Brandon T. Smith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 10 2019, 5:48 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James A. Edgar Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
J. Edgar Law Offices, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Brandon T. Smith, January 10, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1042
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Alicia A. Gooden,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G21-1609-F2-35459
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Brandon T. Smith appeals his conviction for possession of a narcotic drug, as a
Level 3 felony, and his adjudication as a habitual offender. He presents three
issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted into
evidence items seized pursuant to an allegedly stale search
warrant.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted into
evidence his statement to police, which he alleges was not
voluntary.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
prohibited him from asking certain questions on cross-
examination of a police officer.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In April 2016, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Detective Jason
Hart began an investigation of suspected drug dealing by Smith and Smith’s
associate Kierre Washington. Detective Hart was also acting as a Task Force
Officer with the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(“ATF”). Members of the Task Force conducted several controlled heroin buys
between Smith and a confidential informant (“CI”) between April 14 and
August 31. Detective Hart observed Smith and Washington using a “stash
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house”1 located at 6451 Bay Harbor Lane in Indianapolis, where Smith would
stop before each controlled buy with the CI. Tr. Vol. 2 at 227. In August,
Detective Hart obtained a GPS warrant, which permitted him to place a GPS
tracking device on a white pickup truck driven by Smith. Through surveillance,
Detective Hart learned that Smith drove to the stash house more than fifty
times between August 3 and September 7.
[4] On August 31, ATF Special Agent Launa Hunt applied for a search warrant
from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. In
her affidavit submitted in support of the warrant, Special Agent Hunt described
the controlled buys between Smith and the CI as well as Smith’s use of the
residence at 6451 Bay Harbor as a stash house for his heroin trafficking
activities. Special Agent Hunt also stated that Smith and Washington were the
only people who had unrestricted access to the residence. Further, during
August 2016, a second CI contacted investigators to report that Smith and
Washington were working together to sell narcotics and that they had used the
residence at 6451 Bay Harbor as a stash house. On August 31, the court issued
the search warrant for the residence.
[5] During the evening of September 6, officers saw Smith arrive at the residence,
and they saw him leave early the next morning, on September 7. After Smith
left, IMPD officers conducted a traffic stop, arrested Smith, and drove him to
1
Detective Hart explained that a “stash house” is a house where drug dealers do not reside but where they
keep narcotics and firearms. Tr. Vol. 2 at 227.
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the IMPD gun range, which was a nearby isolated location. Officers wanted to
question him in a location where no one could see that he was talking with law
enforcement. Detective Hart and Detective Andrew Deddish read Smith his
Miranda rights and questioned him about selling drugs. Smith ultimately
admitted that he had sold cocaine and heroin, but he denied any connection to
the stash house other than as a visitor. In the meantime, officers executed the
search warrant at the residence, where they found approximately two ounces of
heroin, three firearms, two pills containing methamphetamine, baggies, three
digital scales, hypodermic needles, $510 in cash, and strips of fentanyl. Officers
also found personal items addressed to Smith, as well as photographs of Smith.
[6] The State charged Smith with dealing in a narcotic drug, as a Level 2 felony;
possession of a narcotic drug, as a Level 3 felony; and with being a habitual
offender. Prior to trial, Smith filed two motions to suppress the evidence. In
his first motion to suppress, Smith alleged that his statement to police was not
voluntary. In his second motion to suppress, he alleged that there was no
probable cause to support the warrant, including that any probable cause had
become stale because the officers waited eight days to execute the warrant. The
trial court denied both motions to suppress. A jury found Smith guilty of
possession of a narcotic drug, as a Level 3 felony, and adjudicated him to be a
habitual offender, but the jury acquitted him of dealing in a narcotic drug. The
trial court entered judgment of conviction accordingly and sentenced Smith to
twenty-five years executed. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Search Warrant
[7] Smith first contends that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence
items seized pursuant to the search warrant, which, he contends, was not
supported by probable cause at the time of execution.2 Because Smith alleges a
constitutional violation, the proper standard of appellate review is de novo. See
Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013).
[8] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution both require probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant. Mehring v. State, 884 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008), trans. denied. In Huffines v. State, we explained that
“‘[p]robable cause is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in the location to be searched.”
[United States v.] LaMorie, 100 F.3d [547,] 552[ (8th Cir. 1996)].
We determine probable cause “under a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach.” Id. at 553. A delay in executing a
search warrant may render stale the probable cause finding.
United States v. Maxim, 55 F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 903, 116 S. Ct. 265, 133 L. Ed. 2d 188 (1995).
Important factors to consider in determining whether probable
cause has dissipated, rendering the warrant fatally stale, include
the lapse of time since the warrant was issued, the nature of the
2
Smith makes no contention that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause at the time it was
issued.
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criminal activity, and the kind of property subject to the search.
Id.”
739 N.E.2d at 1096 (quoting United States v. Gibson, 123 F.3d 1121, 1124 (8th
Cir. 1997)).
[9] Smith maintains that the facts and circumstances underlying the search warrant
officers executed at the stash house are analogous to those in Huffines. In
Huffines, officers conducted a single controlled drug buy three days prior to the
issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s residence, and officers waited eight
days after the warrant’s issuance to search the home. The trial court denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress. On appeal, we acknowledged that the officers
had executed the warrant within the ten-day window provided by Indiana Code
Section 35-33-5-7(b) (2018), but we stated that “the fact that the search did not
violate the statute does not address Huffines’ separate constitutional
arguments” that the probable cause supporting the search warrant had
dissipated by the time of execution. Id. at 1095 (citing Jaggers v. State, 687
N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind. 1997)).
[10] In Huffines, we distinguished Gibson, where police had waited four days after
issuance to execute a search warrant. The district court in Gibson denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress, having “concluded that the confidential
informant’s statements about drug trafficking activity at the [defendant’s]
apartment and the traffic in and out of the apartment were sufficiently
indicative of continued drug dealing to provide probable cause at the time the
warrant was issued.” 123 F.3d at 1125. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
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the district court, noting that, “[b]ecause continuing criminal activity was
suspected and corroborated, probable cause did not dissipate in the four days
that lapsed between the time the state court issued the warrant and its
execution.” Id. (emphasis added).
[11] In contrast, in Huffines, we held that the probable cause supporting the search
warrant had dissipated by the time of execution. In particular, we observed that
[t]he State presented no evidence that the police conducted
surveillance of Huffines’ residence between the time the warrant
was issued and when it was executed. The State did not present
evidence regarding any increase or decrease in traffic to and from
Huffines’ home or any evidence indicating on-going drug
activity.
Utilizing the totality of the circumstances approach of the federal
courts, we conclude that the State has failed to demonstrate that
continuing criminal activity was suspected and corroborated. As
such, probable cause dissipated in the eight days that lapsed
between the time of the warrant’s issuance and the search of
Huffines’ home. Therefore, when the police conducted the
search, they did so based upon a warrant not supported by
probable cause.
Huffines, 739 N.E.2d at 1097.3
[12] The totality of the circumstances underlying the search warrant for Smith’s
stash house are distinguishable from those in Huffines. In Huffines, officers
3
As in Huffines, here there is no meaningful difference between our analyses under the federal and state
constitutions.
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conducted a single controlled buy. Here, officers conducted multiple controlled
buys over the course of several months. Further, the State presented evidence
that Smith had visited the stash house more than fifty times in a single month,
and Smith had stopped by the stash house before the controlled buys. A second
confidential informant stated that Smith and Washington used the stash house
in the course of dealing drugs. And Smith spent the night at the stash house the
night before officers executed the search warrant. In short, the State presented
ample evidence of an ongoing drug dealing enterprise such that the search
warrant was supported by probable cause at the time it was executed eight days
after issuance. See Gibson, 123 F.3d at 1125; see also, e.g., Bigler v. State, 602
N.E.2d 509, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding information in probable cause
affidavit was not stale where last known act of distribution had occurred
twenty-one days before warrant issued and where facts showed ongoing drug
dealing for two years), trans. denied. Accordingly, the trial court did not err
when it admitted into evidence items seized pursuant to the search warrant.
Issue Two: Statement
[13] Smith contends that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence his
statement to police. He maintains that his statement was not voluntary. Again,
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because Smith alleges a constitutional violation, our review is de novo.4 See
Speers, 999 N.E.2d at 852.
“A waiver of one’s Miranda rights occurs when a defendant, after
being advised of those rights and acknowledging an
understanding of them, proceeds to make a statement without
taking advantage of those rights.” Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d
1223, 1230 (Ind. 2000). The State has the burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the waiver was made knowingly
and voluntarily. Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 509 (Ind. 1997).
To be admissible, a suspect’s confession must also be voluntarily
given. Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 1997). A
confession is voluntary if it is the product of a rational intellect
and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation,
or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the
defendant’s free will. A.A. v. State, 706 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999). Under the United States Constitution, the State
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant’s confession was voluntary. Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d
1183, 1191 (Ind. 2004).
Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[14] Smith asserts that, during his interview, the officers both threatened him and
made promises of leniency, which rendered his statement involuntary.5 In
4
Smith does not clearly state whether he claims a constitutional violation under the federal or state
constitutions, or both. He mentions the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution at one point, so
we will address his claim under the federal constitution.
5
For the first time on appeal, Smith maintains that the location of his interview, in a police car at the IMPD
gun range with guns being fired nearby, along with the tightness of the handcuffs, which the officers did not
loosen until one-and-one-half hours had transpired after his arrest, also rendered his confession involuntary.
But Smith did not ask to go to a different location or express any concern about the gun range. And Smith
does not direct us to any evidence that he had expressed discomfort as a result of the handcuffs before the
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support of his contention, Smith summarizes the offending statements by the
officers during his interview as follows:
“[Defendant] faces a crapload of time in Federal jail.”
“quite a bit of Federal time.”
“you are looking at a significant amount of time.”
“significant portion of your life in penitentiary”
“He’ll be joining you in Federal prison.”
“When I play those videos to [the] Federal jury . . . “
“You are screwed in Federal Court with your criminal history.”
“We have the ability to take all the assets.”
“If we go to the prosecutor and we say: “He is willing to play
ball, there is a way you walk away from this.”
“And another kicker that factors into that in the federal side of
things on the onset right now – we would need to go over
specifically your involvement within this and you need to take
responsibility for it and acknowledge your participation to the
point where we can say you cooperated in that way. Because
actually that helps you in the federal system. You get
consideration for that. They can knock points off. Everything in
the federal system is on the points system.”
officers loosened them. In any event, it is well settled that a defendant cannot make an argument for the first
time on appeal. See Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. 1999).
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Appellant’s Br. at 19-20.
[15] It is true that a confession is inadmissible if obtained by a promise of immunity
or mitigation of punishment. Collins v. State, 509 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ind. 1987).
However, vague and indefinite statements by the police about it being in the
best interest of the defendant for him to tell the real story or cooperate with the
police are not sufficient inducements to render a subsequent confession
inadmissible. Id. Implied promises are too indefinite to render a confession
involuntary. Id.
[16] Here, the officers’ statements to Smith that he faced a considerable amount of
jail time and might get leniency for his cooperation were too vague and
indefinite to render his confession involuntary. See Higgins v. State, 562 N.E.2d
770, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding confession voluntary where officer told
defendant “the one that cooperates the most” would get the “best deal” from
the prosecutor); see also, e.g., Lord v. State, 531 N.E.2d 207, 209 (Ind. 1988)
(holding confession voluntary where police officer asked, “[I]f I could get [the
prosecutor] down here, would you tell the truth, if he’d cut you a deal?”); Neal
v. State, 522 N.E.2d 912, 913 (Ind. 1988) (holding confession voluntary where
officer promised leniency if defendant “came clean”); Ford v. State, 504 N.E.2d
1012, 1013 (Ind. 1987) (holding confession voluntary where officer told
defendant that others were making statements and that it would be in his best
interests to make a statement himself); Hampton v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1077, 1080
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding confession voluntary where officers told
defendant possible sentences for crime, that mitigating circumstances could be
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considered, and that they would inform court if he was truthful and
cooperative); White v. State, 404 N.E.2d 1144, 1146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding confession voluntary where officer stated, “if you help us like your
sister, we’ll help you”). The trial court did not err when it found that Smith’s
statement was voluntary.
Issue Three: Cross-examination
[17] Finally, Smith contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
prohibited him from questioning Detective Hart about threats Detective Hart
had allegedly made to Smith during the interview. A trial court has wide
discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination, and we will reverse only
for a clear abuse of that discretion. Nasser v. State, 646 N.E.2d 673, 681 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995). The general rule is that cross-examination must lie within the
scope of the direct examination. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion in
controlling the scope of cross-examination when the restriction relates to a
matter which substantially affects the defendant’s rights. Id.
[18] Here, Smith points out that, on direct examination of Detective Hart, the
prosecutor asked him whether he had threatened Smith during the interview,
and Detective Hart answered no. Smith asserts that that question and answer
opened the door for Smith to question Detective Hart about alleged threats he
had made. And Smith made an offer of proof where he asked Detective Hart
about his statements to Smith that he faced “a crapload of Federal time” if he
did not cooperate, and other statements to that effect. Tr. Vol. IV at 16.
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[19] The trial court limited Smith’s cross-examination of Detective Hart based on
the court’s previous ruling that Detective Hart had not made threats against
Smith during his interview. Indeed, again, “‘[s]tatements by police expressing a
desire that a suspect cooperate and explaining the crimes and penalties that are
possible results are not specific enough to constitute either promises or threats.’”
Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Kahlenbeck v. State,
719 N.E.2d 1213, 1217 (Ind. 1999) (emphasis added)). Thus, as the trial court
determined, Detective Hart’s statements regarding possible penalties Smith
faced did not constitute threats. And because there is no evidence that
Detective Hart threatened Smith during the interview, Smith cannot show that
the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited Smith’s questions of
Detective Hart about alleged threats on cross-examination.
[20] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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