Jeff Nelson v. Deaconess Hospital, Inc. (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                        Aug 24 2017, 5:25 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                              CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                     and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Robert T. Garwood                                        Patrick C. Thomas
    Evansville, Indiana                                      Matthew D. Malcolm
    Evansville, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Jeff Nelson,                                             August 24, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    82A01-1611-CC-2690
    v.                                               Appeal from the Vanderburgh
    Superior Court
    Deaconess Hospital, Inc.,                                The Honorable Robert J. Tornatta,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    82D06-1506-CC-3030
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   Jeff Nelson appeals from the trial court’s entry of judgment against him in favor
    of Deaconess Hospital, Inc. (Deaconess) on its action to collect outstanding
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A01-1611-CC-2690 | August 24, 2017   Page 1 of 6
    medical bills. On appeal, Nelson argues that the trial court’s judgment was
    clearly erroneous.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   Nelson received emergency medical services at Deaconess on July 20, 2010.
    Nelson had medical coverage through Pekin Insurance (Pekin) at that time, but
    he did not provide his insurance information to Deaconess. Upon his
    admission to the hospital, Nelson signed a Financial Responsibility Form
    (FRF) in which he agreed to be responsible for the costs associated with his
    hospitalization. The FRF also contained the following language:
    If you have active insurance coverage, we will bill your insurance
    company. It is the patient’s responsibility to understand his/her
    insurance coverage. You will receive a monthly statement if
    your account has a patient due balance. Payment of deductibles,
    non-covered services and co-payments are the patient’s
    responsibility.
    Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 3 at 7. Nelson also signed a Consent for Medical
    Treatment form (Consent), which listed his rights and responsibilities as a
    patient. Among the responsibilities listed was that Nelson would “assure that
    financial obligations are fulfilled as promptly as possible.” Id. at 10.
    [4]   Following Nelson’s discharge, Deaconess billed him separately for each of the
    four services he received. Because Deaconess had not been provided with
    Nelson’s insurance information, it did not bill Pekin for any portion of those
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    expenses. Instead, Deaconess sent Nelson a total of eight invoices (two for
    each service he received), each of which instructed Nelson to check a box if his
    insurance information had changed and indicate such changes on the reverse
    side. All of the invoices listed an insurance balance of zero.
    [5]   Deaconess received neither payment nor insurance information from Nelson,
    so it forwarded the accounts to its extended billing office, Complete Billing
    Services (CBS). CBS mailed Nelson multiple letters demanding payment on
    Deaconess’s behalf. Nelson received letters from CBS but claims that he
    questioned their legitimacy. When a CBS representative contacted Nelson by
    phone, Nelson refused to verify his information. Despite CBS’s repeated
    requests for payment, Nelson did not contact Deaconess to determine whether
    CBS was authorized to act on its behalf. When CBS was unsuccessful in
    collecting payment from Nelson, the accounts were assigned to a collection
    agency, which also mailed letters to Nelson and attempted to telephone him
    regarding the balances due. All collection efforts were unsuccessful.
    [6]   Deaconess filed its complaint for unpaid medical bills against Nelson on July
    27, 2015. A bench trial was held on October 27, 2016, at the conclusion of
    which the trial court found in Deaconess’s favor and entered judgment against
    Nelson in the amount of $9,250.00. Nelson now appeals.
    Discussion & Decision
    [7]   Although the parties did not request special findings and conclusions thereon
    pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 52(A), the trial court sua sponte made limited oral
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    findings from the bench. See Nunn Law Office v. Rosenthal, 
    905 N.E.2d 513
    , 517-
    18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that oral findings and conclusions may suffice
    for the purposes of T.R. 52(A)). Pursuant to T.R. 52(A), we “shall not set aside
    the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
    to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
    Further, where, as here, the trial court enters findings sua sponte, “the specific
    findings control only as to the issues they cover, while a general judgment
    standard applies to any issues upon which the court has not made findings.” In
    re Estate of Hannebaum, 
    999 N.E.2d 972
    , 973-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A general
    judgment may be affirmed on any theory supported by the evidence presented
    at trial. Kietzman v. Kietzman, 
    992 N.E.2d 946
    , 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
    [8]   Nelson’s appellate arguments are based on evidence unfavorable to the trial
    court’s judgment.1 Specifically, he argues that when he received one of the first
    invoices from Deaconess, he mailed the bill and his insurance information back
    to Deaconess. Nelson claims he received no further correspondence from
    Deaconess, and consequently believed the matter to be resolved. Nelson argues
    that Deaconess was obligated under the terms of the FRF to bill Pekin for the
    services he received, and that Deaconess’s failure to do so within the time
    allotted under his Pekin insurance policy resulted in a loss of insurance
    coverage. In other words, Nelson argues that Deaconess was required to bill
    1
    We remind Nelson’s counsel of his duty under the appellate rules to recite the facts according to the
    applicable standard of review and to support factual assertions with citation to the record. See Ind. App. R.
    22(C); Ind. App. R. 46(A)(5), (6), (8).
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    Pekin “[a]s a condition precedent to any financial responsibility” on Nelson’s
    part, and that it breached the contract by failing to do so. Appellant’s Brief at 10.
    [9]    Nelson fails to note, however, that a Deaconess representative testified that
    Deaconess never received Nelson’s insurance information, and the trial court
    made no findings on this issue. Thus, the general judgment standard applies to
    this issue, and we are obliged to consider only the evidence favorable to
    Deaconess as the prevailing party and the reasonable inferences flowing
    therefrom. See Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 
    573 N.E.2d 398
    , 402 n.5 (Ind. 1991) (noting
    that in reviewing general judgments issued in civil cases tried to the bench, the
    appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of
    witnesses, and considers only the evidence favorable to the prevailing party and
    the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it).
    [10]   Nelson agreed in the FRF to be responsible for the costs associated with his
    hospitalization, and the evidence and inferences favorable to the judgment
    establish that Nelson did not provide Deaconess with his insurance information
    despite its continued collection efforts. Thus, even if we assume it was solely
    Deaconess’s responsibility under the FRF to see to it that Nelson’s insurer was
    billed for the services Nelson received, Nelson prevented Deaconess from doing
    so. “[T]he common law of contracts excuses performance of one party where
    the other party wrongfully prevents that performance.” Rogier v. Am. Testing &
    Eng’g Corp., 
    734 N.E.2d 606
    , 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. See also
    Hamlin v. Steward, 
    622 N.E.2d 535
    , 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that “a
    party may not rely on the failure of a condition precedent to excuse
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    performance where that party’s action or inaction caused the condition to be
    unfulfilled” (quoting Kokomo Veterans, Inc. v. Schick, 
    439 N.E.2d 639
    , 645 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 1982), trans. denied)). Because Nelson’s failure to provide his
    insurance information made it impossible for Deaconess to bill Pekin, Nelson
    cannot escape liability for his medical bills on that basis. Furthermore, because
    we can affirm the trial court’s judgment fully on this basis, we need not address
    the other specific arguments Nelson raises on appeal.
    [11]   Judgment affirmed.
    [12]   Kirsch, J. and Mathias, J., concur.
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