Claude F. Hudson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                         FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                Dec 26 2018, 6:51 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                  CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                   Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Claude F. Hudson                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Greencastle, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Lyubov Gore
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Claude F. Hudson,                                       December 26, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    84A04-1708-CR-1871
    v.                                              Appeal from the Vigo Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Michael Rader,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    84D05-1701-F5-338
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1708-CR-1871 | December 26, 2018          Page 1 of 9
    Case Summary and Issue
    [1]   Following a jury trial, Claude Hudson was convicted of battery on a public
    safety official resulting in bodily injury, a Level 5 felony, and found to be an
    habitual offender. He was sentenced to six years in the Department of
    Correction, enhanced by an additional six years for the habitual offender
    finding. Hudson now appeals, raising one issue that we will address: whether
    the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for battery. Concluding
    the evidence was sufficient, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On January 30, 2017, Elizabeth Smart was giving a lecture and conducting a
    meet and greet on the campus of Indiana State University in Terre Haute.
    Patrol Captain Ian Loomis with the Indiana State University Police
    Department was in charge of providing protection for Ms. Smart during her
    time on campus. Captain Loomis was dressed in a suit rather than a uniform at
    the request of Ms. Smart and University officials. His badge was displayed near
    his firearm at his waist.
    [3]   After Ms. Smart’s speech in the Tilson Hall auditorium, Captain Loomis
    escorted her to the adjacent Heritage Lounge where she would meet guests.
    Jennifer Cook, an employee of the University and Ms. Smart’s primary contact,
    stood next to Ms. Smart as people filed by in line to speak to her and have
    books signed. William Pappinchock, another employee of the University, was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1708-CR-1871 | December 26, 2018   Page 2 of 9
    also close by assisting guests. Captain Loomis’ attention was drawn to Hudson,
    who was holding a folding knife at the refreshment table set up in the room. At
    least five times, Hudson looked at the knife, “flip[ped] it” toward Ms. Smart,
    then looked back at the knife. Transcript, Volume 2 at 246-47. Captain Loomis
    repositioned himself so he was closer to Hudson, hoping to draw his attention
    with a show of “low level . . . force” as if to subtly indicate, “[H]ey, I’m here.
    What your [sic] doing may be causing some alarm. What do you say we
    change what we’re doing?” Id. at 247-48. Hudson stopped messing with the
    knife, looked at Captain Loomis, and acknowledged his presence by bobbing
    his head up and down for fifteen to twenty seconds. Hudson opened a tea
    packet with the knife and then put the knife in the right pocket of his coat.
    Hudson gathered his belongings and relocated to a couch approximately twelve
    to fifteen feet from where Ms. Smart was sitting.
    [4]   While sitting on the couch, Hudson had his hand in his right pocket and
    Captain Loomis could see he was fidgeting with the knife. After a few minutes,
    Hudson got up “pretty quickly and began moving toward Ms. Smart.” Id. at
    250. He did not take any of his belongings with him. His movements were
    “dedicated and determined. He got up and moved relatively fast” in Ms.
    Smart’s direction, “with his eyes set on her.” Id., Supplemental Tr. at 6.
    Captain Loomis positioned himself between Ms. Smart and Hudson and placed
    his left hand up as he told Hudson to back up while displaying his badge and
    firearm. Hudson “ran into [Captain Loomis’] arm and delivered two (2) strikes
    to [his] left mid section.” Supp. Tr. at 7. Captain Loomis swept Hudson’s arm
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1708-CR-1871 | December 26, 2018   Page 3 of 9
    away as he attempted a third strike. Captain Loomis described the pain from
    the strikes to his abdomen as a five to six on the pain scale.
    [5]   Both Cook and Pappinchock witnessed Captain Loomis’ confrontation with
    Hudson. Cook saw Hudson approaching Ms. Smart, saw Captain Loomis put
    his arm out to stop Hudson, and saw Hudson run into Captain Loomis’ arm
    and punch him twice in the stomach. Cook drew Pappinchock’s attention and
    asked him to keep an eye out. Pappinchock then moved into a position closer
    to Ms. Smart and heard Captain Loomis tell Hudson to show his hands.
    [6]   In hopes of deescalating the situation instead of resorting to greater force,
    Captain Loomis again told Hudson to back up and indicated that they needed
    to move into another room. Although Hudson was angry and mumbling, he
    complied. In an adjacent room, Captain Loomis secured Hudson’s knife and
    then patted him down, finding no additional weapons. Captain Loomis
    identified himself and stated he was a police officer, to which Hudson
    responded, “[Y]es, I know. I saw you watching me.” Tr., Vol. 3 at 8. Captain
    Loomis was unable to immediately receive information from dispatch about
    Hudson due to technical difficulties, so he issued a no-trespass warning and had
    Hudson escorted off campus. After escorting Ms. Smart to her car at the
    conclusion of the event, Captain Loomis logged the knife into evidence and
    completed a probable cause affidavit. An arrest warrant was issued and served
    on Hudson the next day.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1708-CR-1871 | December 26, 2018   Page 4 of 9
    [7]   Hudson was charged with battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety
    official, a Level 5 felony, and was alleged to be an habitual offender. Hudson
    represented himself at his jury trial, accompanied by standby counsel. The jury
    found him guilty as charged, and in the second phase of the trial, found that he
    was an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the
    DOC. Hudson now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Standard of Review
    A. Pro Se Litigants
    [8]   We begin by noting that Hudson is representing himself on appeal.1 Pro se
    litigants without legal training are held to the same legal standards as licensed
    attorneys. Basic v. Amouri, 
    58 N.E.3d 980
    , 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Pro se
    litigants must adhere to the rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept
    the consequences of their failure to do so, including waiver for failure to present
    cogent argument on appeal. 
    Id. at 983-84
    . We “will not search the record to
    find a basis for a party’s argument” nor will we “search the authorities cited by
    a party in order to find legal support for its position.” Thomas v. State, 
    965 N.E.2d 70
    , 77 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. And we must not become
    1
    Hudson was appointed appellate counsel for purposes of this appeal. Counsel filed a brief on Hudson’s
    behalf, but Hudson thereafter requested that counsel withdraw and he be allowed to file his own brief. The
    court granted Hudson’s request on March 19, 2018, and ordered Hudson to either file a new Appellant’s Brief
    or file a Notice that he was accepting counsel’s brief. Hudson filed his own brief on August 23, 2018.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1708-CR-1871 | December 26, 2018        Page 5 of 9
    an “advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too
    poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984.
    [9]    Hudson’s Appellant’s Brief does not meet even the minimum standards of
    complying with our appellate rules. There is no statement of issues, statement
    of the case, or statement of the facts. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A). It is
    essentially twenty numbered paragraphs of argument with no references to the
    record or citations to case law or other authorities. Hudson does invoke several
    amendments to the United States Constitution but makes no effort to explain
    how they are relevant to his case. In short, most of Hudson’s argument is “too
    poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Id. At its heart, though,
    Hudson’s argument seems to be a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting his conviction, as he claims he did not strike Captain Loomis and
    did not know Captain Loomis was a public safety official. He also claims
    Captain Loomis, who testified at Hudson’s trial, was not present at the book
    signing. We have endeavored to address Hudson’s issues as best we can, but
    any and all issues not expressly addressed herein are waived accordingly. Id. at
    983-84.
    B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    [10]   In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we neither
    reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 
    27 N.E.3d 1065
    , 1066 (Ind. 2015). We consider only the evidence supporting the
    judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
    id.,
     and we will
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1708-CR-1871 | December 26, 2018   Page 6 of 9
    affirm the conviction “if there is substantial evidence of probative value
    supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact
    could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Walker v.
    State, 
    998 N.E.2d 724
    , 726 (Ind. 2013) (citation omitted).
    II. Evidence of Battery
    [11]   Hudson was convicted of battery causing bodily injury to a public safety
    official. 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1
    (g)(5). To convict Hudson, the State was
    required to establish that Hudson “knowing or intentionally touch[ed] [Captain
    Loomis] in a rude, insolent, or angry manner . . . [and] the offense result[ed] in
    bodily injury to [Captain Loomis] while engaged in [his] official duties.” 
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1
    (c)(1), (g)(5)(A). For purposes of the offense, bodily injury is
    defined as “any impairment of physical condition, including physical pain.”
    
    Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2
    -29.
    [12]   Hudson maintained that he did not touch anyone that night in the Heritage
    Room. Testimony from Captain Loomis and Cook show otherwise. Captain
    Loomis testified Hudson struck him twice in the midsection. Cook testified
    that she saw Hudson punch Captain Loomis twice in the stomach. The jury
    believed their testimony. To find otherwise on appeal would require
    reweighing the evidence for ourselves, which we will not do. See Willis, 27
    N.E.3d at 1066.
    [13]   Hudson also claimed he did not know that Captain Loomis was a public safety
    official. It is the State’s burden to prove by objective evidence that a citizen
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1708-CR-1871 | December 26, 2018   Page 7 of 9
    who has encountered a law enforcement officer either knew or should have
    known that he was dealing with an officer. Cupello v. State, 
    27 N.E.3d 1122
    ,
    1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Under our highly deferential standard of review, we
    hold the State met that burden here. The evidence most favorable to the verdict
    demonstrates that Captain Loomis was situated near Ms. Smart to maintain
    peace and order, that he caught Hudson’s eye when Hudson was showing his
    knife and Hudson thereafter acknowledged him, that Captain Loomis displayed
    his badge and firearm when he put his arm out to stop Hudson’s approach, and
    that when Captain Loomis took Hudson out of the room and stated he was a
    police officer, Hudson replied, “[Yes], I know.” Tr., Vol. 3 at 8. The evidence
    and reasonable inferences therefrom are sufficient to support the conclusion
    that if he did not affirmatively know, Hudson at least should have known Captain
    Loomis was a public safety official.
    [14]   Finally, Hudson asserts that Captain Loomis, who testified at Hudson’s trial,
    was not the same man who Hudson encountered in the Heritage Lounge and
    who gave him a no trespass order. See Tr., Vol. 3 at 110 (Hudson testifying that
    the officer on January 30 “wasn’t the same man that is here, I don’t know what
    that’s all about”); Brief of Appellant at 5 (“The fact is that the . . . officer who
    wrote a complaint about Hudson and released him with nothing but a
    trespassing warning . . . is not the officer who appeared in court.”). Captain
    Loomis testified at Hudson’s jury trial that he was present on January 30, 2017,
    and that Hudson had struck him. Cook and Pappinchock both testified that
    Captain Loomis was the officer providing security during the event. Captain
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1708-CR-1871 | December 26, 2018   Page 8 of 9
    Loomis logged the knife into evidence, completed an incident report for the
    Indiana State University Police Department, and completed the probable cause
    affidavit from which an arrest warrant was secured. Hudson’s claim that a
    different officer was involved in this incident is belied by the evidence most
    favorable to the verdict.
    Conclusion
    [15]   There is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the
    crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found Hudson guilty
    beyond a reasonable doubt. Hudson’s conviction is affirmed.
    [16]   Affirmed.
    Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1708-CR-1871 | December 26, 2018   Page 9 of 9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 84A04-1708-CR-1871

Filed Date: 12/26/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/28/2018