John D. Parks v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) , 121 N.E.3d 139 ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 22 2019, 6:24 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John D. Parks Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Bunker Hill, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John D. Parks, January 22, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1220
v. Appeal from the Newton Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Daniel J. Molter,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
56D01-1107-FB-8
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] John D. Parks appeals the trial court’s denial of his Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)
motion for relief from judgment. Parks raises a single issue for our review,
which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion for relief from judgment.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On July 12, 2011, the State charged Parks with one count of dealing in
methamphetamine, as a Class B felony, and one count of possession of
methamphetamine, as a Class D felony. Thereafter, Parks entered into a plea
agreement with the State in which Parks agreed to plead guilty to one count of
dealing in methamphetamine, as a Class B felony, and, in exchange, the State
dismissed the other count. The plea agreement also provided for Parks to be
sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. The trial court
accepted Parks’ plea agreement, entered judgment of conviction, and sentenced
him to a term of twenty years.1
[4] On March 2, 2015, Parks requested that he be allowed to participate in a
purposeful incarceration program. The trial court granted Parks’ request and
1
On the same day, the trial court sentenced Parks to a term of eight years for a conviction under a separate
cause number. The trial court ordered Parks’ twenty-year sentence in the instant offense to run consecutive
to his eight-year sentence in the other cause number.
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permitted Parks to enter a therapeutic community program. The court also
indicated that it “will consider a sentencing modification if [Parks] successfully
completes” the program. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 19.
[5] On February 23, 2016, Parks successfully completed the therapeutic community
program. Accordingly, Parks filed a motion to modify his sentence. In that
motion, Parks stated that he had completed the therapeutic community
program and that he had completed four additional self-help programs. Those
additional programs included: a bible study correspondence course, a Power
Over Addiction correspondence course, a six-month recovery class, and a
purposeful living course. The trial court held a hearing on Parks’ motion.
During the hearing, Parks requested that the trial court modify the remainder of
his sentence to three years on work release followed by two years on home
detention. The trial court denied Parks’ motion.
[6] On August 22, Parks filed a second motion to modify his sentence. In that
motion, Parks stated that he had been accepted into a residential recovery
program called the Wabash Valley Teen Challenge. At a hearing on Parks’
second motion, the trial court determined that the Teen Challenge program was
not an appropriate program for Parks.2 Accordingly, the trial court took Parks’
second motion under advisement and allowed him the opportunity to find a
suitable facility for his treatment. Thereafter, Parks was accepted into a
2
At the time of the hearing on Parks’ second motion, Parks was thirty-five years old.
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residential program at Home for Hope, and Parks requested that the court hold
another hearing on his second motion to modify his sentence.
[7] The court held an additional hearing on Parks’ second motion on November
13, 2017. During the hearing, Parks testified about the classes he had taken
while incarcerated. Specifically, Parks testified that he
went through cognitive thinking[, which] changed my behavior,
my ways of addiction, through the PLUS program. Then when I
filed to be purposely incarcerated—and thanks to you granting
that motion—I was able to undergo a twelve-step program while
incarcerated, the Therapeutic Community, TC CLIFF program
and graduated that as well. Throughout both programs I’ve been
leadership within the programs, and after graduating the CLIFF
program, the PLUS program thought that I was an asset to the
program and called me back over there to be in leadership again,
which I just completed a DOL as a lead aide. As a lead aide in
the PLUS program in a maximum security prison, you have to
hold other offenders accountable for noise level, going into a cell
that’s not their own, for being on the top range, pretty much
doing the work of a correctional officer while we’re in there. We
have to write other offenders up and we have reflection groups,
lead community meetings, mentoring process and I’ve been
doing this for the last three years. Along with that, I’ve also took
[sic] advantage of all the correspondence courses that I could
have access to such as Celebrate Recovery, Mothers Against
Methamphetamines and things of that nature while I’ve been
incarcerated. I’ve done every program in the facility and I’ve
remained conduct and report free for around six years now. And
there’s nothing else for me to do at the facility except to move
forward in my recovery.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 25-26.
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[8] The State objected to Parks’ modification request because Parks still had eight
years remaining on his sentence pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement.
The State also contended that, while Parks should be “stepped down” from the
maximum-security facility, it was “premature” to release Parks directly to a
residential program from his current placement. Id. at 28. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the trial court agreed with the State and found that Parks had too
much time remaining on his sentence for a modification to be appropriate and
that Parks was not yet “ready” for the residential program. Id. at 30.
Accordingly, the trial court denied Parks’ second motion to modify his
sentence. However, in its order denying Parks’ motion, the court
recommended that Parks “be transferred to a minimal secured facility and
authorize[d] the placement of [Parks] in a work release program through the
Department of Correction.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 59.
[9] On March 5, 2018, Parks, pro se, filed a motion for relief from judgment
pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). In his motion, Parks contended that the
trial court made a mistake when it recommended that he be moved to a less
secure facility but did not also modify his sentence. Specifically, Parks asserted
that, despite the trial court’s recommendation, he was not eligible to be moved
to a minimum-security facility or to be placed in a work-release program
without a sentence modification because he had too much time left on his
sentence. He also asserted that his attorney had failed to present to the trial
court the legislative intent behind the statute on sentence modification and a
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complete list of his accomplishments and that it was excusable neglect to rely
on his attorney.
[10] The State responded to Parks’ motion and asserted that his motion was an
improper substitute for a direct appeal; that the trial court had already been
presented with the information on Parks’ accomplishments that Parks contends
his attorney did not present; and that Parks had not made a showing of mistake,
surprise, or excusable neglect. On April 13, the trial court denied Parks’ motion
without a hearing. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[11] On appeal, Parks, pro se, asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1). 3
Trial Rule 60(B) provides, in relevant part, that “[o]n motion and upon such
terms as are just the court may relieve a party . . . from a judgment . . . for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . .” A movant
for relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(1) “must allege a meritorious
claim or defense.”
[12] As we have explained:
3
Parks indicated in his motion for relief from judgment that he was filing that motion pursuant to Indiana
Trial Rule (60)(B)(1) and (8). However, he made no argument in his motion regarding subsection (8), nor
does he make any argument under that subsection in his brief on appeal. Accordingly, we will treat Parks’
motion as one filed pursuant only to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1).
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A Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motion does not attack the substantive,
legal merits of a judgment, but rather addresses the procedural,
equitable grounds justifying the relief from . . . a judgment.
Moreover, a Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motion is addressed to the trial
court’s equitable discretion, with the burden on the movant to
affirmatively demonstrate that relief is necessary and just.
Kmart Corp. v. Englebright, 719 N.E.2d 1249, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(citations omitted), trans. denied. In light of the equitable nature of a request
under Trial Rule 60(B)(1), our standard of review is deferential:
Our standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion may occur if
the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has
misinterpreted the law. . . . The trial court’s discretion is
necessarily broad in this area because any determination of
excusable neglect, surprise, or mistake must turn upon the unique
factual background of each case. Moreover, no fixed rules or
standards have been established because the circumstances of no
two cases are alike. . . . Furthermore, reviewing the decision of
the trial court, we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court.
Id. at 1253 (citations omitted).
[13] Here, Parks contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
Trial Rule 60(B) motion because the Department of Correction “was incapable
of effectuating” the intent of the trial court that Parks be moved to a minimum-
security facility without a modification to his sentence. Appellant’s Br. at 7. In
essence, Parks contends that the trial court made a mistake when it
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recommended that he be moved to a less secure facility but did not also modify
his sentence to allow that move to occur.4 In response, the State asserts that
Parks has not met his burden to demonstrate that the trial court made a
mistake. We must agree with the State.
[14] Here, Parks filed two motions to modify his sentence. In his first motion, Parks
informed the trial court that he had completed the therapeutic community
program as well as four other rehabilitative programs. He also asserted that,
during his time in confinement, he has “remained clear of any major conduct
reports[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 39. Further, during the hearing on his
first motion to modify, Parks informed the trial court that he “has enrolled in
and completed each program” available to him through the system. Tr. Vol. II
at 3. Additionally, Parks stated that he had been assigned to leadership and
management roles in his programs. At the end of that hearing, the court
acknowledged that Parks “has done everything afforded to him under the rules
and regulations of the Department of Correction.” Id. at 6. But, even in light
of that acknowledgment, the court denied Parks’ first motion to modify his
sentence.
[15] Parks then filed his second motion to modify his sentence. In that motion,
Parks informed the trial court that he had been accepted into a residential
recovery program. The trial court held two hearings on Parks’ second motion.
4
In his Trial Rule 60(B) motion, Parks asserted both mistake and excusable neglect. However, on appeal,
Parks only asserts that the trial court made a mistake.
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During the first hearing, Parks stated that he has “done all the programs” that
his facility has to offer. Id. at 12. Then, during the second hearing, Parks
reiterated all of the programs in which he has participated. And he repeated
that he has “done every program in the facility” and that he has “remained
conduct and report free for around six years now.” Id. at 26. Even the State
commended Parks on his accomplishments during the second hearing. But,
again, the trial court declined to modify Parks’ sentence and, accordingly,
denied his second motion.
[16] The record indicates that Parks presented the trial court with all of the
information regarding his accomplishments. And the record demonstrates that
the trial court both considered and acknowledged those accomplishments.
Thus, it is clear that the trial court considered the relevant evidence before it
decided not to amend Parks’ sentence.
[17] Still, Parks asserts that the trial court made a mistake when it denied his motion
to modify because the Department of Correction could not implement the trial
court’s recommendation to place him in a less secure facility without a
preceding sentence modification. However, the trial court’s recommendation
that Parks be moved out of a maximum-security facility was simply a
nonbinding recommendation to the Department of Correction. Indeed, even
the trial court stated that it could recommend that Parks be moved to a
minimum-security facility but that the Department of Correction “do[es] not
have to do that.” Id. at 29. Accordingly, it is clear that the trial court
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understood that it was possible that the Department of Correction would not
move Parks to a less secure facility.
[18] As discussed above, the trial court considered all of Parks’ achievements and
accomplishments but still declined to modify his sentence. Thus, we cannot say
that the trial court made a mistake when it denied Parks’ motion to modify his
sentence. Because Parks has not met his burden of demonstrating that the trial
court made a mistake when it denied his motion to modify his sentence, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Parks’ Trial
Rule 60(B)(1) motion for relief from judgment.5 We therefore affirm the trial
court.
[19] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
5
In their briefs on appeal, the parties dispute whether the consent of the prosecuting attorney was required to
modify Parks’ sentence in light of an amendment to Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17 that occurred in 2018.
But we need not determine whether the prosecuting attorney’s consent was required to resolve this appeal.
Even if the trial court did not need the consent of the prosecuting attorney to modify his sentence, as Parks
contends, the trial court still did not make a mistake when it denied his Trial Rule 60(B) motion for the
reasons discussed above.
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