Joseph F. Cotter v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                           Feb 16 2016, 6:08 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    David M. Payne                                           Gregory F. Zoeller
    Ryan & Payne                                             Attorney General of Indiana
    Marion, Indiana
    Larry D. Allen
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Joseph F. Cotter,                                        February 16, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    27A05-1506-CR-647
    v.                                               Appeal from the Grant Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Jeffrey D. Todd,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    27D01-1504-F6-125
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1506-CR-647 | February 16, 2016   Page 1 of 6
    [1]   Following his plea of guilty to Theft1 as a Level 6 felony, Joseph F. Cotter was
    sentenced to two years and three months executed in the Department of
    Correction. Cotter now appeals, contending that his sentence is inappropriate
    pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   On March 14, 2015, Cotter approached seventy-five-year-old Cyann Scott at
    her home and offered to perform yard work for her. After Cotter did some
    work, she invited him inside for coffee. The two spoke for a while, and Scott
    invited Cotter to come back the next day to attend church with her.
    [4]   When Cotter returned the next day, Scott again invited him inside. He entered
    Scott’s kitchen and saw that she had a prescription bottle of hydrocodone pills
    on the counter. When Scott briefly left Cotter alone in the kitchen, Cotter
    dumped the pills from the bottle into his pocket. Cotter then accompanied
    Scott to church, and Scott dropped Cotter off at his home afterwards. Scott did
    not notice that the pills were missing until later that day.
    [5]   As a result of these events, the State charged Cotter with theft, and the offense
    was elevated from a class A misdemeanor to a Level 6 felony due to a prior
    theft conviction. On June 1, 2015, Cotter, acting pro se, pled guilty without the
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1506-CR-647 | February 16, 2016   Page 2 of 6
    benefit of a plea agreement. The same day, the trial court sentenced Cotter to
    two years and three months executed in the Department of Correction. Cotter
    now appeals.
    Discussion & Decision
    [6]   Cotter contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his
    offense and his character.2 Article 7, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution
    grants our Supreme Court the power to review and revise criminal sentences.
    See Knapp v. State, 
    9 N.E.3d 1274
    , 1292 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 
    135 S. Ct. 978
    (2015). Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7, the Supreme Court authorized this
    court to perform the same task. Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1224 (Ind.
    2008). Per App. R. 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if after due consideration
    of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
    light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Inman v.
    State, 
    4 N.E.3d 190
    , 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 7). “Sentence review
    under Appellate Rule 7(B) is very deferential to the trial court.” Conley v. State,
    2
    Cotter also argues that a number of mitigating circumstances, none of which Cotter advanced for
    consideration at his sentencing hearing, were supported by the evidence. We are unconvinced that these
    mitigators are supported by the record, and in any event, they are waived. See Hollin v. State, 
    877 N.E.2d 462
    ,
    465 (Ind. 2007) (explaining that a defendant is precluded from advancing mitigating circumstances for the
    first time on appeal). We reject Cotter’s argument that he should be afforded latitude in this respect because
    he proceeded pro se at trial. See Evans v. State, 
    809 N.E.2d 338
    , 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that
    “[p]ro se litigants without legal training are held to the same standard as trained counsel and are required to
    follow procedural rules”), trans. denied. To the extent Cotter argues that his waiver of his right to counsel was
    invalid, this argument is not available to him on direct appeal following a guilty plea. See Alvey v. State, 
    911 N.E.2d 1248
    , 1249 (Ind. 2009) (explaining that a defendant may not challenge his conviction following a
    guilty plea on direct appeal); M.Y. v. State, 
    681 N.E.2d 1178
    , 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining the
    “general rule a criminal defendant is prohibited from challenging the validity of a guilty plea by direct
    appeal”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1506-CR-647 | February 16, 2016              Page 3 of 6
    
    972 N.E.2d 864
    , 876 (Ind. 2012). Cotter bears the burden on appeal of
    persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. See 
    id. [7] The
    determination of whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on
    our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
    damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
    case.” Bethea v. State, 
    983 N.E.2d 1134
    , 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting 
    Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224
    ). Moreover, “[t]he principal role of such review is to attempt to
    leaven the outliers.” Chambers v. State, 
    989 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1259 (Ind. 2013). It is
    not our goal in this endeavor to achieve the perceived “correct” sentence in
    each case. 
    Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1292
    . Accordingly, “the question under
    Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather,
    the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King v. State,
    
    894 N.E.2d 265
    , 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in original).
    [8]   In order to assess the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the
    statutory range established for the classification of the relevant offense. The
    advisory sentence for a Level 6 felony is one year, with a minimum and
    maximum of six months and two and one-half years, respectively. Ind. Code §
    35-50-2-7. Cotter received a sentence three months short of the statutory
    maximum.
    [9]   Considering the nature of the offense, we note that Scott, who is elderly and
    uses a walker, allowed Cotter to do yard work for her, invited him into her
    home, and brought him to church with her. Cotter repaid Scott’s kindness by
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1506-CR-647 | February 16, 2016   Page 4 of 6
    stealing the medication she needed to alleviate pain she suffers as a result of her
    medical conditions. Because the medication is a controlled substance, Scott
    had difficulty having it replaced, and ultimately had to do without it for two
    weeks. We are unimpressed by Cotter’s claim, based solely on his own self-
    serving testimony, that the severity of the crime is lessened because he ingested
    the pills instead of committing an additional crime by selling them. We also
    find distasteful Cotter’s suggestion that Scott somehow contributed to the
    offense by keeping her medication in a location accessible to him.
    [10]   Turning now to the character of the offender, we note that at thirty years old,
    Cotter has already amassed four felony convictions; in addition to the instant
    theft conviction, Cotter has been convicted of auto theft, burglary, and another
    theft. Moreover, Cotter has previously violated his probation and been
    dismissed from a drug court program. To the extent Cotter argues that his drug
    addiction mitigates his culpability, we note that Cotter has been aware of his
    substance abuse problem for years and he has not sought out or actively
    participated in treatment. See Caraway v. State, 
    959 N.E.2d 847
    , 852 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2011) (holding that substance abuse may be considered an aggravating
    circumstance where the defendant is aware of his addiction and does not seek
    treatment), trans. denied. Indeed, Cotter testified that he was terminated from
    drug court because he “gave up.” Transcript at 27.                  We find nothing in the
    record to support Cotter’s assertion that he is unlikely to reoffend. To the
    contrary, Cotter’s ongoing drug abuse suggests to us that Cotter remains at a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1506-CR-647 | February 16, 2016   Page 5 of 6
    very high risk to reoffend. For all of these reasons, we readily conclude that
    Cotter’s sentence was not inappropriate.
    [11]   We affirm.
    [12]   Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1506-CR-647 | February 16, 2016   Page 6 of 6