Robert A. Ellington, III v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                    Mar 22 2017, 9:41 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                          CLERK
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                  Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Cara Schaefer Wieneke                                    Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Wieneke Law Office, LLC                                  Attorney General of Indiana
    Brooklyn, Indiana                                        Michael Gene Worden
    Richard C. Webster
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Robert A. Ellington, III,                                March 22, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    84A01-1608-CR-1755
    v.                                               Appeal from the Vigo Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable David R. Bolk,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    84D03-1508-F5-17871
    84D03-1012-FB-3972
    Mathias, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1608-CR-1755 | March 22, 2017              Page 1 of 6
    [1]   Robert A. Ellington, III (“Ellington”), was on probation when he pleaded guilty
    to a drug dealing felony. His probation was revoked, and the balance of his
    previously suspended sentence was ordered executed in the Department of
    Correction. Claiming this placement was inappropriate, Ellington appeals.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural Posture
    [3]   In 2012, Ellington pleaded guilty to Class B felony dealing cocaine and Class D
    felony dealing marijuana (“the 2012 case”). The trial court sentenced Ellington
    to a ten-year term, with time served executed and the balance suspended to
    probation. On August 5, 2015, the State charged Ellington with four Level 6
    felonies and one Class D misdemeanor for possessing and dealing marijuana,
    and maintaining a common nuisance (“the 2015 case”). The next day, the State
    asked for Ellington’s probation in the 2012 case to be revoked.
    [4]   The 2012 and 2015 cases were consolidated, and a plea agreement covering
    both cases was negotiated. For the 2015 case, Ellington agreed to plead guilty to
    one count of Level 51 felony dealing marijuana in exchange for dismissal of the
    remaining charges. Ellington agreed to a four-year sentence, reserving the right
    to argue its terms. For the 2012 case, Ellington agreed to admit violating the
    1
    The State’s charging instruments do not charge a Level 5 felony. However, the State’s amended Count IV,
    the charge to which Ellington pleaded, Appellant’s App. p. 184, alleged that Ellington possessed more than
    thirty grams of marijuana with the intent to deliver it, after a conviction for dealing cocaine. 
    Id. p. 17.
    Level 6
    felony possession with intent to deliver, Ind. Code. § 35-48-4-10(c)(2)(A), is elevated to a Level 5 felony with
    “a prior conviction for a drug dealing offense,” 
    id. § (d)(1)(A),
    as Ellington had in the 2012 case.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1608-CR-1755 | March 22, 2017                  Page 2 of 6
    terms of his probation and to execute the six-year balance of his previously
    suspended sentence, again reserving the right to argue its terms. The sentences
    would be served consecutively as required by statute. Ind. Code § 35-50-1-
    2(e)(1).
    [5]   On June 28, 2016, the trial court accepted the plea agreement. At a sentencing
    hearing on July 25, 2016, the trial court heard Ellington’s evidence and both
    parties’ arguments on the terms of the six-year sentence in the 2012 case and the
    four-year sentence in the 2015 case. A presentence investigation report was
    prepared but does not appear in the record before us.2 The State sought
    execution of the six-year term in the Department of Correction and suspension
    of the consecutive four-year term to probation. Ellington agreed with the State’s
    recommendation as to the suspension of the four-year term but sought
    placement in community corrections for the six-year term.
    [6]   In support of community corrections placement, Ellington introduced an
    evaluation of the Vigo County community corrections program finding him
    appropriate for such placement and a receipt for payment of the program’s
    initial fees. Ex. Vol., Def.’s Exs. A, p. 4, B, p. 13. Ellington also introduced
    eight letters from family and friends, including a pastor and a detective of the
    Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, all praising his character and his
    earnest desire to better his circumstances. 
    Id., Def.’s Ex.
    A., pp. 5-12. Finally,
    2
    Ellington’s appendix does, however, include the presentence investigation report from the 2012 case.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1608-CR-1755 | March 22, 2017               Page 3 of 6
    Ellington’s grandmother, with whom he had lived before and hoped to continue
    to live when placed in community corrections, testified that she would welcome
    his placement with her and that Ellington needed some help managing his
    prescribed antianxiety and antidepressant medications. Ellington’s father was
    murdered when Ellington was young, and the presentence investigation report
    disclosed what the trial court characterized as “mild cognitive issues.”
    Sentencing Tr. p. 18.
    [7]   Treating the consolidated 2012 and 2015 cases as one de novo sentencing
    question, the trial court made a detailed statement of the aggravating and
    mitigating factors it found. In aggravation, the court weighed Ellington’s
    criminal history of seven misdemeanors and two felonies; occasional
    noncompliance with the courts, including a failure to appear and
    “disrespectfu[l]” behavior toward his probation officer, 
    id. p. 17;
    and his failure
    to take advantage of previous opportunities he had been given to avoid
    incarceration, including arrests while on bond and on probation. In mitigation,
    the court weighed Ellington’s mental health, “significant difficult issues in his
    youth,” 
    id. p. 18,
    and the outpouring of support from those who knew him. The
    court also considered Ellington’s acceptance of responsibility in pleading guilty
    but gave this little weight, in view of the plea agreement’s terms.
    [8]   The trial court accepted the State’s recommendation as to the 2015 case and
    suspended the four-year term to probation. As to the six-year balance of the
    sentence in the 2012 case, the trial court committed Ellington to the
    Department of Correction pending his completion of a “Purposeful
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1608-CR-1755 | March 22, 2017   Page 4 of 6
    Incarceration”3 program; “immediately upon successful completion of [the
    program], . . . the balance of [Ellington’s] sentence would be suspended . . . to
    probation.” 
    Id. p. 19.
    [9]    Ellington now appeals his placement in the Department of Correction as
    inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and of his character. The State
    responds in Dickensian fashion that Ellington “needs a more restrictive
    environment so that he might reform his character.” Appellee’s Br. p. 10.
    Discussion and Decision
    [10]   We have the power, granted by our constitution and implemented by the
    Appellate Rules, to “revise a sentence . . . if, after due consideration of the trial
    court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the
    nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule
    7(B) (implementing Ind. Const. Art. 7, § 6). However, “this is not the correct
    standard to apply when reviewing a sentence imposed for a probation
    violation.” Prewitt v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 184
    , 188 (Ind. 2007). Thus, the remedy
    3
    “Purposeful Incarceration” is a program instituted by the Department of Correction and our trial courts:
    In 2009 the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) began a cooperative project with Indiana
    Court Systems called Purposeful Incarceration (P.I.). The Department works in collaboration
    with Judges who can sentence chemically addicted offenders and document that they will
    “consider a sentence modification” should the offender successfully complete an IDOC
    Therapeutic community. This supports the Department and Correction and the Judiciary to get
    addicted offenders the treatment that they need and work collaboratively to support their
    successful re-entry into society.
    Purposeful Incarceration, Indiana Department of Correction, http://www.in.gov/idoc/2798.htm (last visited
    March 2, 2017); see also Marley v. State, 
    17 N.E.2d 335
    , 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing same), trans.
    denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1608-CR-1755 | March 22, 2017               Page 5 of 6
    Ellington seeks is not available to him. Jones v. State, 
    885 N.E.2d 1286
    , 1290
    (Ind. 2008).
    [11]   Sentences or sanctions imposed for probation violations may be reviewed only
    for abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion. 
    Id. Ellington has
    not expressly or
    impliedly challenged the sentencing court’s exercise of its discretion, and the
    State argues that the issue is therefore waived. The State is correct. Jackson v.
    State, 
    992 N.E.2d 926
    , 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (waiver of issue for failure to
    present cogent argument), trans. denied. Even were we to review the court’s
    exercise of its discretion, nothing in its careful weighing of aggravating and
    mitigating factors, nor in its ultimate decision to commit Ellington to the
    Department of Correction pending completion of a Purposeful Incarceration
    program, would strike us as clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
    circumstances before the court. Berry v. State, 
    904 N.E.2d 365
    , 366 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2009) (standard of review for sentences following probation revocation;
    analysis of Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    (Ind. 2007) does not apply).
    Conclusion
    [12]   Appellate Rule 7(B) revision is not available to Ellington. Even if Ellington had
    argued the trial court abused its discretion, he would not have prevailed.
    Ellington’s sentence is therefore affirmed.
    [13]   Affirmed.
    Baker, J., and Pyle, J, concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1608-CR-1755 | March 22, 2017   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 84A01-1608-CR-1755

Filed Date: 3/22/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021