Muhammad A. Stewart v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Nov 08 2018, 7:02 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Donald C. Swanson, Jr. Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Evan Matthew Comer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Muhammad A. Stewart, November 8, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1303
v. Appeal from the
Allen Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Wendy W. Davis, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D04-1708-F6-881
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Muhammad A. Stewart (“Stewart”) was convicted after a jury trial of criminal
confinement1 as a Level 6 felony and domestic battery2 as a Level 6 felony and
was ordered to serve a three-year executed sentence. Stewart raises the
following issue for our review: whether the State presented sufficient evidence
to support his convictions.
[2] We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In July 2017, J.J. and Stewart had been involved in a three-year relationship
and had been living together for six or seven months. On July 25, 2017, the
couple had a verbal confrontation, and as a result, J.J. left the home they shared
in Fort Wayne, Allen County, Indiana to stay with a friend, Danyelle Austin
(“Austin”). Tr. Vol. II at 122-23. After two days of staying with Austin, J.J. ran
out of clean clothing and other basic necessities. Therefore, on the evening of
July 27, 2017, J.J. told Austin that she was going to return to her house to
collect some of her belongings. Id. at 123, 147. Although Austin told J.J. not
to go, J.J. insisted she needed to get her belongings. Id. at 147. Together, the
two women came up with a safety plan, where J.J. told Austin to wait
approximately ten minutes, then to call her cell phone. Id. at 126, 148. If J.J.
did not answer, Austin was instructed to immediately call the police. Id.
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a).
2
See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3.
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[4] J.J. arrived at the residence, entered, and began to collect clothing out of her
dresser drawer when Stewart entered the bedroom and started yelling at her. Id.
at 127. Stewart demanded to know where J.J. had been, and J.J. attempted to
leave the room as he approached her. Id. A loud argument between J.J. and
Stewart ensued, during which, J.J.’s cell phone rang, and J.J. answered the
incoming phone call from Austin. Id. at 129. When J.J. answered the call, all
that Austin could hear on J.J.’s end of the call was J.J. arguing with Stewart.
Id. at 148. After approximately one minute and thirty seconds of listening to
the argument between Stewart and J.J., Austin hung up the phone. Id.; State’s
Ex. 1. As soon as she hung up, however, Austin felt that she should call J.J.
back because she was worried that something might happen to J.J. Tr. Vol. II at
149, 151-52. Austin attempted to call J.J. four more times, but each time the
calls went to J.J.’s voicemail. Id. After the fourth unsuccessful attempt to reach
J.J., Austin called 911 and alerted the police. Id. at 149.
[5] Fort Wayne Police Department Officers Heather Hoffmann (“Officer
Hoffman”) and Darrell Caudill (“Officer Caudill”) were dispatched to the
residence at approximately 8:30 p.m. Id. at 156. The officers parked their
vehicle a couple of houses down from J.J.’s residence and approached the
house on foot. As they got near the house, Officer Hoffmann and Officer
Caudill could hear yelling coming from inside. Id. The screen door of the
residence was closed, but the interior door was open, and the officers could see
inside of the house and observed Stewart standing in the back hallway in front
of the bedroom doors. Id. at 156, 176. Stewart saw the two officers approach
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the house and met them at the front door. Id. at 156. Officer Caudill made
contact with Stewart and asked if J.J. was there. Id. at 157, 176. Stewart called
J.J., and she emerged from the bedroom. As soon as J.J. saw the officers, she
moved quickly toward them. Id. at 177. Officer Caudill observed that “[s]he
appeared to be in quite a bit of a hurry to get out of there.” Id. Officer
Hoffmann’s observation was that J.J. seemed “very afraid . . . very nervous and
frightened” and did not make eye contact with Stewart as she exited the
residence. Id. at 157.
[6] Officer Hoffmann walked J.J. away from the home while Officer Caudill kept
Stewart inside the house. Officer Caudill observed that Stewart was also very
nervous, breathing rapidly, sweating heavily, and shaking. Id. at 177. J.J. told
Officer Hoffmann that, while she was attempting to remove some of her
belongings from the house, Stewart confronted her, pushed her down onto the
bed, placed his hand on her neck, balled up his other fist, and told her that she
was not leaving and that he would hit her again if she tried to leave. Id. at 159.
J.J. stated to Officer Hoffman that, as she struggled to get free, Stewart slapped
her across the left side of her face. Id. J.J. continued to struggle, and Stewart
grabbed J.J.’s hair weave, which was sewn into her hair, and ripped it out. Id.
at 159, 173. Stewart then got up and stood in the doorway of the bedroom,
refusing to let J.J. leave. Id. at 155, 162-63. The incident occurred less than a
minute before Officer Hoffmann and Officer Caudill arrived at the scene. Id. at
158. As a result, J.J. told Officer Hoffmann that her back was hurting, that the
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left side of her face hurt, and that she felt pain along her scalp, but she refused
medical treatment. Id. at 163, 170.
[7] After speaking with J.J., Officer Hoffmann signaled to Officer Caudill to take
Stewart into custody. Id. at 157. Officer Caudill handcuffed Stewart and
placed him in the back of the parked police car. After being arrested, Stewart
began shouting that J.J. was “acting.” Id. at 178. Officer Caudill, who was
wearing a microphone on his lapel, then approached Officer Hoffmann and J.J.
to take pictures of J.J.’s injuries. He photographed J.J.’s face and hair and of
J.J.’s hair weave, which had been retrieved from the bedroom and placed on the
back of a nearby vehicle. Id. at 161-162; State’s Exs. 2-7. While Officer Caudill
was taking these photographs, J.J. told him that Stewart “just grabbed me by
the neck.” State’s Ex. 9 at 00:00:21-00:00:22. She also stated that Stewart had
told her “you aren’t going nowhere” and that he had pushed her down on the
bed and told her that he would not allow her to leave their house again. Id. at
00:0021-00:00:22, 00:01:59-00:02:02. J.J. agreed to talk to a detective and,
during a phone call with the detective approximately one hour later, recounted
the same allegations against Stewart. Tr. Vol. II at 189, 191.
[8] The State charged Stewart with Level 6 felony criminal confinement and Level
6 felony domestic battery. The trial court issued a no contact order prohibiting
Stewart from contacting J.J. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 4. However, sometime
after Stewart was released from jail, Austin saw Stewart and J.J. together. Tr.
Vol. II at 153. After Stewart’s release from jail, J.J. stopped talking to Austin
altogether. Id. at 153-54.
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[9] A jury trial was conducted on April 10, 2018, and during her testimony, J.J.
recanted the allegations she had made against Stewart on July 27, 2017. Id. at
128, 130-32. At trial, she claimed that she had tried to push Stewart out of the
way while the two were arguing, causing him to stumble and strike her face
with his hand as he tried to catch himself. Id. at 128. J.J. denied that he
intentionally slapped her and maintained that her statements to Officer
Hoffman and Officer Caudill were “exaggerated” and that she did not tell the
detective that Stewart battered her and if his report said so, he was “mistaken.”
Id. at 128, 140, 143. She also stated that she wanted to reconcile with Stewart
after the trial. Id. at 136-37. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found
Stewart guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of
three years executed. Stewart now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[10] The deferential standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled. When
we review the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we do not
reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Boggs v. State,
928 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We consider only the
evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from this evidence. Fuentes v. State, 10 N.E.3d 68, 75 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014), trans. denied. We also consider conflicting evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Oster v. State, 992 N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013), trans. denied. We will not disturb the verdict if there is substantial
evidence of probative value to support it. Fuentes, 10 N.E.3d at 75. We will
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affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Delagrange v. State, 5 N.E.3d 354, 356 (Ind.
2014). A conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of
a single witness, even when that witness is the victim. Dalton v. State, 56 N.E.3d
644, 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
[11] Stewart argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
convictions for Level 6 felony criminal confinement and Level 6 felony
domestic battery. Specifically, he contends that his convictions were not
supported by sufficient evidence because they were based on repudiated out-of-
court statements. Stewart asserts that his convictions were solely based on J.J.’s
statements made to the police at the scene, which she later recanted, and that
no other substantial evidence of probative value was presented from which the
jury could infer that the prior, recanted statement was credible.
[12] In order to find Stewart guilty of Level 6 felony domestic battery, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart knowingly or
intentionally touched J.J., a member of his household, in a rude, insolent, or
angry manner and that Stewart had a prior conviction for battery. Ind. Code §
35-42-2-1.3 (a)(1), (b)(1)(A). To find him guilty of Level 6 felony criminal
confinement, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
knowingly or intentionally confined J.J. without her consent. Ind. Code § 35-
42-3-3(a). It is well settled that a conviction may not be predicated upon a
repudiated out-of-court statement unless there is substantial evidence of
probative value from which the trier of fact could infer the repudiated statement
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is credible. Peckinpaugh v. State, 447 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Ind. 1983). It is also
clear that a repudiated statement cannot be rendered credible by another
repudiated statement, or by the repudiated statement itself. Laswell v. State, 494
N.E.2d 981, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). Rather, the corroborative evidence must
be evidence independent of the statement itself. Id.
[13] Here, no such independent corroborative evidence was presented. J.J.
repudiated her statements to police and denied making them when she testified
under oath at trial, and there was no independent evidence of a battery or of
confinement. There were no eyewitnesses to the altercation between Stewart
and J.J., and J.J. suffered no documented injuries as a result of the alleged
battery. Stewart did not admit to any wrongdoing or attempt to flee when the
officers arrived at the residence. Other than the testimony of the officers
regarding J.J.’s recanted statements, there is nothing in the record that
corroborates J.J.’s out-of-court statements or that makes them more credible
than her testimony given under oath at trial. We, therefore, conclude that,
because no substantial evidence of probative value was presented from which
the jury could infer J.J.’s recanted statements were credible, insufficient
evidence was presented to support Stewart’s convictions. We reverse his
convictions for Level 6 felony criminal confinement and Level 6 felony
domestic battery.
[14] Reversed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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