Anthony Hudgins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing May 16 2017, 11:21 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
estoppel, or the law of the case. Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ellen F. Hurley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Anthony Hudgins, May 16, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1612-CR-2760
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Barbara Crawford,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G09-1605-F6-20325
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Anthony Hudgins appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for level 6
felony strangulation. He asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of uncharged acts of misconduct by him. Finding no abuse
of discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At around 9:00 p.m. on May 2, 2016, Savonna Sloan drove to her
grandmother’s house to pick up some tuition money for college. When she
arrived at the house, there was a trash can in the available parking space, so she
exited her car to move the trash can. Sloan was on the phone with her
boyfriend at the time and was annoyed that she had to move the trash can.
Hudgins, her uncle, was sitting on the porch of the house and asked Sloan what
she was doing. She explained to Hudgins that she needed to move the trash
can, and then she returned to her car.
[3] As Sloan parked her car, Hudgins “stormed” down the driveway and “began to
bang” on the driver’s-side window of Sloan’s car. Tr. at 54. Sloan rolled down
her window, and Hudgins repeatedly yelled at her that she was “being
disrespectful, very disrespectful.” Id. He also started pulling on the door “as if
he was trying to snatch the door open.” Id. Sloan exited the car and started to
quickly walk up the driveway. Hudgins followed her and then started
“point[ing] his finger in [her] face and he kept directing [her] to leave” because
she was being “disrespectful.” Id. at 56. When Sloan attempted to go around
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Hudgins, he pushed her and began to choke her by clasping his hands around
her neck until she was unable to breathe. Sloan tried to fight off Hudgins, but
he continued to choke her and pull her by the hair.
[4] Hudgins choked Sloan for approximately thirty seconds. During that time, he
also pulled out one of her braided hair extensions and slapped her face, causing
her glasses to fall off. Sloan responded by slapping Hudgins. Hudgins then
pushed Sloan against the neighbor’s fence. Sloan managed to get to the front
door of her grandmother’s house as Hudgins continued to hold her by the neck
and hair. She banged on the door with her foot and screamed, “[H]elp,
grandma please help.” Id. at 60. When Sloan’s cousin, Danny, opened the
door, Hudgins released his grasp on Sloan’s hair, and Sloan ran past Danny
into the house. Sloan held her throat, struggled to breathe, and gagged. She
cried and exclaimed to Danny that Hudgins “tried to choke me out.” Id. at 82.
Sloan reached the bedroom where her mother and grandmother were, and
vomited on the rug and then again in the wastebasket. Sloan’s grandmother
went to speak to Hudgins, and he exclaimed, “[T]hat bitch hit me. That bitch
hit me. She was being disrespectful.” Id. at 61-62. Hudgins later admitted to
Danny that he tried to block Sloan from coming into the house and that he had
grabbed and choked her. The next morning, Sloan called the police and
reported the attack.
[5] The State charged Hudgins with level 6 felony strangulation. Prior to trial,
Hudgins filed a motion in limine to prohibit the State from “mentioning any
and all acts, other than those specifically mentioned in the charging information
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in the above-captioned matter.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 53. The court took
the matter under advisement until trial. Prior to the start of trial, Hudgins
argued that the State should not be allowed to introduce evidence regarding his
uncharged acts of battery against Sloan, specifically that he pulled her hair and
slapped her face. The State countered that the evidence was admissible because
the uncharged acts were part of a continuing act and occurred at the same time
as the strangulation. The trial court denied the motion in limine and ruled that
the evidence was admissible.
[6] During Sloan’s trial testimony regarding Hudgins pulling her hair and slapping
her face, Hudgins objected to the admissibility of the evidence, and the trial
court overruled the objection. Hudgins also objected to the admission of a
photograph of the braid that Hudgins had allegedly ripped out of Sloan’s hair,
and to the admission of the recording of Sloan’s 911 call during which she
stated that she wished to press charges against Hudgins for “assault and
battery” and stated that Hudgins had pulled her hair to the point where one of
her braids ripped out. Tr. at 63, 65-66; State’s Ex. 4, 5. The trial court
overruled the objections.
[7] The jury found Hudgins guilty of level 6 felony strangulation as charged.
Following a hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of 545 days, with 365
days to be served on home detention and 180 days suspended to probation.
This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
[8] Hudgins challenges the trial court’s admission of evidence. The appellate court
affords the trial court wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.
Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ind. 2012). “We review evidentiary
decisions for abuse of discretion and reverse only when the decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.
[9] Hudgins argues that evidence that he pulled Sloan’s hair and slapped her face
was inadmissible pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)(1), which provides
that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.” Such evidence may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident
.…” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2). “The rationale behind Rule 404(b) is that
the jury is precluded from making the forbidden inference that the defendant
had a criminal propensity and therefore engaged in the charged conduct.” Kyle
v. State, 54 N.E.3d 439, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
[10] However, our supreme court has determined that Rule 404(b) does not bar the
admission of evidence of uncharged criminal acts that are “intrinsic” to the
charged offense. Lee v. State, 689 N.E.2d 435, 439 (Ind. 1997). “‘Intrinsic,’ in
this context, refers to those offenses occurring at the same time and under the
same circumstances as the crimes charged.” Kyle, 54 N.E.3d at 444 (quoting
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Cowan v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). “By contrast, the
paradigm of inadmissible evidence under Rule 404(b) is a crime committed on
another day in another place, evidence whose only purpose is to prove the
defendant is a person who commits crimes.” Wages v. State, 863 N.E.2d 408,
411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “Evidence of happenings near in time and place that
complete the story of the crime is admissible even if it tends to establish the
commission of other crimes not included among those being prosecuted.” Id.
(quoting Bocko v. State, 769 N.E.2d 658, 664-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans.
denied).
[11] Here, evidence that Hudgins pulled Sloan’s hair and slapped her face during the
same confrontation in which he choked and strangled her was intrinsic to the
charged offense. Indeed, the evidence completed the story of the crime and
explained to the jury Hudgins’s motive and intent. Thus, the admission of the
evidence was not barred by Rule 404(b).
[12] Still, the admissibility of intrinsic evidence depends on the balance between the
probative value of the evidence and the risk of unfair prejudice. Kyle, 54
N.E.3d at 444; see also Ind. Evidence Rule 403.1 Evidence is “probative” if it is
“relevant,” Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 398 (Ind. 1999), and evidence is
“relevant” if it has “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining
1
Indiana Evidence Rule 403 permits the trial court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
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the action.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. The risk of unfair prejudice depends on
“the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency
of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis.” Camm v. State, 908
N.E.2d 215, 224 (Ind. 2009). Trial courts are given wide latitude in weighing
probative value against prejudicial effect, and that decision is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Patton v. State, 725 N.E.2d 462, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
[13] The evidence concerning Hudgins’s acts that occurred simultaneously with the
strangulation was highly probative and completed the story of the crime of
which Hudgins was charged. Other than his erroneous assertion that the
evidence was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) because it tended to suggest
his criminal propensity, Hudgins makes no specific argument as to the capacity
of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means or its tendency to suggest a
decision on an improper basis, and we discern no such risk. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence. Therefore, we
affirm Hudgins’s conviction.
[14] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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