Patrick Coughlin v. State of Indiana ex rel. Indiana Department of Workforce Development (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 23 2019, 9:09 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David Paul Allen Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Hammond, Indiana Attorney General
Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Patrick Coughlin, May 23, 2019
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PL-2846
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
State of Indiana ex rel. The Honorable Bruce D. Parent,
Indiana Department of Judge
Workforce Development, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Petitioner 45D04-1801-PL-3
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2846 | May 23, 2019 Page 1 of 13
Case Summary
[1] After the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (“DWD”)
determined that Patrick Coughlin received unemployment compensation
benefits to which he was not entitled, the State of Indiana filed a verified
petition for civil enforcement of the DWD’s determination. Coughlin moved
for summary judgment, asserting that the State’s claim was filed outside the
applicable statute of limitations. The State filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment on the merits of its claim. Coughlin then filed a motion to strike
portions of the evidence that the State designated in support of its cross-motion.
The trial court issued an order denying Coughlin’s motion for summary
judgment and his motion to strike and granted the State’s cross-motion for
summary judgment.
[2] Coughlin now appeals. He contends that he is entitled to summary judgment
because the State’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. He also argues
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike because
the State’s designated evidence does not satisfy certain evidentiary rules
pertaining to affidavits and authenticity. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Coughlin applied for and received unemployment compensation benefits in
fiscal years 2009 and 2010 through the DWD. Subsequently, the DWD
investigated his claims and concluded that he had failed to report income that
he had earned during the relevant time period. The DWD mailed Coughlin
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determinations of eligibility and notices of potential overpayment, informing
him that it had determined that he “knowingly failed to disclose or falsified
material facts,” which, if known, would have rendered him ineligible for
benefits. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 27-33. The determinations of eligibility
informed Coughlin that he had received $8102.00 to which he was not entitled,
that penalties for the fraud would be assessed, and that interest on the balance
due would accrue monthly. Id. Further, the determinations of eligibility
informed Coughlin that they would become final unless appealed within ten
days. Id. Coughlin did not appeal. On January 30, 2012, the determinations of
eligibility became final.
[4] On January 8, 2018, the State filed a verified petition for civil enforcement of
the determinations of eligibility, alleging that Coughlin had failed to disclose
material facts which would have made him ineligible to receive unemployment
compensation benefits, resulting in an overpayment of $8102.00 and resulting
penalties of $4486.25. The petition was verified by the DWD’s keeper of
records, Whitney Cobb, and the notices of potential overpayment and the
determinations of eligibility were referenced in and attached to the petition as
exhibits. Id. at 20-33.
[5] In June 2018, Coughlin filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting
memorandum, and designated evidence, asserting that the State’s petition for
civil enforcement was filed outside the applicable period of limitations. In
August 2018, the State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and
opposition to Coughlin’s motion for summary judgment with a supporting
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memorandum and designated evidence. The State argued that its petition was
timely and that “the undisputed facts of this case permit the court to determine
that after offsets, tax interceptions, and payments [Coughlin] is indebted to [the
State] in the amount of $11,592.03 plus continually accruing interest at one-half
percent per month.” Id. at 77. Coughlin then filed a motion to strike portions
of the State’s designated evidence.
[6] Following a hearing in October 2018, the trial court issued an order denying
Coughlin’s motion for summary judgment, denying his motion to strike, and
granting the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – The trial court properly denied Coughlin’s motion
for summary judgment.
[7] Our review of summary judgments is well settled:
The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation
about which there can be no factual dispute and which can be
determined as a matter of law. The party moving for summary
judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. If the moving party meets its
burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party whose
response must set forth specific facts indicating that there is an
issue of material fact. Any doubts as to any facts or inferences to
be drawn from those facts must be resolved in favor of the
nonmoving party.
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We review a summary judgment ruling de novo. A trial court’s
findings and conclusions offer insight into the rationale for the
court’s judgment and facilitate appellate review but are not
binding on this Court. Moreover, we are not constrained to the
claims and arguments presented to the trial court, and we may
affirm a summary judgment ruling on any theory supported by
the designated evidence. Cross-motions for summary judgment
do not alter this standard or change our analysis. The party that
lost in the trial court has the burden of persuading us that the trial
court erred.
Denson v. Estate of Dillard, 116 N.E.3d 535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citations
and quotation marks omitted). “The defense of a statute of limitation is
peculiarly suitable as a basis for summary judgment.” LaCava v. LaCava, 907
N.E.2d 154, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Morgan v. Benner, 712 N.E.2d
500, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied).
[8] Coughlin argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law
because the statute of limitations had run on the State’s claim. Specifically, he
asserts that the State filed its verified petition for civil enforcement almost six
years after the effective date of the determinations of eligibility, and therefore
failed to bring the civil enforcement action within the applicable statute of
limitations, which he contends is two years. “‘[T]he statute of limitation in
effect at the time a lawsuit is commenced governs the action regardless of
whether it lengthens or shortens the time allowed for bringing suit.’” Indiana
Spine Grp., PC v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 959 N.E.2d 789, 793, n.3 (Ind. 2011)
(quoting State v. Hensley, 661 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).
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[9] The DWD’s authority to recover unemployment benefits that have been
improperly obtained, including by fraud, is found in Indiana Code Section 22-4-
13-1. At the time the State filed its petition, the statute read as follows:
(c) Any individual who knowingly:
(1) makes, or causes to be made by another, a false statement
or representation of a material fact knowing it to be false; or
(2) fails, or causes another to fail, to disclose a material fact;
and
as a result thereof has received any amount as benefits to which
the individual is not entitled under this article, shall be liable to
repay such amount, with interest at the rate of one-half percent
(0.5%) per month, to the department for the unemployment
insurance benefit fund or to have such amount deducted from
any benefits otherwise payable to the individual under this
article.
….
(h) Where any individual is liable to repay any amount to the
department for the unemployment insurance benefit fund for the
restitution of benefits to which the individual is not entitled under
this article, the amount due may be collectible without interest,
except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), by civil action in
the name of the state of Indiana, on relation of the department,
which remedy by civil action shall be in addition to all other
existing remedies and to the methods for collection provided in
this article.
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[10] Section 22-4-13-1 does not provide a time limitation on the civil enforcement
action it authorizes. Accordingly, to determine the applicable statute of
limitations, we must identify the substance of the cause of action. Whitehouse v.
Quinn, 477 N.E.2d 270, 274 (Ind. 1985). “The substance of a cause of action is
ascertained by an inquiry into the nature of the alleged harm.” Meisenhelder v.
Zipp Express, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 924, 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
[11] Coughlin claims that enforcement of a final administrative order is in the nature
of a chose in action, and therefore the applicable statute of limitations is the
two-year limitation period for personal injury found in Indiana Code Section
34-11-2-4(a)(2). Section 34-11-2-4(a)(2) provides, “An action for injury to
person or character, injury to personal property, or forfeiture of penalty given
by statute must be commenced within two years after the cause accrues.”
[12] In support of his argument, Coughlin relies on Haynes v. Contat, 643 N.E.2d 941
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994). There, Haynes filed a complaint with the Indiana Civil
Rights Commission (“ICRC”), alleging that Contat’s refusal to lease rental
property to her constituted unlawful race discrimination. The ICRC issued an
order finding in Haynes’s favor and assessing damages against Contat, which
became effective on March 22, 1991. After Contat failed to pay the damages,
on July 15, 1993, Haynes filed an action to enforce the ICRC order pursuant to
Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-6-3, which at that time authorized a party to an
agency action to file a petition for civil enforcement of the agency order, but
contained no time limitation for bringing an enforcement action. Contat filed a
motion to dismiss Haynes’s action, alleging that her claim was barred by the
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two-year limitation period in Indiana Code Section 34-1-2-2(1), the predecessor
of Section 34-2-4(a)(2). The trial court agreed, and Haynes appealed.
[13] In determining which statute of limitations applied to Haynes’ claim, another
panel of this Court reasoned, “When the agency awarded [Haynes] money
damages, it awarded her a ‘chose in action’: a personal property right not
reduced to possession but recoverable in a court of law.” Id. at 943 (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (4th ed. 1968)). The court concluded,
“Haynes’s enforcement action sought to reduce to possession her property
interest in the ICRC’s determination of money damages. As such, her claim
falls under I.C. 34-1-2-2(1)’s two-year statute of limitations for actions based on
injury to personal property.” Id. at 943-44.
[14] Haynes is not applicable to this case. There, the two-year statute of limitations
applied because Haynes’s claim was in the nature of an injury to her person,
which clearly falls within the claims governed by Section 34-11-2-4(a)(2). In
this case, the DWD determined that Coughlin applied for and received
unemployment compensation benefits to which he was not entitled. Thus, the
State’s claim to enforce the determinations of eligibility can best be categorized
as an action on an account or a contract not in writing. Such claims fit within
the claims governed by Indiana Code Section 34-11-2-7, which provides,
The following actions must be commenced within six (6) years
after the cause of action accrues:
(1) actions on accounts and contracts not in writing.
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(2) Actions for use, rents, and profits of real property.
(3) Actions for injuries to property other than personal property,
damages for detention of personal property and for recovering
possession of personal property.
(4) Actions for relief against frauds.
[15] In this case, the six-year statute of limitations in Section 34-11-2-7 applies.
Because the State filed its verified petition within six years, its petition was
timely. Accordingly, we conclude that Coughlin’s summary judgment motion
was properly denied.
Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Coughlin’s motion to strike and did not err in
granting the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
[16] Coughlin also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike
portions of the State’s designated evidence. We review a trial court’s decision
on a motion to strike for an abuse of discretion. Halterman v. Adams Cty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 991 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances. Id.
[17] Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) requires a summary judgment movant and respondent
to “designate to the court all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on
which it relies for purposes of the motion.” “In ruling on a motion for
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summary judgment, the trial court will consider only properly designated
evidence which would be admissible at trial.” Seth v. Midland Funding, LLC, 997
N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
[18] The State’s designated materials included Exhibit A, Cobb’s affidavit, in which
she attested as follows: (1) she has personal knowledge of the facts stated
therein, and they are true and correct to the best of her knowledge; (2) she is the
DWD’s benefit payment control keeper of the records; (3) Coughlin applied for
and received benefits during the benefit years ending August 1, 2009, and
August 7, 2010; (4) the DWD paid Coughlin $8102.00 in benefits; (5) Coughlin
incurred penalties totaling $4486.25 due to the “fraudulent” overpayment of
benefits; (6) Coughlin accrued interest of $2625.90; (7) the amount of setoffs
applied to the amount Coughlin owes the DWD totals $3622.12; and (8) the
outstanding balance that Coughlin owes the DWD is $11,592.03. Appellant’s
App. Vol. 2 at 83-84. The State also included Exhibit F, the notices of
overpayment; Exhibit G, the determinations of eligibility; and Exhibit H, its
verified petition for civil enforcement.
[19] Coughlin argues that Exhibit A, paragraphs 3 through 8 are inadmissible
because the statements are based on unspecified and/or unauthenticated
records, and he argues that Exhibits B through G are inadmissible because they
are not referenced in the affidavit or otherwise certified or authenticated.
Indiana Trial Rule 56(E) provides,
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
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evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies not previously self-authenticated of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto
or served therewith.
Evidence is properly authenticated, and therefore admissible, when the
proponent “produce[s] evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is
what the proponent claims it is.” Ind. Evidence Rule 901(a). Sufficient
evidence includes testimony of a witness with knowledge. Ind. Evidence Rule
901(b)(1).
[20] As to Cobb’s affidavit, Coughlin does not challenge the admissibility of Cobb’s
sworn statements that the facts recited therein are based on her personal
knowledge and that she is the DWD’s keeper of the records. Because the
affidavit is based on Cobb’s personal knowledge and shows that she is
competent as the keeper of records to testify to the DWD’s unemployment
insurance records, the affidavit is properly authenticated. In addition, “[a]n
affidavit need not contain an explicit recital of personal knowledge when it can
be reasonably inferred from its contents that the material parts thereof are
within the affiant’s personal knowledge.” Kader v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 1 N.E.3d
717, 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting DeLage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Cmty.
Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 693, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied).
See also, e.g., Skaggs v. Merch. Retail Credit Ass’n, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1988) (averments that affiant was employed by phone company and
responsible for customer billing and collections were sufficient to conclude that
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recital of payments and credits made by phone service customer were based on
personal knowledge). Thus, Cobb’s affidavit is admissible on its own. 1
[21] In addition, Coughlin does not challenge the admissibility of the State’s verified
petition for civil enforcement. When the State’s petition was filed, it was
verified by Cobb, the notices of overpayment and the determinations of
eligibility were attached, and Cobb specifically referenced them in support of
the allegations in the petition. When Cobb verified the petition, she also
affirmed the exhibits cited therein. Accordingly, the trial court was entitled to
consider the verified petition, the notices of overpayment, and the
determinations of eligibility and thus did not abuse its discretion in denying
Coughlin’s motion to strike.
[22] Furthermore, we note that Cobb’s affidavit, the verified petition, the notices of
overpayment, and the determinations of eligibility are sufficient to support the
State’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Although Coughlin challenges
1
Coughlin argues that an affidavit based upon unspecified or unverified exhibits is based upon hearsay, and
thus contrary to the personal knowledge requirement of Trial Rule 56(C), citing Seth, 997 N.E.2d at 1142.
That case is distinguishable. There, Midland Funding, LLC (“Midland”), filed suit against Seth for
nonpayment of credit card debt. To make a prima facie case in support of summary judgment, Midland was
required to show that Seth opened a Visa account with Columbus Bank and Trust (“Columbus”), that
Midland was the assignee of that debt, and that Seth owed Columbus the amount alleged in the complaint.
In the affidavit submitted by Midland, the affiant stated that she was an employee of Midland Credit
Management, Inc. (“MCM”), a servicing agent for Midland; that she was familiar with MCM’s record
keeping practices; and that her statements were based upon personal knowledge of those account records
maintained by MCM on Midland’s behalf. The Seth court concluded that the affidavit was inadmissible
because the affiant’s employment with MCM did not establish her personal knowledge of any of the facts
pertaining to Midland’s complaint against Seth and none of the records she relied on were attached to the
affidavit. Id. Here, Cobb is an employee of the DWD and has personal knowledge of the records that are the
basis of the State’s action against Coughlin.
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other exhibits, we need not address their admissibility because any error in their
admission is harmless. See Decker v. Zengler, 883 N.E.2d 839, 845 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008) (“Even if the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion, we will not
reverse if the admission constituted harmless error.”), trans. denied. Coughlin
also argues that the statement in Cobb’s affidavit that the overpayments were
“fraudulent” is inadmissible. Because the determinations of eligibility found
that Coughlin committed fraud by knowingly failing to disclose or falsifying
material facts, any error in the admission of the statement is harmless.
[23] Based on the foregoing, we affirm the denial of Coughlin’s summary judgment
motion and his motion to strike and the grant of the State’s cross-motion for
summary judgment.
[24] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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