Tommy R. Pruitt v. State of Indiana , 78 N.E.3d 14 ( 2017 )

FILED
May 16 2017, 8:03 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna Weissmann Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tommy R. Pruitt, May 16, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
15A05-1606-CR-1235
v. Appeal from the
Dearborn Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. James D. Humphrey, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
15C01-0109-CF-54
Kirsch, Judge.
[1] Tommy R. Pruitt (“Pruitt”) was sentenced to death in 2003 for the murder of a
law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (“Seventh Circuit”) granted habeas corpus
relief, vacated Pruitt’s death sentence, and remanded to the trial court for re-
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sentencing. On remand, the trial court found that the aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors and resentenced Pruitt to a term of sixty-five
years for the murder, to run consecutive to his 115-year sentence, previously
imposed for other related offenses, for an aggregate term of 180 years. Pruitt
appeals raising the following restated issues:
I. Whether the sentence of sixty-five years for murder was
prohibited under Blakely v. Washington;1 and
II. Whether Pruitt’s sentence was inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Our Supreme Court, on direct appeal, set forth the facts regarding Pruitt’s
crimes as follows:
On June 14, 2001, Morgan County Deputy Sheriff Daniel
Starnes was driving his unmarked patrol car on a routine
assignment serving warrants. His son, Ryan Starnes,
accompanied him as part of a college internship. A car driven by
Pruitt caught Starnes’s attention and Starnes followed Pruitt for
some distance, observing increasingly erratic driving. Eventually
Pruitt came to a stop and Starnes pulled in behind Pruitt’s car,
turned on his flashing lights, and approached Pruitt’s vehicle on
foot. Starnes obtained Pruitt’s driver’s license and registration
1
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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and returned to his vehicle to call the information in. In
response, Starnes was told that a recent robbery report suggested
Pruitt might be in possession of stolen weapons. As Starnes
approached Pruitt’s car for a second time, Pruitt emerged with a
handgun and the two exchanged gunfire. Pruitt was shot at least
seven times and Starnes was struck by five shots. Pruitt also fired
at Ryan Starnes, who had remained in Starnes’s car.
Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 98-99 (Ind. 2005).2 Deputy Starnes ultimately
died on July 10, 2001, and Pruitt was charged with numerous offenses,
including murder.
[4] In 2003, Pruitt was found guilty of murder,3 attempted murder, possession of a
handgun without a license, resisting law enforcement, and four counts of
receiving stolen property. Id. at 99. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Pruitt killed a law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty and
recommended the death penalty. Id. The jury then reconvened for a third
phase of the trial and found Pruitt guilty of possession of a firearm by a serious
violent felon as a Class B felony and possession of a handgun without a license
as a Class C felony. Id. The jury also found Pruitt to be a habitual offender.
On November 21, 2003, the trial court imposed the death penalty for the
2
For clarity we refer to the proceedings at trial and on direct appeal as “Pruitt I,” to the post-conviction
proceedings as “Pruitt II,” and to the federal habeas corpus proceedings as “Pruitt III.”
3
Pruitt was also convicted of aggravated battery, a lesser-included offense of murder.
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murder and sentenced Pruitt to an aggregate term of 115 years for the
remaining counts.
[5] Once Pruitt exhausted state court remedies (see Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d 90 and
Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. 2009)), he sought federal habeas relief
challenging the imposition of the death penalty. After Pruitt had been denied
relief in federal district court, Pruitt v. Wilson, No. 3:09-CV-380-RLM, 2012 WL
4513961 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 2, 2012), rev’d sub nom, Pruitt v. Neal, 788 F.3d 248 (7th
Cir. 2015)), the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and vacated the death
penalty, finding that: (1) the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision that Pruitt had
not shown that he is intellectually disabled was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts; and (2) Pruitt had demonstrated that he is
intellectually disabled and constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty.
Pruitt v. Neal, 788 F.3d 248, 270 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161
(2016). The Seventh Circuit granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and
ordered the State of Indiana to either initiate a new penalty-phase proceeding or
release Pruitt. Id. at 276.
[6] The case was remanded to the Dearborn Circuit Court for resentencing on the
murder conviction only, and on April 20, 2016, that court conducted a new
sentencing hearing. The parties understood that Pruitt was to be resentenced to
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a term of years for murder under Count I. Resent. Tr. at 4-5.4 Pruitt raised no
objections to either the original presentence investigation report (“PSI”) or the
probation department’s 2016 update to the PSI (“PSI Update”). Id. at 7.
During the resentencing hearing, Pruitt urged the trial court to make its findings
from the evidence already in the record. Defense counsel stated:
[A]n extensive trial in this matter and an extensive litigation
regarding . . . the mental condition of our client, Mr. Pruitt[,] that
occurred both prior to trial, at the penalty phase, and then at the
Post-Conviction trial, which the Court also conducted. At this
point, you know, that evidence is all actually already in the
record before the Court. As we understand the decision of the
[Seventh Circuit], essentially . . . the death penalty sentencing
was overturned because of what the Court felt [was] significant
evidence of intellectual disability and/or mental illness of our
client, Mr. Pruitt, at the time and before, you know, this
incidence occurred. And we would ask the Court to specifically
note the testimony that the Court actually issued a separate order
regarding what was then called, I think, “mental retardation.”
At that time - and heard testimony, as we understand it, from Dr.
Charles Golden, Dr. Brian Hudson, and Dr. George Schmedlen.
Id. at 7-8.
[7] Pruitt asked the trial court to consider and take judicial notice of the entire
record, including the post-conviction proceedings, in order to find intellectual
disability and mental illness were mitigating circumstances. Id. at 7-14. The
4
References to the transcript from the resentencing hearing are designated, “Resent. Tr. at.”
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State asked the trial court to consider the aggravating circumstance that Pruitt
had a lengthy criminal history and that Pruitt killed Deputy Starnes in the
course of his duties, the latter circumstance having been found beyond a
reasonable doubt by Pruitt’s 2003 jury. Resent. Tr. at 20. The trial court
indicated that it would review the existing records from the years 2003 through
2016. Id. at 19.
[8] On May 2, 2016, the trial court reconvened for pronouncement of the new
sentence which, as the trial court recognized, was required to reflect the
sentencing scheme applicable at the time Pruitt committed murder. Appellant’s
App. Vol. III at 184 (Resent. Order at 2). Accordingly, Pruitt was eligible to be
sentenced within a range that had a “fixed term of fifty-five (55) years, with not
more than ten (10) years added for aggravating circumstances or not more than
ten (10) years subtracted for mitigating circumstances.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-
3(a) (2001). The trial court reviewed the remaining 2003 convictions and their
respective sentences, stating that, at that time, the circumstances “justified a
finding of aggravating circumstances to aggravate those sentences and to run
them consecutive [to] each other.” Resent. Tr. at 25.
[9] The trial court “incorporate[d] all applicable findings contained in the original
Pronouncement of Sentence dated November 21, 2003, for purposes of
resentencing.” Id. Pruitt did not object. The trial court stated,
The sentences and applicable findings in that Order are
confirmed. In addition, the Court considers the [PSI] previously
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ordered and entered on November 21, 2003. As to the April 21,
2016 Sentencing, the Court considers the [PSI Update]. The
Court also considers additional evidence presented in the victim’s
statement provided by Mrs. Starnes at that Sentencing hearing.
Additional factors considered in this matter, for purposes of
Sentencing for Count I, Murder, are as follows. The Court has
taken judicial notice of the evidence and trial proceedings.
Evidence presented in the trial proceedings concluded in
November of 2003. The Court considers the evidence presented
at the hearing on Post-Conviction Relief, concluded in May of
2007. The Court considers the contents of the files in each cause
of action. The Court considers the arguments and evidence
presented on April 20, 2016.
Id. at 25-26.
[10] During resentencing, the trial court considered the following aggravating
circumstances: (1) Pruitt killed Deputy Starnes while the deputy was acting in
the line of duty; and (2) Pruitt had an extensive criminal history. Resent. Tr. at
20, 26, 27. Pruitt’s criminal history included “five prior felonies, prior crimes of
violence, including a Robbery and a Battery, two probation violations, and a
prior firearms violation.” Id. at 27. Pruitt had committed both state and federal
crimes. Id. The trial court also took note of Pruitt’s post-sentence behavior, as
outlined in the PSI Update, which revealed a pattern of bad conduct while
incarcerated, including “Battery with a Weapon, Bodily Fluid or Serious Injury,
Fleeing or Interfering with Staff,” and “Possession, Introduction, or Use of a
Dangerous Weapon.” Id. at 27. The trial court found that Pruitt’s deliberate
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and unprovoked actions toward a uniformed police officer and his “history of
criminal activity and behavior indicate[d Pruitt] is a substantial risk to commit
future crimes and poses a substantial danger and threat to the public.” Id.
[11] The trial court also considered that the nature and circumstances of the crime
were particularly heinous and aggravating because: (1) Pruitt used a police
scanner to hear radio traffic prior to his being stopped by Deputy Starnes, thus
creating “a deadly and tragic trap for Deputy Starnes”; (2) Pruitt exited his
vehicle with his gun and, unprovoked, shot Deputy Starnes five times, thereby
showing his intent to kill the deputy; and (3) Deputy Starnes suffered and
experienced significant pain from multiple gunshot wounds until he died,
almost one month later. Id. at 26. Additionally, the trial court considered lack
of remorse. Id. at 27-28. Specifically, the trial court noted that, while Deputy
Starnes’s widow was making a statement during the Pruitt I sentencing hearing,
Pruitt yelled, “Your husband was a fat coward.” Id. at 28. When Mrs. Starnes
continued, Pruitt yelled out, “Your son’s a coward too.” Id. The trial court
found this behavior was reprehensible. Id.
[12] The only mitigating circumstance presented to the trial court for resentencing
was Pruitt’s mental status and his intellectual functioning. The Seventh Circuit
had made no finding regarding the impact of Pruitt’s mental status on a
sentence for a term of years. Id. Explaining that it had heard and considered
evidence regarding Pruitt’s mental status and intellectual functioning as
presented at trial and in post-conviction proceedings, the trial court on
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resentencing noted that Pruitt did not raise an insanity defense at trial. Id. at
28-29. The trial court also believed that Pruitt had knowledge and
understanding of the wrongfulness of his acts. Id. at 29. It was through the
police scanner and a list of various police radio frequencies that Pruitt
understood he was about to be arrested by Deputy Starnes and, therefore,
exited his car with a loaded firearm and began shooting at Deputy Starnes. Id.
Suspecting that Ryan, who remained in the patrol car, was attempting to call
for help through the police radio, Pruitt also shot at him. Finally, immediately
after the shooting, Pruitt stated to officers that he wished he had complied with
Deputy Starnes’s “request and given up.” Id. Further evidence that Pruitt was
conscious of his actions was the fact that he planned to break into a
Bloomington sporting goods store, as illustrated by his possession of a
Bloomington city map and his removal of the pins from the door at the rear of
the sporting goods store to gain entry. Id. at 29-30.
[13] During resentencing, the trial court explained that it had considered “all the
evidence and circumstances . . . including defendant’s mental health, mental
status, and intellectual abilities,” and had given “due consideration and weight
[to Pruitt’s mental status] as a possible mitigating factor.” Id. at 30. The trial
court found that “given all the facts, circumstances, and evidence,” Pruitt’s
mental status did not provide an excuse for Pruitt’s actions.” Id. Balancing
various factors, the trial court found that the aggravating factors “substantially
outweigh[ed]” any possible mitigating factors. Id. Further the trial court found
that the aggravating factors were sufficient to support both an aggravated
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sentence and consecutive sentencing. The trial court resentenced Pruitt to the
maximum term of sixty-five years for murder, giving credit for time served, and
ordered that sentence be served consecutive to the 115-year term imposed
during the sentencing hearing in Pruitt I. Pruitt now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Compliance with Blakely
[14] Pruitt contends that, because he committed his crime on June 14, 2001, Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) applies. Appellee’s Br. at 7. Specifically, he
asserts that his enhanced sentence violates the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Blakely, because his Sixth Amendment right to have the facts
supporting the enhancement of his sentence tried to a jury was violated. The
State responds that Pruitt has forfeited his Blakely claims and, in any event,
those claims are without merit. Appellee’s Br. at 14. We agree with the State.
[15] In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment
required, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 542 U.S. 296, 301
(2004) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). In Smylie v.
State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 976 (2005), the Indiana
Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of Indiana’s presumptive
sentencing scheme in light of Blakely. Our Court held:
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[P]ortions of Indiana’s sentencing scheme violate the Sixth
Amendment’s right to trial by jury, and that the new rule of
Blakely should apply to all cases pending on direct review at the
time Blakely was announced in which the appellant has
adequately preserved appellate review of the sentence.”
Smylie, 823 N.E.2d at 681-82. The Smylie court concluded, “it is appropriate to
be rather liberal in approaching whether an appellant and [his] lawyer have
adequately preserved and raised a Blakely issue.” Id. at 690. Nevertheless, the
Smylie court limited “the application of Blakely to any case pending on direct
review . . . subject to the standard rules governing appellate procedure such as
waiver and forfeiture.” Id. at 688 (emphasis added). Assuming without deciding
that Pruitt was eligible for Blakely treatment during resentencing, Pruitt has
forfeited that argument.
[16] No later than 2005, Pruitt understood the impact of Blakely. On direct appeal,
Pruitt unsuccessfully argued that Indiana’s capital sentencing scheme violated
Blakely by failing to require juries to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances when
recommending a sentence of death. Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d at 111-12. Pruitt,
however, did not mention Blakely during his 2016 resentencing hearings nor did
he request that findings regarding mitigating and aggravating factors be made
by a jury. Even when the trial court clearly set forth the factors it would take
into consideration, Pruitt did not object. Instead, he requested that the trial
court consider the entire paper record from Pruitt I, Pruitt II, and Pruitt III, to
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make factual findings regarding the mitigating circumstance of his mental
condition. When the trial court used that same record to find aggravating
circumstances, Pruitt, again, did not object. Pruitt was resentenced long after
Blakely was decided, but he made no objection to the fact finding of the trial
court on resentencing, thereby forfeiting his Blakely claim.
[17] Forfeiture, however, is not the only basis upon which Pruitt’s claim fails.
During the resentencing hearings, the State, citing to Davies v. State, 758 N.E.2d
981, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied, argued, “Now that the death
penalty has been taken away by the [Seventh] Circuit, Indiana [l]aw,
specifically the Davies case, allows this Court to consider that aggravating
factor; that [Deputy Starnes] was a police officer [acting] in the line of duty, as
an aggravating factor in sentencing Mr. Pruitt in this case.” Resent. Tr. at 20.
We agree. In Davies, our court held that “where defendant is eligible for either
the death penalty or life without parole pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-
2-9, but instead is sentenced to a term of years, “the trial court may consider the
aggravating factors enumerated in Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-9 in addition
to the factors listed in Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1.” Davies, 758 N.E.2d
at 986. Here, the act of killing an officer acting in the line of duty made Pruitt
eligible for the death penalty under Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-9(b)(6).
While the Seventh Circuit found that imposition of the death penalty was
prohibited because of Pruitt’s mental status, that determination did not negate
the fact that a jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt that Pruitt’s act of
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killing Deputy Starnes, who was acting in the line of duty, was an aggravating
circumstance.
[18] As our Supreme Court explained in Lambert v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1060, 1066
(Ind. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1255 (1997):
The killing of a police officer in the course of duty is a most
serious crime. Police officers routinely risk their lives in the
sometimes high stakes gamble of protecting society. They do a
job that we all want and need done, though few of us possess the
bravery and skill to do. They ask for little in return, but they do
ask for some protection. The General Assembly recognized this
in enacting the statutory aggravator of Indiana Code § 35-50-2-
9(b)(6).
Like the facts in Lambert, here, “[t]he seriousness of this aggravator is magnified
in the present case due to defendant’s use of such deadly force to kill an
unaware and unsuspecting police officer in an otherwise nonviolent and
ordinary [stop].” Id. at 1066 (citing Spranger v. State, 498 N.E.2d 931, 960 (Ind.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1033 (1987) (noting that “[t]he manner, the
motivation, and other attendant circumstances of the offense are the type of
considerations which may augment the value of this aggravating
circumstance”). It was proper for the trial court to consider the aggravating
factors that Pruitt killed an officer acting in the line of duty and that Pruitt had
an extensive and serious criminal record. See Davis v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1087,
1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Use of prior criminal history as an aggravator is
exempt from Blakely’s jury fact-finding requirement.”).
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[19] While Pruitt contends that the trial court’s consideration of the other
aggravating circumstances violated Blakely, we need not reach that issue. Our
Supreme Court has said, “Where the use of some aggravators violates Blakely
and others do not, we will remand for resentencing unless we can say with
confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it
considered only the proper aggravators.” Robertson v. State, 871 N.E.2d 280,
287 (Ind. 2007). In this case, we find remand for resentencing is not warranted.
[20] Pruitt killed an officer in the line of duty and had an extensive criminal record.
At resentencing, Pruitt relied on the status of his mental health as a mitigating
circumstance. While we agree that Pruitt’s mental health is a mitigating factor,
we note that this issue was raised at each phase of this case, during trial, on
direct appeal, during the post-conviction proceedings, and during the federal
habeas proceedings. Without even considering the aggravating circumstance
that Pruitt had a significant criminal history, the jury in Pruitt I found beyond a
reasonable doubt that killing an officer in the line of duty was an aggravating
factor that outweighed the mitigating factor of Pruitt’s mental health.
[21] Starting with the then-presumptive sentence of fifty-five years, the trial court
could have aggravated Pruitt’s sentence to sixty-five years and ordered his
sentences to run consecutively based on a single aggravating factor. See Gleason
v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (same, single aggravator may
be used both to enhance presumptive sentence and to justify consecutive
sentences); McGinity v. State, 824 N.E.2d 784, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (one
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aggravator is sufficient to justify a sentence enhancement), trans. denied. The
trial court found at least two aggravating circumstances that complied with
Blakely. The trial court also found that Pruitt’s mental status was a mitigating
factor. However, addressing Pruitt’s mental status, the trial court explained,
“there is evidence which indicates that the defendant had knowledge and
understanding of the wrongfulness of his acts.” Resent. Tr. at 29. Based on
Pruitt’s use of the scanner, planning of the robbery, and regret that he did not
comply with Deputy Starnes’s request, the trial court diminished the
significance of Pruitt’s mental status as a mitigating circumstance for
resentencing. Here, the trial court had to balance two significant aggravating
factors against the mitigating factor of Pruitt’s mental condition. Because we
can say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same
sentence had it considered only the aggravators that complied with Blakely, we
find no error.
II. Inappropriateness of Sentence
[22] Pruitt also argues that his sentence is inappropriate. Under Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B), we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.” The imposition of consecutive sentences may also be deemed
inappropriate. See Bell v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1080, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(maximum consecutive sentences for three controlled buys in same
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investigation was inappropriate), trans. denied. “Although appellate review of
sentences must give due consideration to the trial court’s sentence because of
the special expertise of the trial bench in making sentencing decisions,
Appellate Rule 7(B) is an authorization to revise sentences when certain broad
conditions are satisfied.” Dupree v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1251, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App.
2016) (quoting Shouse v. State, 849 N.E.2d 650, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans.
denied), trans. denied.
[23] The question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more
appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is
inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “This
determination turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity
of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to
light in a given case.” Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1081-82 (Ind. 2015)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “We recognize that [t]he
principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers . . .
but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Id. at 1082
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It is the defendant’s burden
on appeal to persuade the reviewing court that the sentence imposed by the trial
court is inappropriate. Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d 124, 133 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012), trans. denied.
[24] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we recognize the
presumptive sentence as the starting point the legislature has selected as
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appropriate for the crime. Weiss v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. 2006). At
the time Pruitt committed the crime, the presumptive sentence for murder was
fifty-five years. At the time of resentencing, Pruitt was already facing an
aggregate term of 115 years for the attempted murder of Ryan, for four counts
of receiving stolen property, i.e., firearms, for possession of a firearm by a
serious violent felon, and for a habitual offender finding. The burden is on
Pruitt to persuade us that a sentence of sixty-five years, served consecutive to
the earlier sentence of 115 years, is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender. Pruitt has not met that burden.
[25] The nature of this offense was egregious. While Deputy Starnes and his son
were serving warrants, they observed Pruitt engaging in increasingly erratic
driving. Eventually, Pruitt came to a stop, and Starnes pulled in behind Pruitt’s
car, turned on his flashing lights, and approached Pruitt’s vehicle on foot.
Starnes obtained Pruitt’s driver’s license and registration and returned to his
vehicle to call in the information. In response, Starnes was told that a recent
robbery report suggested Pruitt might be in possession of stolen weapons. Pruitt
had in his car a police scanner and a list of radio frequencies used by law
enforcement, which allowed him to hear Deputy Starnes’s exchange. Pruitt,
who had stolen firearms in his car, did not want to be arrested. As Starnes
approached Pruitt’s car for a second time, Pruitt emerged with a handgun, and
the two exchanged gunfire. Pruitt’s intent to kill Deputy Starnes was reflected
in his act of essentially ambushing Deputy Starnes. Further, once Pruitt saw
Deputy Starnes’s son, Ryan, trying to call for help on the squad car’s radio,
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Pruitt also shot at Ryan. Ryan saw his father get shot multiple times. Deputy
Starnes lingered in great pain for a month before dying, leaving behind a widow
and children.
[26] Regarding Pruitt’s character, Pruitt’s criminal history included “five prior
felonies, prior crimes of violence, including a Robbery and a Battery, two
probation violations, and a prior firearms violation.” Resent. Tr. at 27. Pruitt
had committed both state and federal crimes. Id. The trial court also took note
of Pruitt’s post-sentencing behavior, as outlined in the PSI Update, which
revealed a pattern of bad conduct while incarcerated. That pattern included,
“Battery with a Weapon, Bodily Fluid or Serious Injury, Fleeing or Interfering
with Staff,” and “Possession, Introduction, or Use of a Dangerous Weapon.”
Id. The trial court found that Pruitt’s deliberate and unprovoked actions toward
a uniformed police officer and his “history of criminal activity and behavior
indicate[d Pruitt] is a substantial risk to commit future crimes and poses a
substantial danger and threat to the public.” Id. Pruitt’s character was also
reflected during the sentencing hearing in Pruitt I. Deputy Starnes’s widow was
reading a prepared statement to the trial court when Pruitt interrupted her and
yelled, “Your husband was a fat coward.” Id. at 28. Mrs. Starnes continued,
and shortly thereafter, Pruitt, again, yelled out, “Your son’s a coward too.” Id.
The trial court found this behavior was reprehensible. Id.
[27] There is no question that Pruitt suffers from mental issues and has been
diagnosed with some form of schizophrenia. The specifics of Pruitt’s mental
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challenges were set forth in Pruitt I, Pruitt II, and Pruitt III. Those issues,
however, did not prompt defense counsel to pursue an insanity defense.
Additionally, Pruitt seemed lucid on the day of the murder; he had a police
scanner inside his vehicle, and after encountering Deputy Starnes, he listened to
the scanner. It was at that time that Pruitt understood he would be arrested if
Deputy Starnes found the stolen firearms in his car. Pruitt exited his car with a
firearm in hand and shot Deputy Starnes. Pruitt argues that the trial court
“unfairly ignore[d] what was going on behind the scenes with Pruitt’s untreated
schizophrenia and low mental functioning,” when it “harshly judged Pruitt for
having a police scanner and firing on an officer without provocation.”
Appellant’s Br. at 30. In compliance with Pruitt’s request, the trial court
accommodated Pruitt’s request to look carefully at the evidence regarding his
mental capacity and functioning, and properly determined that Pruitt
deliberately elected to shoot Deputy Starnes to avoid arrest and was fully aware
of the wrongfulness of his conduct. We agree with the trial court on
resentencing. Accordingly, Pruitt’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
[28] Affirmed.
[29] Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A05-1606-CR-1235 | May 16, 2017 Page 19 of 19