In the Matter of the Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of: B.B., N.B., J.B., and D.B., (the Children) and N.B. (Mother) v. Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 09 2016, 9:08 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brendan K. Lahey Gregory F. Zoeller
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination March 9, 2016
of the Parent Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of 71A05-1508-JT-1178
B.B., N.B., J.B., and D.B., (the Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate
Children) Court
The Honorable James Fox, Judge
and
Trial Court Cause Nos.
N.B. (Mother) 71J01-1405-JT-55
Appellant-Respondent, 71J01-1405-JT-56
71J01-1405-JT-57
v. 71J01-1405-JT-58
Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
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Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Appellant-Respondent N.B. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental
rights regarding her four children B.B., J.B., D.B., and N.B (“the Children”). 1
Father’s parental rights as to the Children were terminated on June 4, 2014 and
are not at issue in this appeal. Mother claims that the trial court’s order is
clearly erroneous. We affirm the trial court’s order.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] This case began on November 23, 2009, when DCS filed a petition alleging that
B.B. and J.B. were children in need of services (“CHINS”). Before the CHINS
proceedings underlying this case began, the Children were the subject of a prior
CHINS proceeding and removed twice from Mother’s care for truancy and
neglect issues. The Children were “returned to the care and custody of their
parents in August 2009 with the CHINS case closed,” three months prior to the
initiation of the CHINS proceeding underlying this case. Ex. A. p. 3.
1
Mother has two other minor children, K.B. and Di.B., who are no longer subjects of this case but were part
of the same CHINS proceedings underlying this case.
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[3] Mother does not challenge any of the probate court’s enumerated findings, and
her Statement of the Facts consists solely of the those findings, which are as
follows:
Findings of Fact:
1. [B.B.] was born October 12, 1997 and is 17 years of age;
2. [J.B.], was born September 5, 2003, and is 11 years of age;
3. [D.B] was born August 19, 2004, and is 10 years of age, and;
4. [N.B.] was born August 21, 2006, and is 8 years old.
5. All four children were born to [Mother] and [Father].
6. [Father’s] parental rights were involuntarily terminated as to
all four children on June 4, 2014 in the above captioned cases;
7. Verified Petition Alleging CHINS was filed on November 23,
2009;
8. The petition alleged that in November of 2009, DCS received a
report that [B.B.] and [J.B.], the only school aged children at the
time, were showing excessive absences at school;
9. On November 25, 2009, [B.B.] and [J.B.] were removed from
the care of their parents;
10. On December 7, 2009, Mother failed to appear at the status
conference, was defaulted. And the Court granted the Petition;
11. A Dispositional hearing was held on January 21, 2010;
12. Mother failed to appear at the Dispositional Hearing…
…
13. On April 15, 2010, the Court…found that mother was not in
compliance with the Dispositional Orders;
…
15. On April 15, 2010, DCS also filed Verified Petitions Alleging
CHINS regarding [D.B.] and [N.B.] as DCS had received a
report that the minor child was wandering away from the home,
unsupervised, and the home was dirty;
…
22. On August 19, 2011, DCS received a report of domestic
violence between the parents, who had separated, with mother
remaining in the family home;
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23. Mother was arrested for Domestic Battery, and DCS detained
the minor children yet again;
24. New cases were opened for [D.B.] and [N.B.];
25. A No contact Order was entered between mother and all the
children;
…
39. On February 13, 2013, a Six month Periodic Case Review
Hearing was held, and concurrent plans of TPR [termination of
parental rights], Adoption and Relative placement were
approved, and the Court set a fact-finding hearing for mother;
40. February of 2013, mother lost her housing at Indiana
Avenue, where she’d been living since 2008;
41. Mother stated she did not have money for the utilities that
were due for the home, and so she had to vacate the premises,
despite the fact she was buying the home on land contract, and
her name was legally still on the house;
42. Mother has not returned to the home, or paid the utilities
due;
43. On April 25, 2013, Mother entered an admission to an
Amended Verified Petition Alleging CHINS. On that same date,
by agreement, Dispositional Orders were entered as follows;
…
d. Participate in counseling and Maintain an appropriate
home;
e. Demonstrate appropriate parenting when given the
opportunity to visit with her children;
…
49. On August 6, 2014, a Permanency hearing was held, and the
case plan of TPR, Adoption, and Legal Guardianship for [B.B.]
was approved.
50. At that time mother ha[d] [not] demonstrated her ability to
adequately care for her children;
…
55. Therapist Julianne Stickney testified that she’d been therapist
for [J.B.], and [N.B.] since December of 2013, and that each
child has significant issues;
a. [J.B.] exhibits a great amount of destructive behavior…
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b. [N.B.] has some anger management issues, but has
responded fairly well to processing his past trauma,
changes, and learning self-calming techniques;
…
58. [M]other stopped counseling on her own, stating she felt she
didn’t need it anymore. Despite an ongoing court order for
individual therapy;
59. Mother has not participated in counseling since
approximately April of 2013;
60. In December of 2013, mother had still not obtained housing;
a. DCS agreed it would pay three (3) months worth of rent
and utilities at a home in South Bend;
b. Mother moved into the home but after three months,
still did not have employment;
c. Mother could not pay the rent or utilities and either left,
or was evicted from the home;
61. During that time period several reports for abuse and neglect,
including truancy, were made regarding the child in mother’s
care;
62. Mother was assigned a Lifeline case manager to help her
apply for jobs, and attend appointments, including visitation;
63. Mother’s attitude was generally negative;
64. Mother cited multiple reasons she could not or would not be
accepted for employment, including a felony case for battery;
65. Mother was convicted of Class A Misdemeanor battery;
66. Mother had employment for a brief period, at Paar in
Elkhart, IN, but she claims she could not maintain that job due
to her DCS Court and meeting obligations. She worked there
from late April, or early May in 2013, to July 2013;
67. The Court notes that there were only two hearings during this
period…
68. Mother claims that since that time she’s been unable to find
work because she has no vehicle, but also because she would
prefer to be a stay-at-home mother instead;
…
72. Mother’s sole source of support and housing was her
boyfriend, [W.P.];
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…
77. Mother has had no parenting time with her children for
approximately two (2) years;
78. This is not due to any court order, or DCS barrier, but by her
own choice;
79. Mother acknowledged that [K.B.] who was currently living
with her was suspended from school;
80. Mother demonstrated little insight regarding her children
lamenting “…she cannot go to school and hold his hand”;
81. Mother makes sure he is out the door daily, but once out of
mother’s sight, “it is the responsibility of the school what
happens with him”;
…
87. [Grandmother] described the relationship between parents
(and also home life) with [Father] and [Mother], as chaotic;
…
90. [J.B.] struggles with violent and destructive behavior…
9l. [N.B.] has anger issues:
a. He is responding well to treatment;
…
92. [D.B.] has shown great improvement;
…
Appellant’s App. pp. 42-46. The probate court found that termination of the
parent-child relationship was in the Children’s best interests and granted DCS’s
petition for termination. This appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[4] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise his or her child. Bester
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v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005).
Further, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the most
valued relationships of our culture.” Id. However, although parental rights are
of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights
when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his responsibility as a parent. In re
T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore,
parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests
in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-
child relationship. Id.
[5] The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to
protect the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child’s
emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The probate court need
not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, mental,
and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-
child relationship. Id.
[6] Mother contends that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was
insufficient to support the probate court’s order terminating her parental rights.
In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination
of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only
consider the evidence that supports the probate court’s decision and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the probate court includes
findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights,
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our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the
evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the
legal conclusions. Id. We note that Mother does not challenge the probate
court’s factual findings and instead challenges only the probate court’s
conclusions.
[7] In deference to the probate court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we set
aside the probate court’s findings and judgment terminating a parent-child
relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.
Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the
probate court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not
support the judgment. Id.
[8] In order to involuntarily terminate a parent’s parental rights, DCS must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that:
(A) one (1) of the following exists:
(i) the child has been removed from the parent for at
least six (6) months under a dispositional decree;
(ii) a court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-
5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or
reunification are not required, including a description
of the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the
manner in which the finding was made; or
(iii) the child has been removed from the parent and
has been under the supervision of a county office of
family and children or probation department for at
least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-
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two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is
removed from the home as a result of the child being
alleged to be a child in need of services or a
delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the
parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions,
been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2011).
[9] Mother does not dispute that DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the
first and third elements set forth in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
Mother, however, argues that DCS failed to establish either that (1) there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s
removal from or the reasons for the Children’s continued placement outside of
their home will not be remedied, or (2) there is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of
the Children. Additionally, with regard to J.B. and N.B., Mother argues that
there was insufficient evidence of a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment
of the children following termination.
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I. Conditions Resulting in Removal Not Likely to Be
Remedied
[10] On appeal, Mother argues that DCS failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal from and
continued placement outside her care will not be remedied. Mother also argues
that DCS failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children.
However, it is well-settled that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)
is written in the disjunctive, the probate court need only find either that the
conditions resulting in removal from or continued placement outside the
parent’s home will not be remedied or that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship poses a threat to the child. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003), trans. denied. Here, the probate court concluded that there was a
reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the removal of the
children from Mother’s care would not be remedied2, and because there is
sufficient evidence in the record supporting this conclusion, it is not necessary
for DCS to prove or for the probate court to find that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at
882.
2
The probate court also concluded that the continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to
the well-being of the Children; however, the reasons predicating both conclusions are essentially the same.
Because either condition alone is a sufficient, we address only the former.
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[11] In order to determine whether the conditions will be remedied, the probate
court should first determine what conditions led DCS to place the Children
outside of Parents’ care or to continue the Children’s placement outside
Parents’ care, and, second, whether there is a reasonable probability that those
conditions will be remedied. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005), trans. denied; In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882. When assessing whether a
reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child’s removal or
continued placement outside his parent’s care will not be remedied, the probate
court must judge the parent’s fitness to care for the child at the time of the
termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.
In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The probate court must
also evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether
there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id.
[12] A probate court may properly consider evidence of the parent’s prior criminal
history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support,
and lack of adequate employment and housing. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, a
probate court “‘can reasonably consider the services offered by [DCS] to the
parent and the parent’s response to those services.’” Id. (quoting In re A.C.C.,
682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). The evidence presented by DCS
“need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, DCS need establish only
that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior will not
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change.” In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay L., 867
N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[13] The probate court found, in part, as follows:
This is an unusual case in that multiple cases have been opened
and multiple children have been involved in cases. Two children
were ultimately returned to parents. The Court notes that this
was an unusual turn of events. This was done after a great deal
of testimony and evidence with the understanding that the two
children must be watched closely. Those two children (not the
subject of these proceedings) were returned to parents (one child
to each parent). Father has [not] appeared in this case and his
parental rights were terminated for these four children. The trial
concerned only the mother as to these four children. The Court
notes the findings support that mother has not made substantial
improvements.
In fact the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that
mother is still married to the father whose rights were terminated.
Mother does not have steady employment, or a stable home. She
lives with a man married to another woman. Mother is
unwilling or unable to control adequately [or] supervise the single
child in her care. Mother is not willing or able to accept
responsibility for her failures. The child in her care is regularly
tardy from school and was suspended at the time of this hearing.
Mother has not seen the children for two years other than in this
court proceeding.
For those reasons the court finds that there is a reasonable
probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal of the
children will not be remedied.
***
Mother has not demonstrated the ability to comply with the
Dispositional Order of the Court. Mother has not demonstrated
the ability to obtain gainful employment….Mother has no[]
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ownership in her current residence. In fact mother laments that
she is burdened by debt from the home where these troubles
began. Mother is unwilling to recognize the need or the ability to
change in a way that would benefit her children. Indeed
[Grandmother] indicated that life was chaotic when [Mother and
Father] lived together. While the situation has improved
[Mother] is not able to provide stability, or support for her
children. [K.B.] who now lives with her is failing at school and
[Mother] fails to acknowledge this fact. [Mother] believes that it
is up to her child and the school to work together to help her
child.
Appellant’s App. pp. 23-24.
[14] The Children were the subject of a CHINS proceeding prior to the instant case
due to truancy and neglect issues. DCS noted that the family has been involved
with the CASIE Center3 for truancy issues since 2004 and have exhibited a
pattern of providing “excuse after excuse as to why children are not in school
per school attendance guidelines.” Petitioner’s Ex. A, p. 22. In August 2009,
the Children were returned to Mother’s care and the CHINS case closed. In
November 2009, a new CHINS petition was filed by DCS after B.B. and J.B.
again had excessive absences from school, and the two were removed from
Mother’s care. In its subsequent Dispositional Order, the probate court ordered
Mother to visit with the Children regularly, complete parenting classes, obtain
employment, complete an anger assessment and follow corresponding
3
“The CASIE Center (Child Abuse Services, Investigation and Education) is a child advocacy center serving
the needs of children and families in St. Joseph County, Indiana.” http://www.casiecenter.org/#!what-we-
do/c1rcj (last visited February 24, 2016).
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recommendations, maintain contact with DCS, and complete a family dynamic
assessment. At the three month progress review, the probate court found that
mother was not in compliance with the dispositional orders. In April of 2010,
D.B. and N.B. were removed from Mother’s care after reports that “the minor
child was wandering away from home, unsupervised, and the home was dirty.”
Appellant’s App. p. 19.
[15] Since the Children’s initial removal from Mother, Mother did little to convince
the probate court that the circumstances predicating removal had changed.
With regards to Mother’s anger issues, it appears that Mother failed to make
any significant progress. In October of 2010, Mother threatened DCS workers
stating, “that if she loses her children she will go after DCS and the Magistrate
before harming herself.” Ex. A. p. 56. Case workers reported that Mother
initially made some progress in counseling; however, Mother voluntarily
stopped participating in counseling despite the court order for individual
therapy, and her behavior subsequently deteriorated. Mother and Father
separated in June of 2011. On August 19, 2011, Mother attacked Father after
Father attempted to pick up the Children for weekend parenting time.
According to accounts provided by the Children, Father, and neighbors,
“mother was screaming and cursing at father on the street….Mother then flew
into a rage, punching and slapping at the father, around his face and head, with
her car keys….Father was bleeding from cuts caused by mother during the
attack….the police arrested [Mother] for Class D felony Domestic Battery.”
Ex. A. p. 119. This incident led to new CHINS cases being opened for D.B.
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and N.B., and removal, yet again, of the Children from Mother’s care. In a
later incident, Mother admitted to throwing a brick through Father’s car
window while Father and D.B. were in the car.
[16] The older children discussed this and other incidents with their CASA workers
and reported that “domestic violence against father by their mother was
commonplace.” Id. The Children also disclosed to CASA workers that they
had seen “mother engaged in sexual activity with a man, as well as kissing their
17 year old neighbor…in order to show the older boys ‘how it was done,’” and
“described drug use by their mother with her friends.” Id.
[17] Mother also had issues maintaining stable financial support for the Children.
Despite the probate court’s order to obtain and maintain employment and
maintain an appropriate home, Mother failed to do so. It appears that during
the five-year life of this case, Mother was only employed once for
approximately three months, and Mother claimed that she could not maintain
that job due to her court-ordered obligations. However, the probate court noted
that there were only two hearings during that employment period, one of which
Mother did not attend. In February of 2013, Mother lost her housing, claiming
that she was unable to pay for utilities. Mother had still not obtained housing
by December 2013, at which point DCS agreed to pay for three months’ rent
and utilities for Mother at a South Bend home. However, at the end of the
three-month period, Mother had failed to obtain employment, could not pay
rent, and either left or was evicted from the home.
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[18] Mother argues that she prefers to be a stay-at-home mother, and that the
probate court’s decision to hold her lack of employment against her “violate[d]
her fundamental rights to raise her children as she sees fit….” Appellant’s App.
p. 16. However, as we mentioned above, “[a] court may properly consider
evidence of a parent’s…failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing
and employment.” McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 199.
[19] We also note that throughout the pendency of this case, Mother has habitually
neglected the Children and shown a lack of commitment to preserve the parent-
child relationship. The Children were initially removed from Mother’s care for,
among other things, neglectful behavior, lack of adequate supervision, and
truancy. Mother failed to acknowledge her responsibility to assure her Children
are attending school and instead blames the school. Furthermore, at the time of
the probate court’s order of termination, Mother had not visited Children in
over a year.
[20] The probate court heard testimony from Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Sheila
LeSure and guardian ad litem (“GAL”) Christine Wrage who both opined that
continuation of the parent-child relationships was not in the best interests of the
Children and posed a threat to the Children. GAL Wrage testified that during
the two years she was involved in the case, Mother was entirely unwilling to
comply with orders to obtain employment and housing. Instead of taking
responsibility, Mother complained about DCS and blamed FCM LeSure for her
being unable to maintain employment. FCM LeSure testified Mother was
unable to provide a safe and stable environment for the Children and that she
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did not believe the conditions predicating the Children’s continued removal
would be remedied. FCM LeSure also noted that there was evidence that, in
the short time since moving in with her new boyfriend, there had already been
incidents of domestic violence and drug use involving Mother.
[21] Accordingly, the probate court did not err in concluding that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions which led to the removal of the
Children from Mother’s care would not be remedied.
II. Evidence of a Satisfactory Plan for the Care and
Treatment of the Children
[22] Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish the existence of a
satisfactory plan following termination for J.B. and N.B. Kimberly Majewski, a
family consultant with Kidspeace, testified that J.B. and N.B. had adjusted to
their foster home placements and made improvements with their behavioral
issues. The probate court stated that the plan for J.B. and N.B. was adoption.
Mother argues that there is a lack of evidence indicating that (1) J.B. and N.B’s
current placement is acceptable and (2) that their current foster parents would
consider adoption. Essentially, Mother argues that DCS must find a permanent
adoptive home for the children prior to terminating her parental rights.
However, Mother provides no supporting authority which stands for this
proposition.
[23] This court has previously held that adoption is generally a satisfactory plan.
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A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find
suitable parents to adopt the children. In other words, there need
not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only
that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.
Accordingly, a plan is not unsatisfactory if DCS has not
identified a specific family to adopt the children.
In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (citations
omitted); see also In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d 603, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“In
order for the trial court to terminate the parent-child relationship, the court
must find that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
This plan need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the
direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is
terminated.”). Accordingly, we find that the probate court did not err in
concluding that adoption was a satisfactory plan for the Children.
III. Fitness to Parent
[24] Mother also argues that the probate court’s “failure to find her unfit while at the
same time terminating her parental rights violates Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57 (2000)… and, alone, is grounds for reversal.” Appellant’s Br. p. 15. Mother
essentially argues that the probate court was required to make a specific finding
that Mother is unfit. Mother misinterprets Troxel. In Troxel, the Court noted
that “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit),
there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family….” Id. at 68. Here, the probate court made it abundantly
clear that it found that Mother had not adequately cared for the Children, i.e.
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was an unfit parent.4 Moreover, even if the probate court had indicated that
Mother may have been capable of adequately caring for her Children, it found
that she has consistently failed to do.
[25] The judgment of the probate court is affirmed.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
4
Mother also cites to Finding 50 in the probate court’s order to support the proposition that the probate court
found, at one point, that Mother was a fit parent. “50. At that time mother has demonstrated her ability to
adequately care for her children.” Appellant’s App. p. 20. However, based on the context of the finding, it is
clear that this is simply a typographical error and the finding should have read ‘mother has not demonstrated
her ability….’ Finding 49 states “On August 6, 2014, a Permanency hearing was held, and the case plan of
TPR, Adoption, and Legal Guardianship for [B.B.] was approved.” Id. Finding 50 would be nonsensical if
not read in the negative.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1508-JT-1178 | March 9, 2016 Page 19 of 19