Armando Gonzalez, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                  FILED
    court except for the purpose of establishing                          May 16 2017, 8:23 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                         Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Alexander L. Hoover                                     Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Law Office of Christopher G. Walter,                    Attorney General of Indiana
    P.C.
    Nappanee, Indiana                                       Tyler G. Banks
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Armando Gonzalez, Jr.,                                  May 16, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    20A03-1608-CR-2110
    v.                                              Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Terry C.
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                      Shewmaker, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    20C01-1311-FB-131
    May, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1608-CR-2110 | May 16, 2017            Page 1 of 6
    [1]   Armando Gonzalez, Jr., appeals the sentence he received following our remand
    for him to be resentenced. As Gonzalez has not demonstrated the sentence
    imposed by the trial court is “illegal,” (Appellant’s Br. at 4), we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   When Gonzalez’s case was before us in 2016, we explained:
    The State charged Gonzalez with five Class B felonies: robbery
    while armed with a deadly weapon, burglary, criminal
    confinement, conspiracy to commit burglary, and unlawful
    possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. A jury found
    Gonzalez guilty of the first four charges. In a second stage of the
    trial, the court found Gonzalez guilty of unlawful possession of a
    firearm by a serious violent felon.
    On March 12, 2015, over the State’s objection, the trial court
    reduced the robbery and criminal confinement convictions to
    Class C felonies because of double jeopardy concerns. It
    sentenced Gonzalez to eight years for each Class C felony and
    ordered the sentences served consecutively, for a total of sixteen
    years. The trial court then sentenced Gonzalez to fifteen years
    for each Class B felony to be served consecutively, for a total of
    forty-five years. Gonzalez’s aggregate sentence was sixty-one
    years.
    Gonzalez v. State, No. 20A03-1504-CR-133, slip op. at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 12,
    2016) (footnotes omitted).
    [3]   Gonzalez challenged the order that he serve three of his sentences
    consecutively, and the State cross-appealed the court’s decision to reduce
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1608-CR-2110 | May 16, 2017   Page 2 of 6
    Gonzalez’s convictions of robbery and criminal confinement to Class C
    felonies. 
    Id. at *1.
    We did not address Gonazalez’s issue. Instead, we
    remanded for resentencing after addressing the State’s cross-appeal:
    The trial court erred when it reduced Gonzalez’s conviction for
    robbery and criminal confinement from Class B to Class C
    felonies based on double jeopardy concerns. Accordingly, we
    remand for resentencing with the convictions of robbery and
    criminal confinement as Class B felonies.
    
    Id. at *3
    (footnote omitted).
    [4]   On remand, the trial court held a hearing, at which no new evidence was
    submitted, and resentenced Gonzalez for five Class B felony convictions. The
    court ordered Gonzalez to serve consecutive sentences of fifteen years for
    robbery, sixteen years for burglary, ten years for confinement, ten years for
    conspiracy to commit burglary, and ten years for possession of a firearm by a
    serious violent felon. Thus, Gonzalez’s aggregate sentence was again 61 years.
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   In his Summary of Argument, Gonzalez asserts
    the trial court then modified the length of the sentence on
    [robbery] and [confinement] without any direction from the
    Court of Appeals and without any further evidence being
    admitted. This clearly was error. While it was necessary for the
    trial court to follow the directive of the Court of Appeals to
    amend [those counts] to Class B Felonies, there was no
    discernible reason to modify the length of the sentences . . . .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1608-CR-2110 | May 16, 2017   Page 3 of 6
    (Appellant’s Br. at 6.)
    [6]   First, contrary to Gonzalez’s argument, our opinion did, in fact, give the trial
    court authority to modify the sentence lengths. We wrote that we were
    remanding “for resentencing with the convictions of robbery and criminal
    confinement as Class B felonies.” Gonzalez, No. 20A03-1504-CR-133 at *3. If
    we had wanted the trial court to simply enter a new order that called those
    crimes Class B felonies, as Gonzalez asserts, we would have told the trial court
    to enter a new order without resentencing Gonzalez. See, e.g., O’Connell v. State,
    
    742 N.E.2d 943
    , 952 (Ind. 2001) (remanding for “a new sentencing order”
    because the original sentencing order did not explain the court’s basis for the
    sentence).1 But we did not use that language; we ordered the trial court to
    “resentenc[e]” him. Gonzalez, No. 20A03-1504-CR-133 at *3.
    [7]   Second, we disagree “there was no discernible reason for the trial court to
    increase the sentence on [robbery] by seven (7) years and the sentence on
    [confinement] by two years.” (Appellant’s Br. at 10.) The discernible reason is
    that Gonzalez’s convictions are now of Class B, rather than Class C, felonies.
    When Gonzalez committed his crimes in 2013, the sentencing range for a Class
    C felony was two to eight years, with the advisory sentence being four years,
    1
    Gonzalez relies on O’Connell as a complete list of “the options available to a trial court when an appellate
    court sends a cause back to it for resentencing.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) However, the Supreme Court
    remanded O’Connell’s case to the trial court for a new sentencing order that merely explained how the court
    arrived at O’Connell’s sentence; the Supreme Court did not order O’Connell be resentenced. See 
    O’Connell, 742 N.E.2d at 952-53
    . Thus, O’Connell does not control the extent of the trial court’s authority when
    resentencing Gonzalez.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1608-CR-2110 | May 16, 2017                Page 4 of 6
    Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2005), and the sentencing range for a Class B felony was
    six to twenty years, with the advisory sentence being ten years. Ind. Code § 35-
    50-2-5 (2005). The trial court, based on its weighing of the aggravators and
    mitigators, had imposed maximum sentences of eight years when the
    convictions were entered as Class C felonies, and it therefore makes sense that,
    when resentencing Gonzalez for crimes that were one felony class higher, the
    trial court would wish to impose sentences that were at or above the advisory
    sentence. Cf. Lane v. State, 
    727 N.E.2d 454
    , 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (when
    appellate court remanded for correction of Lane’s sentence, because trial court
    had imposed a fifty-year presumptive sentence after statutory change had made
    the presumptive sentence only forty years, trial court was required to enter the
    presumptive sentence when resentencing, even though presumptive was ten
    years shorter).
    [8]   Finally, Indiana law provides that
    on resentencing after the reversal of a conviction in a multicount
    proceeding, the trial court has “flexibility upon remand,
    including the ability to increase sentences for individual
    convictions without giving rise to a presumption of vindictive
    sentencing, so long as the aggregate sentence is no longer than
    originally imposed.” In so holding, we explained that “a trial
    court is likely to view individual sentences in a multi-count
    proceeding as part of an overall plan, a plan that can be
    overthrown if one or more of the convictions is reversed or
    reduced in degree.”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1608-CR-2110 | May 16, 2017   Page 5 of 6
    Guffey v. State, 
    42 N.E.3d 152
    , 163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal citations
    omitted), trans. denied. If trial courts have the flexibility on remand to increase
    sentences for remaining convictions when one conviction has been reversed, see
    also Hmurovic v. State, 
    43 N.E.3d 685
    , 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (remanding to
    vacate conviction and resentence on the remaining conviction), it would be
    illogical to hold trial courts did not have the same flexibility after we required
    the trial court to enter certain convictions as more serious felonies.
    [9]    For all these reasons, we find no error in the trial court imposing a fifteen-year
    sentence for Gonzalez’s conviction of Class B felony robbery and a ten-year
    sentence for Gonzalez’s conviction of Class B felony criminal confinement.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    [10]   Affirmed.
    Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1608-CR-2110 | May 16, 2017   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20A03-1608-CR-2110

Filed Date: 5/16/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/16/2017