Grady Jamal Moss v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Feb 15 2017, 10:04 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Troy D. Warner Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
South Bend, Indiana
Matthew B. MacKenzie
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Grady Jamal Moss, February 15, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A03-1609-CR-2067
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffery L. Sanford,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D03-1509-F5-199
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1609-CR-2067 | February 15, 2017 Page 1 of 7
Case Summary and Issue
[1] Following a jury trial, Grady Moss was convicted of dealing in cocaine as a
Level 5 felony. Moss appeals, raising two issues for our review, which we
consolidate and state as whether he waived his right to be present at his jury
trial. Concluding Moss waived his right to be present, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Following a controlled buy on September 9, 2015, the State charged Moss with
dealing in cocaine as a Level 5 felony. The trial court scheduled a status
conference for January 4, 2016, and Moss failed to appear. The trial court
rescheduled the status conference and issued a bench warrant for Moss. At the
rescheduled hearing on March 14, Moss was present and the trial court
informed him the court would hold a pre-trial conference on June 6 and a jury
trial would commence on June 20. When Moss expressed concern about being
able to remember the trial date, the trial court provided Moss with a reminder
card. Moss failed to appear for the pre-trial conference on June 6 and the trial
court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Unable to contact Moss, defense
counsel moved to continue the June 20 trial date. After reviewing the relevant
case law and discussing the matter with counsel at length, the trial court denied
the motion to continue and concluded Moss could be tried in absentia if he did
not appear at trial on June 20.
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[3] Moss did not appear at trial on June 20 and Moss’ counsel objected to trying
the case in absentia, arguing the trial court did not advise Moss his failure to
appear at trial could result in a waiver of his right to be present at his trial.1 The
trial court noted the objection and proceeded with trial. The jury found Moss
guilty as charged.
[4] On July 12, Moss appeared before the trial court in custody and the trial court
entered judgment of conviction. At the sentencing hearing, the following
discussion occurred:
[Trial Court:] All right. Mr. Moss, this is a result of the trial that
you were absent from. I think I am required to allow you to give
an explanation as to why you weren’t here for trial. I think you
had told me that you had mixed up the dates?
[Moss:] Yes.
[Trial Court:] Which I don’t think is a really strong reason for
me to vacate the jury’s verdict now. . . . You were here when we
set the trial date. . . . You were informed of the trial date. So I
think based on that that we can go forward. Okay? So I will
listen to your attorney and to you, if you have anything you want
to tell me . . . .
***
1
The record on appeal does not include the entirety of the parties’ discussions with the trial court at the
March 14 hearing. Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the trial court explained to Moss he could be tried in
absentia. For the purposes of this appeal, we address the merits of Moss’ claims assuming the trial court did
not advise him of the potential waiver
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[Moss:] I apologize for missing court, and I was wrong for that.
I’m just sorry for that, and I just want to try and ask you to give
me another chance to do the right thing.
Transcript, Vol. 2 at 82-84. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Moss argues the trial court improperly tried him in absentia. Pursuant to the
United States and Indiana Constitutions, a criminal defendant has the right to
be present during his or her trial. Holtz v. State, 858 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006), trans. denied. A defendant may waive this right so long as the
waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Id. When a
defendant fails to appear for trial and fails to notify the trial court or provide it
with an explanation of his or her absence, the trial court may conclude the
defendant’s absence is knowing and voluntary and proceed with trial when
there is evidence the defendant knew of his or her scheduled trial date. Id. at
1062. However, a defendant who has been tried in absentia must be afforded an
opportunity to explain his or her absence in an attempt rebut the initial
presumption of waiver. Ellis v. State, 525 N.E.2d 610, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
“As a reviewing court, we consider the entire record to determine whether the
defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to be
present at trial.” Brown v. State, 839 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(citation omitted), trans. denied.
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[6] Despite this well-established framework for trying defendants in absentia, Moss
claims two additional requirements must be addressed before a defendant can
be tried in absentia. First, he cites to Jackson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 494 (Ind.
2007), and argues there must be evidence of egregious conduct by the
defendant, noting the court’s statement that Jackson’s absence was “intentional
and inexcusable.” Id. at 496. In Jackson, our supreme court concluded the
defendant waived his right to be present at his trial, reasoning he was informed
of his trial date both orally and in writing and he never contacted the court prior
to his trial to address any confusion he might have had about the trial date. Id.
at 498-99. In fact, the court specifically stated, “Consistent with Indiana law,
the trial court properly concluded that Jackson’s knowledge of the trial date
coupled with a lack of explanation for his absence supported a determination
that there was a voluntary and knowing waiver.” Id. at 499. We therefore
cannot read Jackson as indicating or implying there must be evidence of
egregious conduct by the defendant before the defendant may be tried in
absentia.
[7] Second, he cites to Holtz and argues the trial court is also required to advise a
defendant a failure to appear at trial could result in a waiver of his or her right
to be present at trial. In Holtz, we found no error in the defendant being tried in
absentia, reasoning in part that the trial court had already informed the
defendant the trial may proceed regardless of his attendance. 858 N.E.2d at
1062. However, we did not state as a matter of law the trial court is required to
advise a defendant his absence from trial could result in waiver. Rather, the
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defendant in Holtz was merely present in court when the trial court informed
him of his trial date and did not give a justifiable reason for his absence.
Consistent with a number of cases from this court and our supreme court, this
was and remains sufficient evidence to establish a defendant knowingly waived
his or her right to be present at trial. See, e.g., Jackson, 868 N.E.2d at 498;
Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1273 (Ind. 1997); Calvert v. State, 14 N.E.3d
818, 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); Brown, 839 N.E.2d at 227-28; Soliz v. State, 832
N.E.2d 1022, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied; Ellis, 525 N.E.2d at 611.
The fact the trial court advised the defendant in Holtz of the potential waiver is
merely additional evidence showing the defendant knowingly waived the right to
be present at trial and we conclude such evidence is not a prerequisite to trying
a defendant in absentia.
[8] Consistent with our case law, the trial court informed Moss of his trial date. In
addition, the trial court provided Moss with a reminder card containing the trial
date. Moss did not appear at the June 6 pre-trial conference or at trial on June
20. Moss did not contact his attorney or the trial court and notify them he
would be absent. When Moss finally appeared in custody, the trial court gave
Moss an opportunity to explain his absence. Moss claimed he misunderstood
the trial dates, and when given an opportunity to elaborate further, he only
apologized for his absence and stated he was “wrong for that.” Tr., Vol. 2 at
84. We do not agree such an explanation rebuts the presumption of waiver
already established by Moss’ knowledge of the trial date and failure to appear,
especially in light of the fact the trial court gave Moss a card reminding him of
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the trial date. Compare Calvert, 14 N.E.3d at 822-23 (concluding a defendant’s
deployment to Afghanistan justified his absence at trial), with Brown, 839
N.E.2d at 231 (concluding a defendant’s assertion he was in another county’s
jail during his trial was not an adequate explanation for his absence when he
was present in court when the trial date was set and he chose not to
communicate his predicament to his counsel). We conclude Moss knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to be present at trial.2
Conclusion
[9] Moss waived his constitutional right to be present at his trial. Accordingly, we
affirm.
[10] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
2
Because Moss knowingly waived his right to be present at trial, we conclude all other claims presented in
the Brief of Appellant fail.
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