Karen Fielder v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                  FILED
    court except for the purpose of establishing                          Mar 02 2017, 9:57 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                         Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Karen Fielder                                            Ryan G. Liffrig
    Westfield, Indiana                                       Alexander P. Pinegar
    Church Church Hittle + Antrim
    Noblesville, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Karen Fielder,                                           March 2, 2017
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    29A02-1609-MI-2200
    v.                                               Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit
    Court
    Hamilton Southeastern Schools,                           The Honorable Paul A. Felix,
    Appellee-Defendant                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    29C01-1606-MI-5924
    Baker, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1609-MI-2200 | March 2, 2017           Page 1 of 4
    [1]   Karen Fielder’s children attend Hamilton Southeastern (HSE) schools. In
    2011, Fielder filed a petition to dissolve her marriage and has been involved in a
    contentious custody dispute with her ex-husband since that time. The
    dissolution court has granted physical and legal custody to the children’s
    father.1 Fielder has requested that HSE list her as an emergency contact—
    someone who is permitted to pick up the children from school—in school
    records and that she be allowed to eat lunch with her children on school days
    when the court has not granted her parenting time with her children. HSE
    denied both requests absent an order from the dissolution court that would
    authorize these actions. Fielder filed a complaint seeking to force HSE to
    comply with these requests; the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to
    state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Indiana Trial Rule
    12(B)(6).
    [2]   The first basis of Fielder’s complaint is the Family Educational Rights and
    Privacy Act (FERPA). 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. FERPA is enforced by the United
    States Department of Education, and schools that do not comply with its
    requirements (related to student educational records) can lose federal funding.
    An individual has no right of action under FERPA; instead, only the Secretary
    of Education may enforce its provisions. E.g., Norris v. Bd. of Educ., 
    797 F. 1
    Until very recently, the dissolution court did not even authorize Fielder to have unsupervised parenting
    time with her children.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1609-MI-2200 | March 2, 2017               Page 2 of 4
    Supp. 1452, 1465 (S.D. Ind. 1992). Therefore, the trial court properly
    concluded that this claim offers no relief to Fielder.
    [3]   The second basis of the complaint is Indiana Code section 20-33-7-2, which
    states that a school “must allow a custodial parent and a noncustodial parent of
    a child the same access to their child’s education records” absent a court order
    to the contrary. Fielder does not allege that she has not been provided the same
    access to the children’s school records as their father. As a result, the trial court
    properly concluded that this claim offers no relief to Fielder.
    [4]   Finally, we infer that Fielder may be arguing that the Indiana Parenting Time
    Guidelines require HSE to comply with her requests. Initially, we note that the
    Guidelines are merely guidelines—and, indeed, the dissolution court in this
    case did not follow the Guidelines, affording Fielder substantially less parenting
    time than the Guidelines suggested. Furthermore, the Guidelines are applicable
    to cases involving custody and parenting time. Fielder has offered no
    authority—and we can find none—suggesting that the Guidelines are somehow
    applicable and binding on non-parties to a custody suit or that the Guidelines
    provide a private right of action to sue a non-party for failing to comply with
    part of the guidelines. Consequently, the trial court properly concluded that
    this claim offers no relief to Fielder.
    [5]   In sum, the trial court did not err by concluding that Fielder’s complaint does
    not state any claims upon which relief may be granted. Unless and until the
    dissolution court enters an order authorizing HSE to list Fielder as an
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1609-MI-2200 | March 2, 2017   Page 3 of 4
    emergency contact and/or to have lunch with her children at school, HSE is
    not in the wrong by refusing to comply with those requests.
    [6]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1609-MI-2200 | March 2, 2017   Page 4 of 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 29A02-1609-MI-2200

Filed Date: 3/2/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/2/2017