the three victims’ testimony,
stated “All three (3) of them agreed before you, when they were under oath to
tell the truth as they remember it today.” Appellant’s App. Vol. VI p. 95. We
have reviewed this statement and the others Baker has provided and find none
of them to be improper vouching or elicitation of sympathy for victims but,
rather, fair commenting on the evidence presented at trial. See Thomas v. State,
965 N.E.2d 70, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied (noting that while a
prosecutor may not state his or her personal opinion regarding a witness’s
credibility at trial, he or she may comment as to witness credibility if the
assertions are based on reasons arising from the evidence presented at trial).
Baker has failed to establish that Wheat provided IAAC in this regard.
H. Stipulation of Evidence
[22] Baker contends that Wheat was ineffective by failing to claim that the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing the evidentiary stipulation between Baker and
the State, which involved testimony that would have allegedly otherwise been
inadmissible. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court or when the court misinterprets the law.” Johnson v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1130,
1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. We cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing an evidentiary stipulation that was a clear
agreement by both parties.
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I. Plea Offer
[23] Baker contends that Wheat was ineffective for failing to claim that Baker’s trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by not communicating to him alleged
plea offers from the State. Baker specifically contends that he declined a plea
offer during trial because he was inadequately informed by counsel and that
counsel never disclosed another plea offer. At Baker’s PCR hearing, the post-
conviction court asked Baker if he accepted the plea that was offered during
trial, to which Baker responded, “On advice of my counsel I didn’t, no.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 191. Moreover, Baker presented another plea offer
he alleged to have discovered in his file sent by the public defender’s office,
claiming it was never disclosed to him by trial counsel. However, the plea
agreement was neither signed nor dated by the prosecuting attorney, and Baker
presented no testimony from his trial counsel on the matter. “When counsel is
not called as a witness to testify in support of a petitioner’s arguments, the post-
conviction court may infer that counsel would not have corroborated the
petitioner’s allegations.” Culvahouse, 819 N.E.2d at 863. The post-conviction
court denied Baker relief on these claims, and Baker’s arguments on appeal are
merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
Mahone v. State, 742 N.E.2d 982, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Baker
has failed to establish that Wheat was ineffective in this regard.
J. Rehearing or Writ of Certiorari
[24] Baker contends that Wheat was ineffective for failing to seek a rehearing from
the Indiana Supreme Court or a writ of certiorari from the United States
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Supreme Court on the Indiana Supreme Court’s ruling on his jury unanimity
claim. Baker does not explain why a request for rehearing or certiorari would
have been granted, let alone establish that he would have achieved a ruling any
more favorable than that handed down by the Indiana Supreme Court on
transfer. Moreover, Baker has not established that failing to seek rehearing or
certiorari falls below the objective standard of reasonableness based on
prevailing professional norms, given that a majority of lawyers never even seek
transfer. See Yerden v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting
that “[a] healthy majority of lawyers who lose before the Indiana Court of
Appeals, for example, elect not to seek transfer. On the face of it, without any
explanation, a lawyer who does not petition for transfer has simply performed
according to the statistical norm.”). Baker has failed to establish that Wheat’s
representation constituted IAAC.
Conclusion
[25] We conclude that Baker’s sufficiency of the evidence claim is barred by waiver.
We also find no merit in Baker’s various IAAC claims. Baker has failed to
establish that the post-conviction court erred by denying him PCR.
[26] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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