Jabari R. Eldridge v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jun 03 2015, 7:33 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Donald C. Swanson, Jr. Gregory F. Zoeller
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Christina D. Pace
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jabari R. Eldridge, June 3, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1412-CR-458
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court.
The Honorable Wendy W. Davis,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 02D05-1402-FD-182
Barteau, Senior Judge
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Statement of the Case
[1] Jabari R. Eldridge appeals his conviction by jury of battery resulting in bodily
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injury, a Class D felony, and the jury’s determination that he is a habitual
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offender. We affirm.
Issue
[2] Eldridge raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the State presented
sufficient evidence to rebut Eldridge’s claim of self-defense.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On the afternoon of February 14, 2014, Eldridge was in a car with Andrea
Houston, who he had dated for two years, and Houston’s four-year-old child.
Eldridge was driving Houston to the cable company so that she could pay a bill.
During the drive, Eldridge and Houston argued vehemently after Eldridge took
fries from Houston’s child. Eventually, although Eldridge was driving,
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Houston shifted the transmission into park, which stopped the car.
[4] Meanwhile, Maureen Voors was in her office when she heard the sound of a car
horn. She looked out of her window, which was on the first floor of the office
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Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2012).
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Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (2005).
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The State asserts that Eldridge stopped the car. Appellee’s Br. p. 2. It is clear in the record that Houston
testified that she stopped the car while Eldridge was attempting to drive. Tr. pp. 81, 94. There is no evidence
to support an assertion that Eldridge stopped the car.
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building, and saw a car. A man was choking a woman inside the car. Voors
notified Ron Burkart, who was one of the building’s security officers, about the
attack.
[5] Julie Sanchez worked in the same building as Voors, on the fourth floor. A
coworker asked her to call 911 because of something happening outside.
Sanchez went to a window and saw a car stopped along the road. A man and a
woman were in the car. As Sanchez watched, the man grabbed the woman’s
head and choked her. Next, Sanchez “saw him hit her repetitively.” Tr. p. 117.
The woman could not free herself. Sanchez called 911.
[6] At this point, Burkart and another security officer went outside and approached
the car. Houston was laying across the driver’s seat, honking the horn, and
“screaming for help.” Id. at 124. Burkart and his colleague separated Eldridge
from Houston by having him get out of the car. Officer Heather Huffman of
the Fort Wayne Police Department arrived. She spoke with Houston, who was
crying and very upset. Houston told Officer Huffman “she had been hit by
Jabari.” Id. at 130. Officer Huffman observed injuries to Houston’s face and
neck. Next, Officer Huffman spoke with Houston’s child, who said he saw
Eldridge hit Houston.
[7] The State charged Eldridge with battery and alleged that he was a habitual
offender. The jury determined that Eldridge was guilty as charged, and the trial
court sentenced him in accordance with the jury’s verdict. This appeal
followed.
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Discussion and Decision
[8] Eldridge argues that the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense. The
standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim
of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence
claim. Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is
sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of
fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed. Id. If a defendant is convicted
despite his or her claim of self-defense, we will reverse only if no reasonable
person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable
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doubt. Id.
[9] A valid claim of defense of oneself or another person is legal justification for an
otherwise criminal act. Bryant v. State, 984 N.E.2d 240, 250 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013), trans. denied. According to statute, “A person is justified in using
reasonable force against any other person to protect the person . . . from what
the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind.
Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2013). Furthermore, “No person in this state shall be
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We note Eldridge’s use of intemperate language in his Reply Brief. He asserts that the State “completely
fabricated” facts. Reply Br. p. 1. He further says the State “create[d] evidence out of whole cloth.” Id. at 2.
He also describes the State’s reading of the facts as “a complete and utter fabrication.” Id. at 5. As noted
above, the State misread the transcript in regards to whether Eldridge or Houston stopped the car. The
remainder of the statements in the Appellee’s Brief are factual statements or inferences consistent with the
standard of review, or comments on the evidence. Eldridge’s language is not helpful to our resolution of the
appeal.
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placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person . . . by
reasonable means necessary.” Id.
[10] To support a claim of self-defense in a case that does not involve deadly force, a
defendant must present evidence that he or she (1) was in a place where he or
she had a right to be, (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in
the violence, and (3) had a reasonable fear of the imminent use of unlawful
force. Dixson v. State, 22 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the
State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. Weedman, 21 N.E.3d at 892.
[11] The force used to defend oneself must be proportionate to the requirements of
the situation. McKinney v. State, 873 N.E.2d 630, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. In addition, a mutual combatant, whether or not the initial
aggressor, must communicate the desire to stop fighting, and the other
individual must continue fighting, before self-defense can be reasonably
claimed. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(3).
[12] In this case, witnesses saw Eldridge choking Houston in a car. Sanchez saw
Eldridge grab Houston before choking and hitting her. Later, Burkart
approached the car and separated Eldridge from Houston. Houston was
honking the horn and screaming for help. When the police arrived, Houston
and her child told the police that Eldridge hit Houston. It may be reasonably
inferred from this evidence that, regardless of Houston and Eldridge’s verbal
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dispute, Eldridge instigated the violence. Thus, the State presented evidence
sufficient to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his claim of self-defense. See
Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (State disproved
defendant’s claim of self-defense where evidence indicated that defendant was
the initial aggressor).
[13] Eldridge points to testimony by Houston that she, not Eldridge, started the
physical confrontation and that Eldridge was merely getting out of the car while
she attempted to restrain him. This is a request to reweigh the evidence, which
our standard of review forbids. Even if Houston physically provoked Eldridge,
the evidence most favorable to the judgment demonstrates that Eldridge
participated willingly in the violence and used far more force than was
necessary and reasonable to defend himself. In addition, Eldridge did not
withdraw from the encounter or declare to Houston his intent to withdraw, but
instead choked her, hit her, and continued to struggle with her until separated
from her by security officers. His claim of self-defense must fail. See Ind. Code
§ 35-41-3-2(g)(3); Morell v. State, 933 N.E.2d 484, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(defendant’s claim of self-defense failed because defendant never withdrew from
combat or expressed an intent to withdraw).
Conclusion
[14] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[15] Affirmed-Barteau, Senior Judge
Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.
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