Latoya Torrence v. Courtney Gamble , 124 N.E.3d 1249 ( 2019 )

FILED
May 21 2019, 8:53 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael K. Nisbet Rodney L. Scott
Jeffersonville, Indiana Carli A. Clowers
Waters Tyler Hofmann & Scott,
LLC
New Albany, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Latoya Torrence, May 21, 2019
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CT-2695
v. Appeal from the Clark Circuit
Court
Courtney Gamble, The Honorable Bradley Jacobs,
Appellee-Defendant. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
10C02-1505-CT-68
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2695 | May 21, 2019 Page 1 of 8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Plaintiff, LaToya Torrence (Torrence), appeals the jury’s verdict in
favor of Appellee-Defendant, Courtney Gamble (Gamble), following a personal
injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Torrence raises three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as:
Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury by providing it with a
general verdict form based on Indiana Model Civil Jury Instruction Verdict
Form 5017 in favor of Gamble.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Torrence’s personal injury action against Gamble arises out of a motor vehicle
accident. On July 30, 2013, Torrence was stopped in the south bound lane of
Allison Lane in Clark County, Indiana, waiting for oncoming traffic to clear
before turning left. While Torrence was waiting, Gamble rear-ended Torrence’s
vehicle. The accident resulted in substantial damage to the vehicles and
personal injury to Torrence.
[5] On May 13, 2015, Torrence filed a Complaint, alleging negligence and seeking
property damages, as well as damages for lost wages, and medical expenses.
Gamble denied liability for the accident and asserted a comparative fault
defense in her Answer to Torrence’s Complaint. On September 25 and 26,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2695 | May 21, 2019 Page 2 of 8
2018, a jury trial was conducted. At the conclusion of the presentation of
evidence, the trial court discussed the proposed final jury instructions with the
parties outside the presence of the jury. The trial court provided the jury with
19 Final Instructions and 4 Jury Verdict forms. Jury Verdict Forms A, B, and
C were referenced in Final Instruction 17, which outlined the procedure the
jury was to utilize to determine fault and damages in accordance with the
Comparative Fault Doctrine. Verdict Form D—which was offered by Gamble
and objected to by Torrence—was based on Indiana Model Civil Jury
Instruction Verdict Form 5017 and read as follows:
We, the Jury, decide in favor of the Defendant, [Gamble], and
against the Plaintiff, [Torrence].
(Transcript Vol. II, p. 143). As no written instruction was given to the jurors on
the applicability of Verdict Form D, the trial court allowed the parties to
address the use of Verdict Form D in closing argument. After deliberations, the
jury returned a verdict for Gamble and against Torrence, using Verdict Form D.
The trial court entered judgment on the verdict.
[6] Torrence now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[7] Torrence contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the jury
to consider a general verdict form in violation of the Comparative Fault Act.
Jury instructions serve to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts
presented at trial, enabling it to comprehend the case sufficiently to arrive at a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2695 | May 21, 2019 Page 3 of 8
just and correct verdict. Blocher v. DeBartolo Properties Mgmt., Inc., 760 N.E.2d
229, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Jury instructions are committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. In evaluating the propriety of a given
instruction, we consider: 1) whether the instruction correctly states the law, 2)
whether there is evidence in the record supporting the instruction, and 3)
whether the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions. Id.
When seeking a new trial on the basis of an improper jury instruction, a party
must show a reasonable probability that her substantial rights have been
adversely affected. Elmer Buchta Trucking, Inc. v. Stanley, 744 N.E.2d 939, 944
(Ind. 2001). However, if the instruction is challenged as an incorrect statement
of the law, the applicable standard of review is de novo, and we will not defer to
the trial court’s interpretation of the law. Hill v. Rhinehart, 45 N.E.3d 427, 439
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015). An erroneous instruction warrants reversal only if it
could have formed the basis for the jury’s verdict. Id.
[8] At trial, the jury was provided with Verdict Form D—a general verdict form—
which instructed that the jury could decide “in favor of the Defendant,
[Gamble], and against the Plaintiff, [Torrence]” and no further deliberation
would be necessary. Torrence argues that by giving this general instruction and
using Verdict Form D, the trial court violated Indiana Code section 34-51-2-
7(b), which reads, in pertinent part:
The court, unless all parties agree otherwise, shall instruct the
jury to determine its verdict in the following manner:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2695 | May 21, 2019 Page 4 of 8
(1) The jury shall determine the percentage of fault of the
claimant, of the defendant, and of any person who is a
nonparty. The jury may not be informed of any immunity
defense that is available to a nonparty. In assessing
percentage of fault, the jury shall consider the fault of all
persons who caused or contributed to cause the alleged injury,
death, or damage to property, tangible or intangible,
regardless of whether the person was or could have been
named as a party. The percentage of fault of parties to the
action may total less than one hundred percent (100%) if the
jury finds that fault contributing to cause the claimant’s loss
has also come from a nonparty or nonparties.
Focusing on the statutory language—“shall determine the percentage of
fault”—Torrence argues that the Comparative Fault Act does not allow the jury
to enter a general verdict in favor of a defendant without first determining and
apportioning fault.
[9] Indiana Code section 34-51-2-11 specifies the verdict forms a trial court can
tender to a jury and provides that a trial court must
furnish to the jury forms of verdicts that require only the
disclosure of:
(1) The percentage of fault charged against each party and
nonparty; and
(2) The amount of the verdict against each defendant.
If the evidence in the action is sufficient to support the charging
of fault to a nonparty, the form of verdict shall require a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2695 | May 21, 2019 Page 5 of 8
disclosure of the name of the nonparty and the percentage of
fault charged to the nonparty.
Besides giving general guidelines on the use of verdict forms, the statutes do not
impose any restrictions on the trial court regarding the verbiage or specificity of
the verdict forms.
[10] In Utley v. Healy, 663 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied, we directly
addressed the issue currently before us. In Utley, Utley filed a complaint
seeking damages from Healy after Healy ran a stop sign at an intersection. Id.
at 231. At trial, the trial court instructed the jury by providing it three verdict
forms, one of which simply stated, “We, the jury find for the defendant.” Id. at
233. Like Torrence, Utley claimed that the Comparative Fault Act was
violated because the jury was not required to first allocate the percentages of
fault. Id. This court upheld the general verdict form, finding that
It is a ‘time wasting effort’ for the jury to first determine that
Healy was 0% at fault, apportion the remainder of the
percentages between the city and [Utley] and then conclude that
Healy was not negligent. This action is merely an exercise in
futility since ultimately the jury found Healy not negligent . . .
Once the jury concluded that Healy was not negligent, there was
no reasonable purpose for the jury to engage in a further
allocation of fault.
Id. at 234 (citing Evans v. Schenk Cattle Co., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 892, 896 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2695 | May 21, 2019 Page 6 of 8
[11] On the other hand, we find Brown v. Conrad, 531 N.E.2d 1190 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988), relied upon by Torrence, inapposite to the situation at hand as it was
decided on different grounds. In Brown, this court affirmed the trial court’s
grant of a new trial after the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Brown.
The trial court ordered a new trial because, unlike here, the jury’s verdict was
contrary to the evidence presented at trial, as well as against the trial court’s
explicit instruction in which “the [c]ourt instructs you that as a matter of law
you must find [Brown] to be 100% at fault in this case.” Id. at 1191.
[12] In the case at bar, the trial court provided the jury with four possible verdict
forms depending upon the evidence found credible by the jury. Together with
the four possible verdict forms, the jury also received written instructions on
how to use three verdict forms. They did not receive written instructions on
Verdict Form D. At the close of the evidence, the parties were given an
opportunity to educate the jury on the different verdict forms during closing
argument. Accordingly, Gamble’s counsel focused part of the closing argument
on how to use Verdict Form D. Unlike Utley, where the trial court thoroughly
instructed the jury on all verdict forms, here, the trial court did not provide any
instructions, be it written or verbal, on Verdict Form D instead leaving it up to
the parties to educate the jury. As a result, undue emphasis was placed on a
single instruction. We find that the better practice would have been to have
either provided the jury with Verdict Form D and written instructions—similar
to the other verdict forms—or not to tender Verdict Form D at all.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2695 | May 21, 2019 Page 7 of 8
[13] However, to receive a new trial, Torrence must show a reasonable probability
that her substantial rights have been adversely affected by the undue focus on
Verdict Form D. See Elmer Buchta Trucking, Inc., 744 N.E.2d at 944. At trial,
the jury was presented with contradictory testimony, with Torrence testifying
that she was stopped with her left turn signal on and Gamble stating that
Torrence’s brake lights were not illuminated and her left turn signal was off.
Gamble further introduced evidence that Torrence had been in prior accidents
and that she had been treated for nearly identical medical issues prior to the
current incident. Torrence admitted to pre-existing injuries following a slip and
fall in 2010. By returning the general verdict form in favor of Gamble, the jury
credited the evidence in her favor and determined that Torrence had failed to
satisfy her burden of proof. It was within the province of the jury to determine
and weigh the credibility of the parties and evidence admitted and reach a
verdict thereon. Therefore, we find that any error in jury instruction was
harmless and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
CONCLUSION
[14] Based on the foregoing, we hold that although the trial court failed to properly
instructed the jury, Torrence’s substantial rights were not adversely affected.
[15] Affirmed.
[16] Bailey, J. & Pyle, J. concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2695 | May 21, 2019 Page 8 of 8