Pastor Llobet, M.D. v. Juan Gutierrez ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                      FILED
    Feb 22 2017, 5:48 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Michael E. O’Neill                                         Barry D. Rooth
    Nathan D. Hansen                                           Holly S.C. Wojcik
    O’Neill McFadden & Willett LLP                             Theodoros & Rooth PC
    Schererville, Indiana                                      Merrillville, Indiana
    David W. Westland
    Westland & Bennett PC
    Schererville, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE                                ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS
    DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL OF                                   CURIAE
    INDIANA                                                    INDIANA TRIAL LAWYERS
    Donald B. Kite, Sr.                                        ASSOCIATION
    Wuertz Law Office, LLC                                     Jerry Garau
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Garau Germano, P.C.
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Crystal G. Rowe
    Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
    New Albany, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017             Page 1 of 12
    Pastor Llobet, M.D.,                                       February 22, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
    45A04-1605-CT-1133
    v.                                                 Appeal from the Lake Superior
    Court
    Juan Gutierrez,                                            The Honorable Calvin Hawkins,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    45D02-1307-CT-45
    Vaidik, Chief Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   Dr. Pastor Llobet performed an angiogram on Juan Gutierrez, and Gutierrez
    now claims that Dr. Llobet committed medical malpractice. As required by
    Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act, Gutierrez first filed a proposed complaint
    with the Department of Insurance and presented his case to a panel of doctors
    (a “medical review panel”). His specific argument to the panel was that Dr.
    Llobet was negligent in his technical performance of the angiogram. The panel
    issued an opinion in favor of Gutierrez, who then took the case to court.
    [2]   Shortly before trial was set to begin, it became apparent that Gutierrez intended
    to present a second theory of malpractice: that the angiogram was unnecessary,
    i.e., not “indicated.” At that point, Dr. Llobet turned over records from testing
    that was performed the day before the angiogram—records that apparently
    support his position that the angiogram was, in fact, indicated. He also moved
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017           Page 2 of 12
    to strike Gutierrez’s “angiogram-not-indicated” theory altogether, on the basis
    that Gutierrez did not argue it to the medical review panel. Gutierrez
    countered with a motion to bar Dr. Llobet from using the testing records,
    noting that the discovery deadline had passed and arguing that the records had
    been requested on multiple occasions. The trial court denied Dr. Llobet’s
    motion but granted Gutierrez’s motion. As it stands, then, Gutierrez would be
    allowed to present his “angiogram-not-indicated” theory, but Dr. Llobet would
    not be allowed to respond with a key piece of evidence contradicting that
    theory.
    [3]   Because Gutierrez’s “angiogram-not-indicated” theory was encompassed by the
    proposed complaint he filed with the Department of Insurance and is related to
    evidence that was submitted to the medical review panel, we affirm the denial
    of Dr. Llobet’s motion to strike. However, because we conclude that Dr.
    Llobet should be allowed to use the pre-angiogram testing records to respond to
    the allegation that the angiogram was not indicated, we reverse the trial court’s
    order barring that evidence.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [4]   In April 2007, Gutierrez began seeing Dr. Llobet for treatment of peripheral
    vascular disease. On September 25, 2007, a technician for Dr. Llobet
    performed an arterial Doppler study and ankle-brachial index (“ABI”) testing
    on Gutierrez (ABI testing measures and compares ankle and arm blood
    pressures). Dr. Llobet decided to perform an angiogram (a procedure used to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017   Page 3 of 12
    obtain x-rays of arteries and veins) and was doing so the next day when a
    previously placed stent broke and became dislodged. Gutierrez underwent
    surgery to have the broken stent removed, and he claims that he suffered serious
    injuries as a result.
    [5]   In September 2009, Gutierrez filed a proposed complaint against Dr. Llobet
    with the Indiana Department of Insurance. He alleged, generally, that “[t]he
    health care provided to the Plaintiff, JUAN GUTIERREZ, on September 26,
    2007, fell below the applicable standard of care[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.
    31. A medical review panel was formed, and the parties made submissions to
    the panel. In his submission to the panel, Gutierrez more specifically alleged
    that “[t]he cause of the broken left iliac artery stent during the September 26,
    2007 angiogram procedure was negligent forcing of the Ansel sheath through
    the existing iliac stent by Dr. Llobet.” Id. at 65.
    [6]   In August 2012, the medical review panel requested additional information
    from the parties. Among other things, the panel asked:
    Before the September 2007 procedure, were any additional tests
    performed? For instance, in the admission note of Dr. Llobet
    dated September 26, 2007, it made reference to an abnormal
    Doppler. The panelists do not believe that this Doppler finding
    was included in the information. If it was, could someone please
    direct us to it[?] If it was not, were there any written findings
    from the same[?]
    Id. at 131. In response, Dr. Llobet produced records from the Doppler study
    done on September 25, 2007, but not records of the ABI testing done the same
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017   Page 4 of 12
    day. In May 2013, the medical review panel unanimously concluded that Dr.
    Llobet “failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the
    complaint.” Id. at 133-43.
    [7]   Two months later, Gutierrez filed suit against Dr. Llobet. In his complaint, he
    noted the opinion of the medical review panel and alleged again that Dr.
    Llobet’s actions “were negligent, careless, and fell below the applicable
    standard of care.” Id. at 74.
    [8]   Trial was set to begin on February 16, 2016, but after Gutierrez retained new
    attorneys on February 2, the trial court pushed the trial back to the end of May.
    On February 11, one of Gutierrez’s new attorneys deposed Dr. Llobet’s expert,
    Dr. Lowell Steen, and questioned him extensively about the indications for the
    angiogram. Just before the beginning of his own deposition on February 19,
    Dr. Llobet produced, for the first time, records of the pre-angiogram ABI
    testing. Dr. Llobet testified during the deposition that he had located the ABI
    records two days earlier, on February 17, after learning that Dr. Steen had been
    questioned about the indications for the angiogram.
    [9]   Shortly after his deposition, however, Dr. Llobet moved to strike any allegation
    by Gutierrez that the angiogram was not indicated, on the ground that
    Gutierrez’s only claim to the medical review panel had been that Dr. Llobet’s
    technical performance of the angiogram had been negligent. He relied on K.D.
    v. Chambers, where this Court held that “a malpractice plaintiff cannot present
    one breach of the standard of care to the panel and, after receiving an opinion,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017   Page 5 of 12
    proceed to trial and raise claims of additional, separate breaches of the standard
    of care that were not presented to the panel and addressed in its opinion.” 
    951 N.E.2d 855
    , 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, disapproved on other grounds
    by Spangler v. Bechtel, 
    958 N.E.2d 458
     (Ind. 2011). Gutierrez filed an opposition
    to Dr. Llobet’s motion and then filed his own motion asking the trial court to
    bar Dr. Llobet from using the ABI records, given Dr. Llobet’s delay in
    disclosing them.
    [10]   The trial court issued an order denying Dr. Llobet’s motion to strike and a
    separate order granting Gutierrez’s motion to bar the ABI records, but it
    certified both orders for interlocutory appeal. Dr. Llobet then sought this
    Court’s permission to file such an appeal, which we granted.
    Discussion and Decision
    [11]   The parties cite the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard as the applicable
    standard of review. As to the exclusion of the ABI records, we agree. See Hale
    v. State, 
    54 N.E.3d 355
    , 357 (Ind. 2016) (explaining that discovery rulings are
    reviewed only for an abuse of discretion). However, the essence of Dr. Llobet’s
    motion to strike the “angiogram-not-indicated” theory was that the theory is
    defective as a matter of law. We review such questions de novo. Horton v.
    State, 
    51 N.E.3d 1154
    , 1157 (Ind. 2016).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017   Page 6 of 12
    I. Dr. Llobet’s Motion to Strike
    [12]   On appeal, as in the trial court, Dr. Llobet’s argument regarding his motion to
    strike is based on the above-quoted holding in K.D., which he takes to mean
    that medical-malpractice plaintiffs “cannot bring one allegation of malpractice
    to the attention of the Medical Review Panel, and then attempt to later raise a
    separate allegation at trial[.]” Appellant’s Br. p. 6. Because Gutierrez did not
    specifically raise his “angiogram-not-indicated” theory to the medical review
    panel, Dr. Llobet maintains that he should not be allowed to raise that theory in
    court.
    [13]   Six months after the trial court denied Dr. Llobet’s motion to strike, and two
    weeks after Dr. Llobet filed his opening brief, a panel of this Court (with this
    author concurring) concluded that K.D., to the extent it stands for the
    proposition that a medical-malpractice plaintiff cannot raise in court a theory of
    malpractice that was not specifically articulated to the medical review panel,
    “was wrongly decided.” McKeen v. Turner, 
    61 N.E.3d 1251
    , 1261 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2016), trans. pending. We based that conclusion on the following passage from
    our Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc.:
    We decline to accept Memorial Hospital’s argument that the
    plaintiffs’ action is restricted by the substance of the submissions
    presented to the medical review panel. Pursuant to the [Indiana
    Medical Malpractice Act], the panel was authorized to review the
    medical records and other submitted material pertaining to each
    defendant’s treatment of Nicholas. While a medical malpractice
    plaintiff must, as a prerequisite to filing suit, present the proposed
    complaint for review and expert opinion by a medical review
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017   Page 7 of 12
    panel, there is no requirement for such plaintiff to fully explicate
    and provide the particulars or legal contentions regarding the
    claim.
    
    679 N.E.2d 1329
    , 1332 (Ind. 1997) (citations omitted). In light of that holding
    and the language of the Medical Malpractice Act, we held in McKeen that a
    plaintiff can raise a theory in court if (1) it was encompassed, under the liberal
    rules of notice pleading, by the proposed complaint that was before the medical
    review panel and (2) evidence related to it was submitted to the panel. 61
    N.E.3d at 1261. Not surprisingly, Gutierrez relies heavily on McKeen in his
    appellee’s brief, which he filed a month after we issued that opinion. In his
    reply brief, Dr. Llobet argues that McKeen, not K.D., was wrongly decided and
    that under K.D. he should prevail.1
    [14]   We believe that the holding in McKeen, and the rationale for that holding, are
    correct. Therefore, we reject Dr. Llobet’s argument based on K.D. That does
    not end our analysis, however, for Dr. Llobet contends, in the alternative, that
    Gutierrez’s “angiogram-not-indicated” theory should be stricken even under
    McKeen. While he acknowledges that evidence relating to that theory was
    submitted to the panel (satisfying the second prong of McKeen), he argues that
    the theory was not “encompassed” by Gutierrez’s proposed complaint.
    1
    Notably, while our Supreme Court denied transfer in K.D., it did so only by virtue of a 2-2 vote, with then-
    Justice Dickson, who authored Miller, not participating. 
    962 N.E.2d 654
     (Ind. 2011).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017                      Page 8 of 12
    [15]   Dr. Llobet focuses on the fact that the pre-angiogram testing (or alleged lack
    thereof) took place on September 25, 2007, while the proposed complaint only
    addressed “[t]he health care provided to the Plaintiff, JUAN GUTIERREZ, on
    September 26, 2007,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 31 (emphasis added). Dr.
    Llobet asserts that the proposed complaint “did not provide notice that
    treatment that occurred on September 25, 2007 was at issue[.]” Appellant’s
    Reply Br. p. 11. But the events of September 25 are “at issue” only insofar as
    they relate to Gutierrez’s ultimate claim that Dr. Llobet performed an
    unnecessary angiogram on September 26. Because that claim was plainly
    encompassed by Gutierrez’s proposed complaint (and evidence related to the
    theory was submitted to the medical review panel), we affirm the trial court’s
    denial of Dr. Llobet’s motion to strike.
    II. Gutierrez’s Motion to Bar Evidence
    [16]   Alternatively, Dr. Llobet argues that when the trial court denied his motion to
    strike Gutierrez’s “angiogram-not-indicated” theory, it should have also denied
    Gutierrez’s motion to bar the ABI records.
    [17]   In support of his argument, Dr. Llobet notes the following: (1) he disclosed the
    records within eight days of learning that Gutierrez intended to raise his “new”
    theory; (2) trial was still more than three months away when he disclosed the
    records; (3) there was no reason to disclose the records sooner because
    Gutierrez was originally only challenging the technical performance of the
    angiogram, not the indications for it; (4) the records go to the heart of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017   Page 9 of 12
    Gutierrez’s “angiogram-not-indicated” theory, so they must be presented to the
    jury in order to achieve substantial justice; (5) Gutierrez himself did not strictly
    comply with pretrial deadlines and rules, including waiting until after the
    discovery deadline to seek to depose Dr. Llobet; (6) Gutierrez never specifically
    requested the records; (7) the technician records from studies performed at his
    office (such as ABI testing) are kept separate from his patient charts, which is
    why they were not disclosed with Gutierrez’s chart; (8) his expert (Dr. Steen)
    did not rely upon or even review the ABI records until after Gutierrez raised the
    “angiogram-not-indicated” theory; and (9) he obviously did not intentionally
    withhold the records in bad faith, since they are favorable to him, i.e., they
    support his argument that the angiogram was indicated.
    [18]   In response, Gutierrez argues that Dr. Llobet received several requests that
    should have prompted him to produce the records. In addition to the medical
    review panel’s August 2012 question about whether “any additional tests” were
    performed before the angiogram, Gutierrez notes that Dr. Llobet did not
    provide the records in response to (1) his September 2009 request for “a
    complete copy of his medical records and itemized statement,” Appellee’s App.
    Vol. II p. 16; (2) his April 2011 request for “[a]ll nursing, surgical tech or other
    similar records, notes or the like concerning Juan Gutierrez,” Appellant’s App.
    Vol. III p. 188; (3) his July 2014 interrogatories asking Dr. Llobet to identify all
    exhibits he intended to introduce at trial and all documents relevant to his
    defense; (4) his February 2016 requests for additional information about the
    opinions of Dr. Llobet’s expert, Dr. Steen; and (5) his February 2016 request for
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017   Page 10 of 12
    all of Dr. Llobet’s office notes. Gutierrez also emphasizes that Dr. Llobet
    located the records two days before his deposition but did not turn them over
    until a few minutes before that deposition began, “depriving counsel of the
    opportunity to adequately prepare to question Dr. Llobet regarding the testing
    and the data.” Appellee’s Br. p. 34.
    [19]   The facts upon which Dr. Llobet relies are compelling, but so are those cited by
    Gutierrez, and if these were the only facts before us, we would be inclined to
    defer to the trial court’s decision to bar the ABI records. But the fact that tips
    the scales in favor of Dr. Llobet is that starting on July 13, 2011—the day K.D.
    was handed down—he was operating under a rule that limited medical-
    malpractice plaintiffs to the theories of malpractice that were specifically
    presented to the medical review panel. The only specific theory Gutierrez
    presented to the medical review panel regarding the September 2007 angiogram
    was that Dr. Llobet was negligent in his technical performance of the
    procedure. As such, it is entirely possible that the ABI records never even
    crossed Dr. Llobet’s mind before February 2016. And even if they did, we
    would not fault him for concluding that they were completely irrelevant to this
    litigation. If he had any inkling that the records were relevant, surely he would
    have produced them, since they are favorable to him.
    [20]   Gutierrez notes that the discovery deadline has passed and asserts that he is
    therefore unable to explore the ABI testing “through deposition and other
    discovery methods.” Appellee’s Br. p. 35-36. As a result, he argues, he would
    suffer “extreme prejudice” if the ABI records are not excluded. Id. at 35. Under
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017   Page 11 of 12
    the circumstances, we cannot agree. When Dr. Llobet indicated his intent to
    pursue this interlocutory appeal, the trial court vacated the May 2016 trial date
    and stayed all proceedings. We trust that when this matter returns to the trial
    court, Gutierrez will be afforded the opportunity to conduct necessary discovery
    regarding the ABI records, including supplemental depositions of Dr. Llobet
    and Dr. Steen.
    [21]   Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
    Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1605-CT-1133 | February 22, 2017   Page 12 of 12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case 45A04-1605-CT-1133

Judges: Bradford, Brown, Vaidik

Filed Date: 2/22/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/11/2024