In Re the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights of: P.O.M. (Minor Child) and J.M. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 20 2018, 9:02 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Frederick A. Turner Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Bloomington, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In Re the Matter of the December 20, 2018
Termination of Parental Rights Court of Appeals Case No.
of: 18A-JT-301
P.O.M. (Minor Child) Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
Court
and
The Honorable Frances G. Hill,
J.M. (Mother), Judge
Appellant-Respondent, Trial Court Cause No.
53C06-1704-JT-350
v.
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[1] J.M. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights
to P.O.M. (“Child”), raising two issues for our review which we restate as: (1)
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for a
continuance; and (2) whether the juvenile court made sufficient findings to
support the involuntary termination of her parental rights. Concluding the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for a
continuance and the findings were sufficient to support the involuntary
termination of Mother’s rights, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On three separate occasions in April 2016, Child, who was then not yet three
years old, was found wandering the streets unsupervised.1 And, when Mother
picked Child up from the police station following the last occasion on April 24,
she appeared to be under the influence of an intoxicating substance. Mother
refused a drug screen or to engage in a safety plan. A few days later, on April
26, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging
Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”), citing a lack of supervision
and Mother’s ongoing drug use. Mother subsequently tested positive for
cocaine on May 4 and tested positive for methamphetamine on June 15. The
1
The biological father of the Child is unknown and was not subject to this litigation.
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juvenile court adjudicated Child a CHINS on June 20 and Child was placed in
foster care.
[3] On July 18, the juvenile court ordered Mother to comply with twenty-four
directives to combat substance abuse and mental health issues. Among other
things, these directives required Mother to:
maintain contact with DCS; maintain suitable safe, and stable
housing; maintain a stable source of income; not use, consume,
trade or sell any illegal controlled substances; obey the law;
complete Parent/Family Function Assessment and complete
services as recommended in the assessment; complete substance
abuse assessment and complete recommendations made in the
assessment; submit to weekly drug screens; and attend all
scheduled visitations with the Child.
Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 2 at 33-34.
[4] The juvenile court found Mother was “generally” complying with services at a
review hearing on October 20, 2016, but she had “not yet enhanced her ability
to fulfill her parental obligations[,]” and she had failed to take drug screens on
August 11, September 9, and September 23. Index of Exhibits at 24-27.
[5] The juvenile court conducted a permanency hearing on March 28, 2017.
There, the court found that although Mother was generally loving during her
visits with Child, the police had to be called on one occasion in December 2016
because “Mother screamed for 10 minutes holding the Child and refused to give
the Child to the visitation supervisor[.]” Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 34. The
court further found that Mother “no showed” for almost half her scheduled
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drug screens from December 2016 through February 2017. The court modified
the permanency plan from reunification to adoption due to Mother’s drug use
and inability to make progress toward mental health stability. Id. DCS filed a
verified petition for the termination of the parent-child relationship (“TPR”)
between Mother and Child on April 19.
[6] In Mother’s absence, the juvenile court held another review hearing on June 20,
2017. Mother had continued to miss drug screens and had been arrested for
possession of methamphetamine and a syringe just a week prior. Mother’s
participation in mental health treatment was “not . . . consistent[,]” and
Mother’s therapist reported “no progress was made in April 2017 and Mother
was irrational and not responsive to de-escalation techniques.” Index of
Exhibits at 36.
[7] The juvenile court conducted a termination hearing on August 2, 2017. Mother
requested a continuance at the beginning of the hearing, but the juvenile court
denied her motion. After hearing the evidence, the court terminated Mother’s
parental rights through written findings of fact and conclusions of law issued on
September 1, 2017, concluding:
The DCS has proven by a preponderance of evidence2 as follows:
2
On February 2, 2018, the juvenile court sua sponte issued a Notice and Correction of Scrivener’s Error
which stated:
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26. The Child has been removed from the home for more than
6 months under a dispositional decree.
27. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions which
resulted in the removal of Child from the home will not be
remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the Child.
Although there is no doubt that Mother has love for the
Child, Mother did not express a sincere understanding of
the safety needs of the Child or her responsibilities to
affectively [sic] address or avoid the 3 occasions when the
Child was found wondering [sic] outside of the home
unsupervised as a toddler, Mother continued to use illegal
substances throughout the case even though she was
offered and received significant drug treatment services,
Mother did not fully utilize or benefit from the services to
enable her to obtain stable emotional and mental health
necessary to the care of the Child, despite extensive mental
health treatment Mother continued to exhibit irrational
thinking and did not make significant progress in
necessary goals of learning to regulate her emotions and
distress tolerance, Mother stopped all services and
visitation with the Child for a period of time while this
termination petition was pending by fleeing to Michigan to
avoid a drug arrest warrant in Indiana, and Mother’s
history of near evictions and fleeing to Michigan and
recent criminal acts do not evince housing or social
stability needed by the Child.
… an error was made in stating that the DCS has proven the following by a “preponderance of
the evidence.” Judge Hill decided the case using the standard of “clear and convincing
evidence,” but by scrivener’s error, cited the incorrect standard of “preponderance of the
evidence” in the Ruling.
Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 84.
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28. Termination is in the best interest of the Child. The Child
entered foster care with developmental delays and
behavioral issues. The Child has participated in therapy
and has benefited from the Nurturing Heart Program
implemented by the foster parents to address behavioral
issues. Progress has been made in these areas and the
Child has benefited from the stable and consistent
environment provided by the foster parents. The Mother’s
emotionalism, unresolved mental health issues, and
continued drug use will not provide minimal safety and
stability for the Child. Despite some periods of sobriety
and Mother’s love for the Child, the evidence does not
show that Mother has the motivation or ability to
implement the changes necessary to provide a safe and
stable environment for the Child.
29. DCS has a satisfactory plan for the Child. The current
foster parents that the Child has lived with during the
entire period of this care are willing, able and hopeful to
adopt the Child.
The Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights has
been proven and should be granted.
Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 41-42. Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Motion to Continue
[8] First, Mother argues the juvenile court erred in denying her verbal motion for a
continuance. We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
continue for abuse of discretion. In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243-44 (Ind. 2014).
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An abuse of discretion may be found in the denial of a motion for
a continuance when the moving party has shown good cause for
granting the motion, but no abuse of discretion will be found
when the moving party has not demonstrated that he or she was
prejudiced by the denial.
Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted). “The party seeking a continuance
must show that he or she is free from fault[,]” and there is a “strong
presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion.” In re B.H., 44
N.E.3d 745, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
[9] At the beginning of the TPR hearing, Mother requested a continuance, with her
counsel stating:
[Mother] would like to, she’s had a lot of things going on in her
life to where she hasn’t been able to meet the requirements that
have been set out previously, but she believes she can do that
now. And she’s asked to set this out such that she can complete
a course of treatment, to put her in a better position in front of
this court.
Transcript of Evidence, Volume 1 at 4. DCS objected, arguing that the case
had been ongoing for “over 15 months[,]” and “Mother’s has [sic] had plenty of
time to show her motivation and determination, and efforts at reunification,
she’s failed to do so as of today.” Id. at 5. The juvenile court denied Mother’s
motion before proceeding to hold the hearing that ultimately resulted in
termination of her parental rights.
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[10] On appeal, Mother argues that she needed more time to comply with the
dispositional order and that the juvenile court’s denial of her motion amounted
to an abuse of discretion. In support of her argument, Mother cites the juvenile
court’s Conclusion on Permanency in its March 31, 2017 Order:
Although the hearing was helpful for the court to appreciate the
efforts of Mother, the court concludes that reunification efforts
have not been successful. Mother’s efforts to treat her anxiety
and depression have not been consistent and she has shown only
minimal improvement. Mother’s mental health stability is
necessary to safely supervise and parent her child. Mother’s
continued and significant use of Methamphetamines at least
through February 2017 does not show a commitment toward
reunification with the child. The fact that Mother was
continuing to use even while she was reportedly attending drug
treatment is contrary to a commitment to reunification. The
permanency plan is changed to Termination of Parental rights.
However, termination proceedings can be continued if Mother
demonstrates a clear and consistent commitment to maintain sobriety
and attend and benefit from mental health treatment.
Index of Exhibits at 30-31 (emphasis added). Mother further argues that she
“has shown good cause” for the termination hearing to be continued because,
as her counsel explained, “she was in a better position and able to address the
mental health concerns and the substance abuse.” Brief of Appellant-Mother at
11.
[11] As opposed to demonstrating the type of “clear and consistent commitment”
which may have warranted a continuance, Mother’s situation continued to
decline. Index of Exhibits at 31. Between the date of the juvenile court’s offer
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of a continuance and the denial of her subsequent motion, Mother had
continued to miss drug screens and was arrested for possession of
methamphetamine and a syringe. Moreover, the juvenile court found in its
June 23 Review of Permanency Plan Order that Mother’s participation in
mental health treatment “had not been consistent” and she had made “no
progress . . . in April 2017[.]” Index of Exhibits at 36. Mindful of the “strong
presumption” in favor of the juvenile court’s ruling, In re B.H., 44 N.E.3d at
748, and Mother’s failure to display a “clear and consistent commitment[,]”
Index of Exhibits at 31, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Mother’s motion for a continuance.
II. Termination Order
[12] Next, Mother challenges the underlying termination order. A parent’s interest
in the care, custody, and control of his child is “perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests[,]” Bester v. Lake Cty.. OFC, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147
(Ind. 2005), and these rights are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004), trans. denied. Although these rights are constitutionally protected, they
are not without limitation and the law provides for the termination of the
parent-child relationship when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their
parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
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A. Standard of Review
[13] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265.
Rather, we only consider evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, most
favorable to the judgment, id., and we will only set aside the court’s judgment
terminating a parent-child relationship when it is clearly erroneous, In re L.S.,
717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1161 (2002). The trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
[14] As required by Indiana Code section 31-35-2-8, the juvenile court entered
findings of fact and conclusions thereon when terminating Mother’s parental
rights. Accordingly, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester, 839
N.E.2d at 147. We must first determine whether the evidence supports the
findings; then we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id.
Findings will only be set aside if they are clearly erroneous and findings are
clearly erroneous only “when the record contains no facts to support them
either directly or by inference.” Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind.
1997).
II. Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights
[15] To terminate parental rights, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires the
State to prove, in relevant part:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
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(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
The State must prove the foregoing elements by clear and convincing evidence.
Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2; In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016). However,
because subsection (b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court need
only find one of the three elements by clear and convincing evidence. See Castro
v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),
trans. denied.
[16] Here, the juvenile court found that the State proved both subsections (i) and (ii)
of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) by clear and convincing evidence.3
3
Initially, Mother also argued the juvenile court had applied an incorrect burden of proof and that its sua
sponte order correcting such mistake was “of no moment in this appeal.” Br. of Appellant at 10 n.1.
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Mother now attempts to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support both
conclusions.4
A. Sufficiency of the Juvenile Court’s Findings
[17] Mother argues the juvenile court failed to provide an explanation as to:
how the findings support a conclusion that there is a reasonable
probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal
or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will
not be remedied or that is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
well-being of the child.
Br. of Appellant at 12. Mother, however, fails to support this perfunctory
assertion with cogent reasoning or citation to authority. As such, Mother has
waived this issue for our review. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) (providing that
the argument section of the appellant’s brief must “contain the contentions of
the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning[,]” along
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied upon,
and a clear showing of how the issues and contentions in support thereof relate
to the particular facts under review). Because these perfunctory assertions are
However, “[a]fter reviewing both Briefs and the law,” Mother has since withdrawn this argument. Reply
Brief of Appellant at 5.
4
Mother has not contested the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination is in the best interests of the Child
or that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child. See Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 42,
¶¶ 28-29. Accordingly, Mother has waived any argument as to these conclusions. A.D.S. v. Indiana DCS, 987
N.E.2d 1150, 1156 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (explaining that a parent’s failure to support arguments with
cogent reasoning results in waiver on appeal), trans. denied.
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the only conclusions of law Mother so much as mentions in her brief, she fails
to specifically challenge any of the juvenile court’s conclusions. The failure to
challenge the juvenile court’s legal conclusions results in the waiver of any
argument as to the sufficiency of such findings. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1156 n.4.
Therefore, to the extent Mother challenges the sufficiency of the juvenile court’s
findings of fact, she has also waived these arguments for failure to advance a
cogent argument. Id.
[18] Given our preference for resolving a case on its merits, we will nevertheless
endeavor to address Mother’s arguments—at least to the extent they can be
understood. Mother challenges ten of the juvenile court’s findings of fact,
alleging the findings are “nothing but a recitation of the evidence[,]” and that
the underlying order “lacks the specificity, the precision, and the direction
necessary for this Court to ensure that DCS has proven each element by clear
and convincing evidence.” Br. of Appellant at 12-13.
[19] “A court or an administrative agency does not find something to be a fact by
merely reciting that a witness testified to X, Y, or Z.” S.L. v. Indiana Dep’t of
Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Instead, “a finding of
fact must indicate, not what someone said is true, but what is determined to be
true, for that is the trier of fact’s duty.” Id. “The trier of fact must adopt the
testimony of the witness before the ‘finding’ may be considered a finding of
fact.” Id.
[20] Specifically, Mother argues:
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For example, in its Finding 12, the Trial Court notes that
“Mother’s substance abuse condition began to deteriorate during
her work with Therapist Terry in late spring, 2017.”
Br. of Appellant at 12 (citing Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 36, ¶ 12). Mother
never explains what, exactly, this is an “example” of, but it appears from the
context of her argument that she is arguing the finding is an example of the
juvenile court merely reciting testimony without making a finding. Id. Because
Finding 12 indicates what the juvenile court determined to be true, however, it
is not merely a recitation of testimony and we do not view it as such.
[21] Next, Mother contends “Findings 15-17 are basically a recap of FCM Sarah
Santoro’s testimony.” Br. of Appellant at 12. These findings state:
15. Family Case Manager Sarah Santoro/Instability Family
Case Manager Sarah Santoro (hereafter “FCM Santoro”)
was assigned to the Child’s case in May 2016. The Child
was not returned to Mother during the period of the
CHINS case because of Mother’s non-compliance with
services and safety issues for the Child. Mother did not
demonstrate sobriety or emotional stability necessary to
the Child’s safety. Mother disagreed with her mental
health treatment. Mother did not want to participate in
Dialectical Behavior Treatment (DBT) and attended only
a few sessions. Mother lacked motivation in mental health
treatment and to implement change in her daily life.
Mother exhibited the emotional instability in the
December 2016 screaming incident (see Finding 6) with
the Child present and in a Family and Team Case
Management Meeting in which she escalated
inappropriately in April or May 2017. Mother
obtaining/maintaining mental stability would help her
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obtain sobriety. Mother’s relationship with her wife was
unstable. Mother’s housing was unstable, given the
history of near evictions and Mother’s departure to
Michigan.
16. Failure to Supervise. FCM Santoro addressed the issue
with Mother of the Child being found unsupervised
outside of the home at age 2 or 3. Mother believed a lock
would fix the problem. Mother did not understand that
the lock was not the extent of the problem and didn’t seem
to appreciate the need for close supervision. Mother
indicated the problem was the nanny. Mother did not
express a plan for a better caregiver. The judgment of
CHINS was based, in part, on the Child being found
outside of the home on 3 separate occasions.
17. Illegal Drug Use/Mother’s Flight to Michigan to Avoid
Warrant/Abandonment of Child. FCM Santoro assessed
that Mother did not successfully treat Mother’s drug use
that caused, in part, the CHINS case. Mother was
observed impaired on April 24, 2016 when the Child was
found unsupervised outside of Mother’s home and was
taken into protective care. Mother tested positive for
Cocaine and then Methamphetamine in May and June
2016 within about 2 months of the removal of the Child
from Mother’s care. Mother was offered a drug
assessment, Recovery Coaching, therapy, and random
drug screens. Mother did participate in a Mapping
Program, Recovery Coaching and therapy. Mother had
periods of sobriety but did not maintain. Between
December 2016 and February 2017 Mother showed up for
only half of her drug screens. Mother admitted using
Methamphetamine in February 2017. Mother did not
screen positive for illegal drugs for a period of time after
that but did screen positive for alcohol 3 times. Alcohol
use is considered a relapse for addiction. Mother was
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utilizing services in May 2017; however from the end of
May through July 2017, Mother did not participate in drug
screens or services. At the end of May 2017, Mother’s
wife notified DCS that Mother was arrested in Marion
County for possession of Methamphetamine. Mother was
charged on June 10, 2017 in Marion County for unlawful
possession of a syringe, possession of Methamphetamine,
Possession of Paraphernalia in cause number 49G25-F6-
021560. Exhibit 10. Mother did not appear for a hearing
in that cause and a warrant was issued for her arrest on
June 13, 2017. FCM Santoro spoke to Mother and told
her to turn herself in on the active warrant. Mother did
not do so. The number of Mother’s visits were reduced
because the Child was having difficulty at Head Start and
exhibiting aggression with other children after visits.
Mother’s last visit with the Child was in June, 2017. At
some point in June 2017, Mother left Indiana to avoid the
warrant and Mother stayed in Michigan where she has
family. Mother contacted DCS a few weeks before this
hearing to advice [sic] of her location in Michigan where
documents in her cases could be sent to her. Mother
inquired about services in Michigan but did not ask for
DCS help. Mother was manipulative with the case
manager and the phone call was not productive.
Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 37-39.
[22] There is no question that Findings 15-17 heavily rely on the testimony of
Santoro, but the findings also clearly indicate what the juvenile court
determined to be true. And, so long as findings indicate a determination, we
will not set them aside unless the record contains no facts to support them
either directly or by inference. Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262. Santoro’s testimony
clearly supports these findings and they are therefore proper.
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[23] Finally, Mother argues “Findings 18-24 merely discuss and quote witnesses
without adopting the testimony or making a finding of fact.” Br. of Appellant
at 12. These findings state:
18. CASA Mavis Anderson. Mavis Anderson is the Court
Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) for the Child.
CASA Anderson was employed as a licensed clinical
social worker for 30 years, working primarily in hospitals.
She is now retired. The CASA spent about 100 hours
working on this case.
19. The CASA’s observations of Mother and Child were that
Mother was normally affectionate and appropriate with
the Child, although she could be emotional and increased
emotionalism from Mother was not good for the Child.
The CASA observed a visit of Mother and Child at the
park in which Mother got very angry at the CASA in the
presence of the Child. Mother was loud and the Child was
clearly upset.
20. The CASA believes that Mother’s relationship with her
wife is unstable. Mother was at the Wheeler Mission
because of reported domestic violence with her wife.
Mother told CASA she wanted to return to go home to
reconnect with her wife.
21. It is the opinion of the CASA that termination of Mother’s
parental rights is in the best interest of the Child because
Mother cannot provide a safe home for the child because
of her drug use and mental health issues. The CASA
opined that DCS services have been appropriate to meet
Mother’s needs, but Mother has made no progress.
Mother gets upset unless you tell her what she wants to
hear and Mother doesn’t want to be confronted. The
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CASA opined that Mother has not been able to “get off of
drugs”, she lacks mental health stability, and she lacks a
stable support system.
22. Child. When the Child went into foster care 15 months
ago she was developmentally delayed and exhibited
behavioral problems. The Child has been in the same
foster home with Mr. and Mrs. Samuels for the entire 15-
month period. The foster parents attended Nurturing
Heart Programming to deal with the Child’s behavioral
issues. The Child also received therapy to address her
behavioral issues. The Child’s behavior has improved
while in foster care. The Child is bonded to the foster
parents and to the other siblings in the foster home. The
foster parents are willing to adopt the Child if she is free
for adoption.
23. The CASA observed and opined that the Child’s speech is
improving, she is progressing in school (Head Start), she is
more confident and happy, and she is bonded to the foster
parents.
24. The Child’s Head Start teacher Beth Harris observed that
the Child was quiet, “behind” and lacked verbal and
academic skills when she began Head Start after removal
from Mother; however, she is now an outgoing, happy,
child capable of interacting with adults and other children.
The Child’s language, math and social emotionality skills
jumped 2 points in the last quarter.
Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 39-40.
[24] With the exceptions of Findings 18 and 22, which clearly state the juvenile
court’s determination of fact, the remaining findings do, at least to some degree,
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recite the testimony of witness. Nevertheless, we have explained that a juvenile
court does not err with references to evidence in its factual findings so long as
the findings also contain “thoughtful findings that flow from the evidence.”
S.L., 997 N.E.2d at 1122. That is the case here. All but ten of the findings are
left unchallenged and are thus accepted as true. McMaster v. McMaster, 681
N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that unchallenged trial court
findings were accepted as true). Furthermore, the juvenile court’s conclusions
of law regarding subsections (i) and (ii) of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2),
see Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 41-42, ¶¶ 27-28, include additional findings
which reflect the court’s determinations of fact.
[25] In sum, although the termination order could have been more specific, because
the juvenile court clearly identifies the reasons for terminating Mother’s
parental rights, we find no error.
Conclusion
[26] Concluding the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s
motion for a continuance and the findings were sufficient to support the
involuntary termination of Mother’s rights, we affirm.
[27] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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