Fernando Trujillo v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 31 2016, 6:17 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cynthia M. Carter Gregory F. Zoeller
Law Office of Cynthia M. Carter, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Fernando Trujillo, October 31, 2016
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1601-PC-6
v. Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Respondent. Mark D. Stoner, Judge
The Honorable
Jeffrey L. Marchal, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-0301-PC-8310
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Fernando Trujillo (“Trujillo”) appeals the denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief, contending that the post-conviction court erred in denying his
petition. On appeal, he raises the following consolidated and restated issue for
our review: whether Trujillo received ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] During the interlocutory appeal from the grant of the State’s request to use child
hearsay, this court found the following facts, in part:
In January 2003, C.M. lived in an apartment on 38th Street in
Indianapolis with her mother, Reyna Gregerios (“Mother”), her
father, Alvaro Murietta (“Father”), her then eight-year-old
brother, and Trujillo.1 The apartment had two bedrooms, and
Mother, Father, and their two children slept in one, while
Trujillo slept in the other. On Sunday, January 12, Father, who
usually worked at night, received a call from his employer asking
him to report at 5:00 a.m. Monday morning. Mother was also
scheduled to work on Monday from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. On
Sunday evening, Mother called her sister-in-law, Imelda Lopez,
to see if she could watch C.M. during the day. Lopez agreed.
On Monday morning, Mother told her son, who got on the
school bus around 8:30 a.m., to walk C.M. to Lopez’s house
before he left for school. Mother then left for work while C.M.
was still asleep. C.M.’s brother and Trujillo were also in the
apartment.
1
Trujillo is Father’s cousin.
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Mother arrived home from work around 4:00 p.m. After C.M.
got back to the apartment, she and Mother were in their bedroom
talking. Mother asked C.M., as she always did when Lopez
watched her during the day, whether she had eaten and whether
she was treated well. C.M. then told Mother that Trujillo, whom
C.M. called “Huero,” had grabbed her, laid her on his bed, took
off her clothes, and put his “pilin” in her “culito.” 2 C.M. also
told Mother that it had hurt and that it had happened that same
morning before her brother had left for school. After C.M. stated
that she felt “dirty,” Mother removed C.M.’s underwear and
smelled a strange odor.
Father arrived home around 9:00 p.m., and Mother told him
about C.M.’s allegations. After Father talked to C.M., Mother
and Father took her to St. Vincent’s Hospital for an examination.
Mother spoke with police officers there, but the officers did not
interview C.M. Instead, the officers told Mother and Father to
take C.M. to the Family Advocacy Center on the afternoon of
January 15. The family returned home during the early morning
hours of January 14. That day, C.M. appeared upset but played
with her brother. Father asked C.M. about the incident again
because he did not believe her story, and C.M. told him the same
version of events she had told her mother.
On the afternoon of January 15, two days after the alleged
incident, Mother, Father, C.M., her brother, and Trujillo all went
to the Family Advocacy Center. Indianapolis Police Detective
Cathy Gregory interviewed C.M. outside the presence of other
family members, and that interview was videotaped. Tatiana
Mitchell, a bilingual caseworker with the Marion County Office
of Family and Children (“OFC”), was also present during the
interview and served as an interpreter. Initially, C.M. was quiet
2
The record showed that C.M. only spoke Spanish at the time and that when she used the word “pilin,” she
was referring to penis and when she used the word “culito,” she meant vagina.
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and fairly nonresponsive. Then, after Mitchell asked C.M.
whether she knew why she was there, C.M. spontaneously stated
that Trujillo had taken off her clothes and placed the tip of his
“pilin” in her “culito.” Mitchell told Detective Gregory that the
literal translation for “culito” was “little butt.” Mitchell then
asked C.M. to clarify what she meant by “culito,” and C.M.
repeatedly pointed to her vaginal area. She also stated that this
happened on Trujillo’s bed and that it hurt a little bit.
On June 25, 2003, the trial court conducted a Child Hearsay
Hearing under Indiana Code Section 35-37-4-6. After C.M.
testified, the court determined that she was not competent to
testify at trial. However, after hearing testimony from Mother,
Mitchell, and Detective Gregory, the court determined that
Mother could testify at trial regarding C.M.’s hearsay statements
and that C.M.’s videotaped interview [was] also admissible.
[4] Trujillo v. State, 806 N.E.2d 317, 319-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“Trujillo I”). On
interlocutory appeal, this court determined that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it applied Indiana Code section 35-37-4-6, the “protected
person” statute, to C.M.’s statement to her mother and to C.M.’s videotaped
statement to Detective Gregory and ruled that those matters were admissible.
Id. at 329.
[5] After the interlocutory appeal, Trujillo was found guilty of Class A felony child
molesting following a bench trial. The facts supporting Trujillo’s conviction as
set forth by this court in an unpublished opinion on his direct appeal are as
follows:
Four-year-old C.M. lived in an apartment with her mother,
Reyna, her father, Alvaro, her eight-year-old brother, A.M., and
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her twenty-five-year-old cousin Trujillo. Reyna, Alvaro, A.M.,
and C.M. shared one of the apartment’s two bedrooms, and
Trujillo used the other bedroom. On January 13, 2003, Alvaro,
who usually worked nights and cared for C.M. during the day,
had to work during the day. Accordingly, Reyna made
arrangements for C.M.’s aunt, who lived in the same apartment
complex, to watch C.M. Before she left for work that morning,
Reyna instructed A.M. to walk C.M. to their aunt’s apartment on
his way to the bus stop. Trujillo was at the apartment with the
children when Reyna left for work.
When A.M. was ready to leave, he went to Trujillo’s room where
C.M. was playing on the bed. Trujillo instructed A.M. to leave
without C.M. and indicated that he would take C.M. to their
aunt’s apartment later. Trujillo took off his belt, hit the wall, and
told A.M. to go to school, scaring him. Trujillo told A.M. to
lock the front door behind him.
Trujillo then grabbed C.M., laid her on the bed, “lowered” her
clothing, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Tr. p. 87. That
night, when Reyna returned home from work, C.M. reported the
incident to her. C.M.’s parents then took her to the hospital.
On January 16, 2003, the State charged Trujillo with one count
of Class A felony child molesting. The State later added an
additional count of Class C felony child molesting. On June 16,
2005, a bench trial began, after which the trial court found
Trujillo guilty of the Class A felony charge. The trial court
sentenced Trujillo to thirty years.
Trujillo v. State, No. 49A05-0508-CR-439, slip op. at 2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 28,
2006), trans. denied (“Trujillo II”). Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by this
court on direct appeal. Id. at 8.
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[6] Following his direct appeal, Trujillo filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, Trujillo
claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective “during the child hearsay hearings,
the trial, and the sentencing” because his attorneys “failed to investigate the
case, failed to consult expert witnesses, failed to present exculpatory evidence, .
. . . failed to submit impeaching evidence[,] . . . failed to object to improper
testimony[,] and failed to properly examine and confront the State’s witnesses.”
Appellant’s App. at 18.
[7] At the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, Trujillo presented the
testimony of Jose Salinas (“Salinas”),3 who represented Trujillo during the child
hearsay proceedings and subsequent interlocutory appeal. At the time of the
hearing, Salinas did not have the records from his representation of Trujillo due
to the fact that his old office was damaged during a tornado and a lot of his files
were “destroyed or scrambled.” P-CR Tr. at 9. Salinas testified that he recalled
having concerns regarding the interpreter’s translations during C.M.’s initial
statement to the police. Id. at 10-11. Based on his knowledge as a Spanish
speaker, Salinas believed that the interpreter’s summaries of C.M.’s statements
were not complete and “weren’t verbatim.” Id. at 13. Salinas did not
remember who his successor counsel was or if he ever spoke with the attorney
who took over Trujillo’s case. Id. at 17. Todd Woodmansee (“Woodmansee”)
3
Salinas is now a Marion County Superior Court judge.
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was subsequently appointed to represent Trujillo after Salinas ended his
representation. At the post-conviction relief hearing, Woodmansee testified
that he remembered “very little” about Trujillo’s case. Id. at 23.
[8] Additionally, Trujillo introduced copies of the lower court records,
Woodmansee’s file, and a Department of Child Services (“DCS”) file related to
the incident at the hearing. The State objected to the admission of the DCS file,
arguing that it would not have been available to trial counsel and was not
relevant. Id. at 32. The trial court admitted the file over the State’s objection.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued its findings of fact,
conclusions thereon and ordered Trujillo’s petition for post-conviction relief
denied. Trujillo now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Post-conviction proceedings do not afford the petitioner an opportunity for a
super appeal, but rather, provide the opportunity to raise issues that were
unknown or unavailable at the time of the original trial or the direct appeal.
Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1164
(2002); Wieland v. State, 848 N.E.2d 679, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied,
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1038 (2006). The proceedings do not substitute for a direct
appeal and provide only a narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges
to convictions. Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 258. The petitioner for post-
conviction relief bears the burden of proving the grounds by a preponderance of
the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5).
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[10] When a petitioner appeals a denial of post-conviction relief, he appeals a
negative judgment. Fisher v. State, 878 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. The petitioner must establish that the evidence as a whole
unmistakably and unerringly leads to a conclusion contrary to that of the post-
conviction court. Id. We will disturb a post-conviction court’s decision as
being contrary to law only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to
but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite
conclusion. Wright v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans.
denied. The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence
and the credibility of witnesses. Lindsey v. State, 888 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008), trans. denied. We accept the post-conviction court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous, and no deference is given to its conclusions of
law. Fisher, 878 N.E.2d at 463.
[11] Trujillo argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition for
post-conviction relief because he received ineffective assistance from both of his
trial attorneys. When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we
apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Perry v. State, 904 N.E.2d 302, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Pinkins v.
State, 799 N.E.2d 1079, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied), trans. denied.
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id.
This requires a showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that the errors were so serious that they resulted
in a denial of the right to counsel guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth and
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Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Id. To establish prejudice, a
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome. Id.
[12] Further, counsel’s performance is presumed effective, and a defendant must
offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption. Williams v.
State, 771 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ind. 2002). We will not lightly speculate as to what
may or may not have been an advantageous trial strategy, as counsel should be
given deference in choosing a trial strategy that, at the time and under the
circumstances, seems best. Perry, 904 N.E.2d at 308 (citing Whitener v. State,
696 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Ind. 1998)). Isolated omissions or errors, poor strategy, or
bad tactics do not necessarily render representation ineffective. Shanabarger v.
State, 846 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The two prongs
of the Strickland test are separate and independent inquiries. Manzano v. State,
12 N.E.3d 321, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
2376 (2015). “Thus, ‘[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.’” Id.
(quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 839 (2002)).
[13] Trujillo first contends that his first trial counsel, Salinas, was ineffective in his
representation of Trujillo during the pretrial proceedings and the Child Hearsay
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hearing. Trujillo asserts that Salinas failed to use additional information at the
Child Hearsay hearing that would have proven that C.M.’s statements were not
as reliable as the State represented them to be. Trujillo argues that Salinas was
ineffective for failing to assert that several statements contained in the nurse’s
notes from C.M.’s initial assessment, which were admitted at the Child Hearsay
hearing, called into question the reliability of the child hearsay. Trujillo also
claims that Salinas was ineffective for failing to present any of the healthcare
professionals who had firsthand knowledge of the investigation as expert
witnesses to contradict the testimony given by Mother. Trujillo argues that
Salinas was ineffective for failing to present evidence, contained in the DCS file
admitted at the post-conviction hearing, that would have highlighted a
discrepancy between the evidence reported to the DCS interviewer and the
statement Mother made to the police. Trujillo asserts that if Salinas had
presented this evidence, the outcome of his case would have been different.
[14] The Protected Person Statute, Indiana Code section 35-37-4-6, allows for the
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to specified
crimes, the victims of which are deemed “protected persons.” Tyler v. State, 903
N.E.2d 463, 465 (Ind. 2009). A statement or videotape that is made by a
protected person, and which would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay, may be
admitted in a criminal action involving a sex offense if it concerns a material
element of the charged offense and if the court finds sufficient indicia of
reliability and the protected person testified at trial or is found to be unavailable.
Ind. Code § 35-37-4-6(e).
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[15] Initially, we note that if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice that course should be followed. Manzano,
12 N.E.3d at 325. In order to prove prejudice stemming from ineffective
assistance, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of his criminal proceeding would
have been different. Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009). Here,
Trujillo’s arguments amount to the contention that, if Salinas has presented
certain evidence, the trial court would not have allowed the child hearsay to be
introduced and there is a reasonable probability the outcome of his case would
have been different. We disagree.
[16] At Trujillo’s trial, the only child hearsay admitted from the child hearsay
hearing was Mother’s recitation of what C.M. told her when she made her
initial accusations against Trujillo. Appellant’s App. at 88, 135. C.M. testified at
trial in English as to what Trujillo had done to her. Following her testimony,
the trial court did not allow the videotaped statement of C.M’s statement to the
police to be admitted, finding it cumulative. Id. at 88. In finding Trujillo guilty,
the trial court specifically stated that it was basing its guilty determination on
C.M.’s in-court testimony and not on the child hearsay. Id. at 91. The trial
court noted, “C.M. is to be believed . . . [and] her testimony is worthy of
credit.” Id. It went on to find that Mother’s recitation of what C.M. reported
to her was “really of no moment” because it did not contribute to the trial
court’s verdict. Id. Therefore, as the child hearsay was not used in the trial
court’s finding of guilt, we conclude that Trujillo has not met his burden to
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show a reasonable probability that the result of his criminal proceeding would
have been different and that he was prejudiced by Salinas’s performance.
[17] Trujillo next argues that his second trial counsel, Woodmansee, was ineffective
in his representation of Trujillo during the bench trial. Trujillo contends that
Woodmansee failed to make an adequate investigation into his case.
Specifically, Trujillo asserts that Woodmansee failed to: (1) cross-examine
Mitchell, the translator who was present when C.M. made a statement to the
police; (2) utilize C.M.’s medical records to show that the allegations may have
been coached; (3) cross-examine Mother regarding whether C.M.’s brother was
in the apartment at the time of the molestation; (4) interview Lopez or call her
as a witness; and (5) interview C.M.’s brother and object to his testimony
regarding the discrepancy as to whether he was present in the apartment when
the molestation occurred. Appellant’s Br. at 25-27. Trujillo claims that based on
these substantial errors, prejudice is apparent.
[18] “While it is undisputed that effective representation requires adequate pretrial
investigation and preparation, it is well settled that we should resist judging an
attorney’s performance with the benefit of hindsight.” McKnight v. State, 1
N.E.3d 193, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Therefore, when deciding a claim of
ineffective assistance for failure to investigate, we apply a great deal of
deference to counsel’s judgments. Id. at 201. Establishing failure to investigate
as a ground for ineffective assistance of counsel requires going beyond the trial
record to show what investigation, if undertaken, would have produced. Woods
v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1214 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 930 (1999).
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This is necessary because success on the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness
claim requires a showing of a reasonable probability of affecting the result.
McKnight, 1 N.E.3d at 201.
[19] Trujillo has failed to establish that he suffered any prejudice due to
Woodmansee’s decisions not to interview C.M.’s brother and Lopez, how to
cross-examine certain witnesses, and in what manner to use the medical
records. Trujillo merely states that Woodmansee made certain alleged mistakes
in his representation of Trujillo, but not how the outcome of his trial would
have been different. In finding Trujillo guilty at the conclusion of the bench
trial, the trial court stated that it was basing its guilty determination on C.M.’s
testimony, which the trial court found to be credible. Appellant’s App. at 91.
Trujillo fails to explain how further investigation into the testimony of C.M.’s
brother, Lopez, Mother, and Mitchell or the use of medical records would have
resulted in a different outcome at trial. Additionally, although Trujillo claims
Woodmansee was ineffective for failing to discuss the case with Salinas when
Woodmansee took over the case, he has not shown any prejudice stemming
from this lack of discussion. We, therefore, conclude that Trujillo has not met
his burden of establishing that Woodmansee was ineffective. The post-
conviction court did not err in denying his petition for post-conviction relief.
[20] Affirmed.
[21] May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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